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Introduction
Gregor Etzelmüller / Christian Tewes
Since the 19th century, the theory of evolution has unsettled and shaken tradi-
tional and fundamental anthropological assumptions about the place of human 
beings in nature. The Darwinian integration of human evolution into natural 
history was countered by the philosophical and theological anthropologies of 
the 20th century (Scheler, Plessner, Gehlen, Portmann, Pannenberg) with their 
attempts to hold on to the special status of humans in their intrinsically openness 
to the world and their spirit-endowed nature. Today, evolutionary anthropology, 
as well as the more recent philosophical anthropology, are increasingly based 
on the paradigm of embodied cognition (e. g., Varela, Thompson and Rosch, 
Clark, Gallagher, Thompson, Deacon, Donald, Tomasello, and Jung). Building 
on “embodied and enactive cognitive science”, this volume aims at answering 
the question to what extent the human mind and human cultural cognition are 
attributable to the structures of human existence, structures that have emerged 
in the course of evolution and have in turn been affected by cultural evolution. 
The paradigm of embodiment shows why the traditional dualistic opposition of 
nature and culture, body and mind is unjustified and how it can be overcome by 
an enactive framework of research on embodiment.
1. Current Research on Embodied Cognition
If one surveys the landscape of ever-growing research into embodied cognition, 
one sees not only commonalities but also important differences in the interpreta-
tion of this paradigm’s theoretical commitments. With Richard Menary, one can 
distinguish between a moderate and a strong embodied mind thesis. The propo-
nents of the former view think that some mental states depend on non-neural 
bodily processes or states. The latter position, by contrast, emphasizes that at 
least some mental states are constituted by those non-neural bodily processes (see 
Menary 2015). It is worth noting that the moderate approach even encompasses 
certain varieties of internalism. According to the latter positon, cognition can be 
located within the brain (it is brain bound) without involving any constitutive 
processes that exceed the boundaries of the skull. Frederick Adams and Kenneth 
Aizawa, for instance, do not deny that the nervous system is connected to the 
body and the environment in multifarious causal ways. They also acknowledge 
the claim that cognitive vehicles in the lifeworld such as mathematical notations, 
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or writing tools such as pencils or graphic characters, enable and support the 
accomplishment of cognitive tasks and operations (see Adams and Aizawa 2001). 
However, they are strongly critical of the claim that those states are constitutive 
for cognition. They stick to the more traditional view in the cognitive sciences 
that the human mind supervenes exclusively on brain states.
Both enactivism and the extended mind thesis reject this internalist read-
ing of cognition in favour of strong approaches to the embodiment paradigm. 
Proponents of enactivism have pointed out that there is a mutual and constant 
circulation between body, brain and their environment (Thompson and Varela 
2001, 424). The explication of this circular process in sensorimotor and autopoi-
etic terms reveals that the strong embodied mind thesis is not solely justified by 
the almost trivial insight that perceptual content plays a foundational role in the 
human mind. The crucial point is rather that cognition is not something that hap-
pens inside the skull but is constituted as a “relational domain” by the incessant 
interaction between body, mind, and world (see Thompson and Stapleton 2009).
To understand this kind of interaction in more detail, it is important to note 
that the living organism enacts the world in which it exists. This means that 
organisms actively constitute their environment and are simultaneously consti-
tuted by it. Thus, the strong embodied mind thesis is justified in the case of 
enactivism by means of explicating the relational co-constitution of cognitive and 
mental processes.
Moreover, this approach leads to the conclusion that there is not simply a pre-
given world that an animal with a central nervous system matches or represents 
by means of its neural states (Stewart 2014, 3). Rather, when animals build nests, 
dams, or burrows, they reshape and structure the developmental environment for 
subsequent generations (Sterelny 2010, 470).
Accordingly, the cognitive and cultural evolution of human beings is not 
to be seen as a constant process of adaptation to an independent environment 
existing identically for every living being; it is instead to be seen as a process of 
co-evolution of interrelated systems. Over the course of human development, it 
is particularly the historical-cultural dimension of cognition and the culturally 
shaped environment that – contingent on each other – expand in scope. When 
one approaches the theory of embodiment from such an evolutionary perspec-
tive, one begins to see its potential for overcoming the still implicitly present 
Cartesian divide between mind (res cogitans) and matter (res extensa) which con-
tinues to cast its shadow on the scientific exploration of man.
This dichotomy expresses itself in the fact that the natural roots of human 
beings are traditionally explored by means of the natural sciences and related dis-
ciplines, whereas the varieties of cultural practices in the lifeworld frequently fall 
into the domain of the humanities. This division of labor is always in danger of 
merely giving the dualism a new name, for instance a contrast between nature and 
mind or nature and nurture. Especially in anthropology, there is a strong ten-
dency to uphold dichotomous thinking, even today (Thompson 2007, 410 – 411).
Evolutionary anthropology has tended to emphasize the continuity between 
animals and human beings by pointing to recent findings from evolutionary psy-
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chology, palaeoanthropology, molecular biology, comparative neurosciences, 
etc. Most properties or skills that have been considered exclusive human features 
in the past are rooted in capacities that can be found in other species too (see 
de Waal 2009, Welsch, Singer, and Wunder 2011). The strict naturalistic reinter-
pretation of those findings in a Neo-Darwinian framework sometimes leads to 
the claim that it may be possible to explain cultural entities or institutions such 
as religion or art purely in terms of biological functions (see Dennett 2006, Daw-
kins 2006). Additionally, evolutionary anthropology assumes that there is, in a 
realistic sense, a given human nature due to the environmental constraints on 
human adaptation.
Some cultural anthropologists, on the other hand, basing their tenets on his-
torical studies, respond to these encroachments with a rather radical view. They 
favor a constructivist stance, correctly pointing out that the natural sciences and 
the interpretation of experiments and findings are also produced within the cul-
tural realm of the lifeworld (Schnegg 2015, 42). A more radical interpretation 
of this fact is the conviction that scientific findings need to be conceived as cul-
tural constructs (von Glasersfeld 1996). From this point of view, science does not 
reveal forms or aspects of reality (laws, structures, and entities) that exist as the 
result of a relational co-constitution of human practices with the environment. To 
take one example, not only gender but even the ostensibly “natural” distinction 
of the sexes has been conceptualized in this research tradition as an ideological 
construct (see Butler 2014). Here the impact of postmodernist and radical con-
structivist thinking on cultural anthropology is obvious (Schnegg 2015, 39).
Unsurprisingly, such tendencies sometimes result in a clash between differ-
ent research traditions, and dualistic implications sometimes reappear in modern 
guise. This has led to a chasm opening up between evolutionary and historical 
anthropology, hampering scientific attempts to bridge the natural and cultural 
realm with a coherent conceptual framework.
2. Evolutionary Continuity and Discontinuity
As the above considerations have already indicated, it is the central thesis of this 
book that enactivism has the potential to contribute in significant ways to over-
come this unfruitful divide in contemporary anthropological research. This is 
because enactivism allows for a genuine and coherent explication of the strong 
embodied mind thesis. Evan Thompson, for instance, has worked out in detail 
the thesis that there is a deep continuity between mind and life (Thompson 2007).
His key idea is that even the simplest organism enacts its environment in such 
a way that, via a sense-making process, an environment emerges that is meaning-
ful for the organism. “In observing other creatures struggling to continue their 
existence – starting with bacteria that actively swim away from a chemical repel-
lent – we can, through the evidence of our own experience and the Darwinian 
evidence of the continuity of life, view inwardness and purposiveness as proper 
to living being” (Thompson 2007, 163). To take another example, physicochem-
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ical macromolecules may manifest themselves within the milieu of a bacterium 
as nutrition or poison, that is, as meaningful affordances that either support or 
threaten the organism’s life. These are relational emergent properties which can-
not be reduced to a purely physicochemical description of reality.
This is entirely in line with Hans Jonas’ concept of life as something man-
ifested in the peculiar organization of organisms, which he sees as coexten-
sive with mindful, self-sustaining processes. The fact that mental life is always 
embodied does not only mean “that the mind even on its highest reach remains 
part of the organism” but that the organism, even in its lowest form, prefigures 
mind (Jonas 1966, 1; Sheets-Johnstone 1999, 52). Especially the autopoietic expli-
cation of organisms, their adaptivity and teleological structure, may be regarded 
as the attempt to operationalize those bio-philosophical insights and make them 
available for further empirical research (see Di Paolo 2005).
However, it would be wrong to suppose that cultural processes are simply built 
upon biological processes as higher layers of organization. It is one thing to elab-
orate convincing arguments and refer to empirical evidence for the evolutionary 
continuity of mind and life. It is quite another matter to give explanations for 
how the obvious discontinuities among non-human primates and humans have 
evolved. One explanation given for the distinctiveness of the latter is in terms of 
plasticity. Learning capacities and creativity, such as the ability to adapt to novel 
situations in multifarious ways or to create new problem-solving strategies, are 
important properties of plasticity. It has frequently been pointed out that plas-
ticity is a design feature of the brain with specific modifications among the spe-
cies. To a certain extent, this feature is present in every brain system.
However, in such a comparative approach, a distinctive feature of the human 
brain is its superplasticity. Human beings are remarkably quick at evaluating a 
wide range of strategies for surviving in, and adapting to, a rapidly changing 
environment (Donald 2001, 210). Compared with other animals, “what is differ-
ent about human beings is that they are not just adapted for specific pre-existent 
structures in their environment such as pheromone trails and larvae, but rather 
that they are adapted for acquiring totally new skills and knowledge from their 
social-cultural environments” (Tomasello 2003, 238 f.).
As studies of niche construction have shown, the co-constitution of organ-
isms and environment generally results from continuous bottom-up and top-
down processes. This is true a fortiori with processes of enculturation, which 
are key factors in creating niches for enabling, developing, and stabilizing new 
learning strategies and flexible behavior. Those cultural niches are based on the 
acquisition and transfer of the cultural practices of social groups in a way that 
modifies both the biological and informational environment in mutually deter-
mining ways (Sterelny 2010, 470; Menary 2015, 4). Thus, from a phylogenetic 
and ontogenetic perspective culture plays a paramount role in explaining signif-
icant aspects of the evolutionary discontinuity between non-human and human 
primates mentioned above.
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3. Evolutionary Specificities of the Human Body
Michael Tomasello’s research on great apes and infants can be of help in deep-
ening our understanding of these relations between nature and culture. Humans 
differ from great apes in at least two important respects: by means of intergener-
ational learning processes and a complex understanding of actors as intentional 
and cooperative agents. Already by the age of six months, infants develop the 
ability to follow the direction of a parent’s gaze. This enables them to predict 
people’s action in familiar surroundings. This is an important prerequisite to 
understanding fully-fledged intentional actions at a later age. An important inter-
mediate state for understanding decision-making processes and action plans is 
the so called “nine month revolution” (Tomasello 2001, 61). At this age children 
start to understand other human beings as goal-directed and they begin to engage 
in triadic interactions (Tomasello et al. 2005, 682).
This leads to powerful cultural learning strategies, such as imitative learning, 
whereby the observer must conduct a complex means-end analysis of actions 
(Tomasello et al. 2005, 680). As these findings indicate, it is wrong to suppose 
that the ability for triadic interaction could be acquired in an atomistic fash-
ion. It is obvious from an evolutionary viewpoint that culture functions as an 
ontogenetic niche for children. From the very beginning of their lives, children 
are engaged and immersed in ongoing social practices and a world of cultural 
artefacts, which enable their participation in social interactions (Portmann 1944; 
Tomasello 2001, 78 – 79).
It is important to emphasize, however, that a fundamental cognitive ability 
such as following the gaze of conspecifics requires a special shape and setup of 
the body for realizing such intersubjective cognitive processes in the first place. 
The latter is the upshot of synchronic cultural and biological evolutionary pro-
cesses. In support of these thesis, research points to the fact that the human eye 
has passed through an evolutionary process of adaptation that enables a gaze to 
be followed. There is evidence that “in humans the widely exposed sclera (the 
white of the eye surrounding the darker coloured iris) make it easy for others 
to discern the gaze direction” (Kobayashi and Kohshima 2001, 419). This is an 
adaptation that distinguishes us, among other things, from other primates.
Furthermore, it is possible to show that the contribution made by eyeball 
movement (compared to head movement) to the change in gaze direction is very 
high in humans (Kobayashi and Kohshima 2001, 434). In evolutionary terms, 
this might be due to mutations that changed the phenotypes in such a way that 
it supported the generation of new forms of social interaction. At the same time, 
those properties are positively selected due to their functional effectiveness 
within the socio-cultural realm. Of course, such changes and adaptations occur 
in the context of specific constraints upon the entire morphological structure of 
the body and its embeddedness in the cultural environment.
To give an example, the larger the size of the body becomes, the more effective 
is eyeball movement for controlling gaze direction compared to head or body 
movement (Kobayashi and Kohshima 2001, 426 – 427). This underlines on the 
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one hand the significance of the shape, composition and makeup of the individ-
ual body for the emergence of cultural niches. On the other hand, it indicates 
how cultural constraints can be simultaneously co-constitutive for the human 
body when we may assume that eyeball movement for controlling gaze direction 
is positively selected in the emerging cultural niche. This is then an example how 
cultural and biological factors in evolution are combined an inseparable syner-
getic process (Malafouris 2013, 39).
These aspects of the the phylo- and ontogenetic setup of social interactions get 
a further justification in a phenomenological approach to intercorporeality that 
is an integral part of the enactive research program. Here we refer to the thesis 
that social interactions are based on a form of direct perception. At a pre-reflect-
ive level, we have direct access, for instance, to the emotional states of other 
persons, an access which is not mediated by sub-personal or personal simulation 
processes or inferences (Gallagher 2008, 539).
One can explicate and complement this account with the concept of inter-
bodily resonance. A person’s feelings are expressed in various bodily reactions 
(facial, gestural, or interoceptive) which function as a resonance platform. 
Thomas Fuchs has termed this process intra-bodily resonance (Froese and Fuchs 
2013, 212). When those expressions become visible by means of intra-bodi-
ly-resonance processes (blushing and frowning as expressions of anger), they 
also become accessible for other people and serve as inter-personal resonance 
platforms of the feeling-bodies, intertwined and mutually shaped by an ongoing 
interactive process (a succinct example is contagious laughter). These basic inter-
bodily expressive patterns are directly accessible in perception.
The remarks above on gaze direction already indicate that this capacity allows 
us to take the perspective of conspecifics and to direct our mutual attention to a 
third entity. This leads to an important extension of inter-bodily relationships. 
Building on the capacity for direct perception, it is possible to grasp how the 
evolutionary development of triadic communication and the ability to symbol-
ize and reconstruct the perspective (beliefs, desires, plans) of other human beings 
(“theory of mind”) could occur in the first place.
However, even the evolution of human language has only been possible 
because of a further evolutionary variation of the human body, in particular the 
supralaryngeal vocal tract:
The human larynx or ‘voice box’ (containing the vocal folds or vocal cords) differs 
significantly in position from the larynx of other primates such as monkeys . . . One 
unfortunate consequence of this development is that the lower position of the human 
larynx makes it much more possible for the humans to choke on pieces of food . . . In 
evolutionary terms, there must have been a big advantage in getting this extra vocal 
power (i. e. larger range of sounds) . . . (Yule 2014, 5).
The advantage of a differentiated language outweighed its potentially fatal disad-
vantage (Fuchs 2013, 23 f.). As Donald summarizes research on that matter, this 
must be due to a positive selection pressure at the cultural level (Donald 1991, 
237).
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If we consider evolutionary development and the examples of the human eye 
and vocal tract we can see that the intertwining of natural and cultural evolution-
ary processes generate bodily forms which allow for richer forms of intersubjec-
tivity (and in this sense further forms of cultural developments) and which are 
positively selected due to a feedback loop of selection pressure within cultural 
niches. In this sense we can speak of a mutual causality of nature and culture.
The multidirectional and circular interactions of physiological, psychological, 
and social processes come to the fore once one resists those dualistic tendencies 
in the humanities and natural sciences mentioned earlier. What is needed is an 
interdisciplinary focus on the exploration of the embodied mind. The enactive 
probing and shaping of the environment by the organism leads to an emergence 
of mental processes at different levels of complexity with an immediate feedback 
upon how the organism guides its current and prospective action cycles in its 
habitat (Stewart [2010] 2014, 4 – 5). This implies that any understanding of the 
nature of human beings needs to take into account their mental, cognitive, and 
social operations as well as the physical embeddedness of those mental processes.
4. Aims and Structure of the Volume
It is the aim of this anthology to examine, unfold, and substantiate the thesis that 
the paradigm of embodiment can bridge the gap between cultural and evolution-
ary anthropology, thereby enabling a fruitful exchange between the two differ-
ent research perspectives. Further, the paradigm of embodiment can offer new 
answers to the question of how evolutionary processes could give rise to a living 
being with a specific mental constitution capable of accelerating, stabilizing, and 
influencing its own cultural development in such a remarkable way (Tomasello’s 
famous “ratchet effect”, Tomasello 2001, 5).
It is likely that a coherent answer to this question will also include a new account 
of nature which is different from any model of nature that reductive naturalism or 
physicalism offer (McDowell 1994, 77). Because human beings are to a certain 
extent responsive to reason-giving processes that are indispensable in a complete 
description and explanation of human actions in action theory and anthropological 
research, an evolutionary approach must explain how natural evolutionary pro-
cesses could bring forth human beings who interact with and are responsive to the 
“space of reason” within the socio-cultural realm. Taking these aspects together, 
this points to the continuity of mind and life in nature whereby basic sense-making 
processes prefigure at least some aspects of the normative and meaningful dimen-
sion of full-fledged reasons. This is especially important with regard to ethical 
reflections and how reasons could, to put it in Davidson’s terms, be “causes” or 
play at least a vital role in the development of self-governance and moral commit-
ments of persons (see Davidson [1963] 1980b, [1970] 1980c, [1971] 1980d). The 
self-differentiation of values and the enactive mind within the evolutionary life-
mind continuum is therefore important in that it sheds light on the explication 
of reason and normativity (Di Paolo Rohde, and De Jaegher [2010] 2014, 50 – 51).
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With regard to these questions, the volume starts with an elaboration of the 
concept of embodiment (Section One). As already indicated, the literature on 
embodiment explicates this paradigmatic concept in diverse ways. Certainly 
there is general agreement between classical enactivism, radical enactivism, and 
the extended mind theory that cognitive states not only depend on bodily pro-
cesses but that bodily processes play a constitutive role for the mental formation 
and effectiveness of a person. However, there are also important differences in 
detail in how these shared assumptions are developed. The significance of these 
details for the entire embodied approach to evolution and culture is the central 
topic of the first chapter and is analyzed in the papers that follow. The authors 
go on to explore how, in the structural coupling of the organism with its habitat, 
not only new forms of significance emerge but also mental and cognitive abilities 
that cannot be reduced to the physio-chemical realm.
This question is explored further in Section Two: how, by means of their 
intercorporeal constitution in the lifeworld, do human beings develop cognitive 
and linguistic capacities which transcend the here and now of their immediate 
bodily-based egocentric perspective, such as in declarative memory and prospec-
tive plans of action? At the cultural level, the embodied mind manifests itself as 
a “cultural bodily-based power materialized in countless cultural products that 
enables individual as well as intersubjective conducts of life in dense memories 
and imaginations” (Welker 2015, 310). Using insights from different fields, such 
as cognitive semiotics, biological anthropology, developmental psychology, and 
philosophy of language, the contributors to this section develop an evolutionary 
explanation of language and symbol use.
Section Three explores to what extent the paradigm of embodiment can over-
come the widening chasm between evolutionary and historical anthropology. 
Discussing the ideas of Charles Darwin, the section shows how human evolution 
brings forth a being, which is able to develop forms of sympathy and empathy. In 
the co-evolution of human cognition and empathy, specific human forms of joint 
attention and mimesis play a crucial role. They lead to powerful cultural learning 
strategies. Consequently, on the one side, evolutionary anthropology conceives 
of humans as beings whose variety can only be described by historical means. 
On the other side, historical anthropology makes it clear that even premodern 
cultures were familiar with the fact that human beings are embodied.
The insights of Sections Two and Three are used to shed light on the issue 
of human phylogenesis in Section Four. To explain the origins of contempor-
ary human cultural behavior, evolutionary-biological processes such as genetic 
mutation and selection are widely seen as – to some extent – necessary but not 
sufficient. The contributors to this section follow “bottom-up” approaches to 
get closer to the central question of how the specific combination of natural and 
cultural characters expressed by contemporary humans could have developed in 
physical and cognitive interaction with the material world. This last part of the 
book focuses on the significance of participatory interaction with artefacts and 
materiality for our development as a species. In this regard, material-engagement 
theory and its insights are of primary interest in the volume’s final section.
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1. Philosophical Concepts  




At first sight, it might seem surprising that the concept of embodiment is play-
ing an ever-increasing role in the philosophy of mind and anthropology. Is it 
not evident from many empirical findings that the body “shapes the mind” in 
important respects, as Shaun Gallagher set out in detail years ago (see Gallagher 
2005)? Only very few philosophers defend the argument in the current body-
mind debate that there is a strict dichotomy between mental and physical events, 
let alone entirely different substances (see Meixner 2004). And most theorists 
in the field today accept that humans are the outcome of an evolutionary pro-
cess and that Darwin’s insight (not to be confused with Neo-Darwinism) in the 
Origin of Species (Darwin 1859) has significant explanatory value not only with 
regard to the biological heritage of the human mind but also the cultural condi-
tion (cultural niches) of its existence.
Though these issues are often agreed upon, the explanatory role of the body 
and the metaphysical and anthropological implications of embodiment have still 
to find broad consensus within the cognitive sciences and anthropology. There 
are several reasons for this, as the contributions in the first chapter explain. The 
most obvious is that embodied cognition is frequently viewed as an alternative 
to standard cognitive sciences, or at least as a challenge to some of their basic 
assumptions (see Shapiro 2011). The challenges concern such questions as the 
relationship of the brain and body to consciousness and cognition, the question 
of whether basic minds have representational, content-involving access to the 
world or the role of emotions and affections for cognitive processes.
The first contribution of this chapter analyzes in greater depth the relation 
between brain and body with regard to cognition and consciousness. Mog Sta-
pleton introduces and defends the thesis of proper embodiment. This concept 
of embodiment is intimately related to Thompson and Cosmelli’s view, devel-
oped in recent years, that the entire body and not only the brain plays a con-
stitutive role in the emergence of consciousness (see Cosmelli and Thompson 
[2010] 2014). According to the thesis of proper embodiment, our physiology 
is paramount to our cognition: the underlying “mechanisms” of cognition and 
consciousness are so finely grained that the specification of the algorithm for 
cognition would entail aspects of the “internal body” and not only the configu-
rations and processes of the brain.
The reference to mechanisms indicates that there might be functional states 
that determine how the implementation of sub-personal processes gives rise to 
Christian Tewes14
cognitive and mental states. Stapleton coins this approach “orthodox embodied 
cognitive sciences” (see Stapleton 2013). This refers to one important research 
tradition in current embodied cognitive science that shares the traditional func-
tionalist approach to mind and cognition but does not confine the implementa-
tion of cognitive and mental states to the working mechanisms of the brain. The 
latter approach thus includes the position of extended functionalism (see Wheeler 
2010).
But how is the concept of proper embodiment related to orthodox embodied 
cognitive science? To answer this question, it is important to note that the thesis 
consists of two sub-theses that Stapleton develops in the course of her paper. She 
terms the first one “internal embodiment” and defines it as the thesis that “the 
internal ‘gooey’ body matters to cognition and consciousness in a fundamental 
way” (Stapleton, this volume). She refers here in particular to the sense of our 
internal body in interoception and the constitutive role it plays in conscious-
ness and cognition. The second sub-thesis is termed “particular embodiment.” 
This is the view that the fine-grained details of functional implementation matter 
when it comes to the emergence of cognitive states. Taking both sub-theses and 
their implications together, Stapleton argues that the seemingly clear-cut distinc-
tion between (functional) algorithms and their implementation – a key feature of 
orthodox cognitive science – is undermined by proper embodiment.
The topic of the second paper, by Christian Tewes, concerns the question of 
whether the extended mind hypothesis (still as part of the orthodox embodied 
cognitive sciences) or the enactivist research program in embodied cognition is 
better suited to deal with the research field of embodied memory formation. 
Enactivism involves, among other things, the thesis that even basic organisms 
have sense-making capacities and that there is a strong relation between actions 
and perceptions at different levels of explanation that are not fully captured in 
the traditional cognitive sciences.
In the inaugural paper of the “extended mind hypothesis” (henceforth, EM) 
the extension of memory capacities already plays an important role (see Clark 
and Chalmers [1998] 2010). The extension of cognitive and mental states and 
capacities is usually justified by means of a dynamical systems approach in order 
to show in what cases the mind actually extends the skull and the body and inte-
grates items of the environment into the cognitive machinery.
Proponents of the enactivist camp have challenged this picture und provided 
some distinctions and criteria to differentiate between new emerging (auton-
omous) systems and the mere extension or enhancement of mental capacities. 
Besides the more formal concepts of autonomous systems and sense-making 
processes, enactivism also relies on phenomenological insights and concepts to 
argue for these distinctions. It is Tewes’ thesis that these basic distinctions are 
also of major significance for exploring the constitution of memory. He elabo-
rates this point with particular regard to the question of how enactivism can con-
tribute to research on habitual embodied memory formation and how memory 
research undertaken within the framework of EM can profit from the enactive 
research program and its insights.
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In the paper which follows, Karim Zahidi and Erik Myin apply the radical 
enactivist approach to the phylo- and ontogenetic emergence of numerical cog-
nition. According to “Radically Enactive / Embodied Cognition” (henceforth 
REC), basic cognition is constituted by concrete items of environmentally sit-
uated organismic activity (Hutto and Myin 2013, 11). What is “radical” with 
regard to the REC approach is the conviction that basic forms of perception and 
interaction are mindful – such experiences have phenomenal character and are 
intentionally directed – but do not involve content and the use of representation. 
Thus, as Zahidi and Myin point out in their paper, sensorimotor cognition such 
as chasing a rabbit or grasping a leaf are directed towards objects but do not rep-
resent them (see Zahidi and Myin, this volume). However, this does not imply 
that the existence of representation and contentful states should be abandoned. 
Quite the contrary, these shape the human mind in important respects even if 
they only emerge at later phylo- and ontogenetic stages.
Proponents of REC also hold the view that computational abilities – in strict 
analogy with representational states – require sociocultural language contexts 
for their evolutionary emergence. Zahidi and Myin’s aim is to develop an REC 
account of the phylo- and ontogenetic development of numerical cognition, one 
that implies the inversion of the explanans and the explanandum of the tradi-
tional cognitive sciences. In this sense “REC aims to truly account for compu-
tation in contrast to assuming computation as a basic, and fundamentally unac-
counted for, ingredient in nature” (Zahidi and Myin, this volume).
It is the aim of their paper to show that descriptions of certain types of behav-
ior displayed by animals or pre-verbal infants does not warrant the ascription 
to them of arithmetical competence. In their discussion, the authors focus on a 
proposal that monkeys already possess number concepts. If this claim were to 
be true, it would apparently refute certain basic tenets of the REC approach to 
cognition.
Zahidi and Myin develop conceptual arguments against such a “rich inter-
pretation” of numerical abilities in monkeys and infants, namely “that to treat 
similar things or situations as perceptually similar” already involves representa-
tional and computational abilities. Furthermore, they point to possible empir-
ically-grounded “lean interpretations” that could explain the same behavioral 
evidence without the assumption of basic computational abilities.
In the final contribution of this chapter, Christian Spahn explores the wider 
reasons that have motivated the “turn to embodiment” in the first place. In the 
first part of his paper, he analyzes some deeply rooted motives in Western cul-
ture that have led to dualistic concepts. We measure ourselves with regard to 
values and self-governance that are connected with our ability to “distance our-
selves from mere biological impulses and instincts” (Spahn, this volume). This 
has contributed to the emergence of basic distinctions such as “is” (factual real-
ity) and “ought” (ideal realm) and the idea of mental powers shaping our nature 
(impulses and instincts).
Spahn then shows how enactivism as a theory of embodied cognition tries 
to overcome these dualisms by focusing on the philosophy of organic life (see 
Christian Tewes16
Thompson 2007). The differences between the physical and the organic body and 
the attempt to elaborate a concept of nature that does not coincide with reductive 
physicalism guide Spahn’s discussion. He also evaluates Thompson and Cos-
melli’s critique of neurocentric intuitions that consciousness supervenes locally 
on brain states, drawing upon their conceptual and empirically-based arguments 
for why one cannot isolate brain states and their corresponding conscious states 
from the entire body, even in a thought experiment (see Cosmelli and Thompson 
[2010] 2014).
However, as he points out in the last part of the paper, Spahn does not think 
that dualistic implications are entirely solved within the enactivist research pro-
gram and in its findings. What remains to be explained are such basic questions 
as how the interiority of the organism is related to consciousness. Is it possible 
to answer this question within a naturalistic framework or do we need to look at 
alternative ontological options? And can the sense-making processes of organis-
mic life be built upon to deliver a justification for values and ethical judgements 
(facts versus justification procedures) as well?
Each of these issues delineates fields which embodiment-based research can 
fruitfully explore in future.
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Leaky Levels and the Case for Proper Embodiment
Mog Stapleton
Abstract: In this chapter I present the thesis of Proper Embodiment: the claim that (at least 
some of) the details of our physiology matter to cognition and consciousness in a funda-
mental way. This thesis is composed of two sub-claims: (1) if we are to design, build, or 
evolve artificial systems that are cognitive in the way that we are, these systems will have 
to be internally embodied, and (2) the exploitation of the particular internal embodiment 
that allows systems to evolve solutions with greatly decreased computational complex-
ity – and thus to be flexible and adaptive in the ways that are characteristic of cognitive 
systems – means that the orthodox distinction between algorithm and implementation is 
undermined. Evolved cognitive systems are therefore likely not to instantiate the distinc-
tion between phenomenology, algorithm, and implementation. The leaky levels evident in 
evolved cognitive systems motivate an extension of orthodox embodied cognitive science 
to the internal, affective, “gooey” realm that has so far only been embraced by those in the 
enactive tradition. This suggests that if we are to build artificial systems that will be genu-
inely cognitive they will have to incorporate parts of the gooey realm currently considered 
to be “mere implementation.”
1. Orthodox Embodied Cognitive Science
While there are many conceptions of embodiment that are relevant to philosophy 
of mind and cognitive science (see for example, Clark 1999; Wilson 2002; Ander-
son 2003; Ziemke 2003; Shapiro 2007) a broad overarching characterization used 
both by philosophers and those in the other cognitive sciences, including but not 
limited to robotics, is that our problem solving abilities are much less a matter 
of internal processing of information that comes into the system than orthodox 
cognitive science used to assume. Susan Hurley characterized the way of thinking 
about how minds work in the pre-embodiment revolution era as “the classical 
sandwich” (Hurley 1998): the thing that is doing the important work – the think-
ing or cognizing – is sandwiched between perception, bringing the information in, 
and acting according to the results of the information processing. On this model, 
the body is there to do the sensing and acting. Other than this the non-neural 
body is there just to keep the parts of the brain that these cognitive processes 
supervene on / are identical with (depending on your philosophical take) alive. 
Embodied cognitive science rejected this picture arguing that cognition cannot 
be cleanly separated from perception and action, and that many of our problem 
solving abilities are more a matter of adjusting the system itself, phylogenetically, 
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ontogenetically, or in occurrent action, such that the information processing that 
we would assume to be required if we were to set about programming these abil-
ities into artificial systems, is actually “offloaded” onto the system’s morphology.
While the term “offloading” in this respect is useful to see the difference from 
the pre-embodiment approach it is somewhat misleading because it implies that 
the standard case is that computations are done by the brain, but that they can 
be done by other structures instead. It rather seems to be the opposite. For many 
abilities the standard case is that we utilize the morphology of the body, the pos-
sibilities for action that it gives to us, and other structures in the environment so 
that we never have to do it all in our head (see Clark 1997, 2008b, [2001] 2013) – 
indeed most of us could not even do the calculating required for most of the 
things we do purely in our head. The result of taking embodiment seriously in 
robotics, is that when designing artificial cognitive systems, instead of deciding 
what function was to be implemented and then designing a program to imple-
ment it in a particular robot body (a top-down approach) one could rather con-
sider what kinds of creatures achieve these tasks, consider how their bodies allow 
them to do it, emulate parts of that embodiment in the artificial system, and then 
program minimally to enable the system to engage in the bodily behavior (a bot-
tom-up approach) (see Pfeifer and Bongard 2006, for a detailed examination of 
these principles at work in artificial cognitive systems and robotics).
The lesson for philosophy of mind should be clear from considering this case: 
the mind is both simpler and more complex than we previously imagined. On 
the one hand, we do not do as much of the information crunching that – on the 
orthodox approach – we assumed we must to support the ways that we perceive, 
think, and act. On the other hand, parts of what we had categorized as the mental 
when we assumed that minds were / supervened on neural information process-
ing, seem now to be located in places that we are not intuitively comfortable in 
thinking of providing the supervenience / realizing base for mindedness (Clark 
1997, 2008b; Clark and Chalmers 1998).
The choice is then to say that those are not parts of cognitive processes after 
all (the real cognition goes on in the head) in which case one needs to come up 
with a “mark of the mental” to distinguish real cognitive processes from pro-
cesses that play a merely causal (rather than constitutive) role in cognitive pro-
cessing (Adams and Aizawa 2008). Or, to bite the bullet and acknowledge that 
if we accept functionalism as the orthodox approach did, not only is mind not 
identical with the brain, but it is also perfectly consistent that mind is realized 
not merely by the brain. Andy Clark expresses this view in terms of what he calls 
the Larger Mechanism Story (LMS) as follows:
Aspects of body and world can, at times, be proper parts of larger mechanisms whose 
states and overall operating profile determine (or minimally, help determine) our men-
tal states and properties. (Clark 2008a, 39)
Functionalism about the mind of course implies multiple realizability, which 
entails that, provided that there are other materials which can implement the 
necessary processes, the functions that give rise to mind need not be limited to 
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1 I previously termed this “traditional embodied cognitive science” (Stapleton 2013).
2 I use the term ‘radical embodiment’ here following Clark’s (1999) distinction between 
simple and radical embodiment. Enactivism is therefore one (but not the only) version of radical 
embodiment.
our biological brains. This means that not only might artificial brains be created, 
but that there is no principled reason for confining minded processes to brain 
processes (biological or artificial). Thus, work on embodied (and extended) cog-
nition that comes through this tradition is – in principle – entailed by the func-
tionalism that orthodox cognitive science also assumed (see Wheeler 2010). I 
therefore refer to this approach to embodied cognition (of which Andy Clark 
[e. g., Clark 1997, 2008b] is a paradigm propagator) as “orthodox embodied cog-
nitive science.”1
Hence, while it might seem at first surprising that orthodox embodied cog-
nitive science says very little about the role of the physiological – and homeo-
static – body in cognition we can see that this is because (1) orthodox assump-
tions about cognition held that minded processes supervened in some way on 
brain processes, and (2) functionalism entailed that not only could the brain pro-
cesses that it was assumed that minded processes supervene on be multiply real-
ized in different implementations but could also be partially realized by other 
structures of the brain in the human case (hence “offloading”). The very term 
“extended” (in addition to “offloading”) indicates that this kind of embodiment 
is still working within the orthodox “brainbound” tradition (see Clark 2008b) – 
but extending it outwards by following the implications of functionalism to their 
logical conclusion.
We can therefore see why even though fans of orthodox embodied cognition 
recognize that the body is important to cognition and mindedness, they are 
never theless loathe to think that physiological processes in the body proper make 
a contribution other than a causal or modulatory one to cognition. Any contri-
bution that they do think is made e. g., by emotions, is made in virtue of those 
processes being represented in the brain. So while extended emotions fit in to this 
orthodox embodiment picture, this is not in virtue of the bodily contribution to 
cognition but rather once again following the implications of functionalism for 
the brainbound world view: i. e., taking emotions as represented in the brain as 
the standard case, and then showing that the processes we assumed were done in 
the brain are actually done (or can actually be partially done) through e. g., body 
posture, gesture, interpersonal engagement, or coupling with or structuring the 
environment in certain ways.
Let us then assume the basic tenet of orthodox embodiment: that cognition is 
not (at least not always) brainbound. Is there any more philosophical work to be 
done by asking the following question: if we are to build an artificial system that 
is genuinely cognitive, will implementing all of the processes that LMS throws 
light upon, be enough?
My hypothesis is that it will not be enough. This position, in and of itself, 
is not original; it is the position taken by many in the radical embodied2 and 
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enactive camps (see in particular Cosmelli and Thompson 2010; Thompson and 
Cosmelli 2011, which my project is heavily influenced by). However, these posi-
tions often put themselves, or are put, at odds with the orthodox embodiment 
approach because they build on assumptions which are not shared by all camps, 
e. g., the rejection of the representational / computational theory of mind, or 
the premise that a particular kind of self-organizing and self-creating organiza-
tion underpins the development of cognition in key ways (see Thompson 2007; 
Di Paolo 2005, 2009; Di Paolo and Thompson 2014). These approaches may be 
thought of as biological rather than computational for a number of reasons but at 
the very least because they take as their standard case biologically cognitive crea-
tures and seek to extrapolate from there to what is required for cognition, rather 
than taking the standard case to be the analogy of the mind to the computer.
I am sympathetic to both camps (though my publication history reveals 
that my intuitions mesh rather more with those of the biologically inspired 
approaches). Of course, as each side holds assumptions that contradict those 
of the other, one cannot be a full member of both camps at the same time (see 
Thompson and Stapleton 2009, for a discussion of why enactivism is not the 
same as externalism). What I then want to do is to take the spirit (rather than 
the details) of both camps and consider what insights it gives us. How can we do 
this, when orthodox embodied cognitive science is built upon functionalism, and 
enactive approaches reject functionalism about the mind?
I suggest that the spirit of orthodox embodiment is expressed by Clark (2008a) 
in LMS. Although this is a functionalist principle it is minimally functionalist: it 
does not entail a representational or computational view of the mind, it merely 
points to a mechanistic supervenience / realizing base for the mind. That this kind 
of mechanistic approach to the mind is still a kind of functionalism can be seen 
in Clark’s work on “microfunctionalism” where he argues that functionalism 
does not need to be identified with high level formal descriptions such as beliefs 
and desires, rather what is essential to functionalism is that the “structure not the 
stuff counts” (Clark 1989, 31).
That cognitive creatures are mechanistic in this minimal sense is generally 
accepted in cognitive science – by both the orthodox and the radical. Where 
sides differ is in answering the question of what the minimal set of mechanisms 
is that enables / realizes cognition i. e., which are the ones we need to implement 
in order to build a cognitive system. The orthodox embodiment story clearly 
pushes the boundaries of the Marrian algorithmic level towards – and into – the 
implementational level for morphological features (Clark 2013). Yet, as explained 
above in virtue of its roots in the orthodox (brainbound) tradition, this minimal 
base does not include the internal goings-on in the physiological body. The intu-
ition behind this is presumably that anything that is important that goes on in 
the physiological body is represented in the brain and so a functionalization of 
the relevant processes in the brain will include any relevant information from the 
body proper.
This is where I argue that the orthodox embodiment story errs. Let us talk 
in the mechanistic terms that are accepted by both them and the radicals, and 
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3 The work presented here is a “big picture” view of the project developed in detail in my 
doctoral thesis (Stapleton 2012) situating this in respect to traditional and radical embodied 
cognitive science.
argue that the minimal realizing system is not quite big enough yet: That it must 
include at least some mechanisms that go on in the biological body (both the 
non-neural body and parts of the neural body that are typically functionalized 
out) as proposed by Cosmelli and Thompson (2010) and Thompson and Cos-
melli (2011) with their thesis of “dynamic entanglement” (see also Clark 2013, 
for a discussion of dynamic entanglement from the orthodox embodied perspec-
tive).
Here I outline a story3 which I propose should be accepted by both orthodox 
and radical embodimenters. While those in the enactive traditions will not think 
the story presented here complete as a minimal base for cognition, they should 
accept that it is at least part of what they consider the minimal mechanistic base 
and not reject it as externalist rather than embodied (Thompson and Stapleton 
2009). And, because the story does not rest upon the assumptions of the radical 
approaches that orthodox embodiment rejects, and because it is presented as an 
extension of the mechanistic story and the fluidity of the algorithmic / implemen-
tational distinction that lies at the heart of the orthodox embodiment approach, 
without contradicting any of its own assumptions, orthodox embodimenters 
should also accept this story.
2. Introducing Proper Embodiment
The thesis of “Proper Embodiment” presented here is that (at least some of) the 
details of our physiology matter to cognition and consciousness in a fundamental 
way such that (at least some of) the mechanisms of cognition are so fine-grained 
that specifying the algorithm for cognition would entail specifying parts of the 
internal body normally considered to be background or enabling conditions for 
cognition.
I argue for this thesis through two independent theses: internal embodiment 
and particular embodiment. “Internal embodiment” is the thesis that the internal 
“gooey” body matters to cognition and consciousness in a fundamental way. 
“Particular embodiment” is the thesis that the particular details of our imple-
mentation matter to cognition. Taken together, these generate what I think is a 
compelling case that cognition is not merely embodied in the sense of orthodox 
embodied cognitive science, but Properly Embodied.
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3. Internal Embodiment
Internal embodiment: the internal “gooey” body matters  
to cognition and consciousness in a fundamental way
In arguing for internal embodiment I focus on the role that interoception, the 
sense of the internal body, plays in cognition and consciousness. The term 
‘interoception’ was originally used by Sherrington (1948) to refer to the sense of 
the visceral body (e. g., afferent information from smooth muscles and exocrine 
glands). A. D. Craig has since argued that due to sharing a common pathway 
through the spinal cord and processing areas in the brain, pain, temperature, and 
light touch should also come under the category of interoceptive senses and so 
“interoception should be redefined as the sense of the physiological condition of 
the entire body not just the viscera” (Craig 2002, 655). This sense of the phys-
iological condition of the body gives a broad sense of how the body is faring. 
Although much of this information does not necessarily make it to conscious 
awareness, indeed Craig proposes that it is only in primates that this information 
is represented4 in the right anterior insula, which is correlated with the sense of 
subjective feelings and emotions, it is nevertheless typically co-activated with the 
limbic motor cortex and so may underpin the motivational and valenced aspect 
of affective feelings as distinct from mere feelings of sensations. Interoception is 
therefore plausibly the basis for at least a minimal sense of value and thus intrin-
sic motivation, key parts of the cognitive apparatus that are underspecified by the 
orthodox embodiment paradigm but which a properly embodied story should 
give us an account of.
Furthermore, recent work in affective neuroscience and predictive coding 
gives us reason to think that this interoceptive information may be involved 
in perceptual phenomenology. One such model, proposed by Barrett and Bar 
(2009) argues that when we perceive an object the brain makes a quick initial 
prediction about that object providing the gist of the situation but this does not 
yet correspond to our perception of the world. Rather, given this gist, the brain 
is left to predict the details of the situation based on previous knowledge, where 
“knowledge” is cashed out in terms of sensory-motor patterns that involve inter-
nal sensations including autonomic and endocrine information. On this model 
these predictions, and the filling out of the predictions, are recurrent and con-
tinue until the predictions at macro- and micro-levels no longer generate error 
signals when they are compared to incoming information. Information about 
internal bodily changes feeds in throughout this recurrency embedding affec-
tivity into perception right from low level vision and including into the dorsal 
“where” visual stream.
This model may initially seem unintuitive, influenced as we are by the Mar-
rian framework of visual processing upon which, if affect plays any role it comes 
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in as an addition to fully formed perceptual contents. But consider an intuition 
pump from William James:
Conceive yourself, if possible, suddenly stripped of all the emotion with which your 
world now inspires you, and try to imagine it as it exists, purely by itself, without 
your favourable or unfavourable, hopeful or apprehensive comment. It will be almost 
impossible for you to realize such a condition of negativity and deadness. No one por-
tion of the universe would then have importance beyond another; and the whole collec-
tion of things and series of its events would be without significance, character, expres-
sion, or perspective. Whatever of value, interest, or meaning our respective worlds may 
appear embued with are thus pure gifts of the spectator’s mind. (James 1902, 150)
While James appeals to emotions here, for him emotions are perceptions of 
bodily feelings, and so by definition available to conscious awareness, Barrett 
and Bar’s model proposes that affect is playing an even more fundamental role in 
perception which they call “unconscious affect.” They argue that:
“Unconscious affect” (as it is called) is why a drink tastes delicious or is unappetizing 
. . . why we experience some people as nice and others as mean . . . and why some paint-
ings are beautiful while others are ugly. (Barrett and Bar 2009, 1328)
This idea of “unconscious” contributions to experience that nevertheless shape 
the phenomenality of our experience is not unprecedented in philosophy. The 
phenomenological tradition has given us the concepts of pre-reflective and 
pre-intentional experience which gives all experience its characteristic ‘colour’ 
(see e. g., Ratcliffe 2010) but also contributes to the very structure of cognition. 
Ratcliffe (2005) for example draws on the phenomenological tradition to pro-
pose a reading of James’ emotion theory that goes beyond emotions structuring 
our perceptual phenomenology to their being constituents of cognition. Under-
standing intentionality in the traditional phenomenological sense, as not merely 
the “aboutness” of a mental state but rather “conceptualized in practical terms, 
as an orientation that does not merely reveal but also differently configures the 
experienced world” (Ratcliffe 2005, 192) allows us to understand James as argu-
ing that emotions / feelings are not only perceptions of bodily feelings but rather 
are constituted by / through both the perception of these bodily feelings and the 
feelings themselves.
While at first glance there might seem to be a tension here between on the 
one hand a part of an objective environment being revealed to one in virtue of 
one’s senses and, on the other hand, one’s world being a subjective construct, 
this tension is illusory. The claim is that there is an external world but we have 
access to only the parts of that world that are made available to us through our 
senses. What the phenomenological approach brings out – that the more biolog-
ical approach may leave implicit – is that the senses do not make parts of that 
world available to us “as is” but rather the world is translated through our partic-
ular sensory mechanisms and possibilities for interaction such that experience is 
structured by these in a way we cannot eliminate. Thus, given that affect is inti-
mately bound with our sensory capacities, it also shapes how we experience the 
world – “our world,” and how we can act in that world. And, it is this claim that 
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(2010); Thompson and Cosmelli (2011).
if affect shapes how we experience the world then it also shapes how we can act 
in that world, that I take to be the heart of Ratcliffe’s Jamesian / phenomenological 
claim that affect is constitutive of cognition. I have argued elsewhere in detail that 
drawing on the biological details of the interoceptive underpinnings of affectivity 
can give us good reason to think of affect as constitutive of cognition also in a 
non-phenomenological sense (Stapleton 2012). For the purposes of this chapter 
however the work outlined so far should be enough to motivate the plausibility of 
the weaker claim that in natural cognitive systems like ourselves, having an inter-
nal body shapes consciousness and cognition even when the interoceptive / affec-
tive information is unconscious / pre-reflective. And, because the information that 
feeds into cognition and consciousness is imbued with a natural value, in terms of 
value to the physiological system, to create an artificial system that is genuinely 
cognitive – and therefore has its own intrinsic values as a basis for motivation – 
we may need to implement some kind of functionally equivalent “internal body.”
Internal embodiment – that the internal “gooey” body matters to cognition and 
consciousness in a fundamental way – on its own does not require a modification 
of Clark’s LMS so much as it is an extension of it inwards. It contributes to the 
story something that was lacking in the standard functionalist framework: value 
and motivation, and begins to reintegrate the phenomenological with the func-
tional to more properly address our actual explanandum in cognitive science: nat-
ural cognitive systems. Does Internal Embodiment on its own however actually 
require an internal body, even a functionalized version of one? It is not imme-
diately obvious that the functions that the internal body plays in contributing 
to value and consciousness couldn’t be implemented in the brain (or externally). 
After all, the orthodox embodimenter would argue, even in the biological case, 
the real contribution that they give to cognition and consciousness is in virtue of 
their representations in the brain. If this is the case, then it is not that the gooey 
body matters to cognition and consciousness in a fundamental way but rather 
that our gooey bodies implement functions that matter to cognition and con-
sciousness in a fundamental way. While this may be an important addition to the 
orthodox embodiment story, it is nevertheless a trivial kind of internal embodi-
ment, because the internality is not what is playing the key functional role.
Do we have reason for thinking that the internal, gooey body that has evolved 
as part of us, has a fundamentally more important role than a mere functional 
one at this Larger Mechanistic level? Or, to phrase this in different terms, are 
our physiological processes a mere happenstance of our evolution the essential 
functions of which can be happily implemented in a variety of materials and 
locations? I propose that this is not the case. Rather, natural cognitive systems are 
not only internally embodied but also embodied in a particular way that means 
large mechanistic functionalization of these processes just may not suffice5. This 
is the thesis of particular embodiment.
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Maturana, and Uribe 1974; Maturana and Varela 1980; Thompson 2007; for an accessible in-
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4. Particular Embodiment
Particular Embodiment: the particular details  
of our implementation matter to cognition
Orthodox embodied cognitive science rests upon a version of functionalism that 
is expressed by Clark’s LMS discussed above (see Wheeler 2010). Like most ver-
sions of functionalism this abstracts from the details of implementation because, 
as Clark puts it, the “structure not the stuff counts” (Clark 1989, 31). Any mech-
anistic view of the mind will of course endorse the principle that it is the struc-
ture and not the stuff that counts when it comes to bringing about cognitive 
processes. That there really is a distinction between structure and stuff, however, 
may not be as obvious as it first appears.6
The thesis of particular embodiment is that the particular details of our imple-
mentation matter to cognition and hence any functionalization of the substruc-
ture of cognition would need to be at a fineness of grain that functionalizes these 
details. In order to motivate this thesis I will here put forward two “proofs of 
concept” drawn from evolutionary robotics: GasNets and evolved hardware.
5. GasNets
The principle behind evolutionary robotics is that, by emulating variation, heri-
tability and natural selection one can artificially “evolve” robotic (or simulated) 
agents with complex behavior, gaining the standard advantages of neural nets, 
such as graceful degradation, as well as the targeted behavioral outcomes nor-
mally achieved through traditional programming. This is done by hooking up 
a group of neural networks to a task environment, or a simulation thereof, and 
selecting the most successful ones based on whatever fitness function you are 
using (i. e., those that are most successful – or least bad – at the task assigned). In 
order to increase variation of “genes” a few of those who were not most success-
ful, but close by, are added and this group allowed to multiply while the rest are 
culled and recombinations of these “genotypes” and mutations are introduced. 
These steps are then repeated over and over, through many generations until net-
works evolve that can solve the task (the amount of generations needed to evolve 
a successful solution means that simulations are more practical than evolving 
networks using physical robotic agents at each stage).
It has been known for some time that communication in the brain is not only 
mediated by electrical and chemical signaling but also gasotransmission, such 
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as through gases like nitric oxide (NO), carbon monoxide (CO), and hydrogen 
sulfide (H2S). The assumption has always been, I take it, that in natural cognitive 
systems our implementation is gooey and complex as a result of our evolution 
but that this messy natural “design” could be abstracted away from and func-
tionalized, and perhaps even improved upon. In short, there has reigned a culture 
of “electrical chauvinism” where it has been assumed that all of the important 
properties of cognition are represented at this level and molecular signaling and 
other gooey implementation can be factored out.
Smith and colleagues (2002) set up an experiment to compare the evolvability 
and adaptivity of solutions in standard artificial neural network models designed 
to model electrical transmission between nodes (NoGas) and an adaptation of 
the standard artificial neural network that was designed to also model gasotrans-
mission (GasNet). The difference between the NoGas and the GasNet is that 
in the GasNet activations of nodes are not only a function of the inputs of the 
connected nodes (as with standard neural networks) but is also a function of the 
concentration of gas at that node.
The task that Smith and colleagues set was for robotic agents starting from an 
arbitrary position in a black-walled arena to find and navigate towards a white 
triangle while avoiding a white square. They show that basing their evolution 
of solutions on the GasNet class consistently produced successful solutions in 
fewer generations than evolution of solutions on the NoGas class. They argue 
that the GasNet solutions seem to be more evolvable because they are more 
amenable to being tuned to the particular characteristics of the environment, 
which is to say that the solutions are more flexibly adaptive. This adaptivity 
seems to arise from particular features of the gas diffusion mechanism which 
enable functions to be based on input patterns over time, which in turn allows 
noisy input to be filtered out.
This example from evolutionary robotics shows that a particular (gooey) fea-
ture of our embodiment plays a key role in evolvability leading to populations 
that can quickly adapt to a learning task and a particular environment. This is 
interesting in and of itself, but what is of particular relevance to us here is that 
both the GasNet and the NoGas controllers evolved functionally equivalent 
timing mechanisms. And yet, despite the functional equivalence in terms of the 
success criterion – the particular implementations resulted in a quite different 
amenability to being tuned to a particular environment. The moral for us to take 
from GasNets is that just because both GasNet and NoGas are successful solu-
tions to the environment that they have evolved for (once they have evolved 
and reached 100 % fitness) and are therefore functionally equivalent in regard to 
the success criterion, this does not mean that the level of explanation at which 
we see the functional equivalence is the correct one to understand what is really 
key to the ability of each controller to succeed. That is to say what is key to a 
controller’s being flexible and adaptive – the qualities that we are interested in 
if natural cognition is our explanandum – is not the same as what is key to the 
mere successful implementation of a function. By looking at the ease of evolv-
ability and the mechanisms which underpin this amenability to being tuned to a 
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mind debate. I am not here concerned with whether mental states such as beliefs or memories 
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the substructure of the flexible adaptive behavior that enables / realizes cognition.
particular environment we can see that the relevant level of explanation for the 
adaptive behavior of the controllers is that which specifies the interaction of the 
gas and the nodes. The key point is this: In evolved systems this is not just the 
implementation, but rather it is the relevant level for the algorithm of an adaptive 
system. This is relevant not only over evolutionary timescales but, as Philip-
pedes and colleagues (2005) note, also at the time scale of the (neurally plastic) 
changes themselves so that the biology of gas diffusion in real brains, and their 
subsequent modelling of GasNets parallels the embodied cognition approach to 
cognitive science, but internally. They state:
In highlighting the functional importance of brain morphology, these phenomena take 
us increasingly further away from connectionist ideas and suggest that Pfeifer’s notion 
of ecological balance, which requires a harmonious relationship between an agents’ 
morphology, materials and control, can perhaps be taken inside the head. (Philippedes 
et al. 2005, 145)
This suggests that when it comes to cognition that functional equivalence may 
have to be at a much lower level than that specified by the LMS (and other func-
tionalist approaches).7
6. Evolved Hardware
A second line of evidence for the thesis of particular embodiment also comes 
from one of the authors of the GasNet study: Adrian Thompson. While typically 
in evolutionary robotics algorithms are evolved in simulation and then transferred 
to hardware, this study used evolutionary algorithms to configure the switches on 
a Field-Programmable Gate Array evaluating the circuit based on its performance 
in the real-world (Thompson 1997). The aim of the experiment was to evolve a 
recurrent network of logic gates, and the Field-Programmable Gate Array is a 
digital chip which should therefore be ideally suited to this task. The surprising 
solution which evolved however was not based on logic gates. That is, the gates in 
the chip were not used to do logic. The solution that evolved exploited physical 
characteristics of the chip and behaviors that emerged. For example, a quarter of 
the cells in the array were clearly contributing to the target behavior as disabling 
them resulted in loss of the solution, but some of these cells were not even con-
nected to the main part of the circuit. This defies the standard separation of algo-
rithm and implementation. In this case the exploitation of physical characteristics 
of the chip enabled the system to evolve solutions which had greatly decreased 
computational complexity compared to traditionally designed algorithms. In this 
respect this example corroborates and strengthens the conclusions from the Gas-
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Net study. But this example from evolved hardware does even more than this: 
it gives us a real case where we can see that in evolved systems the line between 
algorithm and implementation is blurred so that it is no longer a trivial matter to 
implement an algorithm evolved on one particular piece of hardware on another 
piece of hardware in the way that functionalism assumes that one must.
7. The Case for Proper Embodiment
I have argued for two theses: internal embodiment and particular embodiment:
1. Internal embodiment: the internal “gooey” body matters to cognition and con-
sciousness in a fundamental way
2. Particular Embodiment: the particular details of our implementation matter to 
cognition
The examples I have outlined in support of the thesis of particular embodiment 
give us good reason to think that the solutions that have evolved to make us 
the flexible, adaptive, neurally plastic cognitive systems that we are, are likely a 
result of the exploitation of our particular embodiment, both over evolutionary 
and developmental time, but very plausibly also over the time scale of the plastic 
changes that underpin new learning in hour-to-hour and day-to-day contexts. 
From this perspective the clean levels inherited from orthodox cognitive science 
and which remain implicit in orthodox embodied cognitive science – algorithmic 
and implementational – are revealed to be leaky in evolved systems.
While on its own the thesis of particular embodiment could be considered a 
mere extension to orthodox embodied cognition (see for example Clark’s consid-
erations of A. Thompson’s work in Clark 2013), in combination with the thesis 
of internal embodiment it packs a much heftier punch: the internal physiological 
realm that interoception brings information from is a complex, dynamic system, 
and the lessons that we gain from the evolutionary robotics and hardware exam-
ples give us reason to think that it will not be easy to separate the algorithm of 
the relevant processes from their gooey implementation. The thesis of particular 
embodiment, while consistent with orthodox embodied cognitive science, is that 
much more radical in combination with the thesis of internal embodiment as 
together they not only suggest, as Philippedes and colleagues (2005) say, that the 
balance between morphology, materials and control can be taken inside the head, 
but that it can also be taken into the body proper.
The combination of internal embodiment and particular embodiment may 
seem to undermine orthodox embodied cognitive science because by pushing 
the leakiness of the algorithm / implementation boundary so far it is no longer 
clear whether there is a boundary at all.8 However, while these theses may well 
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that gives rise to the kinds of experiences that we then categorize according to these “cognitive” 
categories.
9 Whether or not the possibility of being instantiated in different materials implies that 
nanofunctionalism entails multiple realizability is a question for another time.
contribute to undermining orthodox embodied cognitive science in combination 
with other assumptions or arguments (as for example is done in the enactive lit-
erature), as they are presented here, they do not need to be in conflict with the 
spirit of orthodox embodiment approaches. Taking this spirit to be accurately 
expressed by the LMS, the theses presented here motivate the modification of 
this to a “Smaller Mechanism Story” or a “nanofunctionalist” explanation (Sta-
pleton 2012) where the processes that make up the substructure of cognition are 
much closer to the implementational details than traditionally envisioned. Being 
so close to the implementational details means that much of the body that was 
factored out on the orthodox approach is now going to play a role in the algo-
rithmic substructure of cognitive processes. Nevertheless, a Properly Embodied 
cognitive science is not a biologically chauvinist position; a “smaller mechanism” 
or “nanofunctionalist” story implies that these functions could in principle be 
instantiated in different materials and could therefore in principle be extended – 
or rather external elements could in principle be “incorporated” (Clark 2008b; 
Thompson and Stapleton 2009) – but this instantiation is going to be at a much 
finer grain than traditionally assumed.9 Proper Embodiment can thus be taken 
as extending orthodox embodied cognition inwardly, and thereby also extending 
the explanandum beyond abstract cognitive processes that are the target of much 
of cognitive science research back to the flexible, adaptive processes at work in 
evolved cognitive systems.
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Embodied Habitual Memory Formation:  
Enacted or Extended?
Christian Tewes
Abstract: It is the aim of this paper to explore in more detail what enactivism can contrib-
ute to embodied memory research. This is accomplished by a comparative analysis of the 
formation of memories with regard to the extended mind hypothesis. Proponents of the 
latter base their views on the supposed “hybrid nature” of the human mind. According to 
this approach, biological brain-based memories are supplemented by external storage sys-
tems, thereby incorporating different forms of cultural technology into the human mind. 
I argue in this paper that a strong embodied approach to memory formation first needs to 
develop a phenomenological and autonomous system account of habitual body memory. 
This lays the foundation for explaining whether memories are integrated into emerging 
unities or are merely extended.
Introduction
It is the focus of an intense debate over the last couple of years whether enac-
tivism and the extended mind hypothesis mutually exclude each other or follow 
complementary routes in embodiment research. Proponents of both camps have 
tended to opt for the first interpretation but often for quite different reasons.
Along these lines, Rowlands has argued in a comparative analysis that the dif-
ference between enactivism and the extended mind hypothesis (hereafter, EM) 
does not lie in functional or non-functionalist accounts of embodied cognition. 
On the contrary, while enactivism stresses the importance of the body and its 
embeddedness in the environment, the enactive approach to mind and cognition 
does not fall outside the paradigm of functionalism. According to Rowlands, the 
crucial difference between both theories is rather the question of where cognitive 
processes take place. Whereas proponents of EM hold the view that cognition 
can extend into the world via external cognitive vehicles such as tools or comput-
ers, Rowlands thinks that enactivism lacks the conceptual resources to show how 
cognitive or mental states could transgress a sensorimotor system or organism 
in the first place (Rowlands 2009, 61).1 Thus enactivism is committed to a kind 
of internalism.
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recognition, discrimination, and searching) (Clark and Chalmers [1998] 2010, 33). I think that 
these distinctions are inconclusive and are in need of further elaboration. However, it would 
exceed the scope of this paper to show this in the specific thematic field of embodied memory 
research. When I introduce some key concepts from the enactive approach in the second section, 
it will become clear that even basic cognitive processes are not entirely devoid of a sense-making 
(mental) dimension.
Enactivists are eager to point out that this reconstruction of the enactive 
approach to cognition and mind misses significant distinctions and therefore 
misrepresents their position in important respects. Moreover, advocates of enac-
tivism such as Ezequiel Di Paolo and Evan Thompson have shown that EM’s 
tenets are ultimately based on central assumptions of classical cognitivism that 
enactivism tries to overcome (Di Paolo 2009; Thompson and Stapleton 2009).
I will argue in this paper that enactive-inspired research has offered concep-
tual distinctions, methods, and findings that are of philosophical significance 
and which have a striking impact on empirical cognitive research. I will demon-
strate this with regard to certain aspects of habitual memory formation. This 
will be accomplished via a comparative analysis of EM and enactive research. 
Memory formation is a central topic in the realm of EM-inspired research. There 
are impressive works in EM that show how the cultural invention of external 
storage systems enhances and enables types of recollection that constitute the 
enculturated human mind. However, what is missing in those hybrid accounts 
of the mind is the co-constitutive role of the body and intercorporeality for 
those external vehicles and the emergence of new system identities. Furthermore, 
extended functionalism as a central tenet of EM does not allow a consistent spec-
ification of cognition and mental states in the first place. By contrast, proponents 
of enactivism have developed and refined a notion of sense-making that includes 
meaning, intentionality and an experiential dimension in relation to the world. 
This enables the integration of phenomenological insights and research methods 
that are crucial for the exploration of embodied memory capacities.
In the first section, I will give an outline of the extended mind hypothesis by 
exploring the question of whether the original EM thesis and its later augmen-
tation (“second-wave EM”) are in the position to deliver a convincing frame-
work for memory research. In the second section, major ingredients of enactive 
research are introduced, including an autonomous system approach to habits that 
lays the foundation for a conceptually clarified account of memory formation as 
well as the phenomenological concept of body memory. In the final section, I 
apply the distinctions developed in the paper to different aspects of EM-inspired 
memory research. It is the aim of the final section to show that enactivism offers 
both conceptual clarification of the impact of external memory storage systems 
on the human mind and a foundation for further embodied memory research.
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2 I presuppose in this paper that states are realized by processes. However, what distin-
guishes states from other processes is their persistence over a longer period. This depends on 
the organization of stabilized processes within a system (Campbell 2009, 460). Furthermore, I 
understand a “capacity” – by ascribing it to an agent – as a disposition or power to act in a spe-
cific way (Mumford and Anjum 2011, 5).
1. The Extension of the Mind: Basic Principles and Assumptions
What is the primary motivation behind the idea that mental and cognitive states, 
processes, and capacities are extended?2 John Sutton points out that, according 
to EM, mental and cognitive properties and processes are “unevenly distributed 
across biological and non-biological realms” (Sutton 2010, 189). This view of the 
human mind is by no means self-evident. It is obvious that social rituals, artefacts, 
technology, and language expand and enhance cognitive abilities. Yet the decisive 
question is whether external memory devices such as the invention of symbolic 
storage systems should be treated as genuine parts of the “cognitive architec-
ture” itself (Donald 1991, 309). EM theorists are convinced that the integration of 
external items into a newly emerging cognitive system is a matter of fact:
What matters most is our obsessive, endless weaving of biotechnological webs: the con-
stant two-way traffic between biological wetware and tools, media, props, and technol-
ogies. The very best of these resources are not so much used as incorporated into the 
user herself. They fall into place as aspects of the thinking process. (Clark 2003, 198)
These considerations make clear what is at stake in EM. The idea of incorpo-
rating tools, media, and technology implies an anthropological specification of 
human beings. The human mind is hybrid in its nature, made up of biological and 
non-biological parts (Clark 2003, 198).
Seeing it from this perspective, the idea of “extending the human mind” is 
intimately related to the conviction of the “leaky” nature of human beings, or, to 
use ananother metaphor, a view of humans as knots in a biotechnological web. In 
their inaugural paper on “The Extended Mind,” Andy Clark and David Chalm-
ers give quite a detailed justification for this view by explicating the term “exter-
nalism” so as to answer the question “where the mind stops and the rest of the 
world begins?” (Clark and Chalmers [1998] 2010, 27). They are not referring to 
the concept of semantic or content externalism. The primary meaning of the lat-
ter consists in the conviction that content is not fixed in the head but by details 
of the environment that might be opaque to laypersons in specific social or his-
torical contexts (e. g., water = H2O) (Hurley 2010, 102).
Instead, Clark and Chalmers suggest a concept of “active externalism,” where 
the accomplishment of epistemic actions such as a mathematical calculation 
includes pencil and paper or an electronical device (Clark and Chalmers [1998] 
2010, 28 – 29). In such circumstances a coupled system emerges that is constituted 
by a “two-way interaction” between a human organism and an external device 
(Clark and Chalmers [1998] 2010, 29). The central idea behind this systemic 
approach is that all components of the system play an indispensable active causal 
role in establishing and executing a cognitive process.
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Adams and Aizawa caricature this account of mind and cognition with a rhe-
torical question: why is the pencil thinking that 2 + 2 = 4? They also give a hypo-
thetical answer: because it is coupled to the system during the mathematical cal-
culation (Adams and Aizawa 2010, 67). Adams and Aizawa take this example as 
a starting point to accuse the friends of EM of committing a “causal-constitution 
fallacy.” Pencil and paper might play an important causal role in accomplishing 
the cognitive task, but it would be wrong to ascribe to such artefacts any consti-
tutive function in the realization of cognitive operations.
Clark’s reply to this caricature already implies a kind of “delocalisation” or 
distribution of extended cognitive or mental processes over the body and parts 
of the coupled environment:
The appeal to coupling is not intended to make any external object “cognitive” . . . 
Rather, it is intended to make some object, which in and of itself is not usefully (or 
perhaps not even intelligibly) thought as either cognitive or noncognitive, into a proper 
part of some cognitive system, such as a human agent. (Clark 2010a, 83)
For Clark, this principle holds not only for external parts that are coupled with 
a formerly existing system; the same is true for “internal” parts or processes 
such as V4 neurons or groups thereof. He thus rejects the idea that V4 neurons 
(decoupled parts) have the power to think or are the locus of thinking (Clark 
2010a, 83).
These are no trivial clarifications of Clark’s own position. One should keep 
in mind that for the extended mind theorist too, mental or cognitive processes 
are (a) not intrinsic properties of system parts and (b) do not (at least not neces-
sarily) pre-exist the time of coupling. This implies that such processes are emer-
gent features of the entire system that cannot be reduced to its components (see 
Campbell and Bickhard 2011). This is also in line with Clark’s further remarks 
on the systemic approach in EM. He refers to works in dynamical systems the-
ory where global features of a system are also specified as emergent properties 
that have a top-down influence on microphysical components of the system (see 
Kelso 1995).
1.1 The Parity Principle and Extended Functionalism
Considering what has been said so far, it is obvious that these explications, by 
themselves, are not sufficient to show how mental and cognitive processes could 
be extended at all. The reason is that the process of “coupling” says nothing 
about the systemic properties that are emergent products of active causal inter-
relationships between an organism and specific external items of the environ-
ment. An organism is coupled in multifarious causal interrelationships with its 
environment at the atomic and sub-atomic level of description, such as the per-
manent reverberation of light waves / particles from a light-source such as the 
sun. However, this alone does not lead to the emergence of mental and cognitive 
properties. Hence, constant coupling is not sufficient for the emergence of the 
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latter and therefore not appropriate for classifying an emergent property as a 
cognitive or mental process.
The attempt to answer the question of what justifies the ascription of cogni-
tive properties to an extended coupled system leads us to what the EM literature 
calls the “parity principle” (henceforth, PP): “If, as we confront some task, a part 
of the world functions as a process which, were it to go on in the head, we would 
have no hesitation in accepting as part of the cognitive process, then that part of 
the world is (for that time) part of the cognitive process” (Clark 2010, 44). This 
principle has come under attack in the last couple of years, albeit for quite differ-
ent reasons. The immediate reply concerns the charge that PP simply “external-
izes the internal” (Menary 2010, 234). It is not difficult to see why this is so. The 
decision whether a process X is cognitive or not depends, according to PP, on 
re-localizing X in a thought experiment into the skull. Such a “test procedure” 
implies at least that the mark of the mental or cognition is to be found in the head, 
a position one would normally describe as cognitive internalism.
However, one could view PP as merely a heuristic means for giving an exter-
nalist account of cognition without the need to state essential criteria for differ-
ent cognitive kinds. There is a rich research tradition in the cognitive sciences 
that explores cognitive processes in relation to the processing capacities of the 
brain and to the cognitive architecture. From this perspective, the suggested test 
procedure merely follows the established research tradition in cognitive sciences.
Furthermore, PP seems at least to hint at the circumstances under which one 
can classify an emergent property of a coupled system as a cognitive or mental 
process in the first place. It is interesting that Clark stresses further motivational 
reasons to include PP as a major ingredient in the EM agenda. Important for him 
are the anti-biochauvinistic implications of the principle. PP should function as 
a means (a “veil of ignorance”) to ignore the “metabolic boundaries of skull and 
skin.” This is supposed to enable a better focus on the computational and func-
tional power of entire systems and the specific functional roles of the material 
vehicles of mental and cognitive states (Clark [2008] 2011, 77).
This makes clear that proponents of the extended mind hypothesis are not 
only committed to the view that cognitive states extend the boundaries of skin 
and skull. They are also committed to a variant of “extended functionalism.” 
Clark’s hint about the anti-biochauvinistic intention behind PP points to the 
functionalist account of mind and cognition. According to this approach, psy-
chological phenomena are identified by their multiply realizable causal func-
tional roles (Horgan [1994] 2000, 476). Psychic types such as fear, trust, or joy 
have no species-specific boundaries with regard to their concrete (token) instan-
tiation. If physical entities such as Martians, robots, or non-human organisms 
were to exhibit the suitable functional profile at the systemic level of complexity, 
then one would be justified in ascribing to them the respective psychological 
states or processes as well.
Wheeler elucidates why PP is especially apt to bring to the fore the interrela-
tions between EM and extended functionalism. Parity implies functional equiv-
alence between internal and external elements that unfold the same behavior due 
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to their causal-functional contributions to the system. The application of PP thus 
allows that the same type of cognitive and mental states could be realized in quite 
different “generic formats,” namely both biological and non-biological (or an 
integrated combination) and extended and non-extended ones (Wheeler 2010, 
248). Conceived in this way, the thesis that cognitive and mental states are mul-
tiply realizable is built into PP itself.
There are two main lines of criticism of PP. The first line stresses that parity 
leads to untenable consequences but that since it is not an essential part of EM 
it could be replaced by other heuristic means. These means are elaborated in the 
so-called “second-wave” EM and center on the “complementary principle.” The 
second line of argumentation comes from an enactive perspective and conceives 
PP as merely a symptom of deeper problems intrinsic to EM itself. In the next 
section, I introduce both lines of criticism via the example of the formation and 
enhancement of memory capacities.
1.2 The Realization of Memory as a Challenge to PP
In their inaugural paper, Clark and Chalmers apply PP to a now famous thought 
experiment that already has to do with the support and extension of mem-
ory capacities. This thought experiment involves Inga, a woman who decides 
to visit an exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art. She remembers that the 
museum is on 53rd Street and walks into the museum. There is a further per-
son in this thought experiment, Otto, who suffers from early-stage Alzheimer’s. 
He is dependent on a structured environment with “memory prostheses,” like 
many other patients who suffer from dementia. Such patients (or their family 
and friends) augment their home with notes or similar reminders in order to 
sustain and further their autonomous lives. In Otto’s imagined case, however, 
he carries around a notebook “that plays the role usually played by a biologi-
cal memory” (Clark and Chalmers [1998] 2010, 35). He makes the decision to 
go to the museum, consults his notebook to find out where it is, then goes to 
53rd Street and visits the exhibition. The conclusion Clark and Chalmers draw 
is straightforward: “The moral is that when it comes to belief, there is nothing 
sacred about skull and skin. What makes some information count as a belief is 
the role it plays, and there is no reason why the relevant role can be played only 
from inside the body” (Clark and Chalmers [1998] 2010 35). The point about 
extending the causal role of beliefs to artefacts that are not a proper part of the 
body is in need of further clarification. It is not plausible to suppose that every 
interaction with a computer or other artefacts results in cognitive extensions of 
the preceding cognitive system.
Consequently, Clark and Chalmers add three criteria to show under what 
circumstances the conceptual integration of the notebook – or better its caus-
al-functional (memory capacities) integration with Otto’s cognitive architec-
ture – is justified. The added source must (i) be “reliably available,” which means 
that Otto always carries his notebook with him and gets the required infor-
Embodied Habitual Memory Formation: Enacted or Extended? 37
mation more or less whenever he wants it. This points to the second criterion, 
namely (ii) that the retrieval of stored information is automatically accomplished 
and is as “truthworthy” as the information Inga receives from her biological 
memory. This leads to the third criterion (iii) that the stored information should 
be easily accessible (Clark 2010b, 46).
I think it is not unfair to say that these criteria are merely augmentations of 
EM that result from the failure to give a plausible account of a cognitive agent at 
the system level in the first place. I will come back to this point in later sections 
of the paper.
However, there are already problems with PP and with these additional 
criteria at the functional level of description, for instance the question of how 
new material items are incorporated as causal-functional roles into the cogni-
tive architecture of agents. Are external memory storage systems such as Otto’s 
notebook similar enough to biologically based “internal” memory systems to 
allow their functional integration with the cognitive architecture? Given PP and 
the three criteria above, such a strong similarity or isomorphism seems at least 
what is required if EM is to be more than a conceptual possibility and actu-
ally be realized in our world. In this context, Rupert (2004) in particular has 
argued that proponents of EM have failed to show that the use of external mem-
ory devices justifies the view of extended (or integrated) cognition. The decisive 
point, according to him, is that internal acts of remembering and extended mem-
ory states are so dissimilar in important respects that one needs to consider them 
as different cognitive kinds.
Rupert does not deny that culturally invented and accumulated storage sys-
tems function as a cognitive scaffold for the human mind and that they affect the 
structure of internal memory processing (Rupert 2004, 408). But he denies that 
this justifies the assumption that those internal and external modes of processing 
can be explained in the same causal terms or that they amount to an overarching 
natural kind of memory (Rupert 2004, 410).
He substantiates his claim with two examples, the first concerning the func-
tioning of working memory. In order to understand Rupert’s example, it is nec-
essary briefly to introduce some interrelations between working memory and 
other aspects of the process of remembering. “Short term memory” is defined in 
cognitive psychology as the retention of a small amount of memories for short 
time periods, whereas “working memory” is defined as a larger integrated system 
for the manipulation and execution of complex cognitive tasks. What particu-
larly distinguishes the working memory from short-term memory is the concep-
tion of a “central executive.” This determines the integration and coordination 
between several “buffers” (the phonological loop of verbal information or the 
visuospatial sketchpad for visual information). It can be conceived as a control 
system that guides attention and allocates how the available information should 
be manipulated; it also has access to long-term memory (Revlin [2012] 2013, 
140). With regard to our example, Rupert’s question is whether an external mem-
ory storage system could sustain the same cognitive memory function as the 
working memory.
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In a thought-experiment of his own, Rupert imagines a situation where some-
one tries to keep track of an ongoing conversation by writing down every aspect 
of the talk on paper. The idea here is to decide whether the storage of the talk 
on a piece of paper could function in a similar or analogous way to the work-
ing memory as described above. In the imaginary scenario this would obviously 
not work. Any attempt to differentiate important from unimportant informa-
tion written on the paper and then integrate this into the distinct strands of the 
conversation would destroy the practice of communication (Rupert 2004, 410). 
However, one could reply that this example does not convincingly prove a dis-
analogy between the functioning of the working memory and an external func-
tional surrogate; everything depends in this case on the “micro-configuration” 
of the thought experiment. In the future, there might be external technological 
devices that would enable the agent to write down, keep track of and utilize 
the information in real time. It is not clear why this possibility is excluded and 
Rupert does little to dispel such counterarguments.
Rupert’s second example is more convincing. It concerns the so-called “neg-
ative transfer effect”: experiments that show how memorized associations 
between terms (for instance, pairs of names) can block the ability to remem-
ber the same terms when placed in new associations (Rupert 2004, 414). If, for 
instance, a subject learns the combination “Hannah is married to Marcel,” then 
subjects who have previously learned this association need more time to learn a 
new pairing of one of the terms (“Hannah is married to Richard”).
As Rupert points out, a similar negative transfer effect (generation effect) is 
not to be expected when people write down word combinations on a new list 
created from word pairs written on an older list. In this case, a subject hears 
the new association “Hannah is married to Richard” and can immediately write 
down this new pair. Experiments show that a negative transfer effect only rarely 
blocks the external recording of this new association on paper or a laptop. The 
same is likely to be true with later recollections of the newly-paired word associ-
ation. If an experimenter says “Hannah” and indicates that he is referring to the 
second list, the subject can simply read off the newly-paired terms “Hannah and 
Richard” without any interference (Rupert 2004, 414).
Despite the specific problem in the first example, PP faces serious difficulties 
as a result of these considerations. A thorough analysis of the respective caus-
al-functional roles reveals that items of external memory might not display the 
right “functional profile” that would allow their equivalent integration (with the 
same functional effects) into the cognitive architecture of human agents. Even 
more seriously, extended memory devices such as written books or Otto’s laptop 
do not actually deserve, according to Rupert, the ascription of cognitive states or 
processes: “We seem forced, then, to recognize two different explanatory kinds, 
internal memory and external resources used as memory aids, with no reason 
yet found to think that external aids constitute genuinely cognitive states or pro-
cesses” (Rupert 2004, 418).
Wheeler’s answer to these challenges is straightforward. He rejects the view 
that Rupert’s considerations present a problem for PP and that PP should – 
Embodied Habitual Memory Formation: Enacted or Extended? 39
as adherents of second-wave EM argue – be thereby abandoned. Everything 
depends, in effect, on the benchmark for PP. Rupert’s examples presuppose 
that an extended functionalist approach should match the fine-grained details 
of the realization of (internal) cognitive processes. Otherwise, the absence of 
the negative transfer effect is not a counterargument to the extended realization 
of memory capacities in the case of externalized records (Wheeler 2010, 252 – 
256).
However, why suppose in the first place that an extended functionalist 
approach should match the fine-grained details of the realization of cognitive 
processes? Perhaps it is not crucial for a functional specification of memory for-
mation that internal and external processes of recollections are similar in every 
respect. On the contrary, why not assume that the functional specification must 
correspond to a high level of description, namely “other things being equal, [to] a 
system that exhibits some fine-grained functional trait and one that doesn’t both 
count as cognitive” (Wheeler 2010, 257)? In this case, the negative transfer effect 
does not rule out that external storage systems can function as a constitutive part 
of recollection processes.
As it stands, this is not entirely convincing. It might be true that Rupert 
presupposes and favors a chauvinistic form of functionalism that privileges 
“inner-oriented human cognitive psychology” (Wheeler 2010, 255). But what 
makes Wheeler so sure that the fine-grained details of the realization of func-
tional-causal roles do not determine whether X is a cognitive process? Rupert’s 
question why we should think that external memory aids such as written sym-
bols on paper or a laptop “constitute genuinely cognitive states” still remains to 
be answered.
Anticipating this reply, Wheeler concedes that the micro-functional profile 
(the fine-grained details of the functional realization) could actually turn out to 
make the decisive difference to whether a process X is cognitive or not. However, 
he does not think that this concession is devastating for PP. According to him, 
this would only be the case when the fine-grained details of the micro-functional 
roles could only be realized internally or by means of a biological system. Never-
theless, these restrictions are not implied by PP or micro-functionalism (Wheeler 
2010, 260).
I see another serious challenge for PP when Wheeler asserts that functional 
specification in the light of Rupert’s counter examples should be given at a more 
general level of description. By doing so, the integration of external states or 
processes as “cognitive” into a system is guaranteed by definition. Wheeler does 
not deliver any independent reasons for what could count as cognition in the first 
place. This leaves us without any criteria to decide whether PP can convincingly 
be grounded on the idea of a coarse-grained functionalism. Given this, PP’s role 
as a heuristic means for deciding whether an external process is part of the cog-
nitive machinery at all must surely be open to doubt. This is so because PP as 
such is neutral with regard to the question of whether cognitive kinds such as 
episodic memories are realized at a fine-grained level of description or a coarse-
grained one.
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1.3 Second-Wave EM and the Complementary Principle
That the extended functionalist position is in need of a clearer account of cogni-
tion as such is not a view held by the proponents of the so-called “second-wave” 
EM. John Sutton chooses another strategy to meet the challenges faced by PP. 
According to Sutton, the justification for EM should not be based solely on PP 
but rather on the independent “complementary principle” (henceforth, CP). 
The key idea behind CP is the acknowledgement that external resources such 
as Otto’s laptop computer or other stored information are sometimes quite dis-
similar to the functioning of the brain. For Sutton, however, it is not out of the 
question that internal and external mechanisms, media, and processing capacities 
might result from a coupling in a new cognitive agent (system):
It’s just because isolated items aren’t stored atomically in the brain that our relatively 
vulnerable biological memories are supplemented by more stable external scaffolding. 
Brains like ours need media, objects, and other people to function fully as minds. See-
ing the brain as a leaky associative engine . . . forces attention to our reliance on external 
representation in the technological and cultural world. (Sutton 2010, 205)
This passage is revealing for different reasons. Given the supposedly leaky or 
hybrid nature of human beings (see Stapleton, this volume), it makes sense for 
Sutton to suggest replacing PP by CP in order to open up an interdisciplin-
ary approach to mind and cognition within the framework of EM. Sutton refers 
here in particular to Donald’s distinction between “exograms” and “engrams,” to 
make the point even clearer. According to Donald, engrams are “impermanent” 
(they only last a lifetime) and depend on the capacity of the human nervous sys-
tem and the genetic setup, whereas systems of exograms such as libraries, with 
their stored and catalogued symbolic records, are expandable, outlive individuals 
and sometimes outlast their own specific cultural heritage and origin (Donald 
1991, 315).
Sutton does not entirely endorse this strict distinction because he thinks that 
“cognitive artefacts” are not only commodities of the “active mind” but some-
times interact with the brain and body so that they become part of the human 
mind (Sutton 2010, 190). It is beyond doubt that culture has a major impact on 
memory formation, via artefacts, symbols, media, recording systems, and the 
like, and one can explore how this affects the functioning of the brain from a 
phylo- and ontogenetic perspective. Sutton’s own work on this interrelationship 
within the cultural realm is very useful for understanding the enormous capacity 
of cultural devices to extend human memory. We will see in the final section what 
enactivism can contribute to this important line of memory research.
Nevertheless, the quotation from Sutton also indicates that CP is not capa-
ble of dealing with the challenges levelled against EM and set out in the previ-
ous section. Thus, it is certainly a misleading metaphor that “brains like ours” 
need media or technology to “function fully as minds.” The basic intuition is 
again the internalist assumption that the brain is almost identical with the human 
mind but needs a cultural supplement to unfold its ultimate cognitive and mental 
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capacities. The quotation mentions the role neither of the body nor the experien-
tial base in the development and preservation of memory capacities. To embrace 
the complementary aspects of internal and external memory patterns does not 
explain how these dissimilar causal-functional roles result in a new emerging cog-
nitive system with enhanced or extended memory capacities. If we concede, as 
Sutton does, that there are significant dissimilarities in causal-functional roles in 
the case of memory formation, then we are back to Rupert’s worry that these 
roles amount to different explanatory kinds. Sutton tries to disarm this worry 
by suggesting we resist the tendency in complementary-based EM to “treat the 
inside and the outside as distinct realms with fixed properties” (Sutton 2010, 
206). But on its own this does not solve the problem of explaining how coupling 
could result in new unities (systems) with emerging memory capacities. Clark 
himself draws a possible conclusion from this result: “Perhaps the real moral 
of the story is that the realm of the mental is itself too disunified to count as a 
scientific kind.” But it could be even more serious: “We just don’t know a mind 
when we see one. Could the reason for this be that there simply aren’t any there? 
Might the extended mind debate form part of a reduction of the very notion of 
mind in cognitive science?” (Clark 2010b, 63).
These are by no means rhetorical questions. Clark is, of course, eager to reas-
sure that EM does not lead to a reductio of its own position; quite the contrary, 
EM should stand for the biotechnological openness of the “ideas of mind and 
reason” (Clark 2010b, 64). Even so, it is far from clear whether EM has the con-
ceptual recourses to unify what appears so dissimilar in kind and character in 
the first place. In the next step, I will explore whether enactivism can provide, 
at least in principle, convincing criteria for giving a unified account of memory 
formation.
2. Enactivism, Incorporation and Extension
The enactive approach to cognition and embodiment rests upon a variety of con-
cepts, research tools, and methods that mutually support each other (see Thomp-
son 2007). Here I introduce those concepts, research tools, and methods that 
are important for a unified account of the embodied mind and the emergence of 
integrated memory capacities.
2.1 Autonomy, Identity and Sense-Making
At first sight, enactivism and EM both share and integrate concepts and research 
methods from dynamical systems theory, such as the constant coupling between 
organism and environment (Kelso, 1995, 284). Nevertheless, there are important 
differences between both theories in how the system approach is interpreted and 
further specified. Proponents of enactivism focus in particular on “autonomous 
systems” in order to explicate cognition, normativity, and meaning. The para-
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3 Thompson sees clearly that the requirement for autonomy is not only the principle of clo-
sure but also the simultaneous thermodynamic openness of the system. Nevertheless, he does 
not specify the persistent self-maintenance of the system in a far-from equilibrated state as a 
property of autonomous systems themselves. They are “[necessary] conditions not belonging to 
the system” (Thompson and Stapleton 2009, 24). I think that this shortcoming prevents leading 
contemporary theorists of Enactivism from giving a fully-fledged account of autonomy in their 
dynamical systems approach.
digm case for autonomy in this theory is the organism. In terms of Hans Jonas’ 
philosophy of nature and theory of autopoiesis, the organism is conceived as 
a self-affirming entity that maintains and regulates its identity and interactions 
with the environment according to norms drawn from the perspective of the sys-
tem (see Jonas 1966; Thompson 2007, 152 – 153).
The relevant identity conditions do not only apply to organisms as autopoi-
etic systems. Proponents of enactivism use these criteria to specify autonomous 
systems at a more general level with a focus on their unity. More fundamentally, 
such a system (a) generates and regulates its identity under precarious circum-
stances; (b) every process in the system recursively depends on another process 
in the system, thereby forming a closed network; and (c) the system determines a 
possible scope of interactions with the environment (Di Paolo 2009, 15; Thomp-
son and Stapleton 2009, 24). In what follows I look at these tenets in more detail.
Autonomous systems are, despite the principle of closure, thermodynamically 
open systems that regulate the external flow and exchange of energy with their 
environment (Thompson and Stapleton 2009, 24). It is not easy to capture fully 
this dialectical “double aspect” of systemic openness and closure. Maintaining 
the conditions of thermodynamic non-equilibrium is (i) necessary for autonomy 
and (ii) a constitutive relational property of the dynamical system itself.3
Let us explain in more detail why this is so. An autonomous system such as an 
organism is a self-maintaining system that actively contributes to the conditions 
that enables its far-from-equilibrated processes. An organism such as a frog is 
able to switch recursively between different types of behavior so as to maintain 
itself, detecting environmental changes that are related to different behavioral 
choices of the system. This capacity depends on the specific infrastructure of the 
system (Campbell 2009, 466). Metabolism and the recursive interdependence of 
organic components not only generate a biological self and its processual bound-
ary with the environment; they are also simultaneously responsible in important 
respects for the concrete energetic regulation of the system with the environ-
ment, as is obvious in the case of satisfying hunger and thirst. This aspect fits per-
fectly well with Di Paolo’s further elaboration of the notion of “precariousness”:
Precarious circumstances are those in which isolated constituent processes will tend 
to run down or extinguish in the absence of the organization of the system in an oth-
erwise equivalent physical situation. In other words, individual constituent processes 
are not simply conditioned (e. g., modulated, adjusted, modified, or coupled to other 
processes) but they also depend for their continuation on the organizational network 
they sustain. (Di Paolo 2009, 16)
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It is obvious that with this characterization Di Paolo focuses mainly on system 
constituent processes and the role of precarious circumstances in the operational 
closure and mutual interdependence of the components. Their dynamical exis-
tence depends on the entire organization of the network. Nevertheless, when the 
entire organism survives by changing and adapting its behavior and satisfying its 
basic energetic needs such as hunger or thirst, the defining description of precar-
ious circumstances is fulfilled as well.
These aspects of enactivism are of major significance for the extended mind 
debate. The interactive adaptivity of autonomous systems is related to both the 
self-generation and self-preservation of the system and to the co-constitution of 
the environment. As Thompson puts it, an autonomous system “enacts its own 
identity and makes sense of the world from the perspective of that identity” 
(Thompson 2007, 153). Furthermore, this perspective is normative in charac-
ter and is rooted in the autonomous system as the center of activity (Di Paolo, 
Rhode, and De Jaeger 2010, 39). This sense-making capacity and normative 
engagement with the world is, according to the enactive approach, the mark of 
cognition and meaning (Di Paolo 2009, 15).
This implies that the coupling between a system and its environment is not 
a symmetrical relation. Organisms mediate and enact their thermodynamically 
far-from-equilibrated states as centers of activity at different levels of complex-
ity (Di Paolo 2009, 15). Humans can deliberate, for example, about the con-
sequences of environment pollution and make plans to ensure their access to 
clean drinkable water in the distant future. This specification of the asymmetric 
(autonomous) system-environment relation allows further distinctions and infer-
ences that are missing in the system-environment approach of EM.
Enactivism offers a very basic criterion for cognition and mental processes, 
namely the notion of sense-making. According to the enactive approach, even the 
simplest organisms possess cognitive capacities. This emphasizes a strong con-
tinuity between life and mind (Thompson 2007, 157 ff.; see Spahn, this volume). 
What this enactive conviction does not imply – as Richard Menary wrongly 
supposes – is that every living system also has conscious experiences (Menary 
2015, 3). Whether the latter is the case is still a matter of debate and requires fur-
ther exploration. Nevertheless, the continuity approach towards mind and life is 
very promising as a starting point for evaluating the extended mind hypothesis. 
It offers an alternative to the unsolved problem faced by EM, that “the mental is 
itself too disunified to count as a scientific kind” (Clark 2010b, 63). I will delin-
eate the general reasons for this assumption in the next two paragraphs before 
applying the resulting distinctions to the realization of memory formation.
2.2 Non-Locality and Unified Autonomous Systems
As we have seen, PP in EM creates the obvious problem of “externalizing the 
internal,” a challenge for which the complementary principle is itself no appro-
priate remedy. This problem does not occur in the enactive approach because 
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4 Rowlands misses this decisive point when he concludes from his assessment of the enactive 
approach that sensorimotor enactivism is committed to internalism (see Rowlands 2009, 61).
cognition is conceived as a relational property or process that emerges in inter-
action by means of the regulation of coupling with the environment (Di Paolo 
2009, 19).
This implies that cognition is neither internalist nor externalist as Thompson 
and Stapleton have pointed out (Thompson and Stapleton 2009, 25). What brings 
forth meaning and value is the (mediated) coordination of autonomous systems 
with their environment (Di Paolo, Rohde, and De Jaegher 2010, 51).4
Moreover, with its concept of autonomous systems, enactivism offers a for-
mal model and research tool that has the explanatory resources for identify-
ing a unity that might consist of different components. This is so because the 
concept of autonomous systems is not bound to organisms conceived as auto- 
poietic systems. In this context, proponents of enactivism have argued that sys-
tems like the immune system, or intercorporeal synchronizations in mutual inter-
actions such as dance or dialogue, are emergent autonomous systems (Thompson 
2007, 419; see Barandiaran 2016). Such emergent autonomous systems by means 
of inter-bodily relationships have also been termed participatory sense-mak-
ing (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007; Di Paolo, Rohde, and De Jaegher 2010, 
71).
Why are these distinctions important for the extended mind debate and 
embodied memory formation? I will illustrate this with the example of habitus 
formation. This concept can already be traced back to Aristotle’s use of hexis, 
which is frequently characterized as the socially acquired dispositions of think-
ing and acting that become second nature. They include styles of acting within 
a group, the specific posture of the body but also the normative-based incor-
poration of values. From the enactive perspective, the formation of recurrent 
and stabilized habits are emergent autonomous systems. Intentional behavior is 
conceptualized as a sensorimotor achievement. If we assume that a sensorimotor 
system has the plasticity to learn new behavioral patterns, then constant recur-
rent behavior can result in a change of plasticity conceived as the concrete action 
potential of the agent. The latter in turn enforces the stabilization of these recur-
rent behavioral pattern types, generating a mutual interplay that finally results in 
new habits (Di Paolo 2003, 13).
The question is, of course, to what extent the mechanisms of habit formation 
fulfill the criteria of autonomy. When we learn to play an instrument such as a 
violin, the learning process results in emergent stabilized behavioral patterns, 
including the coordination of different limbs and organs of the body (e. g., eye-
hand coordination), brain activity, the entrenched use of an individual violin, 
and conscious processes. All these aspects of the habit formation and skill devel-
opment of playing the violin are mutually dependent and stabilize each other, 
thereby constituting an operationally closed network. Additionally, dynamically 
self-maintaining habits are also the result of selective processes (i. e., one can 
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prefer to learn another instrument instead) and can disintegrate due to invasive 
perturbations or simply when habits are no longer recurrently realized by the 
agent (see Di Paolo 2003). This implies that habits unfold in their network due 
to their adaptive stabilization and self-maintenance. A specific recurrent dynam-
ically achieved form underlies their manifestation. As we will see, such self-main-
taining habits already specify essential features of habitual body memory. These 
aspects enable further distinctions and clarifications that are significant for differ-
entiating between the emergence of new identities such as new memory systems 
and enhanced cognitive abilities by means of embedded individual and collective 
cultural means.
2.3 Phenomenological Considerations and Cognitive Scaffolding
Recapitulating what has been said so far, one could get the impression that the 
enactive approach is merely offering a more detailed framework for understand-
ing the identity of coupled systems. Yet the enactive approach to cognition and 
mentality we have contrasted with EM has already suggested major categorical 
revisions to notions such as “external” or “internal.” Further differences lie in 
the enactive approach’s focus on the phenomenological foundation of the body 
and its integration of tools or prosthesis in its system of movements that are 
crucial for understanding the process of incorporation. The (phenomenologi-
cal) methodological procedure is here to focus not on the body as an intentional 
object but to redirect oneself to the experience of the body as a (partly) “trans-
parent subject,” pre-reflectively perceiving and acting in-the-world (Legrand 
2007, 504; Thompson and Stapleton 2009, 29). From a phenomenological point 
of view, the process of shaping the habitual body is revealed by means of a “kin-
aesthetic reduction.” Elizabeth A. Behnke describes the results of such an inves-
tigation as follows:
I am always and already “making a body” in an ongoing kinaesthetic process that 
privileges some movement possibilities while others are arrested, excluded, curtailed, 
forgotten, or rendered irrelevant. And although this deeply sedimented kinaesthetic 
pattern reflects both my own personal past history and a more pervasive “social shap-
ing” of bodies in a given milieu, all this is being ongoingly “executed” here and now, 
ongoingly carried out in movements and micromovements whose ongoing “how” I can 
begin to inhabit from within, and study, and describe. (Behnke 1997, 188)
These remarks capture in a nutshell many important aspects of memory for-
mation that I will explicate in the next section. What is striking is the foun-
dational specification of “kinaesthetic patterns” in relation to the autonomous 
system approach of habits. Phenomenological investigations enable a qualita-
tively saturated specification of meaningful habits (“personal past history” and 
“socially shaped” meaningful habits), whereas the autonomous system approach 
defines the formal aspects of autonomy. This approach to body, mind, and cog-
nition renders enactivism incompatible with the functional commitments of EM. 
Pre-reflective conscious processes, sense-making, and kinaesthetic patterns form 
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an intertwined unity with regard to the inhabited and experienced habitual body, 
a unity that remains notoriously undetermined in a purely functional re-descrip-
tion.
The phenomenological account also plays a major role in answering the ques-
tion of whether previous “external” items (from the perspective of an autono-
mous system) are incorporated into the kinaesthetic bodily infrastructure (move-
ment possibilities) or merely enhance the capacities of a living body. A famous 
example of the incorporation or “embodying” of environmental items into the 
entire kinaesthetic structure of the habitual body is Merleau-Ponty’s description 
of the blind man with his cane (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 2005, 162). The cane is no 
longer experienced as an object. It is fully integrated into the habitualized senso-
rimotor patterns of the blind man and is “inhabited” as part of the entire feeling 
body so that the world is experienced at the end of the cane. Thompson and Sta-
pleton characterize this as the fulfilment of the “transparency constraint” what 
means that the cane is experienced as part of the perceiving and acting subject 
(Thompson and Stapleton 2009, 29). This leads to the distinction between merely 
using a tool and incorporating it. Or to put it in “autonomous” terms, between 
extending the action potential by means of environmental resources or integrat-
ing it in a newly emerging habitualized kinaesthetic pattern system.
It is striking that Kim Sterelny (2010) uses such phenomenologically inspired 
examples to make a similar distinction between entrenched and individualized 
external cognitive components and merely environmental resources in the con-
text of his scaffolded mind hypothesis. The latter is based on the idea that cogni-
tive skills depend on the mastery of many external resources conceived as “bod-
ies of information” that are not innate. Sterelny explains this by means of the 
niche construction model. Human beings actively structure their environment; 
they adapt to their environment but also adapt the environment to themselves 
(Sterelny 2010, 470). This idea is entirely in line with central tenets of enactivism, 
namely the idea of a co-constitution of the autonomous systems and their envi-
ronment. Humans create tools, social institutions, language, or the externalized 
memory systems mentioned above. This in turn allows the scaffolding of skills 
and knowledge by means of intra- and intergenerational transmissions; in this 
sense, culture provides humans with “a second nongenetic . . . inheritance sys-
tem” (Laland, Odling-Smee, and Feldman 2000, 132).
The case of a batsman with his bat exemplifies, what Sterelny has in mind, 
when he speaks of an individualized and entrenched tool. An expert batsman 
will choose an individual bat that best fits his weight, kinaesthetic patterns and 
balance, etc. After using his bat over a longer period, he can become so attuned to 
it that a substitute bat will feel unsubtle and unwieldy (Sterelny 2010, 474 – 475). 
In this case, the bat is not only individualized but entrenched as well. Sterelny 
thinks that in those circumstances an extension of the body (in the EM sense of 
a coupled system) is actually achieved (Sterelny 2010, 476). In enactive terms, 
a new autonomous system has emerged. By contrast, many external items and 
tools are not extended in this special way. They are interchangeable and con-
tribute to the enhancement and development of the human mind but are not 
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constitutive of the latter. In what follows, I will apply these considerations and 
distinctions to certain aspects of embodied memory formation.
3. Embodied Habitual Memory Formation
As the foregoing elaborations on autonomous systems, incorporation, and scaf-
folding suggest, the differentiation between engrams and exograms in the forma-
tion of memory systems is not only incomplete but in need of major clarification 
as well. I already criticized Donald’s brain-centered idea of engrams as “inter-
nal memory records” (Donald 1991, 314 – 315). Such criticism, of course, does 
not mean denying the central role of the brain in memory formation. Quite the 
contrary, there is empirical evidence that different brain systems are involved in 
realizing distinct functions of the working memory. Gruber and Goschke, for 
instance, have reviewed and evaluated a large amount of research that suggests 
language has a major impact on the realization of working memory capacities:
The first of these working memory systems relies on prefronto-parietal and prefron-
to-temporal cortical networks and appears to be also involved in the top-down modu-
lation of domain-specific sensory association areas towards task-relevant information. 
The second and probably phylogenetically more recent system comprises mainly left-
hemispheric premotor and parietal brain regions which also underlie language func-
tions, including inner speech and verbal rehearsal. We propose that this second system 
plays a central role in the retrieval and maintenance of verbal representations of goals 
and task rules during the advance preparation for a novel task. (Gruber and Goschke 
2004, 106)
These findings indicate the important role of cortical networks in the realization 
of memory capacities and their embeddedness in the cultural niche (especially 
the second working memory); however, they do not justify the further claim that 
memories are somewhere stored in the brain as engrams, retrieved by autocu-
ing mechanisms or triggered in suitable circumstances. As the previous examples 
already made clear, the emergence of networks by the acquiring of new skills 
(learning to play the violin) involves not only the brain but the entire kinaes-
thetic (re)configuration of the body. This implies that the past is “sedimented” 
in stabilized movement patterns. An experienced car driver does not require that 
the process of driving is supplemented by various reflective conscious mental 
acts of recollection. Nevertheless, the pre-reflectively executed acts are obviously 
rooted in past experiences.
Taking different aspects of habitual pattern formation together, Edward S. 
Casey suggests the following characterization of habitual body memory from a 
phenomenological research perspective, namely that it is “an active immanence 
of the past in the body that informs present bodily actions in an efficacious, 
 orienting, and regular manner” (Casey [1984] 2000, 149). As Casey further 
points out, the incessant efficacy of the past also in-forms present bodily actions. 
It structures current behavior with regard to personal and collectively acquired 
and transferred traditions and is also very important for orientation in new 
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 situations. Arriving at new places, we tend to establish very quickly new groups 
of habits, such as to take the correct seat at a table, etc. (Casey [1984] 2000, 
151).
The juxtaposition of exograms and engrams is in danger of missing the strong 
embodied foundation of memory capacities that is also highlighted by Don-
ald’s early specification of the transformative powers of exograms on the human 
mind. In this regard, it is certainly true that external memory is a “critical feature 
of modern human cognition” (Donald 1991, 312). The creation of larger memory 
systems is scaffolded in significant ways by new external symbolic storage sys-
tems such as libraries or computer networks. Such devices and storage systems 
are part of the cultural niche and are part of a very effective cultural inheritance 
system. But this does not mean that individual humans with their biological 
memories are “monads” that are merely integrated as nodes in the larger exter-
nal symbolic memory system (Donald 1991, 313). This picture misses important 
levels of habitual memory foundation and their consequences at different levels 
of explanation. I will indicate some of these levels and consequences in the para-
graph below.
3.1 Embodied Memories and the Emergence  
of Inter-Bodily Habitual Memory Systems
When Casey refers to the deeply sedimented “active immanence of the past” and 
its regulating character on the present, it would be a gross misunderstanding to 
conceive the constitution of these memory patterns as confined to monadic brain 
processes. Learning to fabricate tools by apprenticeship, or learning to dance or 
program a computer frequently require the mutual coordination and synchro-
nization of behavior among different agents. Imitative capacities are required to 
learn such complex skills as playing the piano, using tools to construct techno-
logical devices, or learning a language. Donald himself has explained in detail 
that the refinement and evolutionary development of mimetic capacities are 
one important step towards the emergence of symbolic skills (see Donald 1991, 
2001). Imitating goals and the means to realize them is sometimes regarded as the 
hallmark of bodily mimesis and involves the understanding of intentions (goals) 
within the intersubjective realm (Zlatev, Persson, and Gärdenfors 2005, 8; see 
Zlatev, this volume). These skills are required for tool use and the ability to teach 
them to conspecifics and to pass on this knowledge to the next generation. This 
explains why a cumulative cultural evolution depends to a large extent on imita-
tive learning (Tomasello 2001, 138; see Wulf, this volume).
As already indicated, the latter enables the accumulation of modified cultural 
techniques and their adaptation to a variety of functions which has established an 
efficient non-genetic intergenerational learning transfer at the cultural level. This 
does not exclude, however, that cultural and genetic mechanisms of inheritance 
are mutually intertwined (cf. Deacon, this volume). This process of accumulating 
procedural capacities and implicit knowledge is nothing other than the emer-
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gence of an embodied self-sustaining collective cultural memory system that has 
its roots in the expansion and refinement of intersubjectively based bodily cap-
acities. The constitution of the latter is explained in more detail by what Thomas 
Fuchs and Tom Froese have termed the “inter-bodily memory” or “intercor-
poreal memory” (Froese and Fuchs 2012):
From early childhood on, patterns of interaction are sedimented in the infant’s implicit 
or bodily memory, resulting in what may be called inter-bodily or “intercorporeal 
memory” . . . This means a pre-reflective, practical knowledge of how to interact with 
others – e. g. how to share pleasure, elicit attention, avoid rejection, re-establish contact, 
etc. (ibid., 213)
These reflections on sedimented patterns of former interactions in early child-
hood show that the habitual body memory is not simply in-formed by intercor-
poreal relationships. What emerges are rather new intercorporeal autonomous 
memory systems. Emotional synchronization and imitation are key elements for 
specifying and exploring how these procedural skills and habits integrate dif-
ferent agents into a new memory system network that comprises shared emo-
tions, mutual perspectives, and social encounters. Already from the second 
month of life, infants and adults share feelings and affects and attune to each 
other by means of different action patterns in “protoconversations” (Stern 1985, 
217; Trevarthen 1989). These are dyadic forms of social interaction, in which 
adults and infants touch, smile, move, or gaze in an affectionate, rhythmical, and 
turn-taking manner (Trevarthen and Aitken 2001; Tomasello et al. 2005, 681). A 
good example is the rhythmically coupled hand movement of an infant during 
the speech of an adult (Trevarthen and Aitken 2001, 4). Such interactions lead 
to an inter-bodily memory that Froese and Fuchs (2012) describe as practical 
knowledge. These descriptions conform to the enactive criteria of autonomous 
systems because the creation and maintenance of the (single) habitual body and 
the intercorporeal memory system depend on the dynamic process of a mutual 
co-constitution.
As the above quotation makes clear, these informing processes are also acces-
sible to phenomenological explanation. Behnke’s analysis of the kinaesthetic 
reduction, mentioned above, already indicate that the formation of kinaesthetic 
movements reveals not only skill habits but also the “social shaping” of the body 
(Behnke 1997, 188). This points to the sociocultural dimension of the intercor-
poreal memory that is constituted by a culturally based sense-making process, as 
Bourdieu’s famous passage on “body hexis” makes clear:
Body hexis speaks directly to the motor function, in the form of a pattern of postures 
that is both individual and systematic, because linked to a whole system of techniques 
involving the body and tools, and charged with a host of social meanings and values. 
(Bourdieu 1977, 87)
Through the acquired skills and enduring dispositions of intercorporeal interac-
tions, the manifold facets of cultural evolution are ingrained as “second nature” 
into the human body (Bourdieu 1990, 56). It would be wrong, however, to 
suppose that there is only a culturally induced top-down shaping of the body 
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memory. On the contrary, the constitution of intercorporeal memories also 
enables the use and further development of external storage symbol systems 
from the “bottom up.” This becomes clearer if one looks at the transformatory 
effects on cognition of the process of embodied enculturation. The use of sym-
bolic systems such as written language or mathematical symbols results in the 
transformation of cognitive abilities, abilities which are then sustained by the 
acquisition of new habitualized skills. To give an example, the practice of using 
tools such as pencils and paper leads to (i) new sensorimotor abilities to manipu-
late those items in public and (ii) to a redeployment of neural circuits (Menary 
2015, 9). Hence, exograms do not only shape the habitual body but are also 
sustained by the reorganization and emergence of embodied abilities and dis-
positions that facilitate and stabilize the fabrication and maintenance of cultural 
based technologies.
How do these – admittedly sketchy – considerations compare with an EM 
approach to embodied habitual memory formation? With the aid of the enac-
tive distinctions discussed in the previous section, one can differentiate between 
the emergence of new memory systems and the mere extension or enhancement 
of memory capacities. Intersubjective relations such as the incessantly repeated 
imitation of the parent’s posture, voice, and emotional expression generate a 
long-lasting intercorporeal habitual memory system, consisting of the shared 
procedural memories of the child and her parents that are expressed in all kinds 
of bodily performances.
One could reply that inter-bodily memory systems are not autonomous sys-
tems in the sense defined in the previous section. The reason is that the coup-
ling between the child and her parents are – despite their intimate relationship – 
 fleeting in character (they are merely an effect of short temporal intervals). 
However, the decisive point is that in this case the incessantly repeated (mutual) 
imitations and their modifications lead to sedimented habitual dispositions that 
are actualized in a variety of encounters in dyadic or larger interactions in the 
family context. In such circumstances, a closed network is instantiated and deter-
mines the scope of possible interaction. This network consists of shared emo-
tions, expressions, and meanings that mutually depend on each other and which 
maintain the identity of the system. This does not mean that every interaction 
that enhances the mutual memory capacities of the child and her parents in a 
given situation (playing a memory game or looking at family photos of holiday 
scenes) is incorporated in the inter-bodily habitual memory system as defined 
above.
It is one virtue of enactivism that it offers a criterion for why those newly 
established autonomous systems are cognitive systems in the first place. Inter-
bodily habitual memory systems are the outcome of sense-making processes. 
When agents are synchronized in coupled actions, new autonomous systems 
emerge with socio-culturally meaningful patterns that are the outcome of partici-
patory sense-making processes (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007; Di Paolo, Rohde, 
and De Jaegher 2010, 71). The key question is now how these findings are related 
to distributed memory research in the realm of EM.
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3.2 Distributed Memory Research
It is the merit of second-wave extended mind theorists such as John Sutton to 
focus their research on socially distributed forms of remembering in multifarious 
ways (see Sutton et al. 2010; Michaelian and Sutton 2013). This is a very import-
ant approach in memory research for a closer understanding of the emergence 
of the human mind and the social self. The formation of embodied memory 
is, of course, not exhausted by the habitual memory systems described above. 
Kourken Michaelian and John Sutton describe the phenomenon of distributed 
memory in general terms as follows:
Whatever their evolutionary history, activities of remembering in human beings are 
(as we noted above) notably diverse, often involving not only multiple interconnected 
neural systems, but also bodily practices and external resources of many distinctive 
kinds. Such is, at least, the view of theorists who see remembering as “distributed,” as 
spread over, coupled with, situated among, or incorporating heterogeneous resources 
beyond the brain. (Michaelian and Sutton 2010, 3)
As we have seen, only if one augments this description of distributed memory 
with a purely functionalist approach to mind and cognition does this concept 
come into conflict with an enactivist framework of memory research.
What is at stake for a distributed and enactive memory approach is, for exam-
ple, to explore how the scaffolding of cognitive abilities in cultural niches can 
extend and result in new identities by means of new cultural inventions such as 
language. The personal self or personal identity is a striking outcome of cultural 
evolution. It requires, amongst other things, the phylo- and ontogenetic emer-
gence of different memory systems. In addition to the procedural or habitual 
memory, the constitution of the personal (narrative) self depends on the devel-
opment of episodic and semantic memory systems. The former refers to specific 
events and circumstances that have a source in space and time and are autobi-
ographical in nature (Baars and Gage [2007] 2010, 325). Semantic memories are, 
by contrast, not related to specific episodes (they are more context independent) 
but connected with “a feeling of knowing” that is not based on the entire recol-
lections of events (Baars and Gage [2007] 2010, 325).
I want briefly to indicate how the enactive approach can also fruitfully con-
tribute to distributed memory research in this domain of higher-order mem-
ory capacities. In their historical sketch of current distributed memory research, 
Michaelian and Sutton (2013) present Daniel Wegner’s theory of a transactive 
memory systems. The central tenet of this theory is the conviction that trans-
active memories consist of individuals’ memory capacities and their ability to 
actively communicate recollections between them (Wegner, Giuliano, and Hertel 
1985, 256). As Wegner and colleagues put it:
It is common in theorizing about the thoughts and memories of individuals to posit an 
organizational scheme that allows the person to connect thoughts with one another – 
retrieving one when the other is encountered, and so forth. In a dyad, this scheme is 
complicated somewhat by the fact that the individual memory stores are physically 
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separated. Yet it is perfectly reasonable to say that one partner may know, at least to a 
degree, what is in the other’s memory. Thus, one’s memory is “connected” to the oth-
er’s, and it is possible to consider how information is arranged in the dyadic system as 
a whole. (ibid.)
The enactive approach offers a theoretical framework for how one can concep-
tualize and explore this dyadic personal relationship in autonomous terms. It 
can cope, for instance, with the challenge mentioned in the quotation concerning 
“individual memory stores” which are “physically separated.” In enactivism a 
dyad or inter-bodily relationship is not conceived as consisting of “two boxes” 
that contain individual memories. Instead, habitual memories are already collec-
tively shaped at the purely habitual level by means of cultural mechanisms such 
as emotional attunement or imitations as well as explicit instructions in learning 
processes (Tomasello 1999, 39). This points to the fact highlighted above that 
external symbol systems and verbal language also in-form the body memory in 
important respects (think of Bourdieu’s concept of “body hexis”).
Moreover, in the actual inter-bodily encounter between two persons their 
shared habitual body memories (moods, explicit emotions, skills, meanings, and 
the like) are emergent features of the entire intercorporeal autonomous system. 
This indicates two possible interpretations of Wegner’s transactive memory sys-
tems. He seems to favor a purely causal reading of these autobiographical mem-
ories as verbalized during the conversation (“one’s memory is ‘connected’ to the 
other’s”). This impression gets even stronger when we read that “one person may 
know, at least to a degree, what is in the other’s memory.” In this case, the shared 
memories consist merely of already existing individual personal memories which 
are then more easily retrieved via interaction.
However, it is plausible to suppose that verbalized memories also exist that 
are constituted during the dual narrative memory discourse. Why may this be 
so? When formerly pre-reflective shared experiences of a concrete event X (we 
were both immersed in the experience of an overwhelmingly beautiful landscape 
and our shared feelings towards the landscape) are verbalized during the process 
of mutual recollection, the symbolic representation of X can also be an emergent 
feature of the entire transactive memory discourse. In such circumstances, X is 
a recollection in a verbalized symbolic format that is the result of (a) shared ex- 
periences and (b) a common transformation of this content into a conceptualized 
representation of X.
Wegner and colleagues hesitate to extend this model of dyadic memory sys-
tems to larger groups (Wegner, Giuliano, and Hertel 1985, 257). But there seems 
no logical reason why we could not extend this transactive memory model to 
collectives and societies. A comparison in an enactive research framework with 
the concept of collective memories appears especially promising (Halbwachs 
1939).
These reflections on the transactive memory model open up further research 
perspectives and indicate how distributed memory research and an enactive 
approach to remembering and recollection could fruitfully work together.
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Conclusion
As the foregoing reflections make clear, an enactive approach to memory forma-
tion is not simply complementary to that of EM. Proponents of enactivism do 
not share the functional approach to mind and cognition that unites the first- and 
second-wave of EM. This has important implications for memory research.
First, with its autonomous system theory and the concept of sense-making, 
the enactive approach offers research tools and explanatory resources that are 
better suited to explain phenomena such as incorporation, the identity of a system 
or simply the extension or enhancement of skills and action potentials. Whether 
Otto’s notebook is actually part of a new emerging memory system depends 
on its integration with an operationally closed network and its circular self-sus-
taining relations with other processes of the system. Furthermore, the enactive 
approach has developed criteria for the specification of cognitive processes that 
are missing in EM (both first- and second-wave EM).
Second, an indispensable strand of enactive memory research are phenomeno-
logical based studies on embodied and intercorporeal aspects of memory forma-
tion. The phenomenological foundation of the body and its integration of tools 
or prostheses in the kinaesthetic movement-system of the living body are cru-
cial for understanding the process of incorporation by means of a “kinaesthetic 
reduction” and the criterion of “partial transparency.” As already mentioned, 
these phenomenological approaches stand in sharp contrast to functional exter-
nalism. Intentionality, meaning, and the entire qualitative dimension of memo-
ries receive a foundation in reflective and pre-reflective conscious experiences. 
Furthermore, a concept such as the habitual body memory is well-suited as a 
starting point for a phenomenologically based cultural anthropology (see Csor-
das 1990).
Third, despite these differences between classical enactivism and EM, there 
are also significant options for fruitful cooperation in embodied memory 
research. It is undeniable that, for instance, Donald’s and Sutton’s research on 
evolutionary and cultural memory formation (symbolic storage systems and 
socially distributed forms of remembering) have a high explanatory value for 
memory research at different levels of explanation. The same is true for theo-
ries such as cognitive scaffolding (see Sterelny 2010) or cognitive integration (see 
Menary 2007). Enactivism needs to integrate many of these research insights and 
tools in order to augment, for instance, the exploration – from an evolutionary 
perspective – of the role of participatory sense-making in the constitution of 
the human mind. The same is true for an interdisciplinary research of memory 
formation.
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Radically Enactive Numerical Cognition
Karim Zahidi / Erik Myin
Abstract: We deal with the general question of how culture affects cognition by look-
ing at numerical cognition. After presenting radical enactivism, according to which con-
tentful cognition arises only with the emergence of truth telling practices, we confront 
recent research about the origins of numerical cognition. We contest readings of some of 
the empirical data, according to which numerical cognition predates culture. We argue 
that REC-friendly interpretations of the data are not only possible but preferable, as they 
avoid the staunch theoretical problems which plague cognitivist readings.
Introduction
How does the emergence of culture affect cognition? What changes when skillful 
and cognitively flexible creatures engage in the extensive cooperative endeavor 
called society? Perhaps surprisingly, the view of cognition which has been dom-
inant now for several decades views the transition to culture as having relatively 
modest effects. Here is why. According to the standard view, whenever there is 
intelligence, there is both representation and computation. Any kind of cogni-
tion-driven behavior beyond the simplest reflex-like reactions to the immediate 
surroundings requires computational operations on contentful internal represen-
tations.1 Thus, memory-based navigation in for example both insects (Gallistel 
1998) and rodents (Tolman 1948) has been understood as relying on the compu-
tational manipulation of internal representational entities, be it symbols or maps. 
In providing such explanations, the representationalist / computationalist view 
thus assumes that there is representation and computation at a very early stage. If 
this view is taken literally, it follows that the emergence of culture does not, in an 
important sense, fundamentally change the nature of cognition. Cognition was 
already contentful and computational before culture, so culture does nothing to 
change that.2 Of course, culture can make profound differences with respect to 
what can be represented, and perhaps also in what can be computed, as well in 
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the fact that contents can now be externalized and communicated. Nonetheless, 
the basic picture of representation plus computation as the core of cognition 
remains untouched.
It is possible to hold on to the traditional view – or something like it – with-
out being led to such an epiphenomenalist view of the power of culture by either 
deflating the notions of representation and computation, or by taking a fiction-
alist stance. Deflationary and fictionalist positions allow one to hold that there 
is a fundamental difference between the representations and computations in, 
for example, ants and language-using humans, because representations and com-
putations in the former are less substantial, or even fictional. The deflationary 
move thus consists in minimizing one’s commitments when one uses the words 
‘representation’ or ‘computation.’ For example, one could hold that representa-
tion does not require truth or accuracy conditions. Clearly, deflationism isn’t an 
assertive position, but rather one of retreat. The worry, however, is that after the 
main, and originally motivating commitments with respect to the core notions of 
the representationalist / cognitivist view are withdrawn, all that remains is a label 
and not a substantive and distinctive notion, which can then do genuine explan-
atory work. Fictionalists, on the other hand, insist that ‘representation’ can do 
such explanatory work while being entirely fictional. They hold that explanatory 
virtue and existence can come apart: fictional entities can be perfectly used for 
explanations, even if they do not exist at all. Again, this raises important con-
cerns. If, in many cases, the explanations one is after in the sciences of cognition, 
are causal, it remains to be shown by the fictionalist how purely fictional entities 
can figure in such explanations. Surely, what does not exist cannot be a cause 
(Hutto and Myin, forthcoming).
There are other options than going deflationary or fictionalist. However, these 
positions are still predicated on endorsing the main tenets of the traditional view. 
A more radical move is to simply deny that representation and computation do 
form the basis of all intelligent behavior. An approach that does just that is REC, 
or Radically Enactive / Embodied Cognition (Hutto and Myin 2013). We want to 
highlight REC here, and, taking arithmetic as our main example, argue that REC 
allows for a more satisfactory position about basic minds, minds in culture, and 
their relation.
1. Basic Minds without Content: The REC View3
According to REC, as presented and defended in Hutto and Myin (2013), cog-
nition is not always representational, and does not always involve computation. 
REC holds that basic forms of cognition are best understood in terms of dynam-
ically unfolding interactions with the environment, rather than being explained 
in terms of computational operations on contentful representational entities. In 
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denying that basic cognition is contentful, REC does not deny that basic cog-
nition is intentional, or directed at specific aspects of the environment. That is, 
acts of perceptual, motor, or perceptuomotor cognition – chasing and grasping 
a swirling leaf for example – are directed towards worldly objects and states of 
affairs, or aspects thereof, yet without representing them. This is intentionality 
without intensionality – the latter understood in the traditional sense of “rep-
resenting as,” which does not allow substitution of co-referential expressions.
REC does not claim that cognition never involves content, a position termed 
“Really Radical Enactivism” in Hutto and Myin (2013). Unlike Really Radical 
Enactivism, REC does not deny that the idea of content, specified, for exam-
ple, in terms of truth, or truth conditions, makes sense paradigmatically in the 
realm of language. The distinction between applying a term correctly or incor-
rectly, between speaking the truth and speaking falsely is valid at least for some 
instances of speaking. Other public items like maps or diagrams might involve 
content as well, on the condition that their use is grounded in appropriate norms 
connected with language. According to REC, and reasoning by elimination, 
intelligent or cognitive organismic activities, unless they rely on public represen-
tations embedded in established sociocultural practices, are not contentful, and 
hence not representational.
The arguments in Hutto and Myin (2013) for the existence of basic minds, 
without content, unfolded along two tracks. First, it was pointed out that, for 
an expanding range of cognitive phenomena, from motor activities to percep-
tion, explanations are forthcoming which do not involve content. Here a “Don’t 
Need” strategy was relied upon, similar to the one followed by our fellow 
non-representationalist Tony Chemero (2009). Secondly, there was a “Can’t 
Have” strategy, arguing that, currently, and after having tried what seemed to be 
the best resources, no theoretical motivation could be provided for the existence 
of content beyond what’s established as contentful at the sociocultural level. The 
idea of contentful, yet basic minds, is unsupported, so Hutto and Myin (2013) 
claimed. In line with this the foundational problem was identified as “The Hard 
Problem of Content.”
2. RECkoning4
REC’s view on representation is paralleled by its take on computation. That is, 
just as representation is, in REC, not taken to form a basic ingredient of cog-
nition, so neither is computation. Just like representation, computation is an 
achievement, arrived at only in a specific sociocultural context. This inverts the 
place assigned to computation within the standard picture held in cognitive sci-
ence. Instead of an explanans, computation becomes an explanandum, and the 
explanation has to be achieved via a natural history that details how computa-
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tional practices arise out of noncomputational precursors. By providing such a 
genetic story of computation, REC aims to truly account for computation in 
contrast to assuming computation as a basic, and fundamentally unaccounted 
for, ingredient in nature.
How could such a story go? Computation only got started, so the REC story 
goes, with the emergence of practices of counting, and simple arithmetical oper-
ations such as, initially adding, subtracting, and multiplying. Flegg (2002) pro-
vides an illuminating overview of the main lines along which a natural history 
of computation unfolds. He makes clear that before arithmetical calculation can 
develop, simpler practices, including the practice of counting, have to be in place. 
Counting, as Flegg notes, is in itself “an advanced process; it is by no means an 
instinctive and innate process as it might appear to be” (Flegg 2002, 10). Indeed, 
before counting can arise, specific perceptual and motoric processes need to be in 
place. Perceptual abilities such as distinguishing size and shape are prerequisites 
for counting. But such perceptual abilities are not enough. Counting seems to 
have arisen out of the application of motoric abilities to put sets of objects into 
one-to-one correspondence. A rationale for the emergence of such practices of 
establishing one-to-one correspondences might be found in the practical neces-
sities of communal life in social groups. Especially in agricultural communities in 
which cattle were a valuable asset, one can see how the ability to check whether 
any animals were missing from one’s flock is important. While it is plausible to 
suggest that the pairing of objects could have been first done by using collections 
that were ready at hand, for example body parts or members of the family, this 
technique is impractical when the target collections are too large. Hence, the 
need arises for a technique that works for large collections, such as practices like 
pairing off objects from the target collection with objects from a dedicated col-
lection of token objects (such as shells). Although this technique allows for the 
inspection of larger collections of objects, it is also highly impractical, in that one 
is required to carry around a dedicated set of objects. To overcome these limita-
tions, one thus needs a technique that would allow one to produce such collec-
tions on the spot. A possible solution to this problem is the practice of tallying, 
which arose in the Upper Paleolithic, by which one made inscriptions on a stick 
or knots in a piece of rope – each mark or knot representing one object of the 
collection to be surveyed.5 Arguably, it was this practice that served as a founda-
tion for and precursor to the symbolic representation of number.
The practice of counting does however require more than the ability to put 
different collections in a one-to-one correspondence. It also requires an aware-
ness of order. Following Flegg, such an awareness can arise from the practice 
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of pairing off objects with body parts, in particular fingers, since they come in 
a natural order. The importance of the use of ordered body parts to pair off 
objects is crucial. There are, as Flegg notes, no examples of cultures where the 
ability to count has arisen without there being a “history of an earlier stage of 
body or finger matching” (Flegg 2002, 9). All of this further highlights the role of 
embodied practices in the origins of counting. Tellingly, specific number words 
can be seen to be directly related to those parts of the body used to pair off cer-
tain collections as in this actual sequence of early number words: “the end one is 
bent, another is bent, the middle one is bent, one is still left, the hand has died” 
(Flegg 2002, 10).
Once such linguistic practices were in place, counting, properly understood, 
had arisen. As language and linguistic practices further evolve, number words 
can become more and more separated from the embodied practices and body 
parts that were involved in early counting. However, this separation still does not 
account for the emergence of abstract number concepts. As Flegg notes:
There is much evidence from linguistics to suggest that for a long time they [number 
words] were directly associated with the particular objects being counted. At this stage, 
three sheep could be distinguished from two sheep and three fingers from two fingers, 
but the abstract appreciation of three and two was yet to be understood. Even after he 
had devised effective methods of counting, it was a long time before awareness of num-
ber in the abstract was achieved. (Flegg 2002, 11)
Flegg goes on to document how the embodied nature of counting gives rise to 
the elementary arithmetical operations such as adding and subtracting. Here 
again two important points need emphasis. Firstly, these operations were always 
dependent on the context and the objects: one could, for example, add the num-
ber of sheep or the number of sacks of grain, but there initially was no notion of 
abstract addition. In its most basic form, addition would be performed by phys-
ically putting together two collections, say of sacks of grain, of the appropriate 
cardinality and then counting the number of sacks in the amalgamated collec-
tion. At a later stage this was done by associating the number of sacks of grain 
in each collection with fingers (or tallies) and then counting the total number of 
fingers (or tallies). Note that we find, once again, that the operations performed 
were always context- or object-sensitive. Even when addition was performed by 
counting fingers or tallies, there was still no notion of abstract number or abstract 
arithmetical operations. A true appreciation of the abstract nature of number, so 
Flegg argues, only emerged possibly as late as the first millennium B. C.:
We are still faced with the problem of putting some rough date on man’s becoming 
aware of numbers in the abstract, or at least suggesting where this might fit into our 
history of counting. Obviously, this would have been a gradual process which would 
have come about at different times in different places. In the case of some of the more 
undeveloped tribes to be found today, it has still not occurred. It is certainly a later 
occurrence than the invention of any of the counting systems which we have consid-
ered. Apart from evidence of tallying, written mathematical records go back approx-
imately to 3000 B. C. Such ancient records are very largely associated with practical 
applications of number, though there are occasions where we find calculation carried 
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out apparently for its own sake. It is reasonable to suggest that awareness of number in 
the abstract had its beginnings around this time or fairly soon after, though it did not 
become an influential part of mathematical thinking until the time of the Pythagoreans, 
that is, roughly the middle of the first millennium before Christ. (Flegg 2002, 34)
We have only briefly sketched the emergence of arithmetic, leaving out much 
of the details. However, this overview still provides theoretical and evidential 
support for the RECish idea that genuinely abstract numerical and arithmetical 
abilities only arise in a context in which the sociocultural practices of language 
are well in place. In line with REC’s views on content in general, contentful 
statements about numbers, and the arithmetic operations to which they can be 
subjected too, require – in order to be made at all – that the truth telling prac-
tices, without which there are no contents, pre-exist. Of course, arithmetical abil-
ities don’t arise out of nothing. They do have precursors, but the abilities out of 
which arithmetic arises are not arithmetical abilities themselves.
3. The “Number Sense” Revisited
If the above is indeed a plausible sketch of a natural history of the emergence and 
development of basic arithmetic skills, the emergence of arithmetic goes together 
with the ability to engage in contentful norm-governed public practices. In par-
ticular, conceptual abilities relating to the abstract concept of number can only 
arise in organisms that thrive in a symbolically rich environment.6 Species that 
are not able to engage in the contentful norm-governed manipulation of sym-
bols cannot be said to be computing or do arithmetic. By the same token, young 
infants cannot be said to perform numerical tasks. This however seems to fly in 
the face of much work being done in cognitive psychology. There is a large lit-
erature on what is called “animal numerical cognition” (Gallistel 1993; Dehaene 
2011; De Cruz, Neth, and Schlimm 2010) or the numerical abilities of pre-verbal 
infants (Butterworth 1999; Dehaene 2011; Lakoff and Núñez 2000; Devlin 2000; 
De Cruz and De Smedt 2010). Doesn’t the existence of such scientific (sub-)
industry indicate that the view on numbers and computation sketched here is 
wrong? No, it doesn’t. We will argue that despite having gained wide currency 
in scientific practice, describing certain types of behavior as shown by animals or 
pre-verbal infants as a sign of arithmetical competence is not warranted by the 
empirical evidence.
We will focus on the proposal that monkeys have an abstract number concept. 
This claim has been defended by Jordan and collaborators. In a first series of 
experiments, Jordan et al. (2005) showed that rhesus monkeys are able to match 
a sequence of two or three auditory stimuli, the sounds of animals vocalizing, 
with a sequence of two or three visual stimuli, videos showing a chorus of two or 
three animals vocalizing, according to the cardinality of the sequence of stimuli. 
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This provides evidence for the fact that rhesus monkeys have the ability to match 
numerically equal series of ecologically relevant stimuli across different modali-
ties. In a follow-up study, Jordan et al. (2008) extended these results in two ways. 
First, they demonstrated that, after training, the ability to match sequences of 
stimuli across different modalities extended to sequences containing up to nine 
stimuli, thus showing that the numerical range of the ability was much larger 
than the first set of experiments indicated. Secondly, whereas in the first experi-
ments the stimuli were ecologically relevant – voices and images of animals – in 
the subsequent experiments the stimuli were more abstract – squares on a com-
puter screen and simple tones. In the same set of experiments, the researchers 
also showed that rhesus monkeys were able to tally auditory and visual stim-
uli. For example, when presented with two visual and two auditory stimuli, the 
monkey would be more likely to choose, among a set of different arrays, the 
array containing four dots. In what follows, we will refer to these abilities as 
MTA (Modal Transfer Abilities). According to Jordan et al. (2008) their findings
demonstrate that monkeys can sum the number of sounds they hear and the number of 
sights they see. They do so over a large range of numerical values. Ratio dependence in 
accuracy and reaction time suggests that they rely on analog magnitude representations 
of number when performing numerical computations within or between senses. Thus, 
when humans nonverbally quantify sights and sounds in the world around them, they 
are likely tapping an evolutionarily primitive system that monkeys and perhaps many 
other animal species share. (Jordan et al. 2008, 623)
A number of claims are made here. Firstly, it is asserted that the capacities that 
are displayed in the behavior of the monkeys are numerical abilities. Secondly, 
it is stated that the exercise of such abilities relies on internal numerical repre-
sentations, which are analog or approximate in nature. Thirdly and finally, it is 
claimed that at least one of these representational systems is old, in the sense that 
they are a product of evolution and thus are likely present from birth.
Taken alone, and in concert, these claims go against the REC view. If true, 
then the REC view is false. For, contrary to the REC view, representational and 
computational abilities would not be an achievement gained only in culture. The 
concepts of number and of summing would pre-date culture, both on a phyloge-
netic level (since it is present in species that are non-cultural) and on an ontoge-
netic level (since it is present in very young infants). Possession of the concepts 
of number and summation would be manifest in simple perceptual capabilities. 
Those basic capacities would be made possible and would be explained by an 
underlying abstract numerical concept, or representation of number. A more 
developed number concept (or numerical representation) derives from simpler 
number concepts or representations. At least the simplest of number represen-
tations are innate.
We agree that the truth of these claims would effectively put the REC view 
of arithmetic out of business. However, we will argue that it takes a lot more 
conceptual and experimental work to actually establish that the three core claims 
are in fact true. In particular, we will question whether the available data actually 
warrant the description of the MTA as a numerical capability. As such, we will 
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7 The representations are supposed to be analog or approximate because of the fact that al-
though monkeys might be able to discriminate between two items and three items, they are not 
able to distinguish a collection of 23 items from one consisting of 25 items. Hence, it is claimed 
that they are only able to represent numerical information in an approximate sense.
question whether the positing of number representations actually explains the 
MTA. And finally, we will ask whether claims about innateness do anything to 
address the worries we will raise.
The idea that humans and certain other species come equipped with an “evo-
lutionary primitive [number] system” gained widespread currency following 
the publication, in 1997, of the first edition of Dehaene’s The Number Sense 
(Dehaene 2011). According to Dehaene, this number system is an innate repre-
sentational system that uses analog or approximate representation of numbers 
(Approximate Number System, ANS).7 The existence of such a system allegedly 
accounts for various “numerical” abilities of animals and young infants. It is 
thus a system that incorporates basic arithmetical knowledge and hence that 
knowledge is implicitly available from the very early stages of ontogenetic devel-
opment. We will challenge, not the claim that organisms come equipped from 
birth with a repertoire of behaviors, but, firstly, that these behaviors are properly 
numerical, and secondly, that these behaviors are the product of a knowledge or 
representation driven system that operates unconsciously. The general shape of 
our more specific concern has been identified by Sampson:
A social and historical process has been translated into a fundamental psychological 
process. This reification loses the connection between the sociohistorical and the psy-
chological; it raises the psychological to the status of a fundamental property of the 
human mind. (Sampson 1981, 738)
First, consider the terminology of “numerical abilities” with which the literature 
is infused. Such turns of phrase suggest that the behavior of certain species of 
animals and young infants is continuous with the arithmetic abilities of mature 
humans. Or, in other words, that the difference in cognitive behavior between 
animals and mature humans is merely one of degree but not one of kind. For 
example Brannon and Merritt write: “The ability to understand and manipulate 
numbers is a hallmark of human cognition, but the data reviewed in this chapter 
show that such abilities are not unique to humans” (Brannon and Merritt 2011, 
220).
The idea expressed by Brannon and Merritt, and implicitly endorsed by Jor-
dan et al. (2008) and Dehaene (2011) in their description of experimental work, 
leaps from the fact that certain animals and young children show behavior that 
can be described in numerical terms to the conclusion that the behavior is an 
exercise of the same numerical capacity which mature human beings exercise 
when they, for example, manipulate numerical symbols according to the socio-
culturally established norms of arithmetic. In other words, because the animal or 
infant behavior is analogous to a subset of the behavior which we would desig-
nate as numerical in mature humans, it is assumed to be an exercise of numerical 
abilities.
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8 By “independent general or theoretical considerations” we mean considerations which 
do not already presuppose that all cognitive capabilities involve the manipulation of mental 
representations.
However, such a conclusion is not warranted. The kind of behavior that is 
shown by animals and infants could just be a precursor to the acquisition of fully 
numerical, e. g., arithmetic capabilities – exactly in the way we pointed out above, 
and as such its presence would be a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for 
literally having numerical capacities.
Of course, the numerical competence of mature humans includes, besides the 
ability to manipulate the symbols of arithmetic in the appropriate ways, those 
recognitional capacities that are also present in certain animals. However, from 
that observation, it does not follow that the animal’s recognitional capacities 
share some underlying cognitive mechanism with the arithmetic capacities of 
mature human beings. In order to make this inference, one needs three premises 
to hold simultaneously. Firstly, that the recognitional and arithmetical capac-
ities of mature human beings share some underlying cognitive mechanism C. 
Secondly, that C is also present in monkeys. And finally, that C is recognizably 
arithmetical. While it seems plausible to accept the first and second premise on 
the basis of the available evidence and general evolutionary considerations, the 
third premise is supported neither by the available evidence, nor by independent 
general or theoretical considerations.8 If the REC line on computation and rep-
resentation is correct, then simpler capacities at play in the recognitional abilities 
are just that: simpler capacities. The arithmetical capacities are genuinely dif-
ferent. They build on, but go considerably beyond, the simpler capacities such 
as those involved in the kinds of recognition at issue. Part of what makes them 
different is that they are subject to sociocultural norms.
In other words, it is not because we do not hesitate to attribute numerical 
abilities to mature humans, that we should attribute the same abilities to sub-
jects some of whose behaviors are similar. We attribute the numerical ability to 
humans not only because their behavior is in accordance with certain norms, but 
also because they participate in the practices by which those norms are estab-
lished and maintained. In the case of monkeys and young infants, only one of the 
conditions for attributing numerical abilities is satisfied.
The researchers concerned go beyond simply calling the abilities in question – 
in an as yet unwarranted way – “numerical.” They also claim that the abilities 
manifested in the experiments call for an explanation in terms of a representa-
tional system behind the abilities, and, in the case of Stanislas Dehaene,(2011) in 
terms of an innate representational system.
These further moves should be seen in the light of the fact that, in the case 
of the behavior shown in the experiments of Jordan et al. (2008), one needs to 
account for the fact that monkeys are able to connect numerical cues across dif-
ferent modalities. Call this ability the Modal Transfer Ability, or MTA. In dis-
cussing the crossmodal number effect in preverbal children, Dehaene (2011) is 
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9 What we here term the “Problem of Origins” is also raised by Garofoli (this volume) in 
his discussion of mental modules. While he does not contest that the mind might be modular, he 
nonetheless argues that the idea that mental modules, in particular modules that are supposedly 
responsible for culturally variable cognitive functions, are innate, leaves the emergence of these 
modules through phylogeny entirely mysterious.
upfront about the need for, and alleged virtues of, a representational explanation 
for the MTA:
The simplest explanation is that the child really perceives numbers rather than audi-
tory patterns or geometrical configurations of objects. The very same representation 
of number “three” seems to fire in its brain, whether it sees three objects or hears three 
sounds. This internal, abstract, and amodal representation enables the child to notice 
the correspondence between the number of objects on one slide and the number of 
sounds that are simultaneously heard. (Dehaene 2011, 40)
Dehaene’s proposal here is that the observed widening of capacities across 
modalities shown in the experiments can be explained by the presence of an 
amodal representation. It is the activation of this amodal, numerical represen-
tation – its firing in the brain – that “enables” the child to “notice” the similar-
ity in the patterns across the modalities. As it stands, this alleged explanation 
contains a number of important gaps, which invalidate its explanatory potential. 
That is, Dehaene’s account leaves a number of crucial questions unanswered. In 
the first place, it is not specified how the numerical representation is arrived at. 
The obvious answer would be to assume that the abstract amodal representation 
derives from contact with “the auditory patterns or geometrical configurations 
of objects.” This solution is not available to Dehaene, however, because his rea-
soning in the passage cited is driven by the idea that the encounter with such 
auditory stimuli and geometrical patterns is modality specific, and can become 
amodal or abstract only if it is aided by the presence of an amodal representation. 
Applying this reasoning to the question of how one gets from encounters with 
modality specific stimulation to an amodal representation implies the pre-ex-
istence of an amodal representation to get the feat accomplished. Call this the 
Problem of Origin.9 Another key question concerns the efficacy of the (as yet 
unaccounted for) representation. It is said that “this internal, abstract and amodal 
representation enables the child to notice the correspondence between the num-
ber of objects on one slide and the number of sounds that are simultaneously 
heard” . (Dehaene 2011, 40) but for this to become a credible story, much more 
needs to be said both about what amodal representations are and how they bring 
about this enabling. That is, we are not given any information about what makes 
amodal representations representational, rather than just neural processes that 
are causally connected to perceptual systems in different modalities. We have 
not been told which contents are carried by amodal representation or how those 
contents got there, what justifies calling them contents at all, and how they play 
a role in further cognitive processes. Given the absence of any answers to these 
questions, the only property that is specified of the amodal representation is that 
it “enables” the “noticing of the correspondence.” We are told nothing more 
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about the representation over and above the fact that it is the enabler of the 
capacity to be explained, and hence we are not offered a substantive explana-
tion. Call this the Problem of Substance. Given the fact that Dehaene (2011) 
does not give any answer to the Problem of Substance, his claim that the repre-
sentation explains the capacity becomes the claim that the enabler of the capac-
ity explains the capacity. This is obviously true for any enabler, irrespective of 
whether it is representational or non-representational. Since there is nothing in 
the account which precludes non-representational neural processes playing the 
role of enablers, Dehaene’s (2011) account turns out to be, without further elab-
oration, not distinctively representational.
In the absence of answers to the Problems of Origin and Substance, the 
ANS-hypothesis, instead of bringing us closer to an explanation, takes us farther 
away from one.
But perhaps this goes too quickly. It might be pointed out that there is an 
answer to the Problem of Origin, if it is assumed that the representations are 
innate. If this option is taken, it is recognized that, logically, the reason to invoke 
abstract representations  – namely the cognitive impotence of concrete stim-
uli – precludes the possibility that abstract representations are ever acquired in 
a process of interaction with such stimuli. It is only logical, then, that Dehaene 
(2011) actually takes this step. Consider Dehaene’s (2011) justification for the 
ANS-hypothesis as an explanation for the MTA: if there is an ANS, then MTA is 
allegedly explained by the fact that modal-specific cues are mapped onto amodal 
number representations provided by the ANS-system. Modal-specific cues of 
different modalities thus yield different amodal representations that are then 
compared to each other. A further reason to assume that the ANS has to be 
innate is the fact that the MTA is preserved even if the stimuli are ecologically 
non-relevant or ambiguous:
While waiting for conclusive experiments with younger children, it remains possible 
to maintain that learning, rather than brain maturation, is responsible for the baby’s 
knowledge of numerical correspondence between sensory modalities. By dint of hear-
ing single objects emit only one sound, pairs of objects emit two sounds, and so on, 
the baby may discover the nonarbitrary relationship between a number of objects and 
a number of sounds. Yet, is such a return to constructivism plausible? Some objects 
generate more than one sound, others no sound at all. Environmental cues are therefore 
not devoid of ambiguity, and it is highly unclear that they would support any form of 
learning. I therefore suspect that the babies’ preference for a correspondence between 
sounds and objects stems from an innate, abstract competence for numbers. (Dehaene 
2011, 50)
Apparently, it is because contact with “the auditory patterns or geometrical 
configurations of objects” (Dehaene 2011, 40) does not suffice for acquiring the 
abstract concept that one has to assume that the abstract concept is already in 
place before the learning process sets off. But if such reasoning applies to ontog-
eny, it applies to phylogeny as well. To see how this imperils Dehaene’s position, 
consider that either an innate MTA can be accounted for in a naturalistic, scien-
tific way, or it can not. If the MTA can be explained in a naturalistic way, one’s 
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hopes would lie with a selective process in evolutionary phylogeny. But surely 
such process is one of contact with “the auditory patterns or geometrical config-
urations of objects.” If there are principled reasons why such contact is unable 
to lead to abstract capacities in ontogeny, these must apply to phylogeny as well.
In other words, if we agree with Dehaene that environmental stimulation 
lacks the necessary quality to account for the development, through learning, in 
ontogeny, then the same must be true for phylogenetic development. It is dif-
ficult to see how stimuli that are irrelevant for learning could become relevant 
for phylogenetic development. But then if Dehaene’s argument is correct, this 
shows that we cannot give a plausible evolutionary theory of the emergence of 
the MTA. And given the fact that evolutionary biology is the prime candidate 
for furnishing a non-psychological theory for the emergence of MTA, it also 
becomes doubtful whether one can ever give a naturalistic explanation for MTA. 
Thus MTA remains mysterious.
If all of the above is correct, then there is no explanatory advantage what-
soever in assuming an abstract representation when it comes to accounting for 
MTA, irrespective of whether it is innate or not innate. In other words, despite 
claims to the contrary, a cognitivist representational framework offers no explan-
atory advantages over one that eschews representations as explanatory posits. 
Note that adequate performance in a context of objects which are ecologically 
irrelevant or ambiguous does nothing to change this verdict. Even if observa-
tions of such behavior might point in the direction of innateness, it does nothing 
to favor an innate abstract representational system such as the ANS. That is, 
the REC position does not preclude innate mechanisms. It only opposes innate 
structures such as the ANS, and in particular the reasoning which leads to the 
alleged necessity of positing a representational structure of its kind.
But if the explanation of the MTA will not be representational, how will it go? 
Obviously, it will invoke perceptual capacities, and the ways in which creatures 
learn to treat similar things or situations as perceptually similar, and as allowing 
for similar activity with respect to them. There is a rich tradition of non-rep-
resentational research on this issue, for example in Gibsonian ecological psy-
chology. It describes how acquiring perceptual sensitivities involves becoming 
sensitive to certain environmental variables, something which does not logically 
require representing those variables (Gibson 1979).
Perhaps, the development of certain perceptual capacities, such as seeing 
numerical similarity between two situations, proves only to be possible for 
organisms if they already possess the capacity to perform certain actions. For 
example, perhaps the ability to see equinumerosity in different modalities derives 
from a prior capacity to spatially collect or separate equinumerous amounts of 
objects – to treat one object differently than a collection of two, three, . . . objects, 
for example by segregating them in space. Having acquired those capacities for 
action might then explain the capacity for enriched perception.
These are speculations, of course. The crucial point remains that there are 
strong logical reasons against, and no compelling evidence for, the supposition 
that the matching abilities of monkeys and young infants can serve as evidence 
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for the postulation of a genuinely representational abstract system such as the 
ANS. The introduction of the ANS is, as it stands, a non-explanation. Contrary 
to what a cursory look at the findings of the young science of “numerical cogni-
tion” might indicate, these findings therefore do not put the REC view, that there 
are no numerical concepts prior to culture, out of business.
Conclusion
Our argument shows that the reliance on Dehaene’s ANS-hypothesis to account 
for certain behaviors has no explanatory value, as long as the Problems of Origin 
and Substance are not met. Repudiating Dehaene’s ANS-hypothesis and thus 
denying the numerical nature of the basic capabilities of certain primates and 
young infants rescues the general cultural approach to mathematical cognition 
from foundational problems that plague mental representational accounts.
In joint work by G. Lakoff and R. Núñez (2000), and further developed by 
R. Núñez (2009), we similarly find a critical approach to the ANS-hypothesis. In 
particular, in Núñez’ later work:
A major problem in most accounts of the concept of number is that scholars often 
introduce crucial elements of the explanans in the very explanandum. That is, they take 
number systems as pre-given and introduce them as a part of the explanatory proposal 
itself (Núñez 2008a). Gallistel et al. (2006, 247), for instance, speak of “mental magni-
tudes” referring to a “real number system in the brain,” where the very real numbers 
are taken for granted, and put them “in the brain.” (Núñez 2009, 71)
To analyze the emergence of numerical (and more generally) mathematical con-
ceptual abilities, Núñez in collaboration with G. Lakoff (2000), and building on 
the latter’s theory of cognitive metaphor, developed the framework of Mathe-
matical Idea Analysis. This approach to mathematical cognition lays great stress 
on the embodied origins of our conceptual apparatus. Prima facie, it might seem 
quite close in spirit to our approach, but on closer inspection it conserves ele-
ments of cognitivism which we think should be rejected. First, for all its empha-
sis on the embodied nature of our mental and cognitive apparatus, the approach 
remains firmly anchored in the tradition in which the brain is the central locus 
of cognition:
Ideas do not float abstractly in the world. Ideas can be created only by, and instantiated 
only, in brains. Particular ideas have to be generated by neural structures in brains, and 
in order for that to happen, exactly the right kind of neural processes must take place 
in the brain’s neural circuitry. (Lakoff and Núñez 2000, 33)
Although in this, and other similar passages, Lakoff and Núñez avoid the term 
“mental representation,” it is difficult not to interpret this passage as making 
the same concrete / abstract difference as Dehaene in terms of concrete or modal 
stimuli and their amodal abstract representation, and as endorsing, though 
couched in terms of “ideas,” the claim that mental representations are the enti-
ties that drive cognition. This reading is reinforced by the general line of the 
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metaphoric approach by which new and specialized (e. g., numerical) ideas and 
concepts are created by the application of a number of general cognitive mech-
anisms such as the metaphorizing capacity and the conceptual blending capacity 
(Lakoff and Núñez 2000, 52). Again, this is a set of capacities which apparently 
the mind / brain can perform in isolation and for which no socio-cultural back-
ground is needed. This is all the more surprising since metaphors and the cap-
acity to construct metaphors are primarily linguistic and socio-cultural practices, 
which are the result of a long history of socio-cultural innovations. It would 
seem that the critique that Núñez levels against the ANS-hypothesis is equally 
applicable to the basic tenets of MIA: crucial elements of the explanans are intro-
duced in the explanandum.
We thus find that an account that tries to approach mathematical cognition 
from a perspective that is critical of mainstream approaches still conserves traits 
of these traditional approaches, namely the reification of social and cultural pro-
cesses into fundamental properties of the mind or brain (socio-cultural practices 
such as metaphorizing are transformed into fundamental cognitive mechanisms 
by Lakoff and Núñez). As such, this account remains to at least some extent 
vulnerable to the same problems as the more traditional approaches. The way to 
avoid these problems and to fully appreciate the constitutive role of socio-cul-
tural practices in cognition is to go the way of REC.
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1 I will use the broad term ‘Darwinism’ in the following to refer to any such attempt to 
apply Darwin’s theory to the realm of culture without implying that such a ‘Darwinism’ is nec-
essarily linked to Darwin’s own views. Darwin only cautiously mentions possible consequences 
of his theory for the study of human culture in his Origin of Species (Darwin [1859] 1985, 458). 
He later elaborates his own views on the evolution of humans and culture in The Descent of 
Man (Darwin [1871] 1981). I use the term ‘Darwinian evolution’ for any theory of biological 
evolution that accepts non-directed mutations, competition under scarcity and inheritance (i. e., 
natural selection) as the most important factors in explaining the transmutation of species.
Beyond Dualism?
The Implications of Evolutionary Theory  
for an Anthropological Determination of Human Being
Christian Spahn
Abstract: This paper critically investigates the aim of post-Darwinian theories of embod-
iment to offer a non-dualistic theory of the ‘natural’ and ‘mental’ aspects of human cog-
nition. Traditionally, the belief in genuine human agency (the ability to distance our-
selves from natural instincts in the name of genuine moral and epistemic norms) has led 
to dualistic views of the relation between humans and nature that supposedly have to 
be overcome in post-Darwinian approaches. A short typology of options is sketched: 
pre-Darwinian Optimism is distinguished from Dualistic Naturalistic Pessimism. Against 
this background, Thompson’s theory of embodied cognition is analyzed. Thompson’s 
still unrivaled account puts the organism right ‘in the gap’ between the ‘physical’ and the 
‘mental realm’. Autopoiesis-theories offer, it is argued, the necessary categories to dis-
tinguish organic bodies from physical bodies, while at the same time (via the concepts of 
sense-making and organic agency) establishing a deep continuity and connection between 
‘life and mind’. Further, a brain-centrist view of ‘disembodied cognition’ can be rejected. 
However, three important questions remain. How exactly does organic interiority relate 
to awareness? How does organic and cultural sense-making relate to genuine epistemic 
and ethical normativity? What method and philosophical outlook should be adopted to 
clarify these non-empirical conceptual questions? As long as these three questions remain 
unanswered, the gap between mind and nature remains open for further investigations.
Introduction: Are There Good Reasons  
for a “Bad Dualism” of Humans and Nature?
Although Darwin’s theory is a biological account of the origin and transfor-
mation of species, it has served repeatedly as a starting point for a “Darwinian 
world view”: the expansion of “Darwinian ideas” from biology to human life 
and human culture as such.1
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2 Historically, at least four different phases and variations of this expansion can be distin-
guished (for a typological overview see Illies 2006, 27 – 43): (1) Early, more ideological and phil-
osophical (and sometimes pseudo-)Darwinian interpretations of “culture as such”: one thinks 
esp. of Herbert Spencer and Ernst Haeckel, critically see Bowler (1988, 2009). (2) Ethological 
explanations of human behavior (Tinbergen 1952, Lorenz 1963). (3) Sociobiology (Trivers 1971, 
1972, Wilson 1975, Dawkins [1976] 2006) and (4) Evolutionary Psychology (Tooby and Cos-
mides 1992), for an overview see further Spahn (2010).
Such a temptation to expand “Darwin’s ideas” from biology to culture seems 
natural for at least three reasons: firstly, it can hardly be denied that humans 
belong to the realm of organisms and are at least partly determined by biologi-
cal instincts. If we want to understand human life, we must understand organic 
life as such, of which humans are only a part. And it is Darwin’s theory that 
offers the framework for any modern interpretation of “life as such.” Secondly, 
Darwin’s theory provides a causal explanation of evolution in terms of natural 
selection. Such a theory offers, at least implicitly, a general structural explanation 
of events that unfold under conditions of scarcity, competition, and replication. 
As such, it seems that it could easily be extended to the realm of economic com-
petition, or even to cultural history: companies may be viewed as competing 
against each other for customers and profit by modifying their products; cul-
tures, groups and institutions may be said to compete for “survival and influ-
ence”; even ideas are thought to compete for attention and “replication” (see the 
theory of the evolution of ‘memes’ in Dawkins [(1976) 2006, 189 – 201], and see 
Blackmore [1999]). It is noteworthy that this kind of expansion is not necessarily 
based on a “biologistic view” of culture: the structural aspects of competition, 
variation and replication seem to give some aspects of Darwin’s theory a more 
than biological universality (see Hösle and Illies 1998). Thus, especially within 
sociobiology, many insights from economics and game theory are integrated into 
an evolutionary view of animal and human behavior (Trivers 1971, 1972, Axelrod 
and Hamilton 1981, Axelrod 1984, Maynard Smith 1982, Wilson 1975, Dawkins 
[1976] 2006). Thirdly, Darwin offers an explanation of the origin of complexity 
and adaptation along the lines of “descent with modification.” More complex 
and elaborate organic structures and behaviors are a result of a slow gradual evo-
lution. Such a theory, it seems, stresses continuity over discontinuity and seems 
to be compatible with a reductive account of reality that explains “higher” or 
“more complex” phenomena by referring to more simple phenomena and causal 
mechanisms which are not goal-directed (see Hösle 2001). Such a reduction of 
complexity and the broad range of explanatory power of the mechanisms of evo-
lution are certainly appealing for anyone who is searching for a unified world-
view (see Wilson’s emphasis on “consilience” in Wilson [1998]).
It is no wonder then, that ever since Darwin’s publication in 1859 an expan-
sion of Darwinian ideas into the study of culture has often been promoted. In 
this context it has become a standard view to claim that, after Darwin, we have 
to overcome the traditional Western dualisms of humans and animals, nature and 
culture.2 An extension of Darwinian ideas is thus coupled with a call for a nat-
uralistic monism that should replace the age-old dualism of mind and nature. At 
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the same time, such approaches to cultural studies and the humanities have trig-
gered numerous controversial debates and counter-reactions. Thus, a wide range 
of different stances towards a “Darwinian worldview” can be distinguished – 
reaching from a complete rejection of Darwin’s theory or at least of its rele-
vance for the humanities at one end of the spectrum, up to a biological reduction-
ism that views humans as mere “survival machines” (for this term see Dawkins 
[1976] / 2006, xxi, 19 – 20, 46 – 65) or human culture as a mere variation of animal 
behavior at the other end.3
Since it is, however, a tautology to say that anything in nature (understood 
here as the realm of spatio-temporal events) is a part of nature, one might ask 
why there is even a controversy when it comes to the application of Darwinian 
ideas to human culture. In other words, why is there one part of nature that has 
been, according to the Darwinian view, brought forth and shaped by nature, that 
finds it hard to accept itself as a mere part of nature? Why is this age-old dualism 
of man and nature – contrary to the aforementioned tautology – so appealing?4 
Why was the idea of separating “mind” and “nature” that is so strongly chal-
lenged in the recent debate about embodiment5 so successful in the first place? 
It is not enough to point to historical religious or philosophical traditions that 
were allegedly able to evoke a feeling of dignity merely by denying that humans 
have a natural origin or are only a part of nature. The question is deeper than 
that. Why is the very idea of not being merely a part of nature so appealing for 
self-conscious organisms that are born, live and die in nature?
Regardless of any religious considerations, it seems that almost all traditional 
Western philosophical views since Socrates and Aristotle more or less accept that 
it is a defining part of our human nature to have something like a “second nature.” 
We are able to control and distance ourselves from mere biological impulses and 
instincts. Culture, understood in this way as an act of self-distancing from the 
“merely natural realm” (“first nature”), seems to be a uniquely human feature.6 
Animals and plants, according to this view, aim at survival and replication, they 
“aim” at life. Humans search for meaning, higher goals or for an expression of 
their autonomy: they look for something to “live for.” Life is a goal in the first 
case; it is a means to other goals in the second case.7 According to this view, the 
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12 For a systematic discussion of possible relations between ethics and evolutionism, see 
Kitcher (1993), and for a critique see Illies (2006, 172 – 186).
freedom to distance ourselves from our natural impulses (just as well as from 
cultural prejudices) makes us search for values that give guidance and orientation 
to human life. We are measured then by the values we consciously choose to 
embody. One might therefore picture “mind” as a separated force operating on 
and hopefully sometimes shaping and controlling our “nature”: a dualistic view 
of two substances or forces interacting and counteracting each other is therefore 
tempting.8 One benevolent interpretation of this traditional dualism is thus to 
say that it captures our intuition that practical reason and human agency are in 
their very nature “counter-factual” and normative and thereby different from a 
blind non-directed causal chain of events.9
Following this interpretation, the ultimate underlying reason to evoke a dual-
ism of nature and mankind therefore seems rooted in two ideas: a) implicit and 
reasonable claims about the difference between “Ought” and “Is,” between what 
is “ideal” and “real” and b) about the difference between agency and passive 
events, freedom and necessity. Both dualisms are related to our ethical self-un-
derstanding. Modern Western philosophy has on the one hand strongly empha-
sized the distinction between “facts” and “values.” It is the basis of Hume’s 
and Moore’s insights into the naturalistic fallacy (and for Kant’s differentiation 
between the quid juris and the quid factis question) (see Hume [1740] 1978, 
III.I., 1; Kant 1781, A84; Moore 1903), and it still underlies “ex negativo” the 
Logical Positivists’ rejection of an ethics based on scientific empirical descrip-
tions of reality.10 By contrast, evolutionary naturalism seems to insist upon an 
integration of mankind into our scientific picture of nature. But by emphasizing 
such monism the idea of non-empirical ethical objectivity and the idea of free 
human agency are threatened.11 Any attempt to integrate Darwinian ideas into 
our worldview will therefore depend on our view of the relation between nor-
mative ethics and descriptions of reality.12 Thus the question of how exactly to 
deal with a dualism of nature and mind understood in this way will likely remain 
controversial, at least so long as the ethical assumptions that implicitly underlie 
our picture of “nature” are not made explicit.
Beyond Dualism? 77
13 Thus there are two opposing interpretations of Evolutionary Epistemology: On the one 
hand there is an optimistic version that argues that evolutionary success guarantees something 
like a reliability of cognitive patterns that otherwise might have not been selected (see esp. Pop-
per). On the other hand there are those views that argue that viability (survival) and accurate 
representations do not have to coincide at all (see for example the constructivism of Maturana 
1980). On both interpretations see Spahn (2011a).
1. The Dualistic Playing Field before Embodiment: Pre-Darwinian 
Ethical Optimism and Darwinian Naturalistic Pessimism
In comparison with standards of culture or normative reasoning, our view of 
“nature” is usually not neutral, so that we can now begin to see the outline of a 
broad matrix of implicit philosophical premises that underlie the debate about 
any reconciliation of a “Darwinian picture of nature” with our “ethical stance.” 
In its most simple form, nature can be understood as either (I), in the more opti-
mistic traditions, enabling human goodness and reliable objective knowledge 
about itself or at least as preparing the ground for such goodness and know-
ledge. Pre-Darwinian Optimistic Naturalism assumes a harmony between the 
true nature of humans and our “goodness” in ethics and our ability to find truth 
in theoretical contemplation. These days, such a view is often regarded as either 
a mere religious hope (if we abstract from the sinful part of our nature) or as a 
bygone pre-modern teleological metaphysical view. Or (II), as the pessimistic 
tradition sees it, the conception of nature has to be separated from ontological 
assumptions about “higher goods,” “cultural values,” or “objective truth claims.” 
Nature can be understood as the neutral realm of brute facts at best, but at worst 
it is a reality that is opposed to our ethical ambitions and ideals, such that “in the 
real world” survival matters more than objective recognition of facts and values. 
Here, nature is taken to be the seat of our dark selfish desires, a realm of egoistic 
and brutal competition that needs to be overcome by culture and “self-domes-
tication”. Similarly, cognition is understood as a tool for survival, not for accur-
ate representation of objectivity. This Naturalistic Pessimism does justice to the 
aforementioned difference between what is real on the one hand, and good or 
true on the other hand, even if this often implies an opposition between “real-
ity” and “goodness” or “objectivity.” Given this opposition of nature and human 
normativity, Naturalistic Pessimism involves two possible interpretations of the 
relation between (ethical and epistemological) norms and “nature.”
(II a) One way to understand Naturalistic Pessimism is to see it as an attack 
on moral and epistemological realism. In ethics, from the perspective of a “school 
of suspicion,” nobler traces of human nature might be considered to be “against 
our real nature,” whereas in epistemology, cognition is more concerned with 
survival and thus might even distort reality rather than objectively represent 
it.13 Goodness or “human happiness” seem not to be included in the “plan of 
the universe,” as Freud (1930, 58) famously put it. A “call for humility” (see 
Lorenz 1963, chap. 12), and a downgrading of our epistemological ambitions in 
the light of evolutionary theory (Maturana 1970, 1980), might thus be obvious 
consequences of Naturalistic Pessimism. Another – unfortunate – consequence is 
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that one might proclaim biological “values” such as health and strength, survival, 
“racial purity,” etc., as the only new “real” or “scientific” values, as Social Dar-
winism did. Here, we not only “face,” but embrace the “pessimistic” picture and 
allow “nature,” understood in this way, to be our new “realistic” guide in ethics. 
We give up “ethical illusions” in the name of a better understanding of empirical 
reality or even remodel our values (while ignoring the well-known philosophi-
cal arguments mentioned above against such a naturalistic fallacy) on that (new 
interpretation of) “reality.”
(II b) Conversely, and more traditionally, one might counter Naturalistic 
Pessimism by arguing that “cultural self-domestication” and conceptual scien-
tific thinking must lead us away from nature and help us to overcome the more 
“brutal” instincts as well as the meso-cosmic distortions in our cognition (see 
Vollmer 1990, 161 ff.): the way to goodness and truth, if such a way there is, must 
be a way of culture and science, not of embracing “nature.” The bigger the gap 
between animals and humans, the less “nature” we find in “culture,” it seems, 
and the greater are the chances for goodness to prevail and for cognition to be 
trustworthy. Deconstructing the notion of ‘nature’ and emphasizing “freedom” 
and the “human-animal gap,” is a tempting ethical and epistemological count-
er-reaction to Naturalistic Pessimism. Nevertheless, even this attempt to defend 
our normative cognitive abilities still implicitly accepts Naturalistic Pessimism 
insofar as it would be considered true that any close connection and strong con-
tinuity between human nature and culture could only lead to a humiliation or 
de-evaluation of mankind’s cognitive normativity. I interpret such a reaction to 
the first version (IIa) of Naturalistic Pessimism as a mere variation of Natural-
istic Pessimism, since it subscribes to the basic idea of an opposition between 
“nature” and “ethics” in the same way that Naturalistic Pessimism does. Also in 
this view, the idea of a possible reconciliation of the realm of nature and the realm 
of normativity remains doubtful.
(III) These two variations of Naturalistic Pessimism (simply put, either 
accepting a disenchanted picture of nature as a sober new guide to ethics and 
epistemology in order to overcome naïve claims, or conversely emphasizing the 
difference between man and nature in order to “rescue” our ethical and episte-
mological stance) are both based on juxtaposing “nature” and “norms.” They 
spell out the aforementioned difference between values and facts by equating 
nature with “facts” and values with “culture” or with a conception of reason that 
goes beyond or even against nature.14 In both its versions, Naturalistic Pessi-
mism, even if it subscribes to evolutionary ideas, remains deeply dualistic. Super-
ficially and in its proud self-interpretation, it seems to be more modern than 
Cartesian dualism, because it claims to accept a monistic Darwinism. But it is 
profoundly traditional in its axiological dualism (Spahn and Tewes 2011, 169 ff.).
As with any simplistic binary opposition, we should of course not assume that 
the whole spectrum of reactions to a Darwinian world view is exhausted by these 
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two versions of Naturalistic Pessimism. Rather they should be thought of as rep-
resenting (however popular) polar ends of a spectrum. Against these implicit or 
explicit dualistic views, theories of embodiment claim to be beyond the gap and 
to offer a truly integral perspective that actually reconciles the “natural” and the 
“mental” aspects of human life.
2. Hyper Intellectualism (and Hyper Physicalism)  
in Recent Philosophy and the Turn to Embodiment Theory
Given this urge to overcome dualism in all its forms, in recent years more and 
more approaches in the philosophy of mind and in the cognitive sciences are 
proclaiming that in order to understand cognition, even in its normative aspects, 
we now have to focus much more on “the body” and its place in nature, and not 
just on the mind, let alone the brain. Buzzwords like “Enactivism,” “Embodied 
Mind.”15 even the idea of an “extended mind”16 have become popular topics for 
discussions, books, and conferences. A common line of thought in these new 
approaches is a deep mistrust towards a “Cartesian” view of the mind.17
Tyler Burge, for example, has diagnosed a “hyper intellectualism” in philo-
sophical epistemology:18 the two “main schools” of recent epistemology focus 
strongly or even exclusively on human cognition in order to explain what it 
means to have knowledge of the world (Burge 2010, 14). To be more precise, 
these approaches emphasize only one particular aspect of human cognition: 
linguistic (sometimes even only linguistic-scientific) reference to the world has 
become the standard paradigm for cognition. Simply put, in order to have “true 
justified beliefs” about the world, higher conceptual abilities (i. e., having a lan-
guage) are required. Animal cognition cannot be regarded as being knowledge-
able in this sense, and sometimes it is even denied to be representational aware-
ness at all, because it lacks the necessary linguistic requirements.19 According to 
this view, the senses and the body give us a mere input (sensations, but not rep-
resentations), the mind or the brain with its conceptual abilities transforms this 
into experiences and knowledge. In this paradigm, cognition in the full sense of 
the world is the linguistic or conceptual computation of given sensual contents – 
and this model of cognition focuses on the human brain.
Tyler Burge’s work is of course only one very recent example of many mod-
ern approaches which claim that cognition is not starting from scratch with the 
development of the human brain or of sophisticated language, but that it is essen-
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tially based upon biological agency. Agency, according to Burge, “is grounded in 
functioning, coordinated behavior by the whole organism, issuing from the indi-
vidual’s central behavioral capacities, not purely from subsystems” (Burge 2010, 
331).20 The “Enactive Approach” to cognition fostered by Varela, Thompson, 
and Rosch (1991), is yet another example: it claims that in order to truly under-
stand even such a complex and seemingly autonomous phenomenon as human 
cognition one has to go all the way back to the logic of organic agency. Alva Noë 
stresses in a similar fashion the need to look at “action in perception” (Noë 2004) 
in order to truly understand cognition and the mind. Ruth Millikan advances a 
“teleo-semantic” view that wants to understand language and reference as func-
tions of organisms: representation and cognition are to be understood from the 
perspective of biology (Millikan 1984, 2004). In these ways the organic body 
plays a key role in modern philosophy of cognition, replacing more intellectu-
alistic views of cognition that merely focused on linguistic and computational 
views of intelligence (Thompson 2007, 3 – 15).
This widening of the perspective from the human mind or from human 
knowledge to its evolutionary preconditions is, however, not completely novel. 
Of course, our knowledge of animal cognition21 and of cognitive systems22 is 
nowadays much more detailed than before, and the recent paradigmatic changes 
that Noë, Thompson, and others describe are yet to be surpassed. But the very 
idea of tracing the steps of cognition “from the amoeba to Einstein” and trying 
to situate cognition within the organic body is itself an approach that already 
guides the exemplary works on evolutionary epistemology of Konrad Lorenz 
(1973) and Karl Popper (1972), and it is present in the approaches of Jean Piaget 
(1967) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1942), to name only a few.23 Contemporary 
thinking about the mind is therefore again and again inspired by “philosophy of 
biology.” On the other hand there is a move to emphasize the difference between 
organic bodies and physical bodies, such that early ideas of a reductive physi-
calism should be overcome in favor of a theory of nature that understands the 
crucial difference between merely physical and biological categories.24 In this 
context it also seems that normativity is not a category of physics, but it is crucial 
in understanding organic entities.
In order to sketch these two main ideas (embodiment of the mind, differ-
ence between physical and organic bodies) of theories of embodiment I want to 
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focus on a very recent work by Evan Thompson, one of the most prominent and 
extensive studies of the relation between mind and organisms (Thompson 2007). 
The strength of Thompson’s work lies in drawing upon neurobiological and bio-
logical studies and diverse philosophical traditions, notably Husserl’s phenom-
enological approach. In his book Mind in Life Thompson elaborates his own 
“philosophy of the organism,” taking inspiration from such authors as Kant, 
Merleau-Ponty and Hans Jonas. What new anti-dualistic ideas does the school 
of embodiment offer for a theory of the relation of humans and nature, and thus 
of mind and world?
While traditionally the body-mind problem was spelled out as a problem of 
unifying “the physical” with “the mental,” embodiment theories argue that the 
“organic body” lies in the gap between these two.25 It is neither a mere material 
object, animated by a “ghost in the machine” nor is cognition possible without 
a full organic body. Can such a claim of a deep connection between mind and 
life help us to overcome the above-sketched age-old dualism, and at the same 
time do justice to underlying intuitions about agency and normativity? In order 
to answer this question let us first reconstruct: a) what kind of body the organic 
body is according to Thompson (and thus according to Kant, Merleau-Ponty, 
and Jonas); secondly, b) how does Thompson argue for the view that not only 
the brain but perhaps the organic body as a whole is a precondition for cognition 
or mind?
3. The Body is not merely a Body:  
Thompson’s Philosophy of the Organism
Thompson proclaims at the beginning of the book that he wants to argue for a 
close connection between mind and organic bodies: “Where there is life there is 
mind, and mind in its most articulated forms belongs to life” (Thompson 2007, 
IX).
In order to understand life and organisms, most approaches start by looking 
at the fundamental difference between organic and inorganic systems.26 It is the 
hallmark of modern approaches to focus on essentially new features of organ-
isms without however postulating new “irreducible” substances or “life forces” 
(élan vital, nisus formativus, etc.).27 To put it briefly, in the old battle between 
mechanism and vitalism in biology, “mechanism” has won,28 but reductionism is 
nevertheless not an option.
Thompson and others don’t subscribe to the view that an organism is merely 
a complex mechanical or material system. What differs between living and inor-
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ganic systems is the realization of a new structure, a new type of “self-identity,” 
not the existence of new substances or forces. Philosophically speaking, organ-
isms realize a new way of sustaining identity over time. Thompson relies on 
the influential work of Varela and Maturana (1980, 1992) in labeling this new 
structure an auto-poeitic identity (Thompson 2007, chap. 5).29 While all forms of 
energy and matter are the same throughout nature, the organizational complex-
ity changes. Organic identity is, simply put, defined by metabolism and mor-
phogenesis: organic bodies sustain their “form” by constantly exchanging matter 
and energy with the environment in a self-regulated fashion: this exchange (or 
flow) of matter and energy is crucial for preserving an organism’s identity. While 
a stone, for example, is considered to be the “same” object or body as long as its 
material composition does not change, organisms are essentially characterized 
by such exchanges, or else they “die” and that means they lose their specific 
organic identity. Philosophically speaking: they are the same precisely because 
they change: life has integrated change into its peculiar mode of identity.
But self-preservation through constant change is not enough to sufficiently 
characterize the living body; other emergent physical structures in nature are 
defined by realizing stability within material or energetic change, as Thompson 
points out.30 The crucial point is that life – in addition to being constant in and 
through change – is self-regulating and self-producing: it “creates” the parts of 
the systems that are needed for its viability (=self-preservation) and it must have 
the necessary organizational structures for active self-regulation. Thus, organ-
isms are auto-poietic bodies (Thompson 2007, 97 – 122). While, for instance, a 
burning flame cannot control the influx of energy or material, nor react upon 
disturbances in the environment, nor produce parts of a system that would be 
helpful in regulating and balancing the energy flow, an organism has a certain 
range of flexible responses to changes in the environment and builds its own 
parts of this response system. This leads to one of the most obvious features of 
organisms: their inner “purposiveness,” something that was already stressed by 
Aristotle and lies at the center of Kant and Hegel’s philosophy of organisms (see 
Kant, 1790, A280 – 295).31 The parts of organic systems are tools for the preserva-
tion of life, they are functional or teleonomic; this is already visible in the Greek 
term ‘organon.’
This reflexive purposeful structure can indeed be labeled a ‘self’ and, for 
Thompson, it constitutes the origin of “agency” (Thompson 2007, 167 ff., 
201 ff.). The ability for self-regulated self-sustaining requires what Bertalanffy in 
his work on cybernetics has described as “negative feedback loops” (Bertalanffy, 
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Beier, and Laue 1977): the “set point” (“Sollwert”) of the system for its viability 
must be represented within the system. It must be compared and equilibrated 
with the “actual values” (“Ist-Wert”) of the environment such that the organism 
can produce compensating actions, if necessary, in order to sustain its metabo-
lism. An example is hunger, where a certain internal chemical situation signals to 
the organism that there is an internal lack of available energy and this leads the 
organism to counteract the hunger by looking for food or taking other appropri-
ate actions. Functionally speaking, this requires the representation of the given 
inner state of the organism and the outer state of the environment, plus the neg-
ative feedback regulation of “actions” or processes guided by these two values: 
the “Ought Value” (set points) and the “Is value” of the system must be coupled 
and balanced. It also requires that the organism is able to evaluate its environ-
ment. Thompson follows Merleau-Ponty in arguing that the inherent goal of the 
system to maintain autopoiesis makes the environment relevant. Chemical facts, 
for example, can now “count as” (be treated as) “food” or “poison” or, in more 
complex contexts, as “signals” for food and poison etc. The organic goal-directed 
interaction with the environment constitutes a semantic or proto-semantic rela-
tion between the organism and the world, a point that lies at the center of Mil-
likan’s approach to semantics (Thompson 2007, 75 ff., 147 ff.; Millikan 1984). 
Sense-making is thus crucial for organic agency (Thompson 2007, 152 – 159).
This “cybernetics” of organisms is ontologically speaking extremely fascinat-
ing, because, according to Thompson (2007, 72 – 75,128 – 165),32 it underscores the 
radical structural difference between such a body and any other object or body in 
nature. Spelling out the implied philosophical ontology of such systems lies at the 
center of Hans Jonas’ (1966, 1973) famous philosophy of life that has profoundly 
influenced Thompson’s approach. Jonas says that in addition to the features we 
have already mentioned, such an organic system is characterized by “transcen-
dence” and “needy freedom.” It represents a very peculiar form of self-identity.
Self-identity, according to Jonas, is at first not a given in such a system: to 
sustain itself becomes a task for the organism. Stones or planets don’t “care” for 
their existence, but life does: it thus has a goal, and we need to understand this 
goal in order to understand the functional design of organic systems. Thus Jonas 
and Thompson stress that “interests” and “desires” emerge for the first time with 
organisms in the world; these phenomena are lacking in the physical world.33
This means, secondly, that such a system is dependent on environmental con-
ditions: it is a fragile entity, it is needy.34 At the same time – and this leads us to 
Jonas’ third aspect, “transcendence” – such a system exhibits “something like” 
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freedom35 and reaches already in its very constitution beyond “the here and 
now.” How can this be so? Jonas also argues that an organic system is strictly 
speaking not identical with its material conditions at a given time (Jonas 1973, 
157 ff.). On the contrary, we have said that it will and must exchange its material. 
Thus, Jonas argues, it is “free from,” or not dependent on, this particular given 
material. It cannot be “identified” with it. Almost any material substance (and 
energy at any given moment) can be replaced and exchanged. But, of course, 
while the system does not depend in its identity on the specific material or 
energy that it is made out of it is however dependent on material and energy as 
such. The identity of such a system – and this is the crucial point – must there-
fore be characterized as “immanent-transcendent.” Jonas and Thompson argue 
that the organic body is characterized by “Innerlichkeit” or “Interiority,” a point 
that has also been forcefully made by Merleau-Ponty (1942).36 Grasping this 
functional organic unity that continues over time is more important in under-
standing organisms than mere physico-chemical analysis. This inner self-reg-
ulating organization is therefore neither “outside” of the body, nor is it to be 
identified with the given material-energetical moment. The unity thus transcends 
any given material “snapshot” of the organism.37 The body is not a thing, or in 
Merleau-Ponty’s words, the Leib is not a body (Merleau-Ponty 1942, chap. III). 
Jonas even speaks of an “ontological revolution” in nature: The “form” over-
powers “matter”; or in the more modern language that Thompson uses: emer-
gent systemic properties and holistic causalities are the key to understand such 
bodies (Thompson 2007, 60 – 65). Therefore, while you can “show” and “point 
at” the material parts of a living object, you cannot show or point at “life” itself.
Let us compare this structure to some clearly very similar ideas in the theory 
of the self-identity of the human mind. The “I” / “Ego” or the character of a 
person is in a very similar fashion something “general,” it is transcendent-im-
manent. Any given “Ego” is neither identical with a given thought at any one 
time, nor could it be reconstructed as an “empty” entity “behind” or “outside 
of” all thinking. The I has thoughts, but without thoughts it would not exist. 
Nevertheless, it is not identical with any given thought; it perpetuates itself and 
sustains its identity through and only through its different thoughts. The sim-
ilarity between this dialectical ontological identity of the “Ego” and the afore-
mentioned complex self-identity of the organism is very striking (see Spahn 
2007, 2011a). Furthermore, we have seen that a “semantic relation” of relevance 
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38 Again, this is the main point of Millikan’s (1987) view.
is already implied by the organic interaction with its environment. Meaning, rel-
evance, and information are thus not only mental concepts, but may already be 
“biological categories.”38 Recently, there have been proposals to reconstruct the 
human ability to make non-biological value judgments from an enactive perspec-
tive: value systems are not fixed by biological needs alone and can be employed 
to re-create social values and shared norms via the “mutual attunement of indi-
vidual sense-making” (Di Paolo, Rohde, and De Jaegher 2010, for the theory of 
participatory sense-making see De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2008).
Thompson claims that the notorious mind-body problem can therefore only 
be solved if we stop trying to reconcile the huge gap between our conception 
of the “physical” (understood as “material”) and “the mental” and realize that 
“the organic” lies in the gap between them. The organic body is already char-
acterized by “interiority,” it is a complex entity, not merely a physical thing 
(Thompson 2007, 221 f.). It therefore seems tempting to argue that mind and life 
are profoundly linked to each other, because they share a very similar “mode of 
self-identity,” which at the same time is very different from that of inorganic 
bodies.
Thus it is not surprising that Thompson has recently used his approach to 
attack what he calls (with Ned Block) the “standard view of cognition,” namely 
the claim that consciousness is “a product (only) of the brain.” Not only the 
brain is connected to the mind, the whole organic body is.
4. Thinking is not merely in the Brain:  
Why the Brain cannot be in a Vat
To conclude this discussion of the emphasis on “the body” in enactive 
approaches, let’s take a short look at Thompson’s and Cosmelli’s (2013) view that 
the whole body should be taken into account when looking for the necessary 
correlates of mind or consciousness (often labeled NCC [neuronal correlates of 
consciousness]). Ned Block has criticized Noë’s view and claims that the “min-
imal constitutive supervenience basis” for consciousness is the brain, not the 
whole body. Block wants to defend the claim that he calls the “orthodox view” 
“that nothing outside of the brain is part of” (Block 2005, 264) the metaphysi-
cally constitutive basis for consciousness. Of course, a brain can only survive if 
the body survives, but in order to explain consciousness it would be sufficient to 
look at the changes in the brain.
Thompson and Cosmelli argue that this “orthodox view” is misguided and 
they present two main counterarguments: a) the brain cannot – not even in a 
thought experiment – be “uncoupled” from the body; b) we must distinguish 
(the change in) states of consciousness that might have their basis in changes in 
brain states from the fact that there is “creature consciousness” in the first place.
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39 After sketching some of the requirements for the “vat” machine, the authors conclude: 
“The life-sustaining system is starting to look less like a vat and more like a surrogate living 
body or organism” (2013, 170).
40 Thompson and Cosmelli argue against Andy Clark (2009).
Regarding argument a) Thompson and Cosmelli use the famous “brain in a 
vat” argument to explain their first objection. If the brain is sufficient to func-
tionally explain consciousness then it could hypothetically be isolated, put into 
a vat, and connected to a machine. Such a brain would, according to the thought 
experiment, be capable of the same conscious states (even though they are now 
not about a real world mediated through a real body but coming from a com-
puter) as a “normal brain.” Thompson and Cosmelli, however, deny this. While 
it looks as if the brain could be “sustained and controlled” from a machine out-
side, they point out that such a “vat” must be something that functionally closely 
resembles a real organic body. The first reason for this is that the “life” of the 
brain must be sustained. Therefore, the connected system must be able to sus-
tain the brain’s metabolism (exchange of neuronal fluids, a circulatory system), 
and must pump blood into the system (or an equivalent fluid) (Thompson and 
Cosmelli 2013, 169 – 172).39 For both functions, it would have to be coupled with 
the brain’s metabolism and regulatory systems in such a way that it in fact can 
no longer be said to merely externally control the brain but must also respond 
to the brains’ needs, and therefore be influenced by the brains’ demands: “think-
ing carefully about this experiment will reveal that the brain and the body are 
so deeply entangled, structurally and dynamically that they are explanatorily 
inseparable” (2013, 168). Regulatory loops are needed that make it impossible to 
explain or understand the brain without these other systems of which it is now 
an integral part. “Hence the external control perspective is not generally valid. 
Instead, our life-sustaining system and the brain must be seen as reciprocally 
coupled and mutually regulating systems” (ibid., 170).
Once we take the next step in the thought experiment this coupling becomes 
even more obvious. The brain must not only survive, it must receive “fake” envi-
ronmental stimulations. The authors argue that the complexity of neuronal cog-
nition requires, for example, a perfect synchrony with the brain’s exploratory 
motor efferent signals, and these systems must be controlled by the brains’ sen-
sorimotor-loops (ibid., 172). They claim that due to the almost infinite compu-
tational complexity no virtual but only an actual peripheral sensorimotor sys-
tem could produce or mimic the necessary input. Since the brain’s computation 
is functionally deeply entrenched in life-regulation and bodily homeostasis it 
cannot be functionally decoupled from the brain. Thus, they conclude, from an 
explanatory perspective, the whole complexity of the body must be taken into 
account in order to understand brain functions.
Regarding argument b), this is directed against the “band pass” argument.40 
While one might admit that the existence of the brain is deeply connected to 
bodily regulations one might argue that most of this regulation is subconscious. 
Therefore, to explain the changes in the stream of a “conscious consciousness,” 
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or to explain the changes in aware states of mind one might argue like this: for 
the fully aware or awake stream of consciousness most computational activities 
of the brains are “shielded off,” and only changes in the brain (or even only in 
the higher brain) count. Thus, only looking at the brain is sufficient for awake 
creature consciousness. Thompson and Cosmelli argue that this is a fallacy. Of 
course, it is true (and perhaps sufficient) to believe that changes in awake states 
of consciousness are only caused by or correlated to changes “in the brain,” not 
in the body. But it would be a mistake to conclude from this that “consciousness 
as such” is only linked to the brain. The argument of a change in a conscious state 
that correlates with a change in the brain already presupposes that the creature 
has consciousness (ibid., 177). Given consciousness, it might suffice to look at a 
change in the brain for a change in the content of a given awake state of mind. But 
if the first argument is correct, then the emergence of consciousness as such would 
still depend on the brain and the body.
5. Are we Beyond Dualism yet?
Thompson’s approach is, as we have seen, one of the most prominent and com-
prehensive theories of embodied cognition. His theory profits from its combi-
nation of conceptual philosophical clarity and an incredible richness of empirical 
detail. The careful rejection of “brain-centrism” and, even more so, Thompson’s 
rich and detailed analysis of organic agency and organic identity are unrivalled. 
They are more than just gestures in the direction of post-Cartesian approaches; 
they can and should be considered as groundbreaking outlines of an already 
almost complete account of what a post-dualistic theory of mind and body must 
look like. The close relation that Thompson thus emphasizes between body and 
mind is more than helpful in overcoming a juxtaposition of nature and mind that 
puts consciousness outside of nature and looks at nature as a realm that is alien 
or even “hostile” to the mind (see also Thompson 2015, 105). In this respect his 
work goes refreshingly beyond the simple dualism and oppositions of Natural-
istic Pessimism. In particular his emphasis on “emergence” allows him to evade 
those above-sketched oppositions that occur if we either “reduce” mind to a 
non-normative and non-mental conception of nature or “rescue it” from such a 
conception by stressing a “dualistic” distance between mind and nature. Care-
fully sketching the essential categorical differences within ontological continuity 
in the way Thompson does – such as separating the organic body from physical 
bodies with both conceptual clarity and depth of empirical knowledge – is one of 
the greatest achievements of embodiment theory so far. Nevertheless, while the 
emphasis on continuity, without denying novelty, is a big step beyond dualistic 
Naturalistic Pessimism, at least three questions concerning the general philo-
sophical implications of embodiment theories remain.
1) Is a focus on the “special ontological structure” of organisms and their 
difference from physical bodies sufficient to fully bridge the gap in the body-
mind problem? How exactly does the sketched organic “interiority” relate to 
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41 One of the most fascinating and comprehensive books on awareness from the school of 
enactivism so far is the brilliant new book of Thompson (2015), even if I still tend to think that 
a compulsory argument for either an “identification” of body and mind or for an ultimately 
satisfying view that balances the two without giving primacy to either of them (2015, 100 ff.) is 
missing.
conscious awareness? While the first one can be described from “the third per-
son perspective” and is still a feature of “things in the world” that we can point 
to (even if we can’t point to it directly we can see organisms), the “interiority 
of consciousness” is, it seems, of a very different nature: we only know it from 
the “first person perspective.” Are we allowed to conclude that we are speaking 
about the same thing when we refer to the interiority of our mental life and the 
interiority of organisms? Of course one might argue, as Thompson does, that 
the classical dualistic “zombie-argument” is just circular. It claims that we could 
imagine an organic body like ours but without a mind, while in fact for some 
embodiment theories we are just faced with two sides of the same coin (Thomp-
son 2007, 230 ff.). I am tempted to agree with this claim: if we could perfectly 
reconstruct a copy of my body, including my brain exactly as it is, this “body” 
would indeed (given the laws of this universe) probably have consciousness. But 
to merely claim this identity or strict correlation (even if only for this world) is 
just as much to beg the difficult question. Independent arguments are necessary 
to explain why and if such a connection between bodily interiority and aware-
ness necessarily exists and if we are thereby allowed to identify these two con-
cepts or not.
The fundamental problem remains that there is not yet (and may never be) an 
account that explains or fully re-describes “awareness” in non-awareness-related 
vocabulary. If we understand the inner ontological structure of organic bodies 
according to embodiment theories we are surely beyond a simple dualism of 
opposing “physical objects” and the “mental” realm, but it seems that there is 
more conceptual work to be done in order to “bridge the gap.”41 Thompson, 
in his newest book, agrees partly with this diagnosis. He also insists – rightly 
so – that consciousness can neither be reduced to nor re-described in non-men-
tal vocabulary and stresses what he calls the epistemological “primacy of direct 
experience”: “Consciousness itself has not been and cannot be observed through 
the scientific method, because the scientific method gives us no direct and indepen-
dent access to consciousness itself. So the scientific method cannot have the final 
say on matters concerning consciousness. . . When we use the scientific method to 
investigate consciousness, we’re always necessarily using and relying on con-
sciousness itself” (Thompson 2015, 97 – 98). Rather than trying to re-describe 
mental events in non-mental terms, it might be much more advisable to recon-
sider our notions of nature and of matter, an option that Thompson also favors:
[M]y viewpoint isn’t a materialist one, for two reasons. First, consciousness has a cog-
nitive primacy that materialism fails to see. There’s no way to step outside conscious-
ness and measure it against something else. Science always moves within the field of 
what consciousness reveals; it can enlarge this field and open up new vistas, but it can 
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42 One is reminded of Schopenhauer’s two basic (and I think contradictory) claims: if con-
sciousness is a “product of the brain (or Will)” then every thought or fantasy of the mind seems 
just to be a construction or an illusion of “the Will” or “the brain”: the brain is “real,” the World 
(of the mind, as we see it) is a “Representation,” or a “construction.” But conversely, even the 
idea that the mind depends on the brain is part of how the world appears to us in our mind and 
thus can be understood only from within the perspective of the mind. I think that both views, 
which Thompson also wants to balance, do not easily form a balanced “convergent” circle or 
support each other in the way Thompson implies with his Buddhist poetic image of the relation 
of “name-and-form” as two sheaves of reeds leaning against each other (2015, 102; Thompson 
goes on to say that embodiment and consciousness are “not one, not two”). One might argue 
contrarily that epistemic priority of consciousness and ontological dependency or aposteriority 
are not views that mutually “prop each other up,” but rather point to the opposing worldviews 
of materialism or idealism.
43 Burge (2010, 301 f.) criticizes Millikan’s approach because he thinks that the validity con-
straints of higher cognitions cannot be reduced to the biological evaluation of the environment 
according to the goal of survival. What it means to represent the world correctly, Burge argues, 
is categorically different from representing the world merely in such a way that an organism 
might successfully survive.
44 See esp. Maturana’s constructivism in (1970, 1980). Note the sketched version of Natu-
ralistic Pessimism above.
45 The idea that we need to find a place in naturalism for the fact that we could be motivated 
by “normative reasons” in ethics and epistemology without denying that reasons are “genuine,” 
and thus different from “mere causations,” lies at the center of McDowell’s conception of a 
“second nature” (1996, 1998).
never get beyond the horizon set by consciousness. Second, since consciousness has 
this kind of primacy, it makes no sense to try to reductively explain consciousness in 
terms of something that’s conceived to be essentially nonexperiential, like fundamental 
physical phenomena. Rather, understanding how consciousness is a natural phenome-
non is going to require rethinking our scientific concepts of nature and physical being. 
(Thompson 2015, XXXV; see also 103 ff.)
It remains open how such a commitment to a “non-reductionism” and to emer-
gentism can avoid varieties of dualism or be integrated into a naturalistic frame-
work. In other words, how can we combine the necessary epistemological pri-
macy of consciousness with its ontological aposteriority?42
2) Further, organic agency clearly requires “sense-making” as we have seen. 
Relevance, evaluations, and meaning – and in this sense normativity – begin with 
and are deeply connected to organic agency. If however one embraces traditional 
notions of normative concepts in ethics and epistemology then Tyler Burge is 
right to point out that it is “a root missmatch” to equate fitting cognition for 
survival with possible objective truth.43 One might add: it is also a mismatch to 
equate evaluations based on organic needs with the question of what is objec-
tively good or ethically decent. There is an element in the traditional objectivist 
understanding of “the Truth” and “the Good” that either has to be given up 
when we embrace naturalistic versions of enactivism,44 or, if we stick to a more 
traditional notion of truth in ethics and epistemology, we are forced to move 
beyond identifying viability and organic well-being with objectivity or truth in 
epistemology and ethics. Thus, the gap between what is factual and causal, and 
what is “genuinely rational” and “normative” is, it seems, even more difficult to 
bridge than the one between organic interiority and awareness.45 Strong epis-
Christian Spahn90
46 The exchange between neuroscience and the Dalai Lama was initiated by Francisco Va-
rela. For the idea of a “contemplative neuroscience,” see Thompson (2015, 70 – 74).
47 Thompson rightly rejects the idea that neuroscience could “prove” the identity of the 
mind and the brain: “But neuroscience itself doesn’t demonstrate this identity: rather the iden-
tity is a metaphysical interpretation of what neuroscience does show, namely, the contingency 
or dependence of certain kinds of mental events on certain kinds of neuronal events” (Thomp-
son 2015, 101). Conversely, the Buddhist idea of the existence of a mind without a brain (or 
that the “clear mind state” is not contingent on the brain) is also a “metaphysical” thesis, and 
can’t be solved by (internal) observations, see Thompson (2015, 90). Thompson further argues 
(I believe rightly so) that external scientific observational evidence for such an independence of 
mind-states from matter / brains has not yet been found (see for example his excellent chapter 
on near-death experiences, Thompson [2015, 299 – 314]). But the metaphysical question whether 
mind as such (not human states of cognition that might always rely on the body) is material or 
not, cannot, I think, by definition be solved by any inner or outer observations, since we can 
only observe bodies, or have inner experience as long as we are alive and have a body. Idealism, 
for example, can’t be grounded upon, but also not be refuted by observations. It is a metaphys-
ical view based upon metaphysical arguments.
temic realists like to define truth as being independent of, and not constituted by, 
the contingent existence or mental makeup of organic agents, and moral realists 
like to define values of objective validity independently of contingent acts of 
agreement. But with such questions we clearly leave the philosophy of biology 
behind and enter deep into epistemology and (meta-)ethics.
3) Both these questions concern those ideas that gave rise to a dualistic world 
view in the first place and that were mentioned in the “benevolent” interpreta-
tion of dualism above: dualism is based upon the intuition that normativity and 
awareness are fundamental features of reality that can’t fully be re-described and 
explained (away) by non-normative or non-mental concepts (in more detail, see 
Spahn and Tewes 2011). If we want to answer these two questions then we obvi-
ously have to ask finally what method or viewpoint allows us to even discuss, let 
alone solve these problems? What is a good and fruitful methodological starting 
point to come to terms with these two questions? Are these empirical questions, 
questions about linguistic conventions, or genuine philosophical-conceptual 
questions? Thompson emphasizes the necessity of a dialogue between Eastern 
and Western traditions of thought and critically engages, in an inspiring way, in 
an exchange between neuroscience and Buddhism.46 Thompson’s starting point 
here seems to be that both science and Buddhism are open to critical discussion 
and are both based upon taking seriously inner and outer experiences and obser-
vations (Thompson 2015, XXV). Nevertheless, he also points to the fact that 
certain fundamental questions remain “metaphysical” questions; they can’t be 
solved by observation alone but rather concern the right interpretation of expe-
riences.47 It seems that the modern Western preference for (scientific or method-
ical) “experiences” and “observations” over conceptual clarifications, even if we 
include inner experience and the rich tradition of Buddhist interpretations of 
awareness, might not be sufficient to make important steps forward in answer-
ing the first two questions. This preference for observations is surely justified as 
a necessary presupposition of all scientific investigations, but it can’t itself be a 
necessary presupposition of all philosophical argumentation and discussions. The 
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48 See especially Wandschneider (1986, 1998). Further, the problem that there is something 
external to all observations itself (the problem of the “outer world”) can clearly not be solved by 
observation without committing a circular fallacy, but that does not mean that it can’t be solved 
at all. One might argue that there is a logical (but certainly not an empirical) self-contradiction 
in solipsism or radical constructivism that I can only allude to here: if we were to believe that 
all acts of consciousness are just “subjective” or have no other content independent of these 
acts themselves then the act by which this epistemological “insight” itself is grasped would be 
void of meaning. Different versions of radical skepticism lead to different versions of self-con-
tradictions. Therefore, arguments from self-contradiction point to an interesting transcenden-
tal-conceptual method of philosophical investigations. In these cases we know that something 
is a logical fact not because of experience or because of mere verbal conventions or tautological 
definitions, but because our attempts to negate certain insights presuppose and rely upon the 
very same ideas or concepts that we want to deny. For the difference between different ver-
sions of arguments from self-contradiction, see Illies (2003, 30 – 49) and Hösle (1990, 163 f.). For 
the program of a transcendental-conceptual Logic (“ideale Logik” or “fundamentale Logik” in 
Braßel’s and Wandschneider’s terminology) that includes semantic investigations and thus goes 
beyond most analytical approaches to logic, see Wandschneider (1996) and esp. Braßel (2005).
fact that methodological observations lead on average to reliable results can’t, for 
example, be itself based on methodological observations, once we fully under-
stand the philosophical importance of the problem of induction. Questions of 
how reliably science works (let’s call it epistemology of the first order) are gen-
uinely different from questions of how such a philosophical epistemology itself 
(epistemology of the second order) works. With regard to the first question we 
can be empiricists, but I am sure that this is impossible for the second question. It 
is a fact that methodological observations, given the right conceptual framework, 
lead on average to reliable results, but we can only argue for this and similar prin-
ciples of science itself in a non-empirical, that is genuinely philosophical way.48
This last point is connected to the fact that many philosophical debates about 
embodiment still focus on a certain very traditional understanding of conscious-
ness that belongs to the recent naturalistic-empirical tradition in philosophy, 
namely the claim that consciousness is mainly understood as the ability to be 
“subjectively aware” of something material or physical in the environment: the 
paradigm of cognition still seems to be the perception of external objects and 
their classification and interpretation etc. In keeping with the phenomenologi-
cal tradition, Thompson adds to this the “inner sense” the awareness of subjec-
tive states of being aware of something internal or external. However, in many 
debates there is no focus on the ontological status of qualia themselves – that 
can’t be put “into nature” like other objects, forces or energies. Furthermore, the 
cognition of philosophical, epistemological or ethical states of affairs or facts, if 
there are such facts or states of affairs, seems notoriously difficult to integrate 
into the limited framework of naturalistic philosophy or any epistemology that 
counts observation as the only path to verification and physical and cultural real-
ity as the only possible conceptions of reality.
Again, given reductive naturalism, we can cast doubt on any philosophies and 
worldviews that postulate non-empirical logical facts or state of affairs in addi-
tion to the physical objects of science or the inner experiences of humans that 
sociology, psychology or descriptive phenomenology study. But it is also pos-
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49 It is certainly possible, against radical subjective idealism, to insist upon the fact that the 
world may exist without my act of recognizing it, while it seems tautological that “states of the 
mind” could surely not be independent of the mind, our mind or some mind. There can be, so 
to speak, no mind-independent reality of mind, only of “things.” I think this argument is in-
fluential, but it is based upon a confusion of what the term ‘mind-independent’ should denote: 
if we would truly embrace it in all its glory we would necessarily end up in solipsism. I cannot 
discuss my objection here but only hint at it: according to the realist I do not really “create” the 
world by perceiving it (rather, I create contingent perceptions of a given object by opening my 
eyes and looking, etc., at it). In a similar way, one might argue that I do not really “create” the 
(inner content of the) sensation of coffee or colors for example; I only create perceptions of such 
“qualia” by certain acts: the world of the mind would then, similarly to the “external world,” 
not be my or our creation, but a fact in the universe that can or cannot be perceived. When we 
refer to qualia, speak about them, etc., we try to re-describe experiencing their given objective 
structure. In this view this structure or this-ness is a fact in the universe. It can be actualized in 
my or your mind but it is not therefore a “dream,” an “illusion,” a creation, or a “fiction.” If 
this were so, then also the fact that there is a world at all outside of my (or any) perception would 
have to be a dream, a fiction, etc. One might be tempted to say that we should only reify things 
of the outer sense, but never of the “inner sense” and one might rightly ask what could be an 
equivalent to empirical perception when it comes to “free floating thinking or even imagina-
tion.” I think this preference for an “empirical conception of reality” is a widespread though not 
really convincing move: objectivity of thought cannot without self-contradiction reasonably be 
limited to possible intuitions in space and time and to empirical verification. Our “feeling” of 
“reality” might be linked to senso-motoric givenness and to our possibility of placing things in 
our intuition into space and time, but that is not the only reasonable conception of objectivity 
or reality. It is more plausible to think that the distinction between “real” and “not real” cuts 
through both the inner and the outer sense. We know of “external observations” that turn out 
to be hallucinations or illusions: not all things perceived in the outer sense are “real.” But also 
not all things that can only be grasped by the inner sense are therefore “unreal.” We can have 
dreams of unicorns or witchcraft, but we can also discover logical truths that are not empirical 
in nature, and whose validity is not dependent on my acts of cognitions or on mere conventions 
of symbols. Of course the arguments for and against such an objective idealistic ontology can’t 
be discussed in this paper. For a recent similar and forceful view in connection with the body-
mind problem, see Tewes (2015).
sible to turn the argument around: given a commitment to and arguments for 
the possibility of truth in epistemology and ethics and for the reality of qualia 
as facts in the world, we might reject such naturalistic ontologies and epistemol-
ogies as obviously incomplete. We can think of logical or mathematical proofs 
being sound, even if no one has discovered them yet, or of possible state of affairs 
being valuable even if factually nobody agrees. Can we, in a similar way, count 
as “real” the fact that there is something that empirical objects would feel like, 
would look like, would taste like, etc. for a given kind of mind, independent of 
the actual existence of a contingent given act of such a perception at a certain 
moment in the history of the universe?
We surely ascribe such a reality to the “outer world,” and don’t think that its 
existence depends upon our perception or recognition, but for certain reasons 
most contemporary philosophers hesitate to ascribe such objectivity to qualia 
as such or to their non-empirical content (especially, as we said, when it comes 
to ethical or logical facts). In this way we are, polemically speaking, reducing 
our theory of the mind to a theory of acts of being aware of spatio-temporal 
things or of our own feelings unfolding at a certain place and time.49 Against 
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Husserl, it seems, we are merging noeses and noemata in all those cases where 
we can’t point to an empirical or psychological (or “cultural”) “object” or “state 
of affairs.” Against this naturalistic view more complex ontologies – such as that 
of Frege, or even more so those philosophies in the tradition of objective Ideal-
ism (see recently Nagel 2012, 17) – have always maintained that logical and eth-
ical facts on the one hand and “awareness” and qualia of the mind on the other 
hand, are integral parts of reality as such that can neither be identified with or 
reduced to human mental acts nor with or to natural facts. They may therefore 
constitute a part of reality in its own right. Such a worldview might seem obso-
lete or even outrageous from the perspective of the modern Western naturalistic 
framework. A theory of mind or logical reality that goes beyond contingent acts 
of human cognition is, however, on the one hand still prominent in the Eastern 
traditions with which Thompson engages, but also formed the core of the ideal-
istic tradition of Western philosophy before its turn to naturalism (see esp. the 
essays in Hösle 1996). Even if one rejects with Thompson (2015, 105) Straw-
son’s recent attempts to defend a panpsychism, and also rejects an idealism that 
gives an ontological priority to the mind as alternatives to a naturalism or an 
emergentistic view, the search for a philosophically convincing ontology remains 
open.
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An evolutionary account of the condition humaine is inevitably confronted with 
a crucial issue, which has occupied philosophical thinking since antiquity. Any 
research on the essentials of human existence and the development of mankind 
draws on complex theoretical devices of research. Furthermore, the objects of 
research are defined by properties which are obviously significant to the very 
theories which bring those objects into the limelight. Anything known or know-
able to humans about the origins and forms of their being therefore presupposes 
a well-established realm of meaning, which links the researcher with the objects 
he is examining. For that matter, a common designator of man has been the term 
‘animal rationale’: Man is that particular animal that is rational to himself. He is 
subject as well as object of the complex investigative endeavors which aim at the 
clarification of the condition humaine. And although he has been very successful 
at this enterprise so far, the required clarification comes with a blind spot. Since 
the realm of meaning constitutes the background of human self-investigation, it 
is very hard to see how this background may itself become the object of research 
that strives to understand its origins and the way it came into being.
How is a reasonable narrative about the lineage of symbolic competence 
 possible? An evolutionary account of the condition humaine needs to find an 
answer to this question. It could easily enough rely on theories of meaning as 
they have been proposed in the Hobbes-Locke-tradition of language thought, 
reducing symbolic competence to instrumentally successful signification (Locke 
[1700] 2008, 257). According to this type of language theory symbolic compe-
tence consists of connecting words with ideas, which represent a previously per-
ceived world. The words establish an order within the multitude of perceived 
objects, which allows cognition and orientation. Lines of filiation run from 
Locke’s locus classicus to the stimulus-response connections of classical behav-
iorism on the one hand and to the representationalist theories of meaning in the 
philosophy of mind, on the other, encouraging a twofold-reduction of human 
symbolic competence (Taylor 2016, 3 ff., 103 ff.). They suggest reducing human 
symbolic competence either to a gradually more complex variant of a type of 
sign-use, which is attested among the higher mammals in animal kingdom, or 
to a form of information-processing disconnected from the lifeworldly entan-
glement of the particular individual organism actualizing this competence. The 
essays gathered in this section of this book reject both types of reductionism, the 
behaviorist and the representationalist, thereby defending the embodied evolu-
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tion of a specifically human symbolic competence. Let me roughly highlight this 
double rejection:
If we take human symbolic competence to be a faculty of direct reference 
mapping between signifiers and significates, we miss the point of specifically 
human language: its capacity of indirect reference (reference via an inferential 
network of signs), which presupposes the use of propositions with singular 
terms (Tugendhat 2003, 13 ff.). And if we take human symbolic competence to be 
instantiating an information-processing device, we will not become aware of the 
expressive dimension of language. Johann Gottfried Herder was one of the first 
prominent philosophers in modern thought to emphasize languages’ acquire-
ments of indirectly referring to perceived objects (whereby each word’s and each 
sentence’s reference presupposes a holistic web of meaning) and of expressing or 
articulating the speaker’s attitude to those objects (Herder [1771] 1953). Charles 
Taylor has stressed the tradition of a “constitutive view” on language that 
bridges two hundred years from Herder and Humboldt to proponents of the 
main philosophical schools in the 20th century – like pragmatist George Herbert 
Mead, analytic philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein or phenomenologist Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty (Taylor 2016, 16). And the current discourse on embodied and 
enacted cognition is well aware of its philosophical antecedents in the aforesaid 
philosophies with their romantic predecessors such as Herder (Gallagher 2008). 
What Taylor has coined the “constitutive view” of language is a type of theory 
that considers language’s formative impact on what counts as criteria of its right-
ness: “Being constitutive means that language makes possible its own content, in 
a sense, or opens us to the domain it encodes” (ibid., 40).
Following the constitutive view, language is enmeshed in man’s volitional, 
emotional and cognitive states. It also mediates these states in the ongoing inter-
action with a recalcitrant world. Therefore, language is essential to the way 
humans enact the world in which they exist. The constitutive view fits into the 
conceptual framework of situated or embodied cognition according to which – 
to use Hilary Putnam’s illustrative phrase that he borrowed from Ecclesiastes 4, 
12 – cognition consists in a “threefold cord of mind, body, and world” (Putnam 
2001). The particular symbolic competence of humans, which we may refer to 
as their linguistic competence, has to be conceptualized within the triangular 
structure, which relates mind, body and world. It may then be understood in 
terms of enacting already established correlations of body, mind, and world in 
a novel way that reshapes the interrelated entities. In their introduction to this 
volume, Gregor Etzelmüller and Christian Tewes emphasize that “an evolution-
ary approach must explain how natural evolutionary processes could bring forth 
human beings who interact with and are responsive to the ‘space of reasons’ 
within the socio-cultural realm.” An account of the evolution of symbolic com-
petence has to deliver a reasonable theory about how natural evolutionary pro-
cesses induced conditions of human co-existence under which established forms 
of presymbolic sign-use passed the threshold to the symbolic realm.
If the constitutive view of language is appropriate, only an account that builds 
on the paradigm of embodied cognition will be a promising candidate to under-
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stand the evolution of symbolic competence. The following contributions by 
Thomas Fuchs, Terrence Deacon, Jordan Zlatev, and Matthias Jung are substan-
tial contributions to this enterprise.
Thomas Fuchs, Karl-Jaspers-Professor for the Philosophical Foundations of 
Psychiatry and Psychopathology at the University of Heidelberg, is entitled to 
the first contribution to this section because his essay mainly focuses on the onto-
genetic transmission from presymbolic to symbolic sign-use in early childhood, 
whereas the following three essays explore the far distant regions of phylogene-
sis. Fuchs’ argumentation starts by correlating the enactivist thesis, according to 
which cognition is considered to be a form of interaction between organism and 
environment, with the linguistic thesis of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in 
their seminal book Metaphors We Live By (1980), that bodily experience has had 
an immense impact on the formation of body-related verbal metaphors. Accord-
ing to Fuchs, research suggests, that the semantic-syntactic structure of language 
imitates the operative intentionality of our body. Speech enacts meaning in a way 
that may be retranslated by the potential addressees in embodied understanding. 
According to Fuchs, the enactive account of language is backed up by neuro-
biological findings, which show that the understanding of words activates the 
same sensorimotor brain areas as the practical engagement those words refer to. 
The discovered correlation between language and bodily action serves Fuchs as 
a path to understanding the development of symbolic language. The second half 
of his essay deals with the embedding of language acquisition in the relationships 
of primary and secondary intersubjectivity, highlighting the dynamic between 
the successively verbalized (or rather ‘linguistified’) intersubjectivity on the one 
hand and its neurobiological effects due to the plasticity of the infant’s brain on 
the other.
The newborn, Fuchs points out, perceives her mother not merely as a ‘pic-
ture’ or counterpart, but mimetically, by imitating her movements and expres-
sions and feeling them from within. Fuchs follows the traits of the infant’s social-
ization starting from the “protoconversations” between mother and child. The 
emergence of the first pointing gestures at the age of nine months transform 
the dyad of primary intersubjectivity between mother and child into the triadic 
situation of secondary intersubjectivity, where the actors reciprocally acknowl-
edge each other’s intentional orientation toward objects in the immediate envi-
ronment. Subsequently, the child can take off to capture the world via bodily 
co-presence and cooperation. Fuchs sees the vocal gesture originally embedded 
in an intercorporeal mutual practice that is oriented towards a shared environ-
ment, then, during the further course of language development, separating the 
sign from the physical movement and transporting it into the invisible medium 
of sound. Via the communication of the mirror neuron system, the voice was 
able to call up the idea of the intended actions and objects in both speaker and 
listener. The brain functions become the matrix of language. On the other hand, 
correlates of semantic meaning are functionally and morphologically inscribed 
on the brain as neuronal patterns in the course of interaction. Language therefore 
is not just embodied in our bodily interaction with each other and the world but 
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via brain functions incorporated into our bodies – the brain is a cultural organ, 
the affairs of our social life are organic events.
Fuchs’ essay refutes the classical dichotomy between nature and nurture in 
favor of an irresolvable entanglement of both sides, each affecting and shaping 
the other. This idea is also picked up by Terrence Deacon in his essay entitled 
“On Human (Symbolic) Nature: How the Word Became Flesh”. Deacon, Pro-
fessor for Biological Anthropology at the University of California at Berkeley, 
complements Fuchs’ ontogenetic approach to the correlation of sociality, lan-
guage and brain by the phylogenetic perspective. As beavers have bodies adapted 
to the aquatic niche that beavers create, symbolic communication, according to 
Deacon, became an artificial niche to which hominid brains had to adapt. The 
main focus of Deacon’s essay is the specific cognitive efficiency of symbol use, 
which led to the mutual exertion of selection pressure from brain functions on 
language for special learning and production demands and from language struc-
tures on brain functions for learnability and ease of use.
Deacon offers an evolutionary theory of signs that is based in Peircean semi-
otics. According to his approach semiotic properties are not intrinsic. Anything 
can be taken as a sign for anything else in any respect (e. g. either icon, index 
or symbol) so long as an appropriate interpretant process is generated. Icons, 
characterized by similarity in form, constitute the basis of conceptually grasping 
indexical correlations, whose context-bound interrelatedness, again, feeds into 
the conceptualization of symbols as forms of inferential or indirect decontextua-
lized reference. For Deacon, symbolic competence is therefore like cracking a 
code: One not only needs information about what refers to what, but also needs 
to understand the system of indices, which constitutes the matrix of symbols. 
Therefore “symbols are understood as higher-order semiotic relations embed-
ded in a context of indexical and iconic modes of reference.” It is obvious, that 
according to Deacon’s semiotic approach, the development of pointing and joint 
attention becomes a key stage in the process of hominization. The sophistication 
with indexicality developed prior to speech and was transferred into the use of 
words via the vocal gesture, as Deacons argumentation complements the onto-
genetic approach in Thomas Fuchs’ essay.
One of the major innovations in the hominization process, Deacon empha-
sizes, was the evolution of procedural and episodic memory. Whereas the front-
al-striatal-cerebellar circuit creates memory traces for skilled action by constant 
repetition and fine tuning, the sensory-hippocampal circuit creates memory 
traces for singular experiences by correlations between features. Both become 
essential for the emergence of narrative memory with its syntactical as well as 
semantic structure. Whereas articulatory and syntactical combinatorial skills are 
acquired procedurally, semantic relationships are acquired episodically. On the 
basis of narrative memory, icons can be juxtaposed to point to each other in a 
third iconism, which creates an index. Incongruous juxtapositions can convey 
abstract symbolic content behind the indexical ‘surface’ of the sign. Even more 
so, emotions linked to signs may by their correlation be combined in novel ways. 
Specifically, human emotions such as nostalgia, awe, humor, irony, derived from 
Introduction 103
combinatory sign use, are evoked in the process of semiosis. Essential to Dea-
con’s evolutionary theory of human sign use is the insight that symbolic refer-
ence emerges from and depends upon lower-order indexical and iconic forms 
of reference. Symbolic reference, which refers to the world only via indices, is 
thereby anchored in the sensual experiences of bodily creatures interacting with 
their environment.
Jordan Zlatev, Professor for Cognitive Semiotics at Lund University in Swe-
den, focuses in his essay “Preconditions in Human Embodiment for the Evo-
lution of Symbolic Communication” on the cognitive-semiotic prerequisites 
for the emergence of symbolic communication in the process of hominization. 
Zlatev puts a strong emphasis on the development of human symbolic compe-
tence in a prolonged process of adaptation to the challenges of transformed social 
living conditions. His essay thus puts emphasis on bodily mimesis as a “missing 
link” to the further development of the ‘symbolic species’ (Terrence Deacon). 
Bodily mimesis, according to Zlatev, granted to human cognition and commu-
nication pre-linguistic features in five domains: Firstly, it allowed for system-
atic rehearsal of motor patterns necessary for the fine-tuning of complex skills; 
secondly, it founds highly demanding forms of imitation, in which a novel act 
is observed, modeled and eventually added to behavioral repertoire; it prepares, 
thirdly, the ground for episodic memory, bringing the re-enactment of an event 
through bodily motion under voluntary control; fourthly it provides the basis 
for the formation of rituals and ritual-mediated group mentality; and finally, 
through ritually-bound sequences of mime and gesture, bodily mimesis enables 
intentional communication. Zlatev’s essay suggests answers to the questions of 
how bodily mimesis could evolve and which consequences it had for the devel-
opment of full-fledged symbol use. The answer to the first question is “allopar-
enting”, the answer to the second the “multimodal” character of communication.
As to the “alloparenting hypothesis” Zlatev argues in line with Sarah Blaf-
fer-Hrdy (2009) that the nurturing attitudes of mothers were extended from their 
infants to other members of the group, allowing food and childcare to be more 
equally distributed. The tightening of social bonding, precipitated by the tran-
sition of social group organization to alloparenting, prepared the grounds for 
bodily mimesis. While bodily mimesis, according to Zlatev, opens the way to 
a representational relation between sign and object, the multimodality of com-
munication allowed a gradual shift from predominantly bodily to predomi-
nantly vocal modes of expression. Since the vocal medium has less potential for 
iconic representation, it was prepared to overtake non-iconic representational 
tasks. Here the specific function of the vocal gesture comes to the fore: the vocal 
modality, while being grounded in the iconically based bodily gestures, could 
become increasingly instrumental for higher forms of representation.
For Matthias Jung, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Koblenz, the 
feature of symbolic – respectively indirect – reference, namely its dependence 
upon lower-order indexical and iconic forms of reference, is the main reason for 
conceptualizing the development of language as “Stages of Embodied Articula-
tion”. The depth of human experience, as he points out with explicit reference to 
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Deacon’s works, “is internally connected with our ability to handle linguistic and 
other symbols.” Supplementing Deacon’s view on the organic basis of language 
in the development of narrative memory, Jung introduces the concept of artic-
ulation “as the embodied alternative to representationalist views of language”. 
According to Jung, articulation is “the process of making explicit what the felt 
meaningfulness of action-associated qualities actually means, where its personal 
significance lies and to which entities in the world it refers.” It is thereby embod-
ied in two distinct aspects: On the one hand, the complex relation of semantic 
composition and syntactic ordering of meaning requires sensory-motor perfor-
mances of the body; on the other hand, the enactment of meaning in speech 
depends upon bodily qualities and their felt change during the articulation pro-
cess. Entangling hermeneutical accounts of experience with those of the prag-
matist tradition, Jung argues for the creativity of language, which transforms 
the “underlying pervasive quality” of situations, in which man interacts with 
his environment, into meaning. Since subjective: emotional, sensual, qualita-
tive aspects of the linguistic event of meaning-formation are enmeshed with the 
objective aspects of reference, truth-conditional theories of meaning fall short of 
the formative capacities of embodied language.
But Jung’s argumentation points into yet another direction. Language, he 
says, is deeply embedded in our bodily practices and states of being, but it also 
has the potential to transcend its embedding. Referring to Deacon’s semiotic 
account of the symbolic species, Jung locates the potential of languages to tran-
scend the immediacy of context-bound interaction with the environment in their 
devices for symbolic reference. Symbolic reference, according to Jung, submits 
“second-order capabilities” of reflecting on qualitative states of being and action 
via a network of inferential semantics. Equipped with Deacon’s semiotic differ-
entiations, Jung finally ventures a synopsis of Robert Brandom’s logical hierar-
chy of semantic explicitness in his seminal book Making it explicit (1994) with 
Merlin Donald’s narrative about the co-development of human cognition in the 
cultural process (Donald 1991).
In a first step, adding insights from Brandom’s neopragmatist entanglement of 
normative pragmatics with inferential semantics to his Deacon-based theory of 
signs, Jung conceptualizes “a ladder of articulation having three rungs – indexi-
cal, symbolical and symbolical-reflexive sign usage . . . grounded in iconic refer-
ence” and thereby irresolvably embedded in the qualities of bodily interaction of 
the human organism with his environment. In a second step, he refers the afore-
said rungs in his ladder of articulation to Merlin Donald’s phylogenetic stages 
in the development of linguistically impregnated human cultures. The point of 
this endeavor is to formulate a hypothesis about the successive emergence of 
linguistic characteristics which are specific to what Donald calls the episodic, 
mimetic, mythic and theoretic stages of human culture. According to this his-
torical typology, full-fledged propositional language is thereby restricted to the 
evolvement of what Donald calls theoretical culture during the 1000-year period 
of the so-called Axial Age marked by the appearance of monotheistic religions 
and rationalist philosophies.
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The essays collected in this section formulate different strands of a research 
program which are interlinked but also develop into different directions. The 
challenge of conceptualizing the symbolic competence of the human species as 
essentially embodied in organic and social structures calls for the interdisciplin-
ary coordination of perspectives, which encompass the child’s first steps into 
her linguistic socialization as much as the formation of cultural frameworks, in 
which the conditions of decontextualized deliberation are institutionalized. It 
is the semiotic differentiation between iconic, indexical and symbolic means of 
conscious orientation, which formulates the pivot point of the four contentually 
diverse contributions. On the other side, the plausibility of the semiotic cate-
gories depends on the extent to which they help incorporating empirical fields 
of research into thinking about the constraints of symbolic competence in a 
non-dualist way.
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The Embodied Development of Language
Thomas Fuchs
Abstract: The concepts of language prevalent in cultural and cognitive sciences regard it as 
a complex mental symbol system which is acquired mainly through maturation of suitable 
cognitive modules. In contrast, from an embodied and enactive point of view there is no 
fundamental separation between sensorimotor and symbolic interactions of an agent with 
its environment. The paper first presents arguments for an embodied basis of language 
production and comprehension, in particular results from cognitive neuroscience which 
link language processing to motor areas in the brain. The acquisition of language is then 
conceived as resulting from embodied interactions with others, starting from expressive or 
interbodily resonance, then proceeding to iconic gestures and finally leading to symbolic 
modes of communication. This development is essentially based on understanding others 
as intentional agents, which in turn is enabled by grasping their intentions as embodied in 
expressive, goal-directed, and pointing gestures in the context of shared practices.
Introduction
Since antiquity man has been primarily distinguished as the being that has lan-
guage – the zoon logon echon, as Aristotle defines it, and later as the animal rationa-
lis. According to this definition, on the one hand, humans are living beings like ani-
mals (animalia), and yet on the other hand are fundamentally different from them 
due to language and reason. Through these capacities alone, they achieve culture, 
art, science and technology. They are similar to their animal relations with regard 
to bodily needs, drives and affections; however, reasoned speech distinguishes them 
ahead of all other earthly creatures. Thus, Homo sapiens is an inherently ambivalent 
centaur being, a hybrid of animality and rationality, an animal rationale.
It may still be attributable to this traditional view of anthropology that for a 
long time both the cultural as well as the cognitive neurosciences only treated 
language as a disembodied mental symbol system. Starting with Fodor’s “Lan-
guage of Thought” (1975), words were conceived as producing images or sym-
bols inside the head of the speaker or listener, whose brain would use them 
to construct a representation of the state of affairs “out there” (Fodor 1998; 
Pylyshyn 1984). The fact that language originates from speaking with one 
another, where this primarily represents a bodily movement of expression and a 
joint speech action, that is to say in brief – the bodily performance of speech was 
only acknowledged as an accidental attribute, which seemed to have no effects 
on its structure and the implied contents.
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Only recent decades of infant research and evolutionary anthropology have 
shown the wealth of communication and dialogue that already unfolds in the 
human individual before learning language (Trevarthen 1979, 2009; Stern 1985; 
Tomasello 2008). Bodily communication or body language, as we also call it, is 
mainly conveyed through facial expression and gestures, through the intonation 
of the voice and ultimately through the body’s whole posture. As Darwin ([1872] 
1998) already observed, this expressive communication in humans manifests a 
differentiation and diversity that is unique in the animal kingdom. However, it 
is also the foundation on which verbal-symbolic forms of communication may 
initially develop at all during early childhood. For as we shall see later, language 
acquisition crucially presupposes that children develop an understanding for the 
intentions of others; and at first these intentions are only accessible to them as 
embodied, namely as visible, expressive, goal-oriented and pointing movements, 
whose meaning is exposed in the context of practical bodily interaction.
In what follows, I will proceed from an embodied and enactive view on lan-
guage and its development (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991; Glenberg and 
Robertson 2000; Ziemke 2002; Zlatev 2007). I will argue for the following theses:
(1) Language is not a representation of the world inside the head, but a form 
of embodied intersubjectivity: The meaning and function of words and sen-
tences is derived from our bodily experience of interacting with the world, 
which we share in principle with others, and which is evoked both in our-
selves and in others by our verbal utterances. This is reflected in recent 
research on the involvement of sensorimotor brain areas in language pro-
cessing.
(2) The acquisition of language in infancy is not achieved through an abstract 
attribution of symbols to references, but through the infant’s participation 
in shared intentional practices of interacting with the world. Only as embed-
ded in an interactive “we-intentionality”, can words be learnt and gain their 
meaning.
In both ways, language thus depends on intercorporeality (intercorporéité, Mer-
leau-Ponty 1960), that means, on a sphere of reciprocal bodily understanding 
and interaction, from which words first draw their references and meanings. Fol-
lowing on from these practical interactions, the infant’s brain is also influenced 
and structured by language: the brain only becomes an organ of the symbolic 
mind through social interactions (Fuchs 2010, 2011).
In the first part of my paper, I will argue for the embodied nature of language, 
including the anchoring of language in the brain. In the second part, I will give an 
account of the embodied development of language in early childhood.
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1 This involvement of our body in the meaning becomes even more obvious if we think of 
the difference the German language makes between “lying” and “standing” objects: “Das Buch 
liegt auf dem Tisch” (the book “lies” on the table), but “die Tasse steht auf dem Tisch” (the cup 
“stands” on the table). This usage of the verbs mirrors the different postural imitations that are 
invoked in our body when looking at a flat versus an upright object.
1. Language, Embodiment, and the Brain
The Body as the Medium of Language
In their seminal book “Metaphors we live by”, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) have 
first emphasized the bodily basis of language. They described over 50 systematic 
schemes of body-related verbal metaphors: basic bodily experiences like those of 
in and out, up and down, front and back, warm and cold, fast and slow, near and 
far, etc., cover a wide range of applications in all dimensions of language. They 
become the basic schemes of conceptual development and imagery, and what 
we use to call metaphorical or figurative meanings are in fact derived from our 
bodily experience which is subliminally present and effective even in the seem-
ingly most abstract discourse (see Johnson 1987).
The connection of language and the body has also been examined over the 
past two decades from the perspective of embodied and enactive cognition. This 
paradigm is based on the assumption that there is no strict separation of “lower” 
and “higher” cognitive functions, that is, between perception and movement on 
the one side and thought and language on the other. All forms of cognition are 
fundamentally considered as a form of interaction between an organism and its 
environment (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991), which means that there is 
no abstract level of the mind as a computational symbol system. Instead, motor, 
sensory, and cognitive functions are always intermodally linked. This has also 
led to an embodied view of language as involving bodily systems of movement, 
posture, kinesthesia and proprioception, both in language production and com-
prehension (e. g. Glenberg and Robertson 2000; Ziemke 2002; Zwaan et al. 2004; 
Barsalou 2008; Cuffari, Di Paolo, and De Jaegher 2015).
Let us take an example: If we listen to a simple sentence such as “the book lies 
on the table”, its meaning is constituted for us by a connection of several com-
ponents:
(a) the evocation of two objects in our awareness, which does not only include 
their visual imagination, but also their affordances for our bodily action, for 
example, as something to grasp, to open and to read (the book), something 
solid to sit at or to lay things on (the table), etc.;
(b) our operative (motor, postural) bodily intentionality which lets us implicitly 
grasp the state of “lying”, namely as being stretched out flat, wholly sup-
ported by the ground;1
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2 The fundamental structure of a sentence (subject – predicate – object) implies an agent 
performing some kind of operation on an object, which is precisely the basic structure of our 
embodied relation to the world. Of course, there are many variations – the verb may be intran-
sitive or signify a state rather than an action – but this does not change the fact that a sentence 
expresses what could on principle be our own experience.
3 One might object that all these affordances and bodily conditions are far too complex to be 
present in the immediate understanding of the sentence. As we will see, however, there is now 
a lot of neurobiological evidence showing that this indeed the case (see below). But apart from 
that, the question is how one could ever come to understand the meaning of lying at all, if not 
by “what I know from my own lying”, even if this embodied knowledge is only activated in the 
most remote way when hearing the word later on. For otherwise it would be very difficult and 
circuitous to explain what lying actually means, for example, “the spatial relation of an object 
being in close contact with another object underneath, touching it with its most extended side, 
whereas its smaller sides remain free and upright.” And even then, we would run straightaway 
into the symbol grounding problem (Harnard 1990), for what the symbols “spatial”, “contact”, 
“touching”, “cover”, etc. in that definition mean could only be explained by even more complex 
definitions, and so on ad infinitum. Language cannot be a free-floating system of symbolic ref-
erences – it must ultimately be grounded in embodied experience. This experience is primarily 
given as a knowing how based on bodily dispositions and habits, not as a knowing that repre-
sented in a propositional format (Fuchs 2016a).
4 Usually, this does not require any explicit perspective-taking or mentalizing (“theory of 
mind”): we do not distinguish between an interlocutor’s mental state and his utterances, as if the 
former would have to qualify the latter, but we understand his words as just what they mean in 
relation to the shared situation. The intention is inherent in the verbal expression itself. Only 
in cases of ambiguity or doubt, this unity of intention and utterance may be dissolved, and we 
apply explicit cognitive procedures of perspective-taking or inference (“what did he mean by 
that?”, “what is he up to?”, etc.).
(c) a spatial relation which we know from your own bodily postures or actions 
(lying “on” something, being placed “next to”, etc.);
(d) a temporal relation of simultaneity to our present experience (“lies”);
(e) a syntactical structure which generally combines a subject and a predicate in 
the same way as we experience ourselves as doing something (“the book lies”, 
“the tree stands”, “the bell rings”, etc.).2
So what we implicitly understand when listening to the sentence above would 
have the unfolded meaning of “the thing-I-could-take-and-read is now lying-
like-I-would on the thing-I-could-sit-at”, or similar. A sentence thus combines 
affordance-based terms into patterns of action and relation, or in other words, 
the syntax in a sense imitates the operative intentionality of our body.3 In its basic 
grammatical structure, a sentence expresses a subject acting on an object in a 
way that we could on principle perform ourselves; through this very structure, 
the sentence enacts its meaning and thus enables an embodied understanding, or 
to use an enactivist term, embodied sense-making (Weick 1995; De Jaegher & 
Di Paolo 2007).
To this, we have to add the person speaking the sentence and her apparent 
intention in the interactive context, turning the utterance “the book lies on the 
table” either into an informative answer (there it is!), an implicit request (could 
you hand it over?), a philosophical example (let’s take the following sentence . . .), 
or whatsoever. Understanding another thus involves participating in her inten-
tional attitude towards the situation.4 Moreover, listening to her also involves 
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5 It is worthwhile to follow Kleist’s description in detail: “Often I sit at my desk, poring 
over documents and trying to discover the point of view from which some complicated con-
troversy might be judged. . . . But, lo and behold, if I mention it to my sister, who is sitting 
behind me and working, I discover facts which whole hours of brooding, perhaps, would not 
have revealed. . . . For since I always have some obscure preconception, distantly connected in 
some way with whatever I am looking for, I have only to begin boldly, and the mind, obliged 
to find an end for this beginning, transforms my confused concept as I speak into thoughts that 
are perfectly clear, so that, to my surprise, the end of the sentence coincides with the desired 
knowledge. . . . During this process nothing is more helpful to me than a sudden movement on 
my sister’s part, as if she were about to interrupt me; for my mind, already tense, becomes even 
more excited by this attempt to deprive it of the speech of which it enjoys the possession and, 
like a great general in an awkward position, reaches an even higher tension and increases in ca-
pacity.” (Kleist [1805] 1951, 42 ff.)
6 Cf. also Greek orektos (stretched out, upright) or Latin rectus (straight, right). See Kluge 
(1989) and http://www.etymonline.com.
a tendency of subvocalizing her utterances. This becomes obvious for example 
when listening to a conversational partner who appears to hesitate or to be at 
loss for the right words, and without hesitation one supplies the missing words, 
completing the utterance of the speaker. For the speaker in turn, the attentive 
listener serves as a stimulus for his own speech, as Kleist ([1805] 1951, 43) has 
famously described in his essay On the gradual construction of thoughts during 
speech: “The other person’s face is a curious source of inspiration for a person 
who speaks. A single glance which indicates that a half-expressed thought is 
already understood, bestows on us the other half of the formulation.”5 Language 
production as well as comprehension may thus be described as a special kind 
of participatory sense-making (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007), namely as the 
co-enactment of a sense that is always in the making, through embodied proten-
tions or co-anticipations of both speaker and listener.
If we take all this together, we can assume a prima facie evidence that
(a) language is not a free-floating, abstract symbol system, but a network of 
meanings evoking a certain way of embodied being-towards-the-world (être-
au-monde, Merleau-Ponty) or acting-towards-the-world;
(b) language production and comprehension are crucially based on embod-
ied and enactive cognition, including the situated verbal interaction itself. 
That means, “words are patterns available for enacting certain forms of 
sense-making” (Cuffari, Di Paolo, and De Jaegher 2015), both in speaking 
and in understanding.
One could now argue that this bodily and operational basis of meaning and 
grammar does not apply to higher levels of abstraction: there seems to be no 
enactive account of abstract words like “conclusion”, “peace” or “right”, etc. 
However, a closer look reveals that even the meaning of abstract or metaphorical 
terms is ultimately based on bodily experience (see also Irwin 2015). Let us look 
at some examples:
− The noun “right” (or German Recht) is derived from the Indo-European 
roots reg- (“to move in a straight line, to straighten, to direct”) and regtós 
(“straight, upright”).6 Thus, it is related to a bodily operation which implies 
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7 Could this thesis even be extended to include abstract systems such as mathematical or 
logical structures and operations such as 3√27 = 3, syllogisms or similar? It seems that from 
a certain degree of abstraction, such systems can still be comprehended or applied, but do no 
longer allow for any imagination based on sensorimotor experience. However, it soon becomes 
clear that even here, the abstract terms and operations are initially derived from experiences of 
bodily action in the way Piaget ([1936] 1952) has already described it (although he assumed that 
abstract thought disconnects from the level of primary sensorimotor or preconceptual thinking). 
Thus, addition, subtraction, multiplication, or division are mental operations which are only 
acquired initially by performing the concrete operations in an ostensive way (e. g. supported by 
an upright posture or gait and an experience of balance. This refers to the 
moral sphere as well: being a “righteous”, honest or courageous person means 
an inner or moral attitude which is embodied in a corresponding posture of 
standing or walking upright. Similarly, the meaning of “justice” or “equity” 
(German Gerechtigkeit) is grounded on the experience of bodily equilibrium 
achieved in the upright position (as represented also in the balanced scales of 
Justitia).
− The words “concession” and “concede” are derived from the Latin cedere 
which means to withdraw, to give way. Thus, if I concede a right or a claim to 
someone, I withdraw, however slightly, from my primary bodily stance which 
may also be expressed by a conceding gesture of my arm.
− Apart from etymology, embodiment research may also support the bodily 
basis of metaphorical terms, as for example the connection between guilt and 
impurity, or cleansing, respectively. Pilate washed his hands and thus claimed 
to be innocent of Jesus’ death, and Lady Macbeth develops a washing obses-
sion after the murder of King Duncan. Recent research has now shown that 
cleansing can indeed wash away or alleviate feelings of guilt (Meier et al. 2012, 
Lee and Schwarz 2011, Zhong and Liljenquist 2006) and have a mildness 
influence on one’s moral judgment (Schnall, Benton, and Harvey 2008).
− When we speak of a “warm welcome”, we do so because we actually feel 
bodily warmth in this situation – the social atmosphere is felt as bodily sensa-
tion. Correspondingly, Zhong and Leonardelli (2008) found that test subjects, 
after having been exposed to a situation of social exclusion or ostracizing, 
estimated the room temperature to be colder than before. Moreover, Bargh 
and Shalev (2012) found that persons who experience social loneliness show 
an increased tendency to take warm baths or showers.
Generalizing such considerations and results, one can describe language as a sys-
tem of interrelated terms which refer to all kinds of embodied operations and 
experiences, and which in their syntactical combination imitate our bodily inter-
actions with the world. Even the most abstract terms are ultimately derived from 
some primary form of operation or interaction: Take “abstraction” as drawing 
away (from Latin abs-trahere), “detection” as pulling away a cover (de-tegere), 
“enlightenment” as sheding a light on something to become visible, or “nega-
tion” as an action or resistance against some kind of intrusion (for example, a 
rejecting gesture of one’s hands or a shaking of the head to avoid intake).7
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one’s finger or other countable objects). Of course, the habitualization of these operations leads 
to their formalization which does no longer need (nor afford) operative imagery. However, even 
though a number such as 1,455,578 cannot be imagined in any sense, we still take it implicitly for 
granted that it is composed of as many steps of adding 1 + 1 + 1 . . ., and the same applies for all 
other kinds of mathematical operations – that is precisely why they are called “operations”. The 
same could be shown for logical operations like conclusions (thus, the famous syllogism “All 
humans are mortal, Socrates is human, therefore Socrates is mortal” dips into a box in which all 
objects of a certain type have been put before and picks one out again).
Neurobiological Findings
In the last two decades, the embodiment of language has been increasingly con-
firmed by findings from neuroscience, which show that language processing in 
the brain is functionally connected to sensorimotor systems. Thus, if one listens 
to words, the same sensorimotor areas are activated as for the practical engage-
ment with the objects that the words refer to, or in other words, language com-
prehension is crucially based on action-perception circuits in the brain (Gallese 
2008; Pulvermüller and Fadiga 2010; Jirak et al. 2010). Let us look at some exam-
ples:
− Listening to the words “grasp”, “go” or “shout” activates, alongside the 
receptive language areas, also the motor centers for the corresponding actions 
(Buccino et al. 2005; Jirak et al. 2010). There is even strong evidence for a 
somatotopy of language, that means a differential activation of motor centers 
according to the limb or action involved in the sentence one listens to: Pul-
vermüller (2005) identified specific fMRI-activity patterns in the pre-motor 
cortex for consonant verbs that refer to mouth, arm or leg movements, such 
as ‘lick’, ‘pick’ and ‘kick’. In each case, the premotor cortex is differentially 
engaged in a topographical bodily pattern.
− When listening to verbs referring to hand movements (give, take, point, etc.) 
right-handed people show an activation of the left pre-motor cortex, left-
handed people an activation of the right (Willems, Hagoort, and Casasanto 
2010). This shows that the verbs are processed according to the actual bodily 
movement that one could perform. Moreover, it strongly suggests that they 
have already been learnt in this embodied way: “to give” meant originally 
“handing something over to mom with my right hand” (or left hand, in the 
other case).
− Words related to odours (for example, “cinnamon”) or to sounds (for exam-
ple, “telephone”) cause particular activation in olfactory and auditory brain 
areas, respectively (Pulvermüller and Fadiga 2010). Thus, listening to the sen-
tence “the alarm sounded and John jumped out of bed” will activate areas 
both in the auditory and motor cortex related to sounds and movements 
(Kaschak et al. 2006; Winter and Bergen 2012).
− Moreover, Glenberg and collaborators (2008) and Boulenger, Hauk, and Pul-
vermüller (2009) found that the abstract usage of verbs such as “to give” or 
“to grasp” (to give a reason, to grasp a notion) activates the motor system no 
less than the concrete usage. Granted, these results are still open for debate, 
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and it may also be possible that the context of words influences the degree 
to which the motor regions are involved in their comprehension (Jirak et al. 
2010).
− Generally, merely listening to speech also activates motor brain regions that 
are involved in speech production (Wilson et al. 2004, Pulvermüller et al. 
2006). This corresponds to the tendency of subvocalization during listening 
to an interlocutor mentioned above.
− Finally, it emerged that areas which were thought to have purely verbal 
functions like the Broca and Wernicke area actually combine language and 
bodily movement with one another, specifically via the mirror neuron system 
(Binkofski and Buccino 2004; Gallese 2008). “Mirror” or sensorimotor neu-
rons, originally found in the premotor cortex of macaque monkeys, generally 
link one’s own motor action to the same action as perceived in conspecifics, 
enabling a sensorimotor or embodied social perception (e. g., observing some-
one reaching for a cup activates one’s own motor system for the same reaching 
action, even if only subliminally). In humans, Broca’s area has been found to 
be the core region of the mirror neuron system, and there is increasing evi-
dence showing that this system is at least participating in the connection of 
verbal sounds and possible action (Aziz-Zadeh et al. 2006; Aziz-Zadeh and 
Damasio 2008; Jirak et al. 2010).
All these strands of research are still in flux and a final evaluation is not possi-
ble yet. Nevertheless, there is at least strong evidence for an enactive concept of 
language as being crucially based on bodily perception and action. A consequent 
question is: Does the body also play a constitutive role for the acquisition of lan-
guage, which also means for the establishment of neural action-perception cir-
cuits that are necessary to speak and understand language? In the introduction, I 
have already proposed that language developes as a form of embodied intersub-
jectivity. I now state some reasons in greater detail, looking at the development 
from pre-verbal to verbal stages of intersubjectivity in early childhood.
2. The Embodied Development of Language
Primary Intersubjectivity
Infants are attuned from birth to social interactions, in particular by showing a 
heightened attention to faces and their expressions (Valenza et al. 1996; Turati et 
al. 2002). Research studies conducted during the last two decades have mostly 
found that they are also able to imitate adults’ gestures like sticking out their 
tongue, opening their mouth, frowning, and others (Meltzoff and Moore 1977, 
1989). This capacity for spontaneous imitation of others’ expressions has been 
considered a crucial basis of early social development (Meltzoff and Brooks 2001, 
Meltzoff and Prinz 2002). However, recent research with larger samples and a 
wider range of gestures presented to the infants challenges these results, finding 
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8 The baby’s particular sensitivity to the lived synchrony of interaction was impressively 
demonstrated by Murray and Trevarthen (1985) who designed a Double Television set-up that 
enabled replay of the mother’s affectionate and responsive talk with the baby. When a happy 
minute of the mother’s live communication was later replayed to the baby (thus showing the 
same expressive qualities but lacking synchrony and responsiveness), the baby soon became 
distressed and turned away.
no significant excess of matching over non-matching reactions (Oostenbroek et 
al. 2016). But even if it turns out that imitation is not an innate capacity, but 
develops in the course of mutual exchanges and matching reactions during the 
first months, it still functions as a major component of what Trevarthen (1979) 
has termed “primary intersubjectivity”.
This stage is characterized by an increasing emotional resonance between 
infant and mother that develops via mutual bodily expressions and reactions. 
Usually, the mother intuitively answers the baby’s signals and initiatives with 
suitable vocal and gestural reactions that stimulate further resonance. In the first 
months, mother and infant thus develop dynamic and synrhythmic “proto-con-
versations” (Trevarthen 2001, 2008), that is, fine-tuned sequences of alternating 
expressions with imitative utterances, smiles and gestures just like a conversa-
tion – the later verbal dialogue is already outlined here. Mothers and fathers intu-
itively use simplified, prototypical behavioral forms (welcome reaction, eye con-
tact, musical utterances or “motherese”, exaggerated facial expressions, among 
others) that correspond to the child’s “musical repertoire” and preference for 
expressiveness (Papoušek and Papoušek 1987, 1995; Malloch 1999).
This early intensive dialogue is especially influenced by musical expressive 
qualities, by the rhythm and dynamics of facial, vocal, and gestural interaction 
that express changes of emotion and mood. They may best be described in qual-
ities such as “crescendo”, “decrescendo”, flowing, frisking, smooth, explosive, 
etc., which Daniel Stern (1985) termed “vitality contours” or “vitality affects.” 
For example, a sharply rising pitch contour in maternal vocalization alerts the 
infant, whereas the pitch is low and continuous in comforting or soothing (Fer-
nald 1992, Papoušek 1994). Being the major bridge of emotional exchange, these 
expressive qualities lead to the mutual “affect attunement” of parent and infant 
that Stern highlighted. “Even in early weeks, infants learn little rituals of musi-
cality, in vocal games, in simple rhyming songs, sharing with skill and affection-
ate good humour their recursive events . . . babies are alert to the pulse and subtle 
harmonies of a mother’s speech, turning to tones of sympathy, or withdrawing 
from their absence” (Trevarthen 2008, 18, 21).8 In the course of this preverbal 
communication, the child increasingly learns to connect the mother’s or father’s 
emotional expression with typical recurring situations and thus to distinguish 
its different meanings. The child also learns that his own reactions motivate the 
caregiver to specific behavior, and thereby develops interactive expectations. All 
this conveys to him the basic feeling of living with others in a shared world, of 
being perceived by them and being connected with them – a central precondition 
for the steps that now follow.
Thomas Fuchs116
Secondary Intersubjectivity
(a) Joint Attention and the Pointing Gesture
On the next level of secondary intersubjectivity, the phenomenon of “joint atten-
tion”, which manifests itself from about the age of 9 months, signifies a key step 
towards symbolic communication (Trevarthen and Hubley 1978; Tomasello 2002; 
Bråten and Trevarthen 2007). At this age, babies begin along with adults to turn 
their attention to objects, in particular by following their pointing gestures. Soon 
the babies also proceed to steer the adults’ attention to things through pointing 
themselves, and in doing so cast each other quick glances to reassure themselves of 
their attention. In an illuminating experiment by Tomasello and his group, infants 
aged about 12 months observed how one adult made a hole in a sheet of paper and 
filed it away in a clip folder. The adult now left the room and another adult entered, 
took the folder and placed it in a clearly visible cupboard, which he then locked. 
He left the room, the first adult re-entered and looked around, visibly searching 
for something, with a sheet of paper in his hand. In most cases, the infants looked 
attentively at the adults and then pointed to the cupboard (Liszkowski et al. 
2006).
How can we interpret this experiment? Obviously, the infants recognized 
the adult’s intention, only due to his previous action and now his questioning 
expression. Intentions are therefore not only something internal or mental, 
but they are also perceptible in the goal-oriented bodily actions of others and 
obtain their meaning from the context of the joint situation. There is no need 
first for a “Theory of Mind” (ToM) or some kind of inference or mind-reading 
in order to directly understand others’ intentions in a practical context – after 
all, the usual time of acquiring a sophisticated knowledge of other minds (ToM) 
is not before the age of 4 years. Considered more closely, what does pointing 
imply?
Pointing first involves the mutual relation to a third entity that is seen by both 
partners, being aware that the other is also doing so. Hence, we are no longer 
concerned with the primary dyadic, but with a triadic situation comprising the 
infant, the adult and the mutually intended object or goal of an action (Tomasello 
2002). The joint attention, which is visible in the parallel axes of the child’s and 
adult’s gazes, manifests a specifically human form of communication, namely 
conveying a message about a joint, external reference point. Here lies a funda-
mental limit to the mental capacities of other primates that cannot develop joint 
attention (Fuchs 2013). Even though great apes may become capable of so-called 
imperative pointing (“give me this!”) when raised in human environments, there 
is no declarative or cooperative meaning attached to it (Gómez 2007). In con-
trast, as we saw in the above study, the infants also attempted to help the adult by 
pointing to the object being searched for. This communicative and cooperative 
attitude has been particularly highlighted by Tomasello and his group as a crucial 
difference from proto-pointing gestures shown by great apes (Tomasello et al. 
2005; Tomasello and Carpenter 2007): only through this sharing of intentions, 
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9 It should be mentioned here that Tomasello’s account of infant pointing goes far into a 
mentalistic understanding of others even at this stage (see for example Tomasello et al. 2007). As 
Gómes (2007) has argued, there is also a more parsimonious explanation which emphasizes (as 
I did above) the embodied intentionality of gestures in the infant’s experiential field: “behaviors 
are directly perceived as intentional, that is, as being directed to things other than themselves 
. . . For example, understanding that gaze is directed to an object does not require attributing 
the mental experience of seeing the object – such directionality is directly attributed to gaze it-
self” (Gómez 2007, 730). Regarding intentional behaviour as field-related, one can even assume 
that an infant can “remember and predict the intentional availability of targets for others (e. g., 
whether they will or not be able to find an object hidden in their absence)” (l. c.).
an actual “we-intentionality” is created (“look at this!”, “now we are looking at 
this object together”).
Pointing is a gesture that only makes sense in an intersubjective context: it 
“indicates” the object with the index finger, instead of grasping it. The other 
person must understand this meaning, i. e. follow the direction of the finger into 
empty space until arriving at the object as its goal. The pointing gesture is the 
origin of mutually shared meanings and thus a precursor of the sign – the entity, 
which stands for something different, and represents it (Fuchs and De Jae-
gher 2009). Etymology also refers to the genetic link of pointing, sign and later 
speaking: in German, “zeigen” (to point) und “Zeichen” (sign) have the same 
Indo-Germanic root < deik >. This root also occurs in the Greek “deíknymi” (to 
point, to show) and “dáktylos” (finger), and also in the Latin “dicere” (to show, 
to speak) and “digitus” (finger). The same connection becomes manifest in Ger-
man “deuten” (point) and “bedeuten” (signify) (see Kluge 1989, 807).
The pointing gesture is a grounding experience in still another way. Infants 
experience in this instance that other people also have a direction of attention 
that they can personally influence. Even though we should not be led to assume 
a mentalistic understanding of others at this level, infants at least begin to under-
stand that the world looks different in their parent’s eyes, yet that they can com-
municate with them about it. They show them an object because they notice that 
the adult has not seen it yet, but could soon see it, as shown in the experiment 
of the folder in the cupboard. In other words, infants develop an initial under-
standing of another perspective with which they identify by a kind of co-antici-
pation, assuming that an object has a meaning for the adult. Such a fundamental 
new stage of intersubjectivity is manifested here that Tomasello also refers to the 
“9-month revolution” (Tomasello 2002).9
(b) Other Gestures
Apart from the pointing gesture there are also other communicative gestures that 
develop in the second year of life. In almost all cultures, for example, shaking 
one’s head means “no”. The origin of this movement can be observed in babies 
who move their head to one side to avoid an unpleasant stimulation or to refuse 
further breast-feeding (Spitz 1957). Presumably this evolved into a ritualization 
during the course of phylogeny. As the signal must be clear, it was carried out 
more noticeably, i. e. by more markedly and repeatedly turning the head. On 
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the other hand, nodding one’s head represents “yes” in most cultures. Lowering 
the head probably meant a sort of gesture of humility signifying: I bow to what 
you say; I agree (Eibl-Eibesfeld 1972). These gestures are acquired in the course 
of the 2nd year, with head shaking (“no”) before nodding (“yes”) (Kettner and 
Carpendale 2013).
Other gestures, which develop in the course of the second year of life, are 
of an iconic nature, i. e. they represent pantomime actions or recall something 
absent in the imagination: raising one’s arms means “big”, blowing means “too 
hot”, panting represents a “dog”, flapping one’s arms suggests a “bird” etc. 
(Tomasello 2009, 159 f.). Thus, the early development of non-verbal communica-
tion is characterized by deiktic and iconic gestures which supports an embodied 
view of language acquisition, although from the 14th month or so the gestures 
and vocalizations of this ‘protolanguage’ are already accompanied by the acqui-
sition of verbal speech.
(c) The Development of Language
In the final months of the first year the words adults use to label people, objects 
or actions attract the infant’s attention and invite imitation. Speech acquisition 
occurs not purely cognitively, however, as though language were just a sign sys-
tem to be learned abstractly. According to the social pragmatic approach (Bruner 
1983; Nelson 1996; Tomasello 2000), language acquisition is scaffolded by situ-
ations of intercorporeality, shared attention, joint practice, and ostensive cuing. 
The conditions for this are:
(1) the child’s participation in an interactive framework that is already pre-ver-
bally developed, in other words, verbal interaction presumes intercorporeal 
exchange;
(2) joint attention to a third entity, and specifically in the practical context that 
the speech refers to – that is, the triadic situation;
(3) understanding the communicative intentions of others as being based on 
their goal-directed movements, pointing or expressive gestures.
Hence, social practice represents the reference point and at the same time the 
scaffolding context within which a symbolic language can be learned. In concrete 
terms, this means that the first words are connected with already comprehensible 
gestures, in particular, the pointing gesture. For example, the parents ostensibly 
look at or point to objects and name them (“Look! A ball!”). The child now 
must understand that the parent intends for her (the child) to share attention 
with her to some outside entity, or in other words, the communicative inten-
tion (Tomasello 2000). Of course, grasping the word as meaningful does not yet 
imply higher conceptual capacities, but rather a typification of proto-concepts 
according to similarities of shape and behavior (“balls” means “such round, roll-
ing things”). In the sequence, this leads to a reverse imitation: Now the child uses 
the first words (“there!”, “ball”, etc.), often connected with a pointing gesture, to 
show the adult what she herself finds interesting and wants to share. The adult’s 
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10 Frequently, the interaction also selects wording from spontaneous sound production and 
the child’s babbling, making them into meaningful signals: for example, when the child says 
“Mummy” or “Daddy”, the parents presume her intention is to form these words and reinforce 
them accordingly. Recognizing the effect of her own sounds then leads the child to learn their 
“meaning”.
understanding of the verbal gesture then acts as a reinforcement which stabilizes 
the new gestural meaning.10
A crucial question is how cognitively demanding this early communication 
should be conceived. Tomasello explains it already in terms of Grice’s (1989) 
complex theory of language and meaning: “This is what a linguistic symbol is. It 
is a noise (or other behavior) that two or more individuals use with one another 
to direct one another’s attention and thereby to share attention – and they both 
know this is what they are doing” (Tomasello 2000, 405). This is already a high-
level account of cognitive intentions, implying some kind of meta-perspective 
on the communication (“I know that you know what I mean”). It seems highly 
probable that this rather abstract level is only reached later on, whereas the early 
language use is based on situated and embodied interaction.
Thus, even if the verbal meanings can increasingly be detached from the con-
crete situation – at first, all of early speech acquisition is against the backdrop 
of interactive situations and short episodes: eating, washing, dressing, changing 
nappies, playing, building a tower out of blocks, feeding ducks, and so on. The 
child always first learns co-involvement with the relevant practical situation and 
to form mutual goals, and then he orders the speech, which he has heard, into 
this context (Bruner 1983). He learns the word “ball” when playing ball, the 
word “there” in association with the pointing gesture and the word “Ow!” in 
connection with an expression of pain etc. Children’s perception of the environ-
ment is synchronized with the corresponding verbal expressions that denote it 
and with the adult’s visible attention and intention. They only adopt a word for 
a new object when his or her attention is actually directed towards this object. If 
the adult is looking in another direction or the voice is coming from a tape, the 
child doesn’t connect word and object (Tomasello 2000; Dittmann 2002, 43). The 
capacity for speech therefore only develops within social scaffolding through an 
intercorporeal practice that is oriented towards a shared environment.
In fact, the word is a vocal gesture and initially only complements the point-
ing gesture as a first sign. But the voice also separates the sign from the physical 
movement and transports it into the invisible, no longer localizable medium of 
sound (Fuchs 2010, 210). Thereby, the possibilities of referencing multiply, and 
ultimately the sound signs can even be detached from the concrete situation. 
They are capable of pointing to absent objects, for example to Mummy or Daddy 
when they are absent; they are even capable to pointing to “something like”, that 
means to similar, general, or abstract objects. The gestural-iconic representation 
is then increasingly replaced by propositional speech, and the continued gestures 
accompanying verbal speech serve more visual aspects, for example, to illustrate 
forms, directions, and structures that are the topic of speech.
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11 The idea of singing being the ancestral origin of speech was first put forward by Giambat-
tista Vico in his notion of “Parlare cantando” (cf. Trabant 1991).
12 This correspondence of temporal structure has already been noted by Adam Smith in his 
essay Of the imitative arts ([1777] 1982): “Time and measure are to instrumental music what 
order and method are to discourse; they break it into proper parts and divisions, by which we 
are enabled both to remember better what has gone before, and frequently to foresee somewhat 
of what is to come after . . . the enjoyment of Music arises partly from memory and partly from 
foresight” (quoted after Trevarthen 2012, 259).
Neurobiological Foundations
As we can see from this brief outline of speech acquisition, the body as the 
medium of all action and interaction plays a fundamental role in the process. 
How is this reflected in the neuronal anchoring of language?
Neuroplasticity is a crucial presupposition for language development; in the 
course of meaningful interactions with others, the brain also becomes the matrix 
of language. Two aspects are significant here. Firstly, EEG studies show that 
up to the 2nd year of life the earlier developing right half of the brain which is 
the dominant hemisphere for processing music also manifests stronger activation 
while listening to language than the left half (Patel 2003; McMullen and Saffran 
2004). This corresponds to the enhanced role of musical elements, namely, of 
speech melody, intonation, and rhythm for the perception of the toddler (Trev-
arthen 1998). The more advanced the development of symbolic speech, the more 
areas in the left brain take over verbally relevant functions, in particular, the Wer-
nicke and Broca center and other premotor areas as well as the basal ganglia. 
However, even at a later stage in life, recent results suggest that the neuronal 
resources for processing speech and music still heavily overlap, in particular, in 
the Broca region and its counterpart in the right-half of the brain (Koelsch 2005, 
Koelsch et al. 2005). This suggests that at least in infancy the brain does not 
process music and speech as separate domains, but rather processes speech as a 
particular form of music, indeed that the musical capacities of humans represent 
a decisive precondition for speech acquisition.11
Both music and language are organized temporally, with the relevant struc-
tures unfolding in time, as patterns and sequences of rhythm, emphasis, intona-
tion, phrasing, and contour (McMullen and Saffran 2004).12 This is in correspon-
dence with the central role of melodious-rhythmic interaction, vitality contours 
and affective resonance in the early mother-child dyad, which was mentioned 
above: The musicality of the interaction may be regarded as prefiguring the tem-
poral dynamics in which language may then unfold. The theory of early “Com-
municative Musicality” is supported by acoustic analyses of the measures of 
rhythm, quality and dynamics in the vocal interplay between infants and adults 
(Malloch 1999). Here, an emotional aspect of speech development is involved 
that is especially manifest in prosody. Accordingly, recent neuroimaging results 
indicate that responses to human vocal sounds are strongest in the right superior 
temporal area (Belin, Zatorre, and Ahad 2002), near areas that have been impli-
cated in processing of musical pitch (McMullen and Saffran 2004). This lends 
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13 The question how this matching should be interpreted is still controversial, however. Gal-
lese and Goldman (1998) have originally proposed a simulation theory of mind reading, and 
Gallese (2008) still defends an embodied simulation of others’ expressions on a subpersonal 
level of the MNS. Such concept have been criticized by phenomenological authors, arguing 
against the complicated mechanism of an ‘as-if’-simulation and backward projection of one’s 
own bodily state onto others (Gallagher 2007, Fuchs and De Jaegher 2009). Instead, one’s own 
bodily resonance may be simply inherent in one’s perception of the other, namely as its’proxi-
mal’ or tacit component (Fuchs 2016b).
plausibility to accounts of musical and linguistic co-evolution that emphasize 
emotional communication through prosody as a primary root of both systems.
The second aspect is related to the embedding of speech acquisition in inter-
active contexts. Specialized systems are required for the neuronal connection of 
action, perception, and meaning through speech, and there is now plenty of evi-
dence to suggest a crucial role for the sensory-motor system of the mirror neu-
rons. The localization of Broca’s region in the inferior pre-motor cortex (respon-
sible for speech production, but also for hand and mouth movement) and its 
coincidence with the main areas of the mirror neuron system suggests that lan-
guage originally represented an interpersonal resonance system for action schemes: 
via the communication of the mirror neuron system, the voice was able to call up 
the idea of the intended actions and objects in both speaker and listener.
As mentioned above, the mirror neuron system (MNS) is activated both when 
observing a conspecific reach for or grasp an object and when imagining oneself 
reaching or grasping without actually moving one’s hand. Thus, the system leads 
to matching an observed movement to the internally generated enactment of the 
same movement in the observer.13 Speculating on a connection to the evolution 
of language, Rizzolatti and Arbib (1998) have first assumed that the MNS also 
enables intentional meaning to be assigned to another’s vocal gesture. The con-
nection could be spelled out as follows (see in particular Gallese 2008; Jirak et 
al. 2010):
Mirror neurons also react to suggested goal-directed movements, i. e. they are 
activated when the hand of another individual reaches for an object that was 
already visible earlier, yet is now out of sight (Umiltá et al. 2001). This clearly 
corresponds to the pointing gesture which may be directed to a distant or even 
invisible object. Thus, the MNS would be suitable to support the connection 
of pointing and the object, by evoking one’s own experience of movement and 
direction of gaze. The discovery of audiomotor mirror neurons in the Broca 
homologous area of monkeys also makes this plausible for vocal gestures (Kohler 
et al. 2002, Keysers et al. 2003). These neurons are activated (1) if the animal 
observes an action, which generates a sound – for example, knocking on a table 
or cracking a peanut: (2) if the animal performs the action itself, or also (3) if it 
only hears the knock or crack without seeing the movement. Transferring this to 
the voice, this would imply that the heard voice could potentially evoke the same 
action with an object that the listener could carry out himself.
Hence, in early speech acquisition when pointing and sound gestures are typ-
ically linked with each other, a neuronal coupling would be produced between 
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14 Apart from the studies on action-related word comprehension which were mentioned 
at the beginning, this connection is particularly supported by Aziz-Zadeh et al. (2006), who 
showed that the same cortical regions activated by action observation are also activated by the 
understanding of action-related sentences.
(1) the object being pointed to, (2) the related sound, and (3) one’s own action 
with the object. As a result, the originally only accompanying sound becomes 
capable of evoking the intended object and the object-related action scheme in the 
listener.14 At the same time, the gesticulating pointing to objects recedes more and 
more into the background – as can also be observed in the development of infants.
In the acoustic medium, the word detaches itself from the speaker and is heard 
by him and the recipient together. The acoustic gesture is thus no longer sub-
ject-bound, but for both partners becomes a third entity, an intersubjective sym-
bol. Mead (1973) already identified in this reciprocal aspect the decisive attribute 
of speech: the spoken word as a “significant gesture” becomes a symbol which 
basically causes the same reaction or idea in the speaker as in the listener. On a 
neurobiological level, this may be now understood as follows: communication 
in words is basically grounded in the fact that – in both speaker and listener – 
via the medium of the MNS the word activates a congruence of neuronal pat-
terns, and thus of ideas or action schemes. The concordant intention in both 
partners, which manifests itself in the word as an intersubjective symbol, would 
thus find its match in the resonance which forms between them on the neuro-
nal level. Speech not only produces an intellectual connection among individu-
als, it additionally involves a biologically anchored interbodily resonance system. 
Thus, it is in virtue of our bodies acquiring, through social interaction, similar 
neurological structures that we can share the meaning of words and sentences. 
Although it must be added that the precise functional relevance of the MNS 
for the evolution and ontogeny of language remains far from being clarified, it 
already offers strong empirical support for an embodied and enactive view of 
language.
Summary and Conclusion
My intention in this paper was to show, based on theoretical considerations and 
empirical evidence, that language cannot be conceived as an abstract, disembod-
ied system of symbols represented in the brains of separated individuals. Instead, 
language is both produced and understood as a form of embodied interaction, 
which in speaker and listener evokes the totality of possibilities for action that 
are mediated by the lived body. Thus, verbal communication is not a transfer of 
symbolic significances from one mind to another, but a “gesturing with words,” 
co-enacting our actual and possible relations to the world, and scaffolded by 
our shared practical contexts. Particularly the pointing gesture, through uniting 
bodily movement and “we-intentionality,” may be regarded as the lynchpin that 
leads from primary intercorporeality to the sharing of meanings through sym-
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bolic interaction. However, as Merleau-Ponty has argued, this transition never 
loses the gestural, enactive basis from which language first develops:
“The spoken word is a genuine gesture, and it contains its meaning in the same way 
as the gesture contains its. This is what makes communication possible. In order that I 
may understand the words of another person, it is clear that his vocabulary and syntax 
must be ‘already known’ to me. But that does not mean that words do their work by 
arousing in me ‘representations’ associated with them, and which in aggregate eventu-
ally reproduce in me the original ‘representation’ of the speaker. What I communicate 
with primarily is not ‘representations’ or thought, but a speaking subject, with a certain 
style of being and with the ‘world’ at which he directs his aim.” (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 
1962, 213)
In other words, speech is primarily not a symbol system, but transformed ges-
ture, enacted by the body, and evoking possible actions in it. Speaking and under-
standing are lived acts in which our experiences as embodied agents are always 
present, both in the content and in the syntactical structure that expresses it.
Speech capacity therefore does not develop merely from a biological Anlage 
or genetic disposition, but like no other human capacity it requires embedding 
in a sphere of shared meaning structures and communicative practice in order 
to evolve. Verbal meanings only exist between individuals just as pointing with 
one’s finger only attains its meaning from the jointly oriented gaze. Words are 
carriers of intersubjective meanings, which have formed within a culture and 
increasingly differentiated into a complex referential system. To learn words, 
children must primarily be in intercorporeal, emotional and practical contact 
with others. They must further develop the capacity to focus on the same object 
and to share this intention with them. Scaffolded by these triadic practical sit-
uations the sound gestures may develop whereby we communicate with one 
another symbolically.
When in the embodied interaction with others the child learns their speech, 
then his brain functions as an organ of mediation that increasingly matches the 
heard words with neuronal patterns related to action, interaction and object 
experiences. This matching only occurs if the child experiences the others as 
intentional actors who intend to show him something through their speech and 
whose goal is the intended object. In short, the child must experience himself as 
the intended participant of communication. Only then – and not by means of a 
mechanical-associative connection – can the new words become sedimented as 
neuronal patterns that are associated with experiences of acting and interacting. 
The coupling of language perception and motor activity, which is now demon-
strated by numerous imaging studies of the brain, shows that the meaning of 
words always remains connected to the interactive and embodied experiences in 
which they have been acquired.
The brain as such certainly does not become the location of meanings or the 
“symbol-processing organ”, as it is sometimes referred to. The neuronal patterns, 
as correlates of speech, are only the necessary condition for the child understand-
ing words as meaningful and thus participating in the joint world of the mind 
conveyed through symbols. Only such participation in the shared symbolic 
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world is the sufficient condition for speech acquisition. Language is based on 
meanings, and meanings are ultimately based on embodied relationships. They 
are derived from the early childhood experience of joint attention, pointing, from 
the joint use of speech in practical contexts, and from the intersubjective sym-
bolism of spoken words. Correlates of these meanings are functionally and mor-
phologically inscribed on the brain as neuronal patterns in the course of interac-
tion. In this way, language becomes enmeshed in our organic life: we incorporate 
into our bodies a linguistic style of being. This is also the reason why “linguistic 
events have a direct route to even our physiology, why the complex socio-cul-
tural and interpersonal matrix disclosed by an insult or a compliment make our 
blood rush in quite different ways” (Cuffari, Di Paolo, and De Jaegher 2015, 
1116). Language is nothing else than a manifestation of our embodied sociality.
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On Human (Symbolic) Nature:  
How the Word Became Flesh
Terrence W. Deacon
Abstract: The concept of human nature has been challenged by social scientists because 
of its inability to clearly delineate the distinction between the biologically inherited and 
experientially acquired attributes of being human. Yet the very fact of being susceptible to 
acquired cultural influences irrelevant to other species makes clear that this is an evolution-
arily constrained susceptibility. Symbolic processes are the source of the most important 
and distinctively human acquired influences, and include both linguistically mediated and 
habitually reproduced social conventions. Susceptibility to these influences arose due to the 
evolution of neurological adaptations that support symbolic communication and cognition. 
Although human brains do not include any structures that lack ape homologues, the slight 
reorganization that made symbolic abilities ubiquitous has also created the possibility for 
socially transmitted information to radically reorganize mental functions. In this essay I 
re-analyze the concept of symbolic reference in order to overcome equivocal and ambigu-
ous uses of the concept that obscure the special nature of these adaptations and thus blind 
research to the complex bio-cultural interactions that produce some of the most ubiqui-
tous and unprecedented features of being human. These include modifications of memory 
functions, emotional experiences, the nature of identity, and the range of mental plasticity.
Introduction
Humans are a member of the family of African apes that also includes gorillas, 
chimpanzees, and bonobos. And yet this phylogenetic characterization of our 
species provides a very misleading characterization of what is shared with our 
ape cousins and what makes us distinct – in other words, what has traditionally 
been called human nature. The concept of human nature has a long and troubled 
history (Bock 1980, Hull 1986). Most often it has been used to designate some 
putative set of universally shared biologically inherited psychological traits con-
stituting the so-called “psychic unity” of humankind (the term “psychic” is used 
here and below in its traditional non-mystical sense). As an essentialist enter-
prise, the effort to enumerate this set has failed (Ingold 2006). This turned out to 
be futile for the same reason that identifying the set of physiognomic traits that 
are shared by all and only members of the same species fails to unambiguously 
define a species.
Today, in the era of gene sequencing, taxonomists ground their determination 
of biological group membership on common genetic ancestry. Thus, as the open-
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ing statement of this essay indicates, we humans derive our genetic inheritance 
from the common ancestor of all African apes. Indeed, using genetic criteria it 
is possible to trace our ancestry all the way back to the so-called last universal 
common ancestor (LUCA) of all life on earth, grouping us with ever-larger more 
inclusive clades. The new rule of thumb for analyzing biological ancestry could 
thus be characterized as “follow the (genetic) information.” Membership within 
a phylogenetic group – whether species or kingdom – is ultimately determined 
by all members sharing genetic continuity through a common ancestor.
But this cladistic approach, if pursued exhaustively, can lead to a problem-
atic result even just in terms of phylogenetic genealogy. This is because organ-
isms include large amounts of genetic material that gets shuffled and recom-
bined during evolution, and in some case can involve highly distinct inheritance 
pathways. For example, the lateral transfer of genetic material between bacteria 
makes simple genealogical determination of the equivalent of a bacterial species 
essentially impossible. But even eukaryotic organisms such as ourselves, have 
dual ancestry. Though this is not the result of lateral gene transfer or because we 
have two parents. It is because the genealogies of our nuclear and mitochondrial 
genomes are quite radically separate. Our nuclear genes place us in a lineage that 
traces back to primitive single cell Archaea, whereas our mitochondria have a 
separate genome that shows them to be members of the Bacteria. These genetic 
lineages evolved in parallel and with respect to one another due to the endosym-
biosis of a bacterial lineage within an archaean cell lineage well over a billion 
years ago. In the subsequent epoch of eukaryotic evolution, each genome has 
undergone radical reorganization in functional interaction with the other. As a 
result, there has been a sort of informational, though not molecular, lateral influ-
ence of the one on the other.
In many respects we humans also have dual psychic ancestry. One lineage is 
continuous with our African ape cousins, tracing back from there to all primates, 
mammals, terrestrial vertebrates, and so on. I will describe it as our primate men-
tal genealogy, though many features antedate the origin of the primate clade. The 
other lineage is not traceable through molecular genetics, but through continu-
ous social transmission. I will describe this as our symbolic genealogy.
This dual inheritance perspective is not new. And in many respects it remains 
quite controversial to describe it in terms of parallel evolutionary processes. But 
the relationship I am describing should not be confused with dual inheritance 
theories that dichotomize genetic and social transmission processes, as this is 
defined in so called bio-social evolution theories. In many respects my point is 
the opposite. It is their inextricable entanglement that I want to emphasize.
The interactions between biological and social information transmission is not 
what distinguishes these two cognitive-behavioral genealogies. The significant 
roles of epigenetic and niche-borne sources of inherited biases and constraints on 
the development of behavior and cognition are now well established. This under-
mines simple innate / learned, nature / nurture conceptions of behavioral evolution 
in social species in general, not just in humans. The transmission of cognitive, 
behavioral, and social predispositions down the primate-human lineage neces-
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sarily involved both social continuity and genetic continuity. So it is not the dif-
ference between molecular genetic and social transmission that I am interested in 
highlighting, but rather the entanglement of the symbolic component of social 
inheritance with non-symbolic social-cognitive inheritance, and how this inter-
action has influenced the evolution of their genetically and epigenetically medi-
ated biological supports.
This brings up another parallel with the evolution of eukaryotic cells that 
should be mentioned before proceeding. The coupling of previously autonomous 
organisms which ultimately gave rise to mitochondrial and nuclear genomes did 
not merely constitute a cooperative relationship. It gave rise to an unprecedented 
new level of biological unity, and with it unprecedented new modes of evolu-
tion. The genetic information that characterized each of these once independent 
lineages has been fundamentally changed by their fusion and co-dependence. 
Each has been degraded and modified by the ubiquitous presence of the other 
over more than a billion years to the point that they are no longer even separable 
informational lineages.
Unlike the two lineages that came together to give rise to eukaryotic organ-
isms, however, our primate and symbolic psychic lineages had unrelated ori-
gins and originated in epochs separated by tens of millions of years. The many 
overlapping cognitive, sensory-motor, and social-emotional predispositions that 
monkeys and apes inherited from the common ancestral anthropoid primate 
arose within the last 60 million years. In contrast the unbroken lineage of sym-
bolic information almost certainly doesn’t extend back more than about 2.5 mil-
lion years, and may have a far more recent origin. The radical incommensurabil-
ity of these yoked semiotic genealogies is what makes human nature so difficult 
to characterize in typical biological terms, and also dooms any effort to partition 
humanness into inherited and acquired (e. g., nature versus nurture) components. 
It is an unprecedented entanglement of genealogies that comprises a highly dis-
tinctive universally shared nature that sets us apart from all other species on 
earth.
Like the separate but interdependent genetics of mitochondrial and nuclear 
DNA, our symbolic genealogy has significantly influenced the evolution of our 
primate psychic genealogy, and vice versa. Like the fused genetic lineages that 
became eukaryotic information, these two psychic lineages that became entan-
gled during our distinctive ancestry are no longer separable. Each has been fun-
damentally transformed by the other over this shared evolutionary history so 
that our biology can’t be understood apart from the symbolic cultural context 
that it is informed by. This is why in my 1997 book (Deacon 1997) I described 
humans as a “symbolic species,” analogous to the way we might characterize 
birds as aerial species and dolphins as aquatic species. But unlike these ecologic-
ally specialized lineages, the symbolic “ecology” that humans evolved to fit is not 
external to the human lineage. It is inextricably part of it.
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1. Symbols Oversimplified
In my view one of the most serious impediments to understanding what is dis-
tinct about human cognition is a fundamental misunderstanding about the nature 
of symbolic reference. As a result, our ability to understand the influence of 
our symbolic genealogy is severely compromised. This difficulty needs to be 
cleared up before we can hope to make sense of the common essence that defines 
humanness.
Ironically, the symbol concept has been the victim of oversimplification by 
linguistic theory itself. Language is the very phenomenon most in need of expla-
nation and yet its unprecedented mode of referring is often treated as though it is 
self-evident. According to this common conception of linguistic symbolization 
it is merely an arbitrary (unconstrained) mapping relation between two classes of 
objects – signifiers and what they signify – linked only by convention.
From this perspective, linguistic reference appears as simple as possible, 
involving minimal defining criteria compared to other forms of reference. In 
comparison, iconic signs require some formal correspondence with what they 
signify and indexical signs require some factual connection with what they sig-
nify. Conceived in these terms, symbolic reference is often defined negatively; 
simply as reference that does not depend on either criterion; thus arbitrary. It 
would seem, then, that symbolic reference is primary and both iconic and index-
ical reference forms are the more complex and derived forms.
But this superficial characterization is deeply flawed. Bracketed from this 
analysis is any consideration of how these relations are interpreted and how they 
could have become established. Much of this is cryptically supplied by an unan-
alyzed concept of convention. Most uses of the term assume that it refers to 
formally or tacitly agreed-upon rules or habits of behavior or patterns of use 
in some domain of social interaction. Its basis has become a topic of consider-
able philosophical debate with such philosophical luminaries as Quine, David-
son, Lewis, and Millikan (to name just a few) presenting conflicting accounts. 
However, what is common to all is the recognition that the establishment of 
conventions occurs in a context of end-directed interaction among agents that 
each interpret the behaviors of the others as significant in some respect. In other 
words, conventions result from complex semiotic processes that are not at all 
arbitrary.
Though the problem doesn’t begin with Ferdinand de Saussure’s theory of 
language, the influence of this theory has perpetuated the problem. The concept 
of arbitrarity pertains to the relationship between sign vehicle attributes and the 
attributes of what it signifies. The problem arises from a synchronic (a.k.a. struc-
turalist) account of how words refer. Only paying attention to the obvious fact 
that word sounds do not mimic or resemble what they refer to, their linkage to 
what they are about seems merely arbitrary. Moreover, signifiers (as Saussure 
termed the sign vehicles of language, e. g., words) are treated as the most basic 
types of signs by virtue of being defined by lacking properties shared with what 
they signify.
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Contrasting this with sign forms that share properties with what they sig-
nify, symbolic forms thereby appear arbitrary and simple. A bit of careful reflec-
tion, however, demonstrates that it is not sign vehicle attributes that determine 
whether reference is being mediated by iconic, indexical, or symbolic means.
Arbitrariness is a negative way of defining symbols. It basically tells us that 
neither formal likeness nor factual correlation are used as the basis for symbolic 
reference. But this is inadequate. It fails to specify exactly how the symbolic ref-
erential relation is established. So, even though this is a common shorthand way 
of characterizing symbolic reference it merely passes the buck, so to speak, to 
some assumed and undescribed means by which reference is established. In fact, 
all semiotic relationships include some degree of arbitrarity, because those attri-
butes that are taken as the ground for the sign-object linkage can be chosen from 
many dimensions, and only some will be utilized (if any). What matters, then, is 
the interpretive process and how it makes use of sign vehicle attributes and the 
attributes of what is intended as a referent.
In this respect, we can say that anything can be chosen as a sign vehicle to 
represent anything else and by any mode, depending on the interpretive process 
involved. For example, depending on the interpreter and social context the same 
facial grimace can be interpreted as a sign of pain, a neurological disorder, or the 
communication of social censure. Or the sight of smoke can be seen to resemble 
a cloud, to indicate a fire, or to announce the election of a pope. The relevant 
property is selected by the interpreter and what is being referred to depends on 
the capacity of the interpreter to use that property in a particular way.
So, turning this initial logic of semiotic categorization on its head we can ask: 
What constitutes the interpretive capacity to comprehend a given referential rela-
tionship as either iconic, indexical, or symbolic? In the case of iconic and index-
ical relationships the sign vehicle itself includes properties that provide some 
evidence as to its relation to what it refers to. But where there is no interpretive 
support given by any sign vehicle property, all the interpretive clues must be 
supplied by the interpreter. This is, of course, made obvious when a traveler is 
confronted with an unfamiliar language or when an archaeologist comes upon a 
stone tablet inscribed with an unknown form of writing. Without some external 
source of information, some non-arbitrary semiotic basis, the meaning is effec-
tively encrypted. In contrast, even though we know nothing of the beliefs and 
rituals of the stone-age people who painted on cave walls in Southern France, we 
immediately recognize the idealized forms of animals and humans painted by 
these stone-age “artists.” Interpreting their iconic content is almost trivial, while 
interpreting their symbolic significance is forever beyond our reach. In order to 
be able to interpret the symbolic meaning of cave paintings or the words of an 
ancient lost language one would need some prior experience with the patterns 
and habits of use of these symbolic artifacts within a cultural network of other 
icons, indices, and symbols. In other words, this requires acquaintance with the 
semiotic conventions in which the symbols are embedded.
Similarly, children acquire their facility with language as its symbols are 
embedded in activities of pointing, soliciting shared attention, playful and instru-
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mental interactions, observing the complex correspondences between symbols, 
objects, and events in social activities, etc. All of these activities are constituted 
by non-symbolic forms of communication and interpretation. Only in this way 
can the apparent arbitrarity of symbolic reference be grounded in communica-
tions and actions that are not arbitrary.
So by simply equating symbolic reference with arbitrary correspondence its 
complex infrastructure and historical grounding is ignored. In addition, the sim-
plified assumption that the nature of convention is just a correspondence rela-
tionship glosses over another critical distinction. This is the distinction between 
properties that distinguish types of sign vehicles and properties that determine 
how a sign vehicle refers to something that it is not. Both relations involve con-
ventionality, but in different and partially independent ways. Symbols are in this 
respect doubly conventional. They are conventionally derived sign vehicles that 
refer to things via conventionally determined means.
As the father of semiotic theory Charles Peirce pointed out over a century 
ago, we must distinguish properties of a sign vehicle (e. g., a drawing or spoken 
word), from properties taken to link it to its object of reference. So a conven-
tional sign vehicle can serve as the basis for iconic and indexical reference, as well 
as symbolic. There can be conventionalized typographical icons (e. g., the typo-
graphical smiley face).
Iconic reference depends on shared formal properties between the sign vehicle 
and what it refers to. For example, with a bit of imagination a face can be dis-
cerned on the full moon, or in a cloud formation, and it might even remind you 
of someone you know. But iconism can also be highly abstract. A mathematical 
equation refers iconically, once you know how to discern its symbol-mediated 
isometry (e. g., between the structure of the interpreted equation and a corre-
sponding geometric or dynamical relationship). An equation can be interpreted 
to be iconic (e. g., of a parabolic trajectory) only, however, if you know how to 
discern the way that differences in the mathematical values or operations directly 
correspond to differences in the geometric object of reference.
Indices refer by contiguity in space, time, or deriving from a common sub-
strate. A simple correlation can therefore be the ground for indexical reference. 
A lipstick smear on a man’s shirt collar can be a troublesome indication to his 
wife, a urine scent on a branch can be a sexual index to a female lemur, and the 
mobbing call of a small bird can indicate the present of a raptor. What gets cor-
related and how (accidental, cultural, evolutionary) is arbitrary, but the fact of 
correlation is not.
A rat in a Skinner box pressing a bar in response to a bell in order to get a 
water reward has learned that the bell is an index of the state of the apparatus 
even though this pairing was the whim of an experimenter. The arbitrary pairing 
doesn’t make the one a symbol of the other. Repeated pairing over the course of 
generations in the evolution of a species can similarly be the basis for an innate 
tendency to interpret something indexically. This is the case for the indexicality 
of a vervet monkey alarm call sound and its correlation with the presence of a 
type of predator and the urge to engage in an appropriate defense activity or 
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escape behavior. Conventionalized indices are also quite common. For example, 
consider the white line painted down the middle of two lane roads. Though it is 
a conventionalized sign it refers indexically, not symbolically.
However, by virtue of an unfortunate shorthand it has become standard ter-
minology to call most conventional sign vehicles symbols. Thus current vernacu-
lar habitually terms alphanumeric characters symbols. This usage reflects the fact 
that they have been explicitly developed over millennia to express symbolic rela-
tions. But when your computer begins randomly spewing alphanumeric charac-
ters onto your screen they are indices of a malfunction, not symbols of anything.
As Peirce recognized, symbolic reference involves a conventional type of 
sign vehicle that additionally represents its object of reference in a convention-
ally-mediated way (Peirce 1931). Something can be considered symbolic, then, 
only if the property determining its relationship to what it refers to is also a con-
vention. Symbols are in this sense doubly conventional. So arbitrarity, by itself, 
is not diagnostic of symbolic reference. Nor can it be a critical defining feature 
of language.
Elsewhere (Deacon 1997, 2003) I have argued that although innate iconicity 
and indexicality can evolve by natural selection, symbolic reference cannot. This 
is because of their displacement from features shared with what they represent. 
Symbols lack the reliably repeated associations between properties that natural 
selection requires. This explains why there are no innate words, only innate calls 
(like laughter or sobbing). These are linked to reliable emotional states and char-
acteristic external conditions, which reliably elicit these states.
This requirement has other important implications about language evolution, 
however, that are not generally recognized. Grammatical rules are even more 
abstract and less reliably correlated with anything in the brain or in the world 
than are words. In particular, the surface properties of utterances that provide the 
grammatical and syntactic information required to interpret a sentence are even 
less directly correlated with any physical property or relation in the world than 
are words. So they should be even less likely to arise as a product of biological 
evolution.
Yet the evolution of the capacity to communicate symbolically has clearly 
occurred during the course of human prehistory. We humans are the only species 
that regularly and reliably uses symbolic communication, and even with signif-
icant brain damage and mental impairment it is often still possible for people to 
have some linguistic facility. In contrast, even with extensive training, other quite 
intelligence species (e. g., apes, dolphins, and possibly parrots) can only acquire 
very minimal symbolic communicative abilities. This implies that there must have 
been significant atypical modifications to human brains in the course of their evo-
lution to adapt them to the demands of symbol acquisition and use. So although 
there can be no innate symbols, there can be evolution to make the acquisition 
and use of symbolic communication comparatively easy. In turn, however, the 
regular use of symbolic communication and reasoning over our protracted evo-
lutionary past as a symbolic species has almost certainly changed the ways we 
humans use even those cognitive abilities that long predate our symbolic awak-
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ening. These evolved modifications of human mental capacities have given rise to 
an unprecedented symbolic niche – culture – that forms the ubiquitous semiotic 
ecosystem in which we develop in response to. This atypically modified neurol-
ogy and radically restructured social-ecological context together are responsible 
for the unprecedented deviation of human biology from the biology of effectively 
every other species on earth. So the virtual semiotic world of symbols in which 
we live and to which we have been innately predisposed and developmentally 
shaped has produced what I describe as our distinctive human symbolic nature.
2. How the Disembodied Became Embodied
To begin to understand the cognitive and neurological adaptations that aid sym-
bolic thought and communication it is useful to first ask: Why is symbolic refer-
ence intrinsically difficult for non-human species?
One reason is that learning a symbolic relationship is a bit like cracking a 
code. One not only needs information about what refers to what, but also needs 
to understand the system of indexical relations linking symbols to one another 
and how this system relates to the physical world of properties, objects, and 
relations. This is because symbolic reference is intrinsically systemic and virtual. 
Learning correlations between symbols and objects is a start, but one must rec-
ognize that this is only a clue to the hidden logic of symbol-symbol (token-to-
ken) relationships (i. e., a network of indexical relations such as a linguistic lex-
icon). Recognizing the systemic correlations between symbol-symbol relations 
and relationships between properties and events in the real world requires the 
capacity to transfer relational information from one cognitive context to another 
quite different and abstract one. This demands a higher-order form of learning, 
something like an “insight,” in which one learns how to re-use selected aspects 
of what has been learned in new ways.
Insight learning was first systematically studied by a Gestalt theorist: Wolf-
gang Kohler (1925). He was interested in how apes might problem-solve in a 
novel context in which the solution requires using previously acquired skills in 
novel combinations. For this he created “puzzles” in which trial and error prob-
lem solving would not have worked, such as piling boxes on top of one another 
and climbing on them to reach a suspended banana. To succeed it was necessary 
for the chimpanzee subject to be able to mentally experiment with new combi-
nations of already understood relationships before enacting a plan of action. As 
a result, after a period of frustrated trial and error, one chimpanzee (Sultan) was 
seen to suddenly and deliberately arrange things to achieve the result, without 
trial and error approximations.
The role of insight learning with respect to language acquisition is strik-
ingly exemplified by the account of Helen Keller’s discovery of the symbolic 
nature of language (1905). Blind and deaf from a very early age, she had still not 
acquired language by early middle childhood. Her tutor, Anne Sullivan, eventu-
ally helped her acquire language abilities using a version of finger spelling that 
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was impressed on her hand. Though Helen had acquired a modest set of signs 
that she could use to identify objects, the point at which she discovers their sym-
bolic function, as opposed to just their indexical correlation with immediately 
touched objects, is described as a momentary insight. In an event that both Helen 
and Anne recount in their memoirs, it was an emotionally charged interaction 
taking place at a water pump that caused Helen to become aware that the signs 
she already knew constituted an interdependent system of relations that could be 
used to communicate about things and events not immediately present. In effect, 
she restructured knowledge that she had previously acquired into a system rather 
than merely a collection of correlations.
The transition from the one-to-one correlational relationships that is the 
ground of indexical reference to the system-to-system relationships that ground 
symbolic reference, as occurred in Helen Keller’s epiphany, is not merely learn-
ing. It is rather a restructuring of existing knowledge due to the recognition of 
a previously unnoticed global relational iconism. So the ability to utilize high-
er-level relational thinking across different cognitive tasks and domains is essen-
tial to symbolic communication and reasoning because of the way symbolic ref-
erence is mediated by system-to-system correspondences. In other words, it is 
the recognition that the relational properties among symbol tokens abstractly 
mirror the abstract form of the relationships among properties, objects, and 
events in the world.
Recently this has become investigated in terms of a more general capacity, 
sometimes referred to as transfer learning. It is implicated in a variety of cog-
nitive capacities. These include thinking in terms of analogies, understanding 
indirect inferential relations, dealing with complicated combinatorial relation-
ships, and using information acquired in one domain to reason about problems 
in a very different domain. Importantly, all of these cognitive operations place a 
heavy burden on prefrontal cortex functions (e. g., see Deacon 1997; Vendetti and 
Bunge 2014; Yarkoni et al. 2011; among many others). Likewise studies attempt-
ing to directly test the cognitive-neural demands of making the shift from index-
ical to symbolic interpretations of the same relationships (e. g., Nieder 2009) have 
specifically shown the relevance of these prefrontal-dependent capacities for the 
origins of symbolic capacities.
In my 1997 book The Symbolic Species I review evidence from comparative 
neuroanatomy that suggests that major quantitative changes in the proportions 
of different human brain structures reflect adaptations for the unusual cogni-
tive demands imposed by symbolic communication. In summary, I showed how 
embryological divergence of human brain / body proportions as compared to our 
close primate relatives altered axonal competition during development, favor-
ing connections from relatively enlarged structures. The result was that reduced 
peripheral connections enabled structures less directly linked to the sensory-mo-
tor periphery to outcompete other connections. I predicted that this would have 
a number of structural-functional consequences. These should include relative 
enlargement of prefrontal and probably parietal cortex compared to peripherally 
specialized areas, motor cortex axons invading the nucleus ambiguous (which 
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innervates laryngeal muscles), prefrontal connections displacing cortico-cortical 
and cortico-striatal projections from other systems, prefrontal-cerebellar con-
nectivity increasing, and other less relevant changes.
In other words, human brains and language co-evolved so that languages were 
modified by selection favoring learnability and ease of use (via comparatively 
rapid historical change) and brain functions were modified by selection favoring 
the special learning and production demands of language (via comparatively slow 
evolutionary change). One important caveat to keep in mind, however, is this dif-
ference in the rate at which things change in culture and biology. For example, if 
we compare the amount of time that it takes for a language to split into mutually 
uninterpretable divergent forms to the amount of time it takes for large mammals 
like ourselves to split into distinct species unable to interbreed – i. e., thousand 
versus hundreds of thousands of years respectively – then we can assume at least 
two orders of magnitude of rate difference. Thus there will be perhaps hundreds 
of fundamental changes in the structures of human languages that only collec-
tively affect selection with respect to common attributes. This means that rather 
than human brains reflecting specific structural features of language, only the 
most invariant sensory, motor, attentional, and mnemonic functions will have 
been selectively favored for their symbolic-linguistic contributions.
With respect to the symbolic cognition problem, then, one of these anatom-
ical differences stands out as specifically relevant: prefrontal cortex expansion. 
The implication I draw from the coincidence of the distinctive prefrontal expan-
sion in humans and the intense demand placed on transfer learning capacities 
is that this distinctively human neurological deviation is an adaptation evolved 
to ease the acquisition and use of symbolic communication and reasoning. But 
how could this have come about? Did brains become restructured for other rea-
sons and just coincidentally provide the support for this unprecedented learning 
capacity?
I believe that this apparent “coincidence” has a simpler explanation. These 
anatomical changes reflect the demands of symbolic communication because 
they were favored in a context in which it was necessary to acquire and use sym-
bolic communication in order to successfully survive and reproduce. What began 
as a minimal capacity for symbolic communication (which experiments have 
shown in apes) supported a very minimalistic form of symbolic social communi-
cation, but its value for group success and individual survival and reproduction 
became a force for both increased reliance on symbols and therefore increased 
demand on the neurological substrates that this required.
3. Neural Adaptations to a Symbolic Niche
Once symbolic communication became critical to hominid life it effectively 
became an artificial niche to which hominid cognition had to adapt. I argue that 
the changes in regional brain proportions and connections, briefly described 
above, exemplify ways that hominin biology was altered to succeed in this anom-
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alous niche. Analogous to the way that beavers bodies have become morphologi-
cally and physiologically adapted to the aquatic niche that beavers create, human 
brains have become adapted to the special demands of living in the symbolic 
niche they collectively create. And even the ecological niche that humans inhabit 
has been modified radically by the technological consequences of our symbol-
izing. So both human brains and the epigenetic context that shape how these 
unusual capacities are interdependently shaped into our mature mental predis-
positions are radically unlike what is found in any other species.
So how are we to characterize the distinctive nature of humanness if it is not 
possible to untangle the biological from the symbolic? One common response 
has been to give up the effort and to argue that any simple neo-Darwinian 
approach is made useless by this irreducible interdependence (e. g., Ingold 
2007). But it would be misleading to further conclude that this semiotic-biolog-
ical causal entanglement has produced a human mode of being that is entirely 
open-ended and lacks intrinsic constraints. Indeed, despite the unprecedented 
diversity of human social arrangements and languages, these distinctively human 
domains are nevertheless also statistically quite constrained. This is reflected in 
strong central tendencies – rather than some set of universals or list of common 
attributes – that independently have emerged again and again in human social 
arrangements, rituals, belief systems, and ways of communicating.
The approach I will take in the remainder of this essay is not, then, to attempt 
a survey of human social and psychological commonalities. The question I will 
instead address is: “What distinctive human predispositions can be inferred from 
our knowledge of this semiotic-biological foundation?” And specifically, I will 
focus on ways that the more or less virtual constraints imposed by our symbolic 
heritage have become physiologically embodied in ways that make them insepa-
rable from what is considered biological.
4. Neither Nature nor Nurture
The first of these I will consider are those predispositions that are critical sup-
ports for symbolic-linguistic communication. These follow from the underlying 
semiotic support that is necessary to ground symbolic reference (as discussed 
above); specifically, the dependency of symbols on indexicality.
Because symbolic relations are indirect and “virtual” – constituted by sym-
bol-symbol relations – an isolated symbol cannot determine reference to any-
thing outside this symbolic domain. This has led to an extended history of argu-
ments over the so-called symbol-grounding problem. I believe that this problem 
only appears to present a dilemma because symbolic reference is treated as prim-
itive and simple. The dilemma disappears when symbols are understood as high-
er-order semiotic relations embedded in a context of indexical and iconic modes 
of reference.
Divorcing linguistic analysis from all forms of semiotic analysis except this 
simplified conception of symbolic reference, has also made it appear as though 
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the highly systematic structure of language is also arbitrarily imposed. This has 
led to a half century of irresolvable nature / nurture debates concerning the possi-
ble locus of its cause. At one extreme, this structure has been attributed to innate 
sources of knowledge: nature (often described as universal grammar). Whereas 
at the other extreme, it is attributed to communicative habits and conventions 
that spontaneously develop in different societies: nurture. The innatist approach 
is criticized for being biologically implausible, while the social convention 
approach is criticized for being unable to account for the remarkable universal-
ity of many aspects of language structure. So is the resolution some combination 
of nature and nurture?
I have argued (Deacon 2003, 2011, 2012) that neither nature nor nurture nor 
even some combination of these provide an adequate solution to this debate. 
These options fail to notice an entire third realm of causal influences that results 
from the oversimplified conception of symbolization. This is the realm of semi-
otic constraints that arise due to the necessary semiotic infrastructure supporting 
symbolic reference.
Consider one of the most fundamental universals: the basic combinatorial 
nature of a sentence, or to be more technically accurate, the requirements for 
predication (which we might describe as communicating about something spe-
cific). Why is communicating linguistically intrinsically combinatorial? All lan-
guages produce structures that we recognize as sentences which either explicitly 
or implicitly combine at least two functionally different components. I believe 
that this necessarily follows from two important semiotic constraints. First, as 
noted above, symbol tokens mark positions within a systematic network of rela-
tions between symbols. As Saussure recognized, signifiers and signifieds (e. g., 
words and their meanings) are primarily markers of relative difference in rela-
tion to each other, independent of any individual real world binding to specific 
objects, events, or properties. Reference to individual facts of the world requires 
indexicality with its factual contiguity.
This dyadic sentential requirement derives from the inability of symbols to 
refer beyond the domain of other symbols without being additionally provided 
with indexical linkage. By itself a symbol token, like an isolated word, just pick 
out a position in the network of symbol-symbol associations. Only proper 
names have a specific link to a specific entity. So for a symbol to additionally 
have reference outside this virtual domain of symbolic associations it must be 
linked to an index or something that functions indexically. Consider someone 
uttering the word ‘hard.’ By itself it just brings to mind related associations, e. g., 
to words like soft, solid, difficult, and so on. But uttering the word and at the 
same time tapping on the table top with one’s knuckles communicates that this 
particular surface is hard. The tapping is an index because of its immediate phys-
ical connection to the table. But this is not all. If the tapping were to take place 
minutes after the utterance there would be no such reference communicated. 
This demonstrates that there is a second indexical feature involved. The phys-
ical-temporal correlation between the tapping and the utterance also is inter-
preted indexically. In this way the combination provides a transitive indexical 
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“bridge” linking the abstract symbol to the specific hardness of the real physical 
table. But notice that the tapping could have been replaced by the phrase “This 
[table] is . . .” – perhaps also with the addition of a pointing gesture.
This constraint reflects fundamental features of both symbols and indices. 
Indexicality requires both the co-presence with a symbol token and embedded-
ness in a specific physical context. Contiguity of an index to a symbol (e. g., 
adjacency) provides both language-internal indexicality and language-external 
grounding. This dyadic linkage between semiotic functions in sentences and 
phrases within sentences, reflects the constraints on indexicality. This is what 
dictates phrase structure and its many syntactic correlates, such as the necessity 
of “merging” functionally different words into higher-order unit, limitations on 
between-phrase function-word movement, and long-distance dependency rela-
tions, to mention a few. Because of the factual contiguity constraint of indexical-
ity, words functioning symbolically and indexically must be immediately linked, 
for the same reason that words and manual indices (such as the tapping described 
above) must be factually linked (though also employing iconic relations, such 
as gender agreement can provide some flexibility on what counts as adjacency). 
This imposes significant limitations on what can be “merged” with what in a 
phrase or clause, what parts of speech can be moved with respect to others, and 
what constitutes an embeddable phrasal unit.
This has an important bearing on questions concerning knowledge of lan-
guage structure. Specifically, it suggests that grammatical roles and their associ-
ated syntactic constraints can be “discovered” both historically as new languages 
emerge and developmentally because there will be clear feedback concerning 
adequate or ambiguous specification of reference (Deacon 2011, 2012). The oft-
cited “poverty of the stimulus” argument, which suggests that there is nearly 
a complete lack of corrective feedback concerning grammatical and syntactic 
errors in early childhood, is simply looking in the wrong place for the appropri-
ate source of feedback.
5. Pointing and Joint Attention
Young children have a bit of an innate head start when it comes to their ability 
to learn the constraints of indexicality. In the half year prior to acquiring their 
first words (another uniquely human predisposition discussed below) their com-
munication with caregivers is aided by a predisposition to use their outstretched 
arm to point, often coupled with a non-linguistic vocalization such as whining 
to indicate an unfilled desire with respect to some object or activity. In addition, 
they quickly learn that a change in the direction of gaze of a caretaker is predic-
tive of their future behavior with respect to something in that direction.
These distinctively human adaptations aiding cooperative indexicality are well 
known, and have become a major focus of comparative study. Whereas even 
human infants easily and spontaneously develop gaze following, pointing behav-
iors, and shared referential predispositions at an early age, well in advance of 
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language acquisition, few other species come close to this level of performance, 
even with explicit training. This early indexical sophistication is an important 
precursor for the development of language. A sophisticated prior understanding 
of the constraints critical to unambiguous shared indexical reference provide a 
critical scaffold for the development of the core attributes of this universal gram-
matical constraint.
The constraints on successful indexicality are thus learned prior to speech and 
effectively transferred to use with words. Though the development of sophisti-
cation with indexicality will continue to be learned in the context of early lan-
guage acquisition this mostly requires discovering how each particular language 
encodes these functions in words. As the first words are acquired (initially as 
vocal indices correlated with gestures) the functional forms of grammar and the 
structural constraints of syntax are in many respects already known. Applying 
this knowledge to language use requires the sophisticated transfer learning abili-
ties that have also evolved, but not innate knowledge of grammar.
6. Vocal Skill and Mimicry
Another distinctive characteristic of humans that sets our species apart from 
essentially all other land mammals is our capacity to produce complex vocal-
izations that involve the articulation of the mouth and tongue with precisely 
synchronized control of the lungs and larynx. The innately produced calls of 
other land mammals are comparable to human laughter and sobbing, in being 
stereotypically structured and invariantly linked with specific arousal states. This 
mammalian limitation is a consequence of the fact that the descending neural 
control for the tongue, jaw, and facial muscles is distinct from that controlling 
the larynx and lungs. This is because the muscles of the mouth and face need 
to be under complex voluntary control in order to be able to adapt moment to 
moment to the variety of foods that need to be processed. In contrast, pharyn-
geal, laryngeal, and lung muscles need to function the same way time after time 
with each swallowing or breath, and need to do so infallibly and automatically. 
As a result, in the vast majority of land mammals these automatic systems are 
controlled locally in the brainstem, with little or no cortical input, as part of the 
visceral-motor system.
Species besides humans that have some skilled control of vocalization are only 
found among birds and cetaceans (the group including dolphins and whales). In 
these groups the production of sound uses structures other than a larynx. These 
include muscles constricting the pathway through the sinuses leading to the blow 
hole in cetaceans, and the muscular syrinx at the branch point of the bronchi in 
birds (see Deacon 1997 for details).
Along with these motor control adaptations, humans are predisposed to imi-
tate the vocalizations of other humans. This is of course an important predis-
position for early language acquisition, since each human language requires the 
ability to understand and produce many thousands of language-specific sound 
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combinations (e. g., words). Although other species exhibit some mimicry capa-
bilities, the human capacity is an order of magnitude more complex. Interest-
ingly, almost all other species with significant imitative abilities exemplify this 
capacity in the aural-vocal domain, and have very limited behavioral mimicry 
capabilities. This phylogenetic bias probably reflects the fact that behavioral 
mimicry requires a complex visual-behavioral transformation to compensate 
for the mirror-image effect that reverses left and right, whereas sound mimicry 
requires no such transformation.
7. Narrative Memory
In all species of mammals learning depends on one or the other of two distinc-
tively different mechanisms for establishing long-term stable memories, each 
depending on quite distinct neural substrates (e. g., see Baars and Gage 2007).
The acquisition of skills is accomplished by repetition of an activity, which 
progressively improves precision and efficiency of the activity and increasing its 
automaticity and reducing the need for consciously monitoring production. It is 
generally assumed that repetition progressively strengthens some complex syn-
aptic pathways and weakens others. Thus retention and recall of this information 
is facilitated by the way that the signaling has become canalized by redundant 
synaptic strengthening. Since skill learning is particularly important for motor 
systems (even though also necessarily coupled with sensory feedback), the major 
brain systems involved mostly involve a frontal cortex to basal ganglia to thal-
amus to cortex loop, and a similar cortex to cerebellum to thalamus to cortex 
loop. Damage to structures or connections comprising these loops, significantly 
impairs this sort of memory formation. This mnemonic strategy is often called 
procedural memory for these reasons. It exemplifies the general principle that 
mnemonic strength and accessibility is a function of statistical redundancy.
In contrast, it is also critical to be able to store and retrieve experiential infor-
mation in contexts where repetition is not possible. What has been called epi-
sodic or declarative memory is memory for events or episodes that occurred 
once, uniquely, are not repeated, and involve little in the way of repeatable 
actions. This requires the generation of redundancy of a different sort: redun-
dancy of associations. This creates memory traces for singular experiences by 
correlations between features. Thus when we try to recall a specific experience 
from our past, it is generally necessary to triangulate to it using correlated asso-
ciations, involving dates, places, typical social frames, and so forth. This form of 
mnemonic redundancy is formally orthogonal to the logic of procedural mem-
ory, and is thereby supported by quite distinct neural substrates. Thus, episodic 
memory is generated by neural circuits linking sensory cortices with the hippo-
campus and hippocampal damage significantly impairs the ability to consolidate 
new episodic memories.
Because of this functional segregation of these mnemonic systems, language 
can play an interesting mediating role. Indeed, it has become the foundation of 
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an unprecedented new form of memory. Early in the process of language acqui-
sition articulatory and syntactical combinatorial skills are acquired procedur-
ally. In contrast, the symbolic reference that constitutes word meanings and their 
penumbra of semantic and experiential values are necessarily acquired. Because 
of this dualistic use of mnemonic systems language enables each mnemonic sys-
tem to reciprocally cue the other. Narrative memory is the result. It forms the 
basis for promising, reasoning, theorizing, creating our identities, histories, poli-
tics, and art. Essentially, every form of socially maintained pragmatic knowledge, 
from religious belief to technology, is built from a growing matrix of narrative 
forms.
So although the neural substrates supporting these distinct mnemonic systems 
have not been fundamentally altered in human evolution from the ancestral pri-
mate condition, human cognition has been radically restructured by this novel 
mnemonic capability. The effects of this on the nature of human identity, agency, 
and social organization, as well as on the capacity of social groups to acquire and 
preserve complex knowledge over time, cannot be over-estimated.
8. Emergent Emotions
The consequences of these unprecedented adaptations for symbolic cognition 
weren’t merely cognitive and linguistic, however. These capabilities have also 
incidentally produced uniquely human forms of emotional experience. Like the 
unique functional synergies that have re-organized the way that ancient mne-
monic systems can be used, symbolic capacities have similarly re-organized the 
functions of the emotional systems of the brain. This has given rise to a whole 
class of human-unique emotional capacities (Deacon 2006). These might more 
accurately be described as symbolically modulated emotional relationships that 
also are realized by neuronal systems that we humans share with most other 
mammals.
Because symbol tokens represent their content indirectly and without sharing 
attributes or direct correlations with the thoughts they convey, the salience and 
intensity of their emotional correlates are also substantially reduced. This enables 
symbols to be combined and juxtaposed in many more diverse ways than other 
sorts of signs. This combinatorial freedom can lead to the expression of emo-
tional interactions that could not otherwise occur. Because the correlated emo-
tions aroused by symbol combinations are of low intensity they too are more 
easily manipulated and combined in novel ways. So it’s not that we have evolved 
novel neurological systems for emotional expression, but that these processes can 
be set into novel synergistic and antagonistic and complementary combinations 
that would be very unlikely to occur in the absence of symbolic processes.
So what are some plausible candidates? Awe, nostalgia, righteous indignation, 
aesthetic appreciation, humor, irony, eureka . . . All these involve unusual juxta-
positions of more basic emotional dynamics, likely activated differently in the 
distributed structures responsible for emotion, including differences in homol-
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ogous structures in the two hemispheres. So not only can this involve the sepa-
rate circuits that handle different arousal and hedonic states, but the bilaterality 
of these systems may also allow novel combinatorial interactions of otherwise 
mutually incompatible emotional dynamics in response to the flexibility of sym-
bolic manipulation. This may help to explain the human fascination with activi-
ties that symbolically tweak our emotions in unusual and surprising ways.
For two prominent examples consider humor and artistic aesthetics. Humor 
involves a distinctive emotional replacement logic: a rapid shift of arousal from 
one state of expectation (often with tension) to another that completely dispels 
the tension. Curiously, this can be driven by purely linguistic twists of logical 
expectation, as in puns and jokes. This may involve a left to right hemispheric 
shift of activation because of the typical replacement of a typical logical expecta-
tion with a contextually parallel but absurdly unrelated consequence. In contrast, 
the aesthetic elation that can be elicited by artistic works often involves sustained 
emotional juxtapositions, rather than alternation. And other more complex emo-
tional dynamics may be involved in the eureka experience of discovering new 
and surprising connections, the sense of irony elicited by juxtaposed opposites, 
or the sense of righteous indignation elicited by recognizing the failure to con-
form to expected norms.
9. Religiosity
Because of this suite of adaptations and the fact that linguistic communication 
and symbol-mediated cognition are integrated into every aspect of our lives we 
humans have essentially become symbolic savants (Deacon 1997; Deacon and 
Cashman 2009). We find ourselves intuitively and irresistibly “looking beyond 
the surface” for hidden meanings. The cognitive biases that evolved to make 
symbolic communication seem natural and effortless and quickly becomes the 
mental tool used to negotiate the vast majority of challenges we face, has likely 
also radically altered the way we tend to interpret even everyday non-symbolic 
experience. A linguistic description is an impoverished transcription of the 
thought that gave rise to it. The perceived sounds are clues pointing to an unseen 
thought not present to the senses and so must be reconstructed. The sounds and 
objects present to the senses are not meaningful in themselves, they are what we 
have to work with as intermediaries to discover the meaning making process that 
produced them.
The world’s many spiritual traditions almost universally depict the existence 
of a world beyond the immediate physical world that is in some way more fun-
damental and ultimately determines the events and forms found in the world 
available to our senses (Deacon and Cashman 2009). Though what constitutes 
the constellation of beliefs and practices that define “religion” is a matter of con-
tentious debate, in nearly every society we find traditions that assume that there 
exists a nonphysical world hidden from direct sensory experience. Deacon and 
Cashman (2009) describe this as the “bilayered world” assumption. Just as we 
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intuitively assume that the words and actions of others are merely the superficial 
physical manifestations of an otherwise inaccessible agency that is the source of 
meaning and purpose expressed in these physical manifestations, so too have we 
come to look upon the happenings in the physical world to be the superficial 
expressions of some hidden teleology. It is as though we are unable to inhibit 
this compulsion to see everything in the image of symbols. Is it simply that since 
infancy we have needed to seek the meaning behind the curtain of the language 
and culture we are immersed in? Or did our long adaptation to a symbolic niche 
predispose us to reflexively think of the world we perceive as though it is text 
that needs to be interpreted, if only one knew how? Either way it has molded us 
into symbolic savants who incessantly and irresistibly see the world in bilayered 
terms.
In many respects, then, I consider the human discovery of the use of symbols 
to be the “original sin.” Symbolic abilities have given us access to the knowledge 
contained in the forbidden fruit, and in this way we have been driven from the 
obliviousness of a pre-symbolic Eden. It provided access to unique emotions, 
indirect access to the thoughts and experiences of other minds, and a yearning for 
meaning in the narrative that is human identity. This transition has left us forever 
seeking a meaning hidden within a disembodied realm and thinking of the mun-
dane physical world around us as deriving any of its value from this projected 
meaning source.
10. Relaxation of Selection and Plasticity
How could these many diverse cognitive and behavioral traits have become so 
functionally intertwined and interdependent as to provide such a novel means of 
thinking, feeling, and communicating? And how could the diverse brain systems 
supporting them have come to work in such a tight and unprecedented synergy? 
This is particularly challenging to explain because this symbolic capacity is in 
effect an emergent function, not some prior function just requiring fine-tuning. 
Our various inherited vocalizations, such as laughter, shrieks of fright, and cries 
of anguish, are comparatively localized in their neurological control (mostly sub-
cortical) as are other modes of communication in animals. In comparison, lan-
guage depends on a widely dispersed constellation of cortical systems, each of 
which can be found in other primate brains, but evolved for very different func-
tions. These brain systems have become collectively recruited for language only 
because their previously evolved functions overlapped significantly with some 
processing demand necessitated by language, though evolved for quite different 
functions altogether.
A related mystery concerns the extent to which this dominant form of human 
communication depends extensively on information acquired by social transmis-
sion. Even for theories postulating an innate universal grammar, the vast quan-
tity and high fidelity of the information constituting even a modest vocabulary 
stands out as exceedingly anomalous from a biological point of view. How did 
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such a large fraction of our communicative capacity wind up offloaded onto 
social transmission? And what explains the remarkable reliability of this process?
These unprecedented emergent features of brain function and cognition sug-
gest that a co-evolutionary logic alone is insufficient to explain them. Recent 
investigation of a parallel shift in both complexity and neural substrate in bird-
song may, however, be able to shed some light on this.
In a comparative study of a long-domesticated bird, the Bengalese Finch, and 
its wild cousin, the White-Rump Munia, it was discovered that the domesticated 
lineage was a far more facile song-learner with a much more complex and flexible 
song than its wild cousin (e. g., see Okanoya 2004). This occurred despite the fact 
that the Bengalese Finch was bred in captivity for coloration, not singing. The 
domestic / wild difference of song complexity and song learning in these close 
finch breeds parallels what is found in comparisons between other bird species 
that are song-learners and non-learners. This difference also correlates with a 
much more extensive neural control of song in birds that learn a complex and 
variable song through social transmission.
The fact that this behavioral and neural complexity can arise spontaneously 
without specific breeding for singing is a surprising finding since it is generally 
assumed that song complexity evolves under the influence of intense sexual selec-
tion. In the case of the Bengalese Finch, his source of selection was eliminated by 
the intervention of human breeders.
In Deacon (2010), I argued that, paradoxically, it was the relaxation of natural 
and sexual selection on song structure that was responsible for its elaboration 
in this example. In brief, with song becoming irrelevant to species identification 
and mate choice in the domesticated lineage, territorial defense, mate attraction, 
predator avoidance, and so on, the innate mechanisms constraining song were 
allowed to degenerate. Mutations that resulted in degeneration of these systems 
and existing recessive alleles producing a less stereotypic song would not have 
been weeded out. The result would be the reduction of innate biases controlling 
song production. The domestic song could thus be described as both less con-
strained and more variable because it is subject to more kinds of perturbations. 
But with the specification of song structure no longer influenced by innate audi-
tory biases and strictly controlled by the primary forebrain motor center of the 
songbird brain (called nucleus RA), other linked brain systems could begin to 
play a biasing role. With innate motor biases weakened, auditory experience, 
social context, learning biases, and attentional factors could all begin to influence 
singing. So the domestic song would be expected to become more variable, more 
complicated, and more influenced by social experience. These changes are what 
we observe in the case of the Bengalese Finch.
This is relevant to the human case, because a number of features of the human 
language adaptation also appear to involve a relaxation of innate constraints, 
allowing multiple brain systems and extrinsic influences to affect linguistic com-
munication. The presence of infant babbling, increased variability and skilled 
modification of vocal behavior, decoupling of vocalization from arousal state, an 
extensive capacity for vocal imitation, etc., may all be consequences of a paral-
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lel relaxation of selection with respect to vocal communication. Freedom from 
constraint is also an important precondition for being able to correlate learned 
vocal behaviors with the wide diversity of objects, events, properties, and rela-
tionships that language is capable of referring to. It is also a plausible answer to 
the combinatorial synergy problem of brain functions (discussed above) because 
it provides an evolutionary route to multi-system coordination.
How might this analogue to the effects of domestication have arisen in human 
prehistory? Perhaps the most striking clues to an answer come from major 
changes in body structures and demographics occurring at various points in our 
hominin ancestry. The first and most obvious is a shift to bipedal locomotion 
somewhere in the period around 4 million years ago that relaxed selection on the 
upper limbs and hands enabling more flexible manipulation of objects. This was 
a precursor to the discovery of how to produce and use sharpened stones to gain 
access to the rich animal flesh resource that may date to over 3 million years into 
the past. But what may be the most radical change probably didn’t occur until 
about 2 million years ago. This transition is characterized by a number of cor-
related anatomical and behavioral changes that indicate a major shift in all aspects 
of hominin life. Stone tool use becomes ubiquitous, bipedal locomotion becomes 
fine-tuned to modern forms, body size increases, brain size increases above typ-
ical ape levels, jaws and teeth are significantly reduced, and sexual dimorphism is 
decreased to modern levels. And perhaps most significantly, it is at this point that 
tool using hominins are, for the first time, found outside of Africa, in Central 
and Southeast Asia. There were likely other similar migration events occurring 
subsequently, but the last and most extensive migration out of Africa occurred as 
recently as 60,000 years ago, as anatomically modern-looking people swept over 
all of Eurasia to replace previous populations. Each of these events suggests that 
new levels of flexibility have become available giving rise to yet further phases 
of relaxation.
There is also increasing genetic evidence of relaxation of selection distin-
guishing humans from other primates. Although traditional assumptions about 
the role of genetic change in evolution have tended to focus on mutations that 
augment some function, evidence is growing that gene duplication and gene 
loss – including especially loss of non-coding regulatory sequences – has con-
tributed to significant evolutionary change (e. g., Olsen 1999; Hunt et al. 2011). 
Human-specific loss of over 500 otherwise highly conserved non-coding regu-
latory sequences has recently been reported (McLean et al. 2011). This extensive 
loss of genetic regulation may be a signal of human-specific relaxation of selec-
tion and an increased sensitivity to epigenetic and environmental influences.
This argument inverts the claim that increased genetic specification of gram-
matical knowledge underlies our language capacity and is instead consistent with 
the explanation of language universals arising from extra-biological sources (such 
as suggested above). But perhaps the most important implications involve the 
incredible flexibility of human cognition and behaviors. We largely take this for 
granted, but in many respects it is one of the most robust and significant aspects 
of our distinctive nature. As a result, not only are human languages incredibly 
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diverse, but all aspects of human culture show unprecedented diversity com-
pared to anything found in the rest of the animal kingdom. Many of the dis-
tinctive symbolic adaptations discussed above reflect this increased openness to 
developmental and cultural influences that have led many to question the very 
concept of human nature.
Conclusion
In this essay I have reviewed extensive evidence that the unusual demands of 
symbolic communication and thought have restructured our brains, have pro-
vided an unprecedented degree of behavioral flexibility, and have embedded us 
in a symbolic ecosystem – culture – that is radically unlike the Umwelt of any 
other species. Symbolization has thereby modified nearly every aspect of what 
makes us human. The result is that our distinctive “nature” is as much symbolic 
as it is biological.
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Preconditions in Human Embodiment  
for the Evolution of Symbolic Communication
Jordan Zlatev
Abstract: The evolution of human language and thought is crucially based on the use of 
symbols, understood as socially-shared, conventional and systematic representations. In 
this chapter I argue that the evolution of human-specific symbolic communication took 
place over a prolonged period of time, relying on three key preconditions related to human 
embodiment. First was the evolution of a degree of intersubjectivity that is unique among 
great apes, most likely made possible by the adoption of cooperative breeding (allopar-
enting) as a key reproductive strategy. This in turn made possible the pro-sociality that is 
a further precondition of human communication, and which developed in pre-linguistic 
cultures via bodily mimesis (Donald 1991; Zlatev 2008). Finally, vocal-manual multimo-
dality was essential for the transition from a predominantly bodily and iconic mode of 
representation to a predominantly (though not exclusively) vocal and symbolic mode. The 
suggested scenario implies extensive bio-cultural co-evolution, and draws upon extended 
Darwinian models such as multi-level selection theory, operating on both individuals and 
groups, with complex tradeoffs.
Introduction: Whence the Symbolic Species?
Human cognition and communication have unique properties when compared 
to those of non-human animals: this much is fairly uncontroversial. But as soon 
as we ask which properties these are, and how they have evolved, controversies 
loom large. It is often claimed that the representational and combinatorial pow-
ers of language are the key factors of human uniqueness (Christiansen and Kirby 
2003), and one of the more successful definitions of us is as “the symbolic spe-
cies” (Deacon 1997). To some extent, the term is apt, and the re-kindled interest 
in the topic of language evolution – as a means to address the classical questions 
of who we are and where we come from – is justified. But in effect, this is only 
a paraphrase of the initial “which and how” question, since there is little agree-
ment on the fundamental features of language: are they “computational,” cog-
nitive, social, semiotic, or combinations of these (Chomsky 1986; Itkonen 2003; 
Zlatev 2007)? Likewise, the term “symbol” is one of the most ambiguous ones in 
the field, with many disagreements arising from misunderstandings (Heine and 
Kuteva 2007; Hurford 2007).
In the present chapter, consistent with discussions of the ontogenetic origin 
of symbolic communication (McCune 2008; Werner and Kaplan 1963; Zlatev 
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and McCune 2014), I take a synthetic cognitive-semiotic perspective and define 
symbol use as the production and comprehension of signs which are (a) repre-
sentational, i. e., they are understood by their users as denoting general or spe-
cific objects, properties and events (Sonesson 2007), (b) conventional, i. e., shared 
within a community (Itkonen 2003), though not necessarily “arbitrary” (see Sec-
tion 3), (c) expressed along with communicative intent (Tomasello 1999; Zlatev 
2013) and (d) systematically interrelated (Saussure [1916] 1983; Deacon 1997). 
The implications of this definition will become clear as we go along.
Symbol use – which is at the heart of language – is indeed at the essence of 
what makes human nature and culture unique. In this respect, I am in agree-
ment with so called “discontinuity theories” of language origins (Tatterstall 
2014). However, I part company when they assume that the transition to symbol 
use and language should therefore be regarded as abrupt, resulting either from 
sudden inventions or macro-mutations, sometimes said to coincide with “overt 
archeological evidence for symbolic activities” (ibid., 224) that are less than 
100,000 years old. Rather, I argue that the evolution of symbolic communication 
was a prolonged process, and language would not have evolved, nor would it be 
learnable by children, or be able to function in general, if it were not for three key 
cognitive-semiotic properties, which all have to do with the nature of our embod-
iment. The first, on which I have placed considerable focus in the past, is that of 
bodily mimesis (Donald 1991, 1998, 2001, 2012; Zlatev 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2014a). 
As summarized in Section 1, the Donald-Zlatev hypothesis is that an ancient, 
nearly two-million-old adaptation unleashed unprecedented capacities for rep-
resentation, skill and imagination: an indispensable “missing link” on the way to 
language. However, with time I have realized that the bodily mimesis hypothesis 
is in itself not a sufficient evolutionary explanation of human symbolic origins.
On the one hand, bodily mimesis presupposes enhanced trust, empathy and 
cooperation within tightly knit social groups, or in one word: an advanced form 
of intersubjectivity that is sometimes called ultrasociality. While bodily mime-
sis and intersubjectivity may have to some degree co-evolved (Zlatev 2008a), it 
is very difficult to understand how the capacities described in Section 1 could 
have been established, without a prior evolution of uniquely human capaci-
ties and motivations for “sharing” (Zlatev et al. 2008). There have been numer-
ous proposals in the literature for the contexts in which (human) ultrasociality 
evolved: from foraging (Tomasello et al. 2012) to agriculture (Gowdy and Krall 
2016). However, considering a multitude of factors, including the coherence of 
the evolutionary sequence, nearly all such accounts leave something wanting. 
In Section 2, I summarize some theoretical proposals and argue that the com-
bined evidence supports most strongly one particular theory for the evolution 
of uniquely human intersubjectivity: the alloparenting hypothesis (Hrdy 2009). 
As alloparenting has to do with reproduction, and is expressed in a multitude of 
bodily forms of interaction like emotional attunement, neonatal mirroring and 
joint attention, this is another aspect of human embodiment.
On the other hand, a body-based theory of the origins of symbolic communi-
cation is said to face a crucial challenge, regarded by some as “insuperable” (Ken-
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don 2009): why is the predominant channel of human language vocal, rather than 
gestural? In Section 3, I provide an answer, summarizing recent evidence from 
experimental semiotics (Galantucci and Garrod 2010), based on a third pre-con-
dition that is also crucially tied to embodiment: the fundamentally multimodal, 
vocal-gestural nature of linguistic communication. The idea of “multimodal 
origins” has been gaining ground in the literature, as a middle ground of sorts 
between gesture-first and speech-first theories (Hurford 2007; Taglialatela et al. 
2011). What I propose is a more specific version of the thesis, according to which 
the meanings expressed by the different channels of bodily expression – gesture 
and speech – need to be viewed as interacting but distinct, unlike some accounts 
by which they are inseparable (McNeill 2005, 2012).
Finally, I summarize the argument, and order the landmark evolutionary 
achievements in a hypothetical sequence stretching over the past four million 
years. Notably, the scenario presupposes modern developments in evolutionary 
theory that go beyond the gene-centered perspective of Neo-Darwinism.
1. Bodily Mimesis: The “Missing Link” to Symbol Use
In a nutshell, the bodily mimesis hypothesis states that “an adaptation for 
improved volitional control of the body gave our ancestors advantages in the 
domains of imitation, empathy and (gestural) intentional communication. This 
paved the way for the evolution of language, with no other biological adapta-
tion . . . apart from improved vocal control” (Zlatev 2014a, 166). Etymologically 
stemming from the Greek verb mīmeisthai (to imitate), the concept of mimesis 
and its cognitive role was noted by Aristotle, who commented on “man’s natural 
propensity, from childhood onwards, to engage in mimetic activity (and this dis-
tinguishes man from other creatures, that he is thoroughly mimetic, and through 
mimesis takes his first steps in understanding” (Aristotle 1987, 34). In effect, 
Donald naturalized the concept, in framing (bodily) mimesis as “an embodied, 
analogue, and primordial mode of representation” based on “a unified neu-
ro-cognitive adaptation that formed the early foundation of a distinctly human 
mind-sharing culture” (Donald 2012, 180 – 181). Consistent with the bodily 
mimesis hypothesis, the archeological record for Homo erectus (1.8 – 0.5 MYA) 
provides evidence for complex Acheulean (so-called “Mode 2”) tool-manufac-
ture, campfires and long-distance migration over most of Eurasia. The paleonto-
logical evidence shows basically modern human anatomy, and a double increase 
in brain size compared to predecessors. Adding evidence from neuroscience, 
psychology, anthropology and primatology (Donald 2001; Zlatev 2014a) sup-
ports the thesis that an adaptation for enhanced voluntary control of the body 
served as the key to a “cultural style that can still be recognized as typically 
human” (Donald 2001, 261), and yet was not dependent on language.
An attractive feature of the hypothesis is its parsimony: while the original 
adaptive function of bodily mimesis could have been tool production, it would 
have naturally been extended to much else: “pantomime, imitation, gesturing, 
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shared attention, ritualized behaviors, and many games. It is also the basis of 
skill rehearsal, in which a previous act is mimed, over and over, to improve it” 
(Donald 2001, 240). In sum, bodily mimesis granted to human cognition and 
communication pre-linguistic, and yet uniquely developed features in at least the 
following five domains.
Complex skills: Many motor skills do not rely on a mimetic controller. How-
ever, the kinds of motor patterns necessary for complex skills like bipolar axe 
production and precision throwing require systematic rehearsal and the ability 
to “compare, in imagination, the performed act with the intended one” (Donald 
2012, 182). Mimesis brings the ability to “shift attention from the external world, 
and redirect it to [our] own bodies and actions” (Donald 1998, 45), and thus to 
align the performed and observed movements.
Social learning: Again, simpler forms of social learning like goal emulation, 
response facilitation and stimulus enhancement, are available to many primate 
species. However, true imitation – in which a novel act is observed, modeled 
and eventually added to the behavioral repertoire – is much more restricted 
(Tomasello 1999). Only human children reproduce an observed action with high 
fidelity even when some of the steps are clearly not functional to achieving the 
goal, i. e., what is now known as “over-imitation” (Horner and Whiten 2005). 
From the other side (that of the teacher), helping by overtly demonstrating, 
guiding and when necessary correcting is also a universal, human-specific trait 
(Gergely and Csibra 2006).
Memory and planning: The ability to (consciously) remember some event 
experienced in the past is characteristic of episodic memory, allowing mental 
access to “a particular experience (witnessed, or felt, or thought something) in 
a particular place at a particular time” (Tulving 2005, 15). It is also important 
for planning and guiding of future actions. There has been accumulating evi-
dence that at least some episodic memory is not specifically human (Hurford 
2007) and Donald (1991) has referred to the minds and cultures of chimpanzees 
as “episodic,” acknowledging that they are not strictly limited to the here and 
now, allowing “flashbacks,” even if these are not under voluntary control. The 
mimetic controller adds to this not only volitional control of the imagination, 
but the ability to explicitly re-enact a past or future event through bodily motion.
Rites and rituals: Moving further into the social domain and combining the 
functions discussed above – skill rehearsal, re-enactment and (over-)imitation – 
provides the bases for another universal of human cultures: rituals. These involve 
more or less formalized, invariant and stylized bodily performances, loaded with 
affective meaning, and serving social bonding (Bell 1997). Donald writes of 
“reciprocal mimesis” (Donald 1991, 6) as the means for establishing such forms 
of “group mentality.” The highly normative and (in part) symbolic character of 
many rituals transcends the borders of the “mimetic stage,” intermixing with 
the subsequent “mythic stage” in Donald’s evolutionary model, characterized 
by narrative and language.
Mime and gesture: A re-enacted hunting dance is clearly representational, in 
the sense that expression and content are clearly differentiated for both the per-
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former and audience. In a general sense, it is also communicative. But rituals are 
generally performative rather than informative, and lack the full sense of (Gri-
cean) intentional communication, in which there is both an intention to inform 
the audience of something new, and a higher-order intention for the audience to 
understand this (Sperber and Wilson 1995). Hence, it is doubtful if “mime and 
non-linguistic gesture come for free with skill” (Donald 2012, 182). The coop-
erative motivations and cognitive capacities for the use of communicative inten-
tions need to be seen as an extension of the motoric aspects of mimesis (Zlatev 
et al. 2013). And arguably, “Gricean intentions” are still needed to bridge the 
gap between animal expressive communication and language (pace Bar-on 2013).
In sum, the concept of bodily mimesis is both specific and rich in relations 
and extensions: from the motoric skill to social cognition and human-specific 
culture. Hence, it has been necessary both to constrain it and to provide it with a 
hierarchical structure, distinguishing simpler from more elaborated forms (e. g., 
Zlatev 2008b). Adapting a definition used in previous publications, an actual or 
imagined act of cognition or communication is an act of bodily mimesis if: (a) it 
involves a cross-modal mapping between exteroception (e. g., vision) and pro-
prioception (e. g., kinesthesia); (b) it is under conscious control and is perceived 
by the subject to be similar to some other action, object or event; (c) the subject 
intends the act to stand for some action, object or event for an addressee, and for 
the addressee to recognize this intention; (d) it is not fully conventional and nor-
mative; and (e) it does not divide (semi)compositionally into meaningful sub-acts 
that systematically relate to other similar acts, as in grammar. A conceptual-em-
pirical model known as the Mimesis Hierarchy (Zlatev 2013) follows from this 
definition by assuming that these features build incrementally upon one another, 
so that possessing only (a) yields proto-mimesis, whereas (a) and (b) together give 
dyadic mimesis, while adding (c) leads to full triadic mimesis. With the last two 
(negative) criteria in the definition follow the two “post-mimetic” stages: (d) pro-
tolanguage, with signs following criteria for correctness, but lacking systematic 
relations among them; and (e) language, with sufficient systematicity to allow the 
construction of discourse and narratives.
Table 1 shows the five stages of the Mimesis Hierarchy, alongside correspond-
ing social-communicative skills. Reviews of comparative psychological and social 
neuroscience research (Zlatev 2008a, 2008b) show abundant evidence for pro-
to-mimesis in non-human primates, and some for dyadic mimesis in non-human 
apes, and especially chimpanzees. But without extensive human enculturation, 
triadic mimesis skills are inaccessible, and even the most successful “language 
apes” like the bonobo Kanzi do not appear to master them fully (which can 
explain their inability to acquire anything more than proto-linguistic skills). The 
conclusion is thus that it is the lack of bodily mimesis, rather than any “language 
acquisition device” or such that prevents non-human primates from evolving 
both cumulative culture and language. Another review of the comparative evi-
dence reaches similar conclusions (Vaesen 2012): seven pre-linguistic domains 
show clear differences between human and great ape capacities: (1) motoric: 
hand-eye coordination; (2) social-cognitive: imitation, teaching, and social rea-
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soning; and (3) general cognitive capacities: causal reasoning, function-based cate-
gorization (e. g., related to tools) and executive control (e. g., related to planning). 
Considering the functions of bodily mimesis outlined earlier (i. e., skill, planning, 
imitation, rites, gesture), there is considerable overlap between these lists: from 
the most specific (1), to the social consequences of bodily mimesis in (2) and the 
most general ones in (3). In other words, the poly-functional nature of bodily 
mimesis may help explain the internal coherence among the features that distin-
guish human and animal cognition, apart from language.
Further, by comparing the features and skills in Table 1 with the definition of 
symbol use presented in the introduction, it becomes clear how bodily mimesis 
can function as the bridge from primate episodic cognition to language. Iconic 
gestures (“pantomime”) are clearly representational, and declarative pointing and 
joint attention bring with them the markers of communicative intent. Fully con-
ventional (normative) signs like emblems and single words take on an additional 
property of symbols, but only once their systematic and combinatorial potential 
is realized (in grammar and story-telling) is there “fully symbolic communica-
tion.”
Table 1. The five stages of the Mimesis Hierarchy, in rising order, with incre-
mental features and corresponding cognitive-semiotic structures.
Stage Novel feature Cognitive-semiotic structures
#5 Language Semiotic  – Fully symbolic communication
  systematicity – Grammar
   – Narrative
#4 Protolanguage Conventionality / – Emblems
  normativity – Words
   – Multimodal utterances
#3 Triadic mimesis Communicative  – Declarative pointing
  intent – Iconic gestures
   – Joint attention
#2 Dyadic mimesis Volitional  – Full imitation
  re-enactment – Imperative pointing
   – Shared attention
#1 Proto-mimesis Mapping extero- – Emotional contagion
  ception and  – Attention contagion
  proprioception – Neonatal mirroring
   – Mutual gaze
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This model may be somewhat schematic, but it helps to appreciate both the 
potential and the limits of bodily mimesis. Cognitive-semiotic enhancements in 
the five domains highlighted earlier provide the essential ingredients of a type of 
culture that is not based on language, but on shared skills, (simple) rites, (public) 
representations, and non-linguistic communicative signs. The kind of imitation 
that comes with bodily mimesis makes cumulative cultures possible (Richerson 
and Boyd 2005) since “only imitation gives rise to cumulative cultural evolution 
of complex behaviors and artifacts” (ibid., 108). Yet, the rate of cultural evolu-
tion was very slow until the appearance of the “symbolic artifacts” emphasized 
by many archeologists (Tatterstall 2014), and it is possible that fully modern-like 
languages are contemporaneous and brought about through historical, rather 
than biological processes (Heine and Kuteva 2007), during the past 100,000 years.
Let us postpone the discussion of the transition from bodily mimesis to lan-
guage as a “conventional-normative semiotic system for communication and 
thought” (Zlatev 2008b, 137) for Section 3, where we explore the nature of the 
transitional “protolanguage” and its (gradual) evolution to modern-like lan-
guages, in part thanks to the multimodal character of bodily mimesis. But first, 
we need to consider the evolution of a pre-requisite for bodily mimesis itself: the 
type of social context that would generate a “society of intimates” (Givón and 
Young 2002).
2. The Intersubjective Preconditions for Mimesis
Human cultures and minds are special with respect to the extent of their inter-
subjective sharing. Our species is sometimes characterized as being not simply 
social, but “ultrasocial” (Campbell 1982; Tomasello 1999). As far as the shar-
ing of cognitive phenomena such as linguistic rules, moral norms and religious 
beliefs is concerned, human uniqueness is indisputable. But these are relative 
latecomers in evolution, as well as in ontogenetic development, and cannot help 
us get at the roots of intersubjectivity. As stated in a recent anthology on the 
social origins of language: “the major transition, all of us agree, must have been 
the establishment within social groups of unprecedentedly co-operative, trusting 
relationships. Only then could language . . . begin to evolve” (Dor, Knight, and 
Lewis 2014, 14). More basic than the sharing of norms and beliefs is that of food 
and care for children and elderly, as is customary for hunter-gatherers (Wiessner 
2002). But what factors brought this about? In a recent target article, Gowdy 
and Krall (2016, 1) discuss the “lack of consensus in the biological sciences in 
classifying social behavior” and opt for the following definition: “Ultrasocial-
ity refers to the most social of animal organizations, with full time division of 
labor, specialists who gather no food but are fed by others, effective sharing of 
information about sources of food and danger, self-sacrificial effort in collec-
tive defense” (Campbell 1982, 160). Curiously, however, this ends up including 
“ants, termites and humans in several scattered archaic city-states,” but not hunt-
er-gatherer societies. Indeed, the social organization that our ancestors lived in 
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since the dawn of Homo until some 10,000 years ago lacked the kind of ant-like 
subjugation of the individual to the interests of the collective that Gowdy and 
Krall (2016) claim became dominant with the rise of organized agriculture (and 
become global with market capitalism). Thus we need to look elsewhere for the 
preconditions of mimetic cultures.
One reason why strong forms of pro-social behavior such as altruism are 
always both relevant and controversial in evolutionary discussions is that, at least 
on the face of it, they contradict a basic principle of the “modern synthesis” in 
evolutionary theory: “costly group-beneficial behavior cannot evolve unless the 
benefits of group-beneficial behavior flow non-randomly to the genes that give 
rise to the behavior” (Richerson and Boyd 2005, 198). A number of well-known 
approaches have turned out not to generalize to all cases, and to human con-
texts specifically. Kin-selection (Hamilton 1964) can explain cooperation only in 
species that are very closely related, such as social insects and bees. Reciprocity 
can evolve and become stable in small groups, but becomes easily vulnerable 
to “free-riders.” The two mechanisms to resolve this have their own problems: 
tracking reputations can influence willingness to cooperate, but this requires 
fairly advanced memory systems and “gossip,” which of course presupposes lan-
guage, and hence cannot be evoked as precondition for it. Finally, retribution for 
non-collaborators requires group-wide moral norms, and some system to police 
these into action, or else become vulnerable to “second-order free-riders” (who 
like most of us prefer to look the other way, rather than risk harm).
The debates go on in evolutionary theory, but as more and more are willing 
to move beyond the “Geno-centrism” of Neo-Darwinism into various exten-
sions such as epigenetics (Jablonka and Lamb 2007) and developmental systems 
(Oyama et al. 2000), an old Darwinian idea – that selection may operate on whole 
groups, and not just on individual and their genes – has been revived and elabo-
rated as multi-level selection (MLS) theory (Richerson and Boyd 2005; Sober and 
Wilson 1999). In a recent publication (Zlatev 2014b), I considered four specific 
theories for the evolution of human-specific sociality in the light of such devel-
opments, and attempted to evaluate them with respect to the following factors: 
(a) Is there an explanation why a higher level of sociality evolved in the Homo 
genus, rather than in other animals? (b) What kind of evolutionary mechanism 
is provided, and is it plausible? (c) Is the timing proposed consistent with rele-
vant anatomical changes (e. g., bipedalism, reduced canines, and reduced sexual 
dimorphism)? (d) Is the theory consistent with anthropological evidence from 
extant hunter-gatherer societies, as well as technologically advanced ones? (e) Is 
the theory consistent with evidence on how the features claimed to be unique 
for human sociality develop in children? In this section, I will briefly review the 
claims of these theories and how they relate to these five criteria, and in addition, 
consider their compatibility with the bodily mimesis hypothesis from Section 1.
The four theories can be summarized as follows. Dunbar (1996) proposes that 
life on the savannah necessitated larger groups, which required a novel mecha-
nism for social bonding, realized first as vocal grooming. Deacon (1997) hypoth-
esizes that a sex contract in a multi-male / multi-female group paved the way to 
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both morality and symbolic reference. Tomasello (2008) advocates a cognitive 
adaptation for joint intentionality and Hrdy (2009) argues that a transition to 
alloparenting as dominant reproductive and rearing strategy radically altered our 
ancestors’ interpersonal relations. The first two of these theories focus on the 
origin of language, with sociality as something of a “byproduct,” while the latter 
two are explicitly formulated as precursor theories. Let us consider the cases for 
each below in terms of the first four criteria, leaving the final developmental fac-
tor (e) for special consideration at the end.
2.1 Vocal Grooming and Gossip
Dunbar shows that physical grooming is an important mechanism of social 
bonding and coalition building in primates. However, it is time-consuming and 
therefore sets limits on group sizes. With life in open territory, larger groups are 
beneficial for minimizing the risk of predation, foraging and territory defense. 
The solution found by our ancestors was first “vocal grooming,” on top of which 
“language evolved to service social bonds in a more generic sense by providing 
a substitute for social grooming” (Dunbar 2009, 14). But why was this evolu-
tionary path not taken by other primates? The ecological conditions of gelada 
baboons are apparently similar. In partial support for Dunbar’s theory gelada also 
live in large terrestrial groups / herds of 200 – 300 individuals, and have evolved 
enhanced vocal signaling to keep contact with members of the same “harem” (a 
one-male reproductive unit), but nothing resembling a symbolic communication 
system allowing them to “gossip.”
Dunbar famously bases his theory on fairly robust correlations between 
group and neo-cortex sizes in primates from monkeys to humans, interpolating 
the likely group sizes of extinct hominins. The central proposal is that neo-cor-
tex increased in response to larger groups: “Since maintaining coherent groups is 
cognitively demanding, brain size (or more specifically neo-cortex volume) will 
evolve to match the cognitive demands of the species’ optimal group size” (Sut-
cliffe et al. 2012, 51). References to “mating opportunities” suggest standard indi-
vidual-level selection: individuals with larger brains, a larger number of friends 
and better vocal grooming reproduced more successfully. But one may argue 
that group size optimality is not a property determined by individual brains, and 
that some form of multi-level selection may be needed to converge on “optimal” 
groups, both in terms of size, and the adequate means to bond their members. 
Present-day human social groups fall into three categories – small, medium, and 
large, corresponding to “bands,” “cultural lineage groups,” and “tribes” – with 
respective size ranges of 30 – 50, 100 – 200, and 500 – 2500 members each. The num-
ber that best matches Dunbar’s estimates for “optimal group size” given human 
neo-cortex is approximately 150. This so-called “Dunbar’s number” has been 
criticized: in Western societies “the range in network size is vast, with 90 % of 
the adult population knowing anywhere between 250 and 1,710 other people, 
and half knowing between 400 and 800” (Wellman 2012, 174). On the other 
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hand, most anthropologists emphasize the band of 30 – 50 people as the most 
significant group for hunter-gatherers, and it is likely that in such “societies of 
intimates” the initial adaptations for human-specific intersubjectivity took place.
On the issue of timing, Dunbar (2009) points to the relatively scarce fossil evi-
dence of a larger thoracic vertebral canal (MacLarnon and Hewitt 1999), which 
has been (controversially) interpreted as an index of improved vocal control in 
Homo heidelbergensis and concludes that “the 0.5 mya [R]ubicon may mark the 
appearance of some form of intensely music-like exchanges, with full grammat-
ical language (i. e. language as we know it today) emerging only later – perhaps 
with the appearance of anatomically modern humans around 200 kya” (Dunbar 
2009, 29). But 0.5 MYA is a very late onset for the process leading to human-spe-
cific sociality, given the many earlier changes, from Ardipithecus ramidus at 
4.4 MYA (involving reduced canines, reduced sexual dimorphism and partial 
bipedalism) to the mimetic culture of Homo erectus, from 1.8 MYA (see Sec-
tion 1).
2.2 Sex Contract
Deacon’s explanation for the evolution of human-specific sociality is likewise 
ecological: our ancestors needed to survive in large male-female groups, with 
slowly maturing infants (due to bipedalism). This called for extensive maternal 
care and paternal provisioning, which could only be stabilized through a contract 
that required symbolic marking of the social rights and obligations of sex-part-
ners. As summarized by Deacon (1997): “The need to mark these reciprocally 
altruistic relationships arose as an evolutionary adaptation to the extreme insta-
bility of the combination of group hunting / scavenging and male provisioning of 
mates and offspring” (ibid., 401). In other words, Deacon proposes that social 
norms and symbol use spearheaded the process that made human societies more 
cooperative rather than vice-versa. Analogous to Dunbar, Deacon correlates the 
evolution of “symbolic reference” with increase in brain size, but emphasizes the 
prefrontal cortex, responsible for much of “higher” social cognition and execu-
tive functions, as especially important.
Since at the root of the adaptation proposed by Deacon is not pair-bonding 
per se (which could perhaps be accounted for by direct reciprocity, and expected 
to result in an adaptation for emotional attachment: love), but symbolically 
mediated social norms, beneficial for the social group as whole, group selection 
is even more strongly implied than in the case of Dunbar – groups that found a 
way to ensure sex-based division of labor and paternal provisioning out-com-
peted those that did not. When did this happen? Deacon also appeals to novel 
ecological conditions of “life on the savannah” for what started the process, but 
places the beginning of the transition at more than 3 MYA, with australopithe-
cines. Since for Deacon this should mark the onset of symbol use (rather than 
“music-like exchanges”), this is a remarkably early date, without any support 
in the archaeological record. Also, since for hunter-gatherers the distribution 
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of food concerns not “nuclear families” but the whole group (Wiessner 2002), 
Deacon’s scenario seems rather unrealistic. Paternal provisioning is far from uni-
versal: “Across cultures and between individuals, more variation exists in the 
form and extent of paternal investment in humans than in all other primates 
combined” (Hrdy 2009, 162).
2.3 Joint Intentionality
Departing from child and language development, Tomasello has over the past 
two decades presented different versions of the thesis that the evolution of lan-
guage must be grounded in prior adaptations for social-cultural life. Tomasello 
(2008) argues for two such adaptations: a capacity for shared intentionality, 
needed for conducting planned actions jointly, and a pro-social motivation to 
share (information). More recently, these are referred to as joint intentionality, 
and a two-step process is ascribed to its evolution. The first step is the following: 
“a change of ecology . . . lead humans to an interdependent lifestyle, especially 
collaborative foraging, which resulted in the evolution of new skills and moti-
vation for collaborating with others (joint intentionality), and gave individuals 
special incentives for helping their partners altruistically as well” (Tomasello et 
al. 2012, 685). Evidence of active collaborative hunting and gathering is said to 
coincide with the emergence of Homo heidelbergensis ca. 800,000 years ago.
The second major step involves extending such “small-scale collaboration” 
to whole communities on the basis of cultural conventions, norms and institu-
tions, setting the stage for cultural group selection and cumulative cultural evo-
lution. Timewise, this is said to coincide with the appearance of Homo sapiens. 
The original way of dividing shared intentionality and pro-social motivation had 
the troublesome implication that motivational / emotional aspects would have 
evolved only at a secondary stage. With the extended scenario, altruistic motives 
are expected to evolve during the first step: “obligate collaborative foraging pro-
duced interdependence among members of a group, and this makes it in my direct 
interest to help others who might be my future partners” (Tomasello et al. 2012, 
679). In sum, while Tomasello does not explicitly endorse multi-level selection, 
the overall account, ranging from reproductive benefits for individuals, through 
“social selection,” to cultural group selection, is fully consistent with it. Further, 
the authors state that “in this context humans became cooperative breeders, reg-
ularly providing childcare to offspring who were not their own” (Tomasello et al. 
2012, 680), explicitly acknowledging the final theory under discussion.
2.4 Alloparenting
Hrdy (2009) proposes that what started the cascade of processes which led to 
increased brain size, human-specific cognitive abilities and ultimately language 
was a switch in reproductive and rearing strategy: “Without doubt, highly com-
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plex coevolutionary processes were involved in the evolution of expanded lifes-
pans, prolonged childhoods, and bigger brains. What I want to stress here, how-
ever, is that cooperative breeding was the pre-existing condition that permitted 
the evolution of these traits in the hominin line” (Hrdy 2009, 277; italics added). 
Such a switch is plausible, since it is only in our species among the Great Apes 
that childcare is extensively shared among group members. While in orangutans, 
gorillas, chimpanzees, and even bonobos, mothers are the only ones to hold and 
nurse infants due to fear of kidnapping or infanticide, other alloparenting pri-
mates like marmosets and tamarins are “unusually altruistic, displaying a curi-
ously human impulse to give” (Hrdy 2009, 96).
Unlike the other authors discussed here, Hrdy does not appeal to changes in 
ecological conditions for what started the process: our ancestors did not have to 
make the transition to alloparenting (characterizing only 3 % of mammal spe-
cies), but the groups who did so were evolutionary winners, as alloparenting 
allows for unusually fast rates of reproduction, despite large-brained, and slowly 
maturing babies: “Mothers can overshoot their capacities to provide, and fathers 
can vary, because both sexes evolved in a highly fluid system where alloparents 
often provided the compensatory assistance” (Hrdy 2009, 167). The hypothe-
sis is that the nurturing tendencies of mothers were extended to other mem-
bers of the group, including fathers but not limited to them, allowing food and 
childcare to be more equally distributed within the group than, for example, in 
Deacon’s scenario. The proposal is also distinct from the so-called grandmother 
hypothesis, according to which women live longer than female apes after ceasing 
to ovulate, due to their positive role in the survival of grandchildren (Hawkes 
2004). Hrdy observes that human longevity increased for both men and women, 
and while (maternal) grandmothers typically function as alloparents, other group 
members do as well: “Efe babies average 14 different caretakers in the first days 
of life” (Hrdy 2009, 9).
Hrdy argues that this process can be accounted for by an evolutionary model 
that generalizes Hamilton’s Rule rB > C where r does not refer only to genetic 
relatedness (and hence standard kin selection) since “once the neural and physi-
ological underpinnings for helping behavior were in place, helpers did not need 
to be close kin” (Hrdy 2009, 88). Since kin selection can be seen as a special form 
of group selection (Sober and Wilson 1999) this “generalized kin selection” can 
be seen as a form of multi-level selection, with selection between groups favoring 
those which have adapted the “winning strategy.” The transition is proposed to 
have occurred with Homo ergaster / erectus around 1.8 MYA, based on evidence 
for changes in diet (including meat), sexual division of labor, larger brains and 
longer life-spans. However, this was hardly an abrupt transition, since the traces 
of a process of “self-domestication” can be found in Ardipithecus ramidus, with 
reduced sexual dimorphism and partial bipedalism. This suggests a co-evolu-
tionary scenario of more immature infants, prolonged childhood, more need for 
shared care and provisioning, in which alloparenting was not the single initial 
factor, as suggested by Hrdy, but was itself facilitated by increased altriciality 
(i. e., very immature babies). In birds, cooperative breeding has been found to be 
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more likely to evolve in taxa where chicks are helpless rather than in those where 
they are soon able to survive on their own (Cockburn 2006).
Hrdy bases her theory extensively on the child-care practices of extant hunt-
er-gatherer groups, reminding us that these should not be viewed as “living fos-
sils,” but rather as the closest models for what the lives of our pre-agricultural 
ancestors could have been like. It is significant that in culturally, geographically 
and environmentally highly distinct hunter-gathering societies such as Aka, Efé, 
!Kung San (Central Africa), Himba (Western Africa), Yanomamo (Venezuela), 
and Agta (Philippines), care is shared between mothers and alloparents, and in 
some cases fathers.
2.5 Ontogenetic Development and Summary
I single out here ontogeny as a special criterion, in line with the emphasis in cur-
rent evolutionary thinking on the need to integrate evolution and development 
in a united evo-devo approach, as “evidence from genetics, embryology, and 
developmental biology has converged to offer a more epigenetic, contingent, and 
dynamic view of how organisms develop” (Lickliter and Honeycutt 2003, 819). 
Or as summarized by Thompson (2007): “The core idea of this new synthesis – 
that all important changes in evolution are alternations in development” (ibid., 
195). As shown below, of the four theories, only those of Tomasello and Hrdy 
explicitly address development, and that of Hrdy is arguably the one that is most 
consistent with an integrated evo-devo approach.
The key adaptations of Dunbar’s theory are expanded neo-cortex and 
improved vocalization. Concerning the latter, human-specific vocalizations 
indeed start early in the first year of life, but the neo-cortex undergoes extensive 
expansion first in late childhood (6 – 11 years), after much of language and sym-
bolic competence are already in place. Deacon (1997) repeatedly points out that 
symbols (in his particular definition) are easily acquired only by young brains. 
But why this should be so is not fully clear, as the supposedly key pre-frontal 
cortex matures slowly in development, and not fully until adulthood. Tomasello 
and colleagues focus on early-developing social skills such as sharing impulses, 
joint attention and declarative pointing, which are claimed to be human-spe-
cific, universal and pre-linguistic (Liszkowski et al. 2012; Tomasello et al. 2005). 
While some of these claims have been contested (Leavens and Racine 2009; Leav-
ens, Hopkins, and Bard 2005), evidence of prolonged childhood compared to 
apes, and apes consistently failing tasks that require cooperative intentions where 
even preverbal children succeed, strongly suggest an evolutionary adaptation for 
intersubjectivity realized in early childhood. What is less clear is how it could 
have been selected for in the kinds of contexts envisioned by Tomasello and col-
leagues, such as (cooperative) foraging.
Hrdy explicitly evokes the infant intersubjectivity approach in developmen-
tal psychology (Bråten 2006; Trevarthen 1979), which can be summarized in the 
words of its key exponent: “We are born to generate shifting states of self-aware-
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ness, to show them to other persons, and to provoke interest and affectionate 
responses from them” (Trevarthen 2011,119). This approach has been criticized 
for being too “adaptationist” and inconsistent with current evo-devo thinking 
(Racine et al. 2014), but placed in the perspective of Hrdy’s theory, this is clearly 
not so. According to the latter, growing up in the context of alloparenting, the 
human child is both selected for and develops enhanced understanding of per-
spective and self-awareness:
A baby thus had far more incentive to monitor his mother’s whereabouts and to main-
tain visual and vocal contact with her, as well as far more motivation to pay attention 
to her state of mind, and to the willingness of others who might be available to care for 
him when his mother was disinclined. (Hrdy 2009, 114)
Furthermore, the adaptation is assumed to have concerned not only children, but 
the whole interactional niche, involving a “self-reinforcing evolutionary process 
of parents and alloparents who are more sensitive to infantile signals and babies 
who are better at emitting them” (Hrdy 2009, 220). As pointed out earlier, this 
can be conceived in terms of post-Neo-Darwinist ideas like niche-construction 
and multi-level selection, and is not predicated on simplistic kinds of evolution-
ary psychology.
We can now sum up the comparison of the four theories of the evolution of 
human-specific sociality in terms of the five factors given at the beginning of this 
section. Concerning (a), Dunbar, Deacon and Tomasello appeal to specific (though 
somewhat different) ecological conditions for the transition, but in all cases other 
primates could be seen to share these conditions and yet do not evolve the human 
intersubjective skills. In comparison, Hrdy’s argument that alloparenting was the 
“pre-existing condition” that started the process is the most persuasive one. Con-
cerning (b), I have suggested that all four theories imply, explicitly or implicitly, 
multi-level selection, providing more arguments elsewhere (Zlatev 2014b).
With respect to (c) the alloparenting hypothesis is most consistent with the 
evidence for early origins of human intersubjectvity, with or even prior to Homo 
erectus of 1.8 MYA. Dunbar’s claimed transition to vocal grooming around 
0.5 MYA is much too late to explain the earlier biological and cultural changes 
to our species, while Deacon’s presumed onset of symbolism at 3 MYA is much 
too early. However, as will be suggested in the conclusions, their ideas may be 
applicable to specific aspects, in a composite evolutionary account. Concerning 
(d), the kind and size of the relevant social groups, the “band” of 30 – 50 mem-
bers seems to be key, corresponding most closely to the social niche in which 
human-specific intersubjectivity first arose, prior to language. On the other hand, 
identifying and cooperating with the “clan” of 150 or so people, and the “tribe” 
of 500, not to mention still larger circles like “nations,” clearly require moral 
rules and symbolically mediated shared values, which presuppose language. 
Finally, we saw above how both alloparenting and shared intentionality can be 
aligned with evidence from child development, with some degree of correspon-
dence to developmental stages. Bråten (together with Trevarthen) distinguishes, 
schematically, between (1) primary intersubjectivity, from the first months of life 
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onwards, based on “direct sympathy with actual others’ expressions of feelings 
in intimate reciprocal subject-subject contact”; (2) secondary intersubjectivity, 
from 9 months, involving “objects of joint attention and emotional referencing 
are brought into play within trusting relations of companionship . . . sometimes 
inviting imitative learning”; and (3) tertiary intersubjectivity, based on “symbolic 
conversation with actual or virtual companions” (Bråten 2007, 3). We may link 
these developmental stages to evolutionary stages, and the Mimesis Hierarchy 
(see Table 1, Section 1) as follows: (1’) human-specific traits of intersubjectivity 
evolved first on the level of “direct sympathy” between child and alloparents; 
(2’) these were subsequently extended to the cognitive skills of shared intention-
ality and mimesis (dyadic and triadic); (3’) only (much) later, with the evolution 
of proto-language and language, were “symbolic conversations” and the kind of 
moral norms envisioned by Deacon made possible.
Thus, of the four theories reviewed in this section, Hrdy’s theory fares best 
with respect to all the comparative criteria  – as an explanation of why and 
how the unique type of human intersubjectivity, combining features of Great 
Ape intelligence and tamarin-like altruism, could evolve. It is consistent with 
Tomasello’s theory of joint intentionality, after reversing the originally proposed 
order in which the more cognitive aspects preceded the motivational ones, plac-
ing the onset on “direct sympathy with actual others’ expressions of feelings” 
in the context of communal reproduction, child care and practical teaching. The 
bodily and emotion-laden nature of these basic capacities, practices and skills 
motivates seeing them as expressions of human embodiment, anticipating and 
perhaps further co-evolving with bodily mimesis.
3. From Bodily Mimesis to Language: The Role of Multimodality
As described in Section 1, and schematically shown in the Mimesis Hierarchy, 
bodily mimesis provides two of the four features of symbol use given in the 
introduction. First: a representational relation between sign and object, above all 
on the basis of an iconic (resemblance-based) ground. Second: the understanding 
of communicative intent, a second-order intention for the addressee to grasp the 
communicator’s first-order informative intention. I have argued that the com-
bination of these two features is a pre-linguistic, human-specific characteristic. 
While Tomasello’s shared intentionality hypothesis, and in particular joint atten-
tion, with its higher-order intentionality (“I wish for you to see that I see X”), 
highlights the second feature, bodily mimesis accommodates both (Zlatev 2008a; 
Zlatev et al. 2013).
But what about the highest two layers of the Mimesis Hierarchy which, as 
reflected in Table 1, imply the remaining two features of symbolic communi-
cation: the use of conventional (i. e., socially shared) and systematic signs? This 
question was addressed in a recent doctoral thesis with the characteristic title 
The Evolution of Symbolic Communication: An Embodied Perspective, posing 
the problem as follows:
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A major step in the evolutionary process by which human communication could have 
emerged has been proposed in the bodily mimesis hypothesis. . . . This ability provides 
a foundation from which symbolic communication can arise, but how such a transi-
tion would have taken place has not been fully examined. This thesis examines the gap 
between bodily mimesis and symbolic communication. (Brown 2012, 1)
It should be noted that Brown (2012) assumes a different definition of “sym-
bol” than that used here: a customary (negative) definition stating that the sym-
bolic sign is not to stand in a motivated relation to its referent, but rather to be 
“arbitrary.” This until recently generally accepted take on the “linguistic sign” 
in the steps of Saussure ([1916] 1983), has been seriously questioned (Alhner and 
Zlatev 2010; Perniss, Thompson, and Vigliocco 2010), to the extent of claiming 
that non-arbitrariness, i. e., degrees of similarity and contiguity between sign and 
object, may constitute an essential prerequisite for language acquisition (Imai 
and Kita 2014). Nevertheless, Brown’s approach to the evolution of symbols, 
grounded in experimental semiotics and computational simulations, is highly 
useful for the present account due to the following considerations. First, it helps 
explain the gradual shift from a predominantly bodily to a predominantly vocal 
mode of expression (Zlatev, Donald, and Sonesson 2010). Second, it explains 
why the process was accompanied by a partial loss of iconicity, and thus greater 
reliance on knowing linguistic conventions (Zlatev 2014a). Third, the combina-
tion of the previous two transitions may have provided a key contribution for 
the evolution of the final feature of symbols: elaborate within-system relations 
and combinatorial potential. Let us motivate these three factors in turn.
As pointed out in Section 1, the “switch to speech” is currently considered 
the key problem of gesture-first theories of language origins (Fitch 2010). Mul-
timodal origin theories avoid this, but at a price. Two different kinds of multi-
modal theories of language origins can be distinguished. First, single system the-
ories claim that “hand and mouth” were tightly interlinked from the start, with a 
distribution of semiotic labor – the gestural modality carrying the iconic / imag-
istic representation, and the vocal the symbolic / arbitrary ones (McNeill, 2005, 
2012). The problem with such theories is that they both predict a stronger link 
between the two modalities than what is attested, e. g., in ontogenetic develop-
ment (Bates et al. 1979; Zlatev 2015), and that they underestimate the degree 
of non-arbitrariness in speech, (e. g. Dingemanse 2012), an insight that is being 
increasingly supported, as pointed out earlier.
The kind of multimodality predicted by bodily mimesis is of a weaker kind, 
with the bodily-visual and vocal-auditory channels in coordination, but still 
operating as two supplementary modes of expression, according to the second 
type of multimodal theories: interactive ones (Kita and Özyurek 2003). Due to 
a number of factors, such as its proximity to fully-fledged actions, the bodily 
channel would have dominated communication initially. Then, over a pro-
longed period of time, a gradual shift of the communicative load toward the 
vocal channel can be expected to have taken place: “a transitional period of over 
half a million years . . . from the appearance of Homo erectus to that of archaic 
Homo sapiens . . . during all this time, humans regularly communicated bi-mod-
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ally, only gradually shifting from a code that foregrounded gesture to one that 
foregrounded voice” (Collins 2013, 136). The question is why this happened, 
as simple ecological explanations (e. g., “speech could take place in the dark”) 
are unconvincing (Fitch 2010). The answer given by Brown (2012) and others 
using the tools of experimental semiotics (Galantucci and Garrod 2010) lies in 
the semiotic properties of the modalities: the vocal medium has less potential for 
representing meaning on the basis of similarity than the manual-bodily medium 
(Fay, Arbib and Garrod 2013). Furthermore, there is a trade-off: when relatively 
few messages need to be communicated, an “iconic code” is advantageous, but 
with larger vocabularies, iconic coding leads to ambiguity, and hence a more 
arbitrary mapping is more stable (Monaghan, Mattock and Walker 2012). As 
summarized by Brown (2012): “the vocal modality would have become predom-
inantly symbolic because its lower non-arbitrary capacity increases the likeli-
hood that vocalizations are perceived as arbitrary” (ibid., 134).
However, as the iconicity of the vocal channel decreases, it is even more 
important that the non-arbitrariness of bodily mimesis functions as a support 
structure: “the conventionalization process requires a rich and supportive com-
municative infrastructure in which novel arbitrary signs can be used . . . so that 
the intended form-meaning relationships could be correctly interpreted” (ibid., 
81). Thus, parallel use of both channels while bodily mimesis maintained its icon-
ic-indexical ground was needed for the stabilization of a code based on fully con-
ventional (i. e., commonly known) and iconically bleached (“arbitrary”) signs. In 
contrast, this process would not have worked if mimesis (or “pantomime”) had 
first been reduced to “protosign,” as per the definition given by Arbib (2005): 
“a manual-based communication system . . . elements for the formation of com-
pounds which can be paired with meanings in a more or less arbitrary fashion” 
(ibid., 195). If gestural communication had become such, it could not function as 
the “rich and supportive communicative infrastructure” needed to support the 
learning of vocal signs that have lost their transparency, and it would be much 
harder to explain why the gestural modality does not continue to dominate in 
language. In sum, according to this argument (which is admittedly tentative since 
it is based on indirect evidence from experiments and simulations), the “weaker” 
form of multimodality of bodily mimesis was necessary both for the relative 
shift in communicative load from body to mouth, as language remains multi-
modal (Zlatev et al. 2010), and for the establishment of a protolanguage with 
a large number of fully conventional spoken signs (Monaghan, Mattock, and 
Walker 2012).
At this stage, the organization of signs into systems of paradigmatic oppo-
sitions and syntagmatic / syntactic relations would have been facilitated: as the 
“arbitrary” signifiers are more detached from their referents, they become to a 
larger extent objects of attention in their own right. This would have stimulated 
learning their interrelations: the linguistic system of oppositions, as envisaged by 
structuralism, and of the combination of words into propositions. This, I believe, 
is at the core of Deacon’s conception of “symbolic reference” (Deacon 1997), 
according to which symbols are essentially interconnected in systems, and not 
Jordan Zlatev168
primarily related to the world of experience, in the manner of iconic and indexi-
cal signs. At the same time, such symbols would not be able to function without 
the latter, an example of what Deacon (2003) elsewhere refers to as “semiotic 
constraints.” Note that the present proposal, which to my knowledge has not 
been previously elaborated, is not that “the transition to speech” was a necessary 
precondition for the evolution of grammar. First of all, such a statement would 
be falsified by the elaborate grammars of signed languages. Rather, the suggestion 
is that for hearing people, there was a natural drift toward the vocal modality 
with larger vocabularies (which came along with more complex cultures), and the 
combination of large vocabularies and relatively “arbitrary” signs, was a key push 
toward the organization of linguistic systems. In fact, there is evidence for a cer-
tain degree of complementarity between iconicity and system character in signed 
languages as well, where the process from bodily mimesis to full-scale symbol 
use can be observed to take place over a number of generations (Sandler 2012).
Summary and Conclusions
We began by proposing that the question of the evolution of language is largely 
synonymous with that of the evolution of symbols, after defining these as con-
ventional, intentional and systematic representations. Communication, and 
eventually thought, on the basis of such signs is qualitatively different from that 
of non-human animals (Zlatev 2009). Yet there was no cataclysmic event which 
brought about this in a leap: evolution is a miser, and proceeds in relatively small 
steps. The resolution of this apparent contradiction requires a scenario of the 
evolution of symbol use that takes place over a prolonged period of time, and a 
number of more or less distinct stages. We may conclude by bringing together 
the three key preconditions of symbolic communication related to human 
embodiment focused on in this chapter – alloparenting, bodily mimesis and mul-
timodality – in a composite account, accommodating certain points from other 
theories that were mentioned along the way.
Hrdy’s thesis that a transition to alloparenting, unique among the Great Apes 
and very rare among mammals, characterized the evolutionary niche in which 
human intersubjectivity evolved, offers the best explanation so far of what set 
human evolution on a different track from that of the other Great Apes. This 
transition can be hypothesized to have begun even before the evolution of Homo 
ergaster-erectus of ca. 1.8 MYA, and perhaps even to have served as one of the 
crucial factors that led to this, including the stabilization of bipedalism.
The second major transition was that of Donald’s “mimetic culture” based 
on tool production, pedagogy, division of labor, cooperative hunting and for-
aging. All these presuppose mimetic, multimodal but predominantly gestural, 
communication with communicative intentions: “triadic mimesis.” Importantly, 
this was not yet language, and arguably not even a protolanguage (see Table 1). 
Tomasello’s theories and empirical support for pre-linguistic shared / joint inten-
tionality is fully compatible with this account.
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The next step in the scenario is the hypothesized gradual transition to a 
vocal-gestural protolanguage, leading to Homo heidelbergensis ca. 0.5 MYA, the 
ancestor species to both us and the Neanderthals. As argued in Section 3, the 
multimodal nature of bodily mimesis, and the different intrinsic capacities of 
gesture and speech for iconicity, would have played a key role for the transi-
tion. In addition, Dunbar’s hypothesis of “vocal-grooming” suggests a second 
reason why vocal communication (and improved volitional control of the vocal 
apparatus) could have been enhanced. Initially, gesture and vocalization could 
mostly have served different functions – representation and affiliation, respec-
tively – but over time, vocalizations would have been “reinterpreted” as com-
municative signs, given the tight synchronization of multimodal, gestural-vocal 
communication.
With the larger, more organized and technologically advanced social groups of 
anatomically modern Homo sapiens from ca. 200,000 years ago, a larger vocab-
ulary of conventional expressions, increasingly relying on the vocal channel, 
would have provided the impetus for systematization. Thus the capacity for 
learning and using intricate sign-sign relationships would have come about: the 
final feature from the definition of symbol use used in this chapter. To some 
extent, Deacon’s “sex contract,” linking linguistic and moral norms, may have 
played a role in this process, but much later than originally proposed. Thus the 
human potential for system building may, in a sense, be “innate,” and yet not 
codified in the genes, or a “language instinct,” in a way that is consistent with 
current evo-devo thinking. Importantly, this potential is in the words of Arbib 
(2005) “post-biological,” i. e., emerging through processes of cultural evolution, 
such as grammaticalization.
Equally importantly, such a composite scenario of the evolution of human 
symbolic communication, which I believe is both supported by the evidence and 
theoretically coherent, goes beyond “mainstream” models of evolution based 
only on individual-level and gene-level selection. In the footsteps of Donald’s 
(1991) original stage-model of human cognitive semiotic evolution, it presup-
poses extensive bio-cultural co-evolution, and extended Darwinian models such 
as multi-level selection theory, operating on both individuals and groups, with 
complex tradeoffs between them. Less complex models could hardly be expected 
to be able to account for the evolution of the one and only “symbolic species” 
on our planet.
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Stages of Embodied Articulation
Matthias Jung
Abstract: Human beings are embodied symbol-users. By performing bodily movements 
humans are capable of creating symbolic meanings which are intimately connected with 
the corporeal experience of living-in-the-world, but at the same time transcend the bound-
aries of the organism within its environment. The concept of articulation enables us to do 
justice to these two complementary aspects of the human life-form. Having introduced the 
notion of articulation, Peirce’s semiotic theory is then employed to show how the func-
tional integration of different types of signs shapes our semiotic capabilities and with them 
our consciousness. Finally, the distinctions which have been elaborated are put to the test 
by connecting them with the history of cultural evolution.
Introduction
In the last two decades, the general claim that human cognition is not only 
embrained but also embodied has developed from an outsider position to some-
thing only a little short of a mainstream truism. As long as the details are left 
unspecified, most (second-generation)1 cognitive scientists and philosophers 
would concede that functioning brains (even if channels for sensory input and 
motor output are provided) are necessary but in no way sufficient conditions 
for cognition. In the meantime, the surge of enthusiasm about embodiment has 
reached an impressive height and produced rather extreme positions like radical 
enactivism (see Hutto and Myin 2013). The contested question now seems to be 
not whether cognition is embodied but how deep the embodiment goes.
Conceptualizing cognition and mind in terms of embodiment undoubtedly 
has many advantages. It helps us to avoid unconvincing dualist anthropologies 
and to keep both feet on the ground of what can either be phenomenologically 
described or scientifically analyzed. It situates cognition in the real world and 
thus immunizes against the alienating effects of neuro-constructivism in the fash-
ion of Thomas Metzinger (2009).2 In moral philosophy, to mention a hitherto 
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3 For an important move in this direction, see Meuter 2006, chap. 8.
4 Hubert Dreyfus, deeply influenced by Heidegger, is the most prominent promotor of this 
conception (e. g., Dreyfus 2014).
5 See the section “Action and Play” in Jung (2010, 157 – 158).
6 The importance of – innerworldly – transcendence in Dewey’s thought is carefully elabo-
rated in Kestenbaum (2002).
7 As Michael Tomasello’s “shared intentionality hypothesis” reminds us, see Tomasello 
(2014). For a concise summarizing diagram, see ibid. (140).
mostly neglected but important point, it allows us to situate overly abstract uni-
versalisms within the enactive primary intersubjectivity of corporeal persons.3
It is, however, possible to overemphasize embodiment. This happens when, 
attempting to describe cognitive processes in terms of skillful coping of the 
organism within its specific environment,4 we lose sight of something essential 
for human cognition: our capacity to transcend the here and now of our embod-
iment. Embodied cognition is not necessarily driven by instrumental goals, as 
the term “coping” might be taken to imply. In this regard, the manner in which 
the American pragmatists are often highlighted as pioneers of the coping-con-
ception of embodiment is characteristic. Teed Rockwell, to give one example, 
refers to Dewey’s philosophy as paradigmatic for the pragmatist alternative to 
dualism and opines that for Dewey “an experience is always constituted by a 
goal-directed activity” (Rockwell 2005, 164). It is true that Dewey often under-
lines goal-directedness, but it would be a real mistake to overlook the degree to 
which he, for example in Art As Experience (Dewey [1934] 2008b), also acknowl-
edges the importance of intrinsically satisfying activities with no instrumental 
or external purpose. Hence the importance of play in his account of embod-
ied action.5 Such embodied activities do not lend themselves to an understand-
ing in terms of coping. Ultimately, “every experience is the result of interaction 
between a live creature and some aspect of the world in which he lives” (Dewey 
[1934] 2008b, 50). But this leaves ample room for the aesthetic dimension and 
for the transcending force of higher-order goals.6 It is therefore important to 
avoid a one-sided reception of pragmatism as a philosophical source of embodied 
cognition. Only by acknowledging the degree to which the classic pragmatists – 
arguing from within the interactional unity of organism and environment – leave 
room for the depth and uniqueness of human experience, can we wholeheartedly 
appreciate their contribution to embodied cognition.
The aforementioned depth of human experience is internally connected with 
our ability to handle linguistic and other symbols. In the course of our evolu-
tionary development, the structure of our minds, as Terrence Deacon has argued 
convincingly, co-varied with the evolution of semiotic capabilities (Deacon 
1997, 449 – 450). We have embodied minds, shaped by our usage of symbols as 
well as by our corporeality. Our symbolically (and intersubjectively7) enlarged 
consciousness enables us to escape the realm of direct experience. We live in 
normatively structured cultures, in which possible worlds play an integral part 
of our orientation in the real world. We are capable of purposeless, entirely 
non-instrumental thought, of “musement” in the meaning Peirce gave to that 
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8 Peirce has even based his famous and controversial “Neglected Argument” (for the exis-
tence of God) on this state of mind, of which only symbol users are capable, see Peirce (1998, 
434 – 450).
term.8 Man’s cognitive feats include the construction of cosmological models, the 
development of comprehensive worldviews and – last but not least – the writing 
of books about embodiment. These capabilities are difficult to account for in 
terms of any narrow conception of situated interaction with the environment. 
And they cannot be dismissed as mere epiphenomenal side-effects of the selective 
advantages produced by flexible coping-strategies within the environment. This 
point was forcefully made in Thomas Nagel’s recent Mind in Cosmos (Nagel 
2012). On the other hand, fortifying the distinction between body and mind into 
a dualism is clearly no alternative, since the latter is distinguished from the for-
mer by rendering the respective components “in terms that make . . . their char-
acteristic relations to one another ultimately unintelligible. (Descartes’s dualism 
is, as always, the paradigm.)” (Brandom 1998, 615). Dualism avoids reductive 
naturalism only at the cost of denying essential embodiment. The challenge, in 
my eyes, thus lies in articulating our condition as situated but at the same time 
situation-transcending organisms in terms of embodied performances. As Teed 
Rockwell succinctly puts it: we are neither brain nor ghost and need to look for 
a nondualist alternative to the mind-brain identity theory (Rockwell 2005, 164).
The term “embodiment” itself already suggests the integration of organic 
functions with something different that is usually described as mind or “Geist” 
in the German tradition (admittedly, “Geist” has a more dualistic ring to it than 
“mind”). There’s a different danger lurking here, though: embodiment may – 
dualistically – be misunderstood as the contingent coupling of organic features 
and independently describable cognitive properties. This temptation has ancient 
Platonic roots but can, prima facie, also be detected in modern functionalist talk, 
when multiple realizability is conceived of in a manner which separates func-
tional description and physical instantiation.
So how can we adequately think about our human condition as embodied 
symbol users? In this paper, I will develop a suggestion centered on the concept 
of articulation. Many animals communicate via highly sophisticated systems of 
signs, and the meaning of facial expressions, gestures, posture, gait, etc., can often 
be understood across species-borders, as Darwin famously showed (Darwin 
1998). But there is no evidence available that any other species except Homo sapi-
ens uses symbolic language in which meaning is conveyed by articulated strings 
of signs which combine direct and indirect reference to the world. Articulation is 
a genuinely corporeal activity, but it creates meanings which are detachable from 
the here and now of their articulation. By articulating what is meaningful for us 
in the course of our interactions with our environment, human culture brings 
forth a realm of meanings which are relatively independent from their origin and 
may in turn influence the embodied experiences of future generations, which 
will produce further creative fusions of actual and sedimented experience, and 
so on. These repeated feedback-loops between articulated meanings and novel, 
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9 The pragmatist philosopher who most forcefully developed the internal relation between 
thinking and intersubjective symbol-use is G. H. Mead: “We sometimes speak as if a person 
unanticipated experience – hermeneutic cycles, as Wilhelm Dilthey would have 
called them – introduce second-order reflexivity into first-order bodily coping, 
without ever severing the connection to the lived body. Insofar as the idea of cop-
ing implies that the purpose of intelligent behavior is predetermined by the affor-
dances and obstacles present in the immediate environment of the organism, a 
decisive transition occurs and the fixed distinction of means and ends is dissolved: 
real-time coping is supplemented with genuine reflection upon the reasonable-
ness of purposes, instrumental reasoning becomes embedded in second-order 
thinking, mere preferences become evaluated by values and norms. In the course 
of all this, the living-organism-within-its-environment remains the anchor point.
All expressive systems are ultimately owned in the same way as any other motor sys-
tem: that is, they are self-rooted. . . . The conscious mind may have reinvented itself and 
greatly extended its reach in language, but it has never lost its vestigial roots in embod-
iment. (Donald 2001, 137)
In what follows, I will try to elaborate this conception in three steps. First, I 
will sketch the concept of articulation as the embodied alternative to represen-
tationalist views of language, second I will introduce some basic insights from 
Peirce’s theory of signs as a key to understanding the deep integration of sym-
bolic transcendence and embodied sign-usage, and finally I will try to connect 
these insights with actual developments of cultural history.
1. Making Us Explicit – Articulation as the Practice  
of Embodied Sign-Usage
As pragmatists, phenomenologists and exponents of the hermeneutic tradition 
have pointed out time and again, we live in a reality of qualitative meanings. 
“The world in which we immediately live, that in which we strive, succeed, and 
are defeated is preeminently a qualitative world. What we act for, suffer, and 
enjoy are things in their qualitative determinations” (Dewey [1930] 1998, 195). 
These meanings come to us in the first instance not as representational content, 
but as something which is implicit in our practices and may be felt more or less 
intensely in the form of what John Dewey calls a “single pervasive quality” (ibid., 
198). Distinct qualities accompany the situations we live through and individuate 
them. These qualities, however, are prima facie unarticulated. They contain no 
countable parts and no distinction of reference and meaning. Articulation is the 
process of making explicit what the felt meaningfulness of action-associated qual-
ities actually means: where its personal or social significance lies and to which 
entities in the world it refers. Symbol-users sometimes accomplish this without 
actually articulating themselves, but even mute, fully-fledged thinking presup-
poses linguistic abilities and is best thought of as internalized conversation.9
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could build up an entire argument in his mind, and then put it into words to convey it to some-
one else. Actually, our thinking always takes place by means of some sort of symbols. It is pos-
sible that one could have the meaning of the word ‘chair’ in his experience without there being 
a symbol, but we would not be thinking about it in that case. . . . In a thought process there has 
to be some sort of a symbol that can refer to this meaning, that is, tend to call out this response, 
and also serve this purpose for other persons as well” (Mead 1967, 146).
10 See the section “Symbolizing in Pantomime” in Tomasello (2014, 59 – 66).
11 “Es vereinigen sich also im Menschen zwei Gebiete, welche der Theilung bis auf eine 
übersehbare Zahl fester Elemente, der Verbindung dieser aber bis ins Unendliche fähig sind, 
und in welchem jeder Theil seine eigentümliche Natur immer zugleich als Verhältnis zu den zu 
ihm gehörenden darstellt. Der Mensch besitzt die Kraft, diese Gebiete zu teilen, geistig durch 
Reflexion, körperlich durch Articulation, und ihre Theile wieder zu verbinden” (von Humboldt 
1994, 13).
12 “We tend to perceive speech sounds in terms of ‘articulatory gestures,’ whose boundaries 
and distinctions correspond to articulatory (i. e., somatomotor) features, not just sound fea-
tures”(Deacon 1997, 359).
The etymology is helpful here: the Latin articulus literally means the bodily 
joint whose inflections allow us to structure movements in general. The same 
applies to expressive movements: they are articulated, that is, their meaning is 
brought about by the position, direction and order of the performed gesture. 
Today, not only Michael Tomasello10 is convinced that gesturing was at the 
beginning of symbolic language, and this means that the syntactical character 
of language is derivative of the process of bodily articulation in the literal sense. 
At the beginning of the 19th century, Wilhelm von Humboldt11 discovered the 
phenomenon later called “double articulation,” the fact that human languages are 
structured twice: words are composed out of smaller discrete phonemes, mean-
ings are composed out of morphemes. Thus articulation is essentially embodied: 
it consists in the functional coupling of semiotic meaning to bodily movements 
characterized by discrete parts and multiple, but limited, degrees of freedom in 
connecting them. In his book The Symbolic Species (1997), Terrence Deacon 
offers a convincing case for the sensory-motor character even of phonetic articu-
lation: empirical research shows that the gestalt-like comprehension of “articula-
tory gestures”12 lies behind our astonishing ability to detect words in the fast and 
blurred soundstream of speech. If we had to rely on acoustic impressions alone, 
we would never be able to discriminate the meaning of spoken language – it is 
the activation of patterns which match oral-vocal movements that does the job.
Semiotic articulation (in Humboldt’s terminology “Reflektion”) is thus based 
upon somatic articulation, which is not only dependent upon our body scheme 
and the coordinated movements it enables but is also directly connected with 
the felt meanings the Deweyan unifying pervasive qualities convey. The phe-
nomenal gestalt of a pervasive quality and the expressive meaning conveyed by 
the person’s countenance, posture, gesture, gait, etc., are two sides of the same 
coin. If our embeddedness within our environment were characterized by flu-
ent transactions, in which no hitches occurred, that would be the whole story 
and my paper would have to end here. But as a matter of fact, we live in a resis-
tive world in which the interactional loops between organism and surrounding 
are constantly disintegrated and have to be restored again and again. As Peirce, 
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13 It is very easy to misconceive the phrase “problem-driven.” For the classical pragmatists, 
it precisely doesn’t mean that language and reason are mere instruments for the solving of pre-
given problems. Whereas intelligence – the term used across the border between human beings 
and other animals – is always in the service of coping, mankind’s problems stem mostly from 
second-order ends not already fixed by survival-problems. Of course it is possible to still call 
this kind of problem-solving “coping,” but then what is coped with is the conditio humana – not 
as something eternally fixed, but as the result of contingent historical developments.
Dewey, and Dilthey pointed out in unison, the need for articulation is the need 
for reflective transformation of problematic situations into less problematic ones 
(Since the pragmatist use of the term problem is likely to cause misunderstand-
ings, a clarification is in order: for pragmatists, problems are not be conceived of 
as exceptional occurrences with negative value. They are as much part and parcel 
of our interactions as uninhibited exchange; problems in the ordinary meaning 
of the term form only a more troublesome subspecies of them.). In the light of 
this conception, making matters explicit is always driven by a felt dissonance, be 
it ever so slight, within the interactional cycle, which in order to be solved has to 
be articulated. During this process, the holistic gestalt qualities which accompany 
action are transformed into semiotic performances containing discrete parts in an 
articulated sequence which determines its meaning.
If we conceive of language, as I suggest, as the problem-driven explication13 of 
felt qualities by both bodily and symbolic means, the veridical representation of 
matters of fact features as only one subspecies of the genus and not, as truth-con-
ditional theories of meaning would have it, as what language is all about. “Truths 
are but one class of meanings, namely, those in which a claim to verifiability by 
their consequences is an intrinsic part of their meaning” (Dewey [1927 – 1928] 
2008a, 4 – 5). The gestalt qualities of the lived body in its environment can never 
be represented in language anyway, since they have no parts at all that might be 
mapped in an isomorphic manner onto linguistic content. Their function in the 
process of articulation is to deliver a sense of directedness, not to be captured 
in their entirety. As Wittgenstein reminded us, the signs we use in our speech 
acts are the only means we have to determine their meanings (see Wittgenstein 
[1953] 1971, 220). But conversely it is also true that only the felt meaning which 
accompanies the process of articulation guides us in choosing the right words in 
a given situation. In this manner, articulation is always embodied in two distinct 
aspects: first, both the semantic composition of words out of smaller units and 
the syntactic ordering of meaning within a sentence depend upon sensory-motor 
performances of the body; and second, the successive determination of meaning 
within speech depends upon corporeal qualities and their felt change during the 
articulation process. Depending on the necessities of the context, this process 
may develop in a variety of ways, focusing either on subjective, intersubjective 
or objective features of the problematic situation. Representational theories of 
linguistic meaning misconceive their topic by taking the referential aspect, which 
allows us to separate and make explicit intentional correlates of consciousness, 
for the axis around which language revolves.
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14 “It is in this phase of subjectivity, with its activities of attention in the solution of the 
problem, i. e., in the construction of the hypothesis of the new world, that the individual qua in-
dividual has his functional expression or rather is that function” (Mead 1964, 52). For a detailed 
account, see Jung (2009, 217 – 252).
15 But see n13 for a non-reductionist understanding of the term “problematic.”
Charles Taylor, in a widely read paper on theories of meaning, has therefore 
proposed substituting representationalist accounts with expressivist ones (see 
Taylor 1985, 284 – 291). Taylor conceives of language as articulatory in principle: 
by articulating the implicit meaning of our interactions with the environment, 
we achieve three crucial things: we generate explicit (ibid., 256 – 258) and public 
(ibid., 259 – 260) consciousness and shape the distinctions we need to handle our 
human affairs (ibid., 260 – 263). My only critique of Taylor’s conception – labeled 
by him variously as the “Herder-Humboldt-Haman,” “romantic” or “expres-
sivist” (ibid., 255 – 256) theory – would be that it unnecessarily plays down the 
limited, but still very important role of veridical, propositional speech. From 
a pragmatist point of view, the gestalt qualities with which articulation begins 
emerge from the entire interactional cycle and not from the subject alone. There 
is, strictly speaking, no such entity as an individual subject there: the latter 
emerges, as George Herbert Mead has shown, only during the process in which 
the problematic situation is reconstructed.14 Thus, if we talk about expressivist 
theories of meaning, we should carefully avoid all subjectivist implications: what 
is expressed in articulation is not inwardness – “Innerlichkeit” in the roman-
tic sense – but the meaning of the fully-fledged mind-brain-body-world-cycle. 
Facts about the world, explicable in propositional language, are integral parts of 
this relational structure. The need to separate subjective and objective compo-
nents and thus to distinguish expressive (in the narrower sense) and referential 
utterances emerges as part of the problematic situation. Consequently for prag-
matists, the term expressivism should be taken to signify the generic condition 
of which expressions of subjectivity and of facts about the world are only sub-
species, differentiated from each other not as natural kinds, but as pragmatic 
requirements of problematic situations.
To sum up, articulation is the embodied explication of problematic15 situa-
tions. It is aptly called expressive, because it creates explicit consciousness, start-
ing from meaningful yet underdetermined situations. Articulation is not a pic-
torial relationship between some already predetermined content and semiotic 
meaning, but is concerned instead with reconstructing problematic situations in 
a manner which enables interaction to be resumed. Sometimes, however, this 
implies separating the objective, referential aspects of a given situation from the 
ones pertaining to the interaction-unity between organism and environment: 
propositional language emerges. The instruments for this and other remarkable 
feats of explication are signs: signs in their mutual interdependence and division 
of labor. An anthropological theory of articulation needs a semiotic foundation, 
and it is Charles Sanders Peirce who delivered it.
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16 Note that in Peirce’s rendering only indexical signs connect language with experience. 
Likenesses, according to Peirce, are always ambiguous, as long as they are not interpreted by an 
index (see Peirce 1998, 7, for an example). My own, slightly different, account here is influenced 
by Dewey’s concept of unifying qualities as explained at the beginning of section 1 of this paper. 
These qualities I regard as iconic signs for identifying specific situations as resembling other 
situations in the history of the symbol user’s experience. Insofar as they actually function in this 
manner, they presuppose direct acquaintance.
2. Peirce’s Triadic Semiotics and the Mutual Dependence  
of Embodiment and Symbolic Transcendence
The fruitfulness of Peirce’s semiotics for the study of embodied cognition is con-
vincingly exemplified in Terrence Deacon’s The Symbolic Species (Deacon 1997, 
69 – 101). Deacon begins by pointing out that dyadic concepts of reference, those 
which work with some sort of mapping or one-to-one correspondence between 
words and entities or events in the world – as exemplified by the semiology 
of de Saussure – fail to explain the indirect character of human language. “The 
correspondence between words and objects is a secondary relationship, subor-
dinate to a web of associative relationships of a quite different sort which even 
allows us reference to impossible things” (ibid., 70). Symbolic reference is special 
not in being referential but in being symbolical, and that is: indirect. That’s the 
reason only a triadic semiotics like Peirce’s can do justice to the distinctive fea-
tures of language. Monkey alarm calls refer to the world as well as human sym-
bols, but human symbols refer primarily to other symbols and only indirectly 
to the world. This indirectness of human languages enables us to think and talk 
about virtually everything: the existence or nonexistence of God, normative and 
evaluative claims dealing with nonexistent but desirable states of affairs, modal 
and temporal differences, abstract entities like the ones of particle physics, etc. 
It comes at a price, of course: symbols allow us to transcend embodied direct 
experience and thus to develop reflexivity and be guided by counterfactual ide-
als, but symbolic communication still depends on direct experience for its con-
nection to reality. “No combination of words,” Peirce says bluntly, “(excluding 
proper nouns, and in the absence of gestures or other indicative concomitants of 
speech), can ever convey the slightest information” (Peirce 1998, 7). A symbol 
denotes a “kind of thing” (ibid., 9), not anything particular, and it establishes its 
meaning indirectly, by the manner in which it is woven into a holistic network 
of other signs, not via direct acquaintance. Thus symbols are dependent upon 
non-symbolic, direct reference, which is accomplished by the united workings 
of iconic and indexical signs.
This threefold distinction of symbols, indices, and icons is the most import-
ant among Peirce’s many subtle classifications of signs, because it enables us to 
understand the functional integration upon which human sign-usage is based. 
Even though human languages are entirely shaped by their symbolic character, 
symbols are crucially dependent upon icons and indices, which convey direct 
experience.16 Icons are imitative signs, picking out certain likenesses among 
things which are in the direct presence of the sign-user. Indices presuppose icons. 
Stages of Embodied Articulation 183
17 See the “The Symbolic Threshold” in Deacon (1997, 79 – 92).
To quote Peirce, they “show something about things, on account of their being 
physically connected with them” (ibid., 5). In order to do so, an indexical sign 
must iconically be identified as the token of a certain type, and it must estab-
lish some corporeal relationship between the sign-user and what is designated. 
Symbolic meaning transcends the here and now of the sign-user by virtue of 
establishing meaning and reference independently from direct experience. But 
the chain connecting the symbolic web to the immediate reality of qualitatively 
experienced gestalts and what Peirce calls the indexical experience of acting and 
being acted upon can only be prolonged, but never broken, if our thoughts are 
to be distinguished from the mere flight of fancy.
Every given instance of reasoning, Peirce insists, must involve a triad of signs, 
namely icons, indices and symbols (ibid., 9). It is only their functional integra-
tion which endows our language with its symbolic character, not the symbolic 
sign in isolation. This Peircean insight is absolutely crucial. Symbols are embod-
ied in icons and indices, and we are embodied symbol-users, whose bodies and 
social / physical environments provide the means for this anchoring-process. 
Without the lived body, its phenomenal presence in the world and its articu-
lated sensory-motor behavior, symbol-usage would not encounter the “outward 
clash” (Peirce 1992, 233) – Peirce’s congenial term for the experience of unantic-
ipated, resistive reality which only acting brings forth. Without this resistance, 
language would become entirely self-referential. On the other hand, without 
symbolic signs, we would not be able to transcend our immediate reality and 
become the reflective beings we at least sometimes are. It is the outstanding 
achievement of Peirce to have developed a fully integrated picture of symbolic 
sign-usage, and thus to have shown how embodiment and transcendence are 
internally connected.
Peirce himself never reflected systematically on the evolutionary path to sym-
bolic sign-usage – from the time when there were no signs at all over the time 
when iconic and iconic-indexical signs evolved to the present stage of fully-fledged 
symbolic language. But Terrence W. Deacon has developed an elaborate, albeit 
necessarily somewhat speculative account of this process in Peircean terms (see 
Deacon 1997). From the standpoint of anthropology, the decisive fact is that 
the emergence of symbolic communication does indeed lead to a fundamental 
change – Deacon calls it crossing the “symbolic threshold”17 – of a categorical, 
not quantitative nature. Symbolic communication released the human mind by 
enabling a mode of intentionality no longer restricted to the organism’s immediate 
surrounding. This change, though, was not accomplished by leaving behind imme-
diate experience but rather by means of a functional reintegration of the evolu-
tionarily older forms of sign-usage: “iconic and indexical referential relationships 
are implicit and essential components of symbolic reference” (Deacon 1997, 450).
Thus, no account of human embodied cognition will be satisfying which 
excludes our symbolic (that is, reflective) second-order-capabilities. On the other 
hand, no adequate account of our symbolically structured minds will ever be 
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18 In Gen 28:12, Jacob has a dream in which angels are constantly climbing up and down a 
ladder connecting heaven and earth.
19 For the distinction between regulism (the conviction that [linguistic] normativity pre-
supposes explicit rules) und regularism (the opposite claim, that normativity can be reduced to 
factual regularities), see Tomasello (1999, 29).
able to get rid of the fact that even the most abstract reasoning is embodied. 
Climbing the stages of articulation is not comparable to Wittgenstein’s famous 
ladder that we must cast away once we have mounted it (see Wittgenstein ([1921] 
1963, 6.54); it is more like acquiring new capabilities by using the ladder to climb 
continually up and down. Jacob’s ladder from the book of Genesis might offer 
a more appropriate metaphor.18 In this manner, we can conceive of distinct, but 
internally connected rungs or stages of embodied articulation. Each rung has 
semiotic and anthropological properties which may, with appropriate care and 
restraint, be used heuristically to better understand cultural developments. In the 
last part of my paper, I will try to sketch the rungs of this ladder.
3. The Ladder of Articulation
The most fascinating developments in recent evolutionary anthropology are 
those which allow for the deep integration of nature and culture in a non-re-
ductionist manner. Michael Tomasello has shown us from an evolutionary per-
spective how it is natural for us to develop our cognitive equipment by cultural 
transmission (Tomasello 1999), and Merlin Donald has distinguished stages of 
consciousness that he takes in their entirety to be part of our current cultures and 
at the same time to describe actual phases of human evolution (see Donald 1991, 
2001). In what follows, I will make use of Donald’s work and rely on the triadic 
distinction of signs together with insights drawn from Robert Brandom in order 
to bring out its full anthropological significance. Brandom has written a famous 
book titled Making it Explicit (1998), in which he conceptualizes language in 
terms of making explicit the meaning of our actions and the norms embodied in 
them. This is a pragmatic stance I endorse, despite the fact that Brandom almost 
entirely leaves out embodiment and focuses narrowly on propositional language. 
His key insight is nevertheless very helpful: pragmatically, language can be seen 
as the explication of something already implicit in practice, but capable of dis-
tinct modes of explication. These modes can be ordered in an ascending sequence, 
leading to logically (not only quantitatively) higher degrees of explicitness.
Brandom’s ladder of explication begins with intersubjective practices that 
go beyond causally explainable “matter-of-factual-regularities” – as regulism19 
would have it – insofar as they bear the normative character of signs endowed 
with conditions of correctness, but have not yet reached the stage of articulated 
normativity. Unfortunately, Brandom makes no attempt to connect his reflec-
tions with empirical research about evolutionary stages of sign-usage. But the 
context suggests that, to give just one example, the “joint-intentionality”-phase 
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20 It is perhaps no mere coincidence that the chapter’s motto is taken from Brandom’s Mak-
ing it Explicit.
21 For the concept of rational expressivity, see Brandom (1998, 105 – 117). “The fundamental 
characteristic role of logic vocabulary is to make it possible to talk and think explicitly about 
the inferentially articulated semantic contents implicitly conferred on expressions (among other 
things) by their role in rational practice” (Brandom 1998, 117).
of human development, preceding the later collective intentionality, in Michael 
Tomasello’s account of cognitive evolution (Tomasello 2014, 32 – 79),20 can be 
seen as an instantiation of Brandom’s first rung. The “natural gestures of point-
ing and pantomiming” (Tomasello 2014, 33) which characterize this phase exhibit 
both deep embodiedness and implicit normativity. In the terminology of Peirce, 
we are in the realm of indexical (which necessarily include iconic) signs. But 
from the vantage point of embodied cognition it is quite obvious that Brandom 
starts too late. In order for gestural, normative signification to get off the ground, 
we need qualitative experience. The ladder has to be fixed on the ground, so to 
speak, and this is accomplished by bodily expressions and the unified qualities 
that accompany them. They are endowed with a unified gestalt that allows them 
to function as iconic (proto-)signs. Articulation then starts with the conscious 
stylization which gestures enable – presumably beginning with limb and whole-
body movements and later becoming vocalized. These gestures establish index-
ical relations between a community of sign-users and their habits of pointing to 
certain aspects of the world and of the community itself (as in rituals) and are 
crucial in creating and solidifying the common ground of shared intentionality. 
But indexical explication, albeit the starting point of articulation, still presup-
poses the physical co-presence of sign and signified.
This changes radically once the symbolic threshold is crossed. On the sym-
bolic level, meaning and reference are established and stabilized non-indexically 
by complex, inferential, so to say “horizontal” relationships between symbols in 
holistic networks. The connection to embodied experience thus becomes indi-
rect, which amounts to loosening the iconic and indexical bond with embod-
ied experience without cutting it off. In the course of the child’s language-ac-
quisition, for example, the concepts ‘mother’ and ‘father’ are always introduced 
indexically, namely by direct reference to concrete mothers and fathers. But after 
the transformation to symbolicity has taken place, the meaning of these con-
cepts becomes detachable from personal experience and is fixed in the linguistic 
and logical relations between the concepts ‘mother,’ ‘father,’ ‘children,’ ‘parent,’ 
‘family,’ ‘relatives,’ ‘male,’ ‘female,’ etc. To be sure, individuals and communi-
ties still have to anchor indirect reference in their embodied experiences, but the 
“naked” meaning is then established and stabilized irrespective of direct acquain-
tance. Thus, even people who never saw a single snowflake fall are enabled to 
understand what the word ‘snow’ means. Once natural languages have reached 
this decisive stage of indirect reference, according to Brandom, they are always 
characterized by rational expressivity, that is, by the mastery of a language which 
uses logical operators that allow us to make explicit which inferential relation-
ships and validity claims are implied in speaking.21 Language allows us to make 
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22 To avoid confusion: Even rational expressivity already uses logical vocabulary. Logical 
expressivity bends back the logical vocabulary to the community of symbol-users in order to 
make explicit what it means to be such a community.
23 “Collectivity has thus become the essence of human reality” (Donald 2001, 298). More 
recently, Michael Tomasello’s “shared intentionality hypothesis” (see Tomasello 2014) has given 
this intuition a much more detailed account.
explicit not only the intentional correlates of our actions, but also the way in 
which we are related to these correlates.
After symbolic communication is established in cultural evolution and ontog-
eny, the highest possible level of sign-usage is attained. But Brandom’s ladder is 
not finished yet. Its last rung consists of what he calls logical expressivity. Lan-
guage can be used not only to articulate, roughly spoken, the relation of meaning 
and reference, as in rational expressivity.22 Symbol-usage generates the possibil-
ity of second-order thinking, of taking a reflective stance towards language itself 
and the kind of embodied consciousness it brings forth. Here are the concluding 
sentences of his book: “We are more than rational, expressive beings. We are also 
logical, self-expressive beings. We not only make it explicit, we make ourselves 
explicit as making it explicit” (Brandom 1998, 650). For Brandom, self-expres-
siveness is essentially about the way in which the ability of human beings to make 
explicit the structures of our linguistically shaped relation to the world effects 
our understanding of what and who we are. From the perspective of an anthro-
pology of embodiment, this position leaves out the entire embodiment-part and 
the whole range of non- and pre-linguistic experiences implied in it. But if we 
keep in mind – pace Brandom – that even logical expressivity is strictly depen-
dent upon our corporeal entanglement with the world for the meaningfulness 
and the verification of second-order-concepts, his hierarchy of explication proofs 
is an essential tool for conceptualizing the tense relation between embodiment 
and symbolic transcendence. In this way, we are left with a ladder of articulation 
having three rungs – indexical, symbolical and symbolical-reflexive sign-usage – 
and which is grounded in iconic reference. The human life-form results from the 
practice, so to speak, of moving up and down this ladder time and again, not 
from the use of symbolic signs in isolation.
The final step of my argument will now be to connect these insights with Mer-
lin Donald’s reflections on the evolution of human cognition and culture. Don-
ald distinguishes four successive layers, namely the episodic, mimetic, mythic, and 
theoretic stages of culture, whose inner structures and connectedness can be elu-
cidated by using the Peircian and Brandomian conceptions I sketched above. In 
the course of each stage (except the first), embodied cognitive capacities are teth-
ered more strongly to intersubjective modes of consciousness and intentionality 
and to culture,23 thereby enlarging our ability to think about the world in a con-
text-independent manner. Whether, in the long run, Donald’s ideas will stand up 
against the background of our ever-changing and growing empirical knowledge 
about human evolution is of course a matter that cannot be decided in advance 
nor out of the philosopher’s armchair. But for the time being, the matching of 
his evolutionary perspective with semiotic and anthropologic categories may be 
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taken as evidence for the ladder of embodied articulation. The following sketch 
will be a very rough and oversimplified one, but it should suffice to bring out the 
general structure.
Donald’s first stage, the episodic one, is shared by all primates, whom he 
describes as members of the “consciousness club” (Donald 2001). Its character-
istic novel forms are episodic event perceptions, bringing forth self-awareness 
and event sensitivity. The episodic consciousness of primates can pragmatically 
be interpreted in terms of Deweyean gestalt-like qualitative unities, which allow 
us to identify and re-identify situations and thus enable iconic sign-usage. Bran-
dom’s first rung of the explication-ladder may then be seen to parallel Donald’s 
second stage, the mimetic one of the early hominids, in the course of which phys-
ical interactions are stylized and often ritualized. Donald conceives of it as “an 
extension of conscious control into the domain of action” that “enabled playact-
ing, body language, precise imitation and gesture” (261). These new capabilities 
exhibit an indexical structure, in which certain activities stand for collectively 
shareable meanings. As far as I can see, Donald’s account is fully compatible with 
Tomasello’s recent emphasis on cooperation and shared common ground. Don-
ald also highlights the importance of mimetic skills for the refinement of tool-
making. On this level, hominids can develop shared intentionality and articulate 
the emotional and practical meaning of shared situations by the mutual attune-
ment of mimics and gestures. Nevertheless, the decisive transition in the evolu-
tion of modern humans is the next one, the crossing of the symbolic threshold, 
characterized by Donald as “the spiraling coevolution of thought and symbol” 
(274). It enables indirect reference and what Brandom calls “rational expressiv-
ity”: the ability to explicate the logical relations between the “assertional com-
mitments” (Brandom 1998, 167) involved in discourse, thereby pondering the 
reasons backing up the interlocutor’s claims. Symbolic language detaches the 
content of speech from immediate experience while still depending on the latter 
and thus allows us to articulate context-independent meanings by context-de-
pendent means. In short: “language transcends embodiment at the same time that 
it depends on it” (Gallagher 2005, 127). Donald associates the development of 
symbolic language with the emergence of Homo sapiens, finding its culmination 
in the evolution of Homo sapiens sapiens. His key-word for the – as he calls it – 
mythic culture thus enabled is narrativity. Human affairs and the experience of 
nature are fused in orally-transmitted narrations which enable what Tomasello 
calls the “ratchet effect” of culture (Tomasello 1999, 37 – 40), the cumulative 
building of increasingly complex artefacts.
With symbolic communication, the triadic structure of sign-usage has 
unfolded. But it is only when the theoretical and last stage of Donald’s expla-
nation is reached, that the power of symbols is fully realized. The last stage of 
embodied articulation does not correspond to an evolutionarily unprecedented 
form of sign-usage, but to the qualitative step within symbolicity. This happens 
when the reflective distance built into indirect reference is extended from objects 
to the practice of symbol-usage itself – what Brandom calls logical expressivity, 
which enables second-order thinking, allows for the explication of the difference 
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24 Hans Joas’ “The Axial Age Debate as Religious Discourse” (2012, 9 – 29) offers a concise 
outline of the developing debate and its current relevance. For a more extensive version of this 
text, see Joas (2014).
25 The locus classicus is Jaspers ([1949] 1983). In the discussion which followed, two of 
Jaspers’s original claims proved to be untenable: his overly rigid time-frame and his contention 
that the Axial civilizations developed essentially independently from one another. Furthermore, 
historians and sociologists have criticized the concept for its inherent over-generalizations. Con-
sequently, it would perhaps be useful to shift focus from a too strongly unifying concept called 
Axial Age (implying the existence of parallel developmental stages forming one distinct histori-
cal period) to the analysis of diverse Axial developments, conceptually unified by breakthroughs 
in second-order thinking and concepts of transcendence. Such a move would place the emphasis 
on the systematic, not the empirical concept, but need not deny the special importance of the 
half millennium between roughly 800 and 300 B. C.
26 In A Secular Age (2007), Charles Taylor depicts the impact of the “Axial revolution” as 
“The Great Disembedding” (Taylor 2007, 146). Embeddedness and Embodiedness are not iden-
tical, but they overlap substantially and the former implies the latter. Thus, from the perspective 
of embodied cognition and Peircean semiotics, desembedding can never be complete: it signifies 
a shift in the inextricable dialectic relation between immediate experience and symbolic tran-
scendence, not the dissolution of the tense unity they form.
between sign and signified and therefore for the emergence of concepts of tran-
scendence. The ability to make explicit, over and above the explication of refer-
ential claims, the relation between the signs we use, the thoughts we can think 
and the world, is inherent already in the mastery of symbols. But only when this 
ability pervades social structures does it gain world-changing significance. Don-
ald links this last transition, starting about 40,000 years ago, to the development 
of external storage systems such as writing (see Donald 2001, 260, table 7.1), 
and in some recent publications he has explicitly connected it to the Axial-Age 
debate in sociology and history (Donald 2012, 47 – 76). The concept of an Axial 
Age emerged around the turn of the 20th century24 and has recently become a 
focal point for ongoing debates about the possibility of multiple modernities, the 
relationship between science and religion, about universalist moral systems, etc. 
Basically, the term refers to the time period in the middle of the first millennium 
B. C., when the incipient stages of science together with novel forms of cultural 
expression (e. g., theater), universalistic ethics and religions, rational organiza-
tions of the state – sometimes accompanied by surges in radical political criti-
cism – emerged in China, India, Persia and the near East / South-eastern Europe 
(Israel and Greece).25
And it is here that we’ve come full circle. I started with the idea that embod-
ied cognition must, in a non-dualist manner, include our symbolic capability of 
transcending. And I end by expressing my conviction that, in the evolution of 
human culture, it is indeed possible to identify, in many different cultures and 
partly independent from each other, a developmental stage where the tension 
between the inseparable dimensions of symbolic transcendence and particular, 
localized experience becomes the driving force of culture: the Axial Age.26 The 
breakthroughs which shaped human culture in its present form are historically, 
anthropologically, and semiotically connected with reaching the last stage of 
embodied articulation: semiotic transcendence.
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3. Embodiment as a Bridging Concept  




“In the future I see open fields for far more important researches. . . . Much light 
will be thrown on the origin of man and his history” (Darwin [1859] 2009, 428). 
With these well-known words from the last pages of On the Origin of Species, 
Charles Darwin (1809 – 1882) marked the starting point of evolutionary anthropol-
ogy. The closing remarks include the evolution of human beings into a panoramic 
perspective on how the earliest forms of life fanned out into life’s current diversity. 
In keeping with the logic that characterizes evolution throughout, Darwin also sees 
human beings acquire “each mental power and capacity by gradation” (428) only.
A rigorous inclusion of humanity in the general evolutionary dynamic of life 
implies a dual heritage in anthropology. To begin with, attention to evolutionary 
dynamics in anthropology will insist on the fundamentally embodied nature of 
all dimensions of human life. To speak about human experience includes speak-
ing about particular bodies, which have a history, albeit on a time scale differ-
ing from cultural history as commonly conceived. One would expect the path 
dependence of the genesis of bodies to have a bearing on how human life is lived 
and experienced.
How processes of variation and selection have contributed significantly to 
what it is to be human can be illustrated with several examples. Darwin’s sec-
ond anthropological book, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals 
([1872] 1999), points to physiological phenomena, shared by humans with other 
animals, such as blushing, an increased pulse, and sweating or raised hair associ-
ated with particular emotional states. Cultural anthropologists may object that 
different cultures vary in the wider meaning such emotional expressions take on. 
But the relevance of evolutionary inheritance can at least be illustrated with the 
fact that an artist’s choice of material will neither determine the overall meaning 
and expression of the resulting piece of art, nor will it be irrelevant.
Further, infanticide is not particularly rare in several mammal species. The 
common evolutionary explanation is that a new resident male increases its own 
genetic representation in the future gene pool by reducing the offspring of rival 
males and rendering the mother sexually receptive sooner (Hausfater and Hrdy 
2008). It turns out even that among humans, it is more often the stepparent than 
any other person who is responsible for serious neglect or even the death of a 
child (Voland and Stephan 2000).
The other aspect of a prominent role of evolution in anthropology, a coun-
terbalance to the aspect just illustrated, consists in the suspicion that evolution-
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ary anthropology may represent a temptation to an illegitimate reductionism. 
Darwin’s closing argument in the Origin includes a note that is both distinctly 
‘hawkish’ and progressivist in suggesting that, “as natural selection works solely 
by and for the good of each being, all corporeal and mental endowments will 
tend to progress towards perfection.” The final pages of Origin see human psy-
chology “securely based on the foundation” of evolutionary biology. The evo-
lution of “higher animals” is inconceivable unless resulting gradually “from the 
war of nature” (Darwin [1859] 2009, 428 f.). Such a harsh, progressivist view 
implicitly plays off unambiguous adaptive optimality against an abiding diversity 
of particular traits within a species. But abiding diversity, in contrast to variation 
evolving into adaptedness, is the hallmark of human culture. It is described and 
interpreted by anthropologists who probe the unexpected varieties of human 
modes of being in the world. Yet the marginalization of human diversity by a 
hierarchy of higher and lower forms of civilization, quite in keeping with the 
colonial politics of the time, can also be found in Darwin’s work (e. g., Darwin 
[1871] 2004, 134 – 139).
In this context it should also be noted, however, that Darwin’s case for a sin-
gular, natural origin of all humanity was inspired by his passion for emancipa-
tory politics, which he articulated in discussions about slavery in North America 
(Moore and Desmond 2004). On a less explosive level, moreover, it is remark-
able how Darwin already hinted at diversity within an animal species in discuss-
ing, for example, the production and use of tools among animals (Darwin [1871] 
2004, 102 – 104). More recently, this has become a powerful research program 
that has led some primatologists to speak wholeheartedly of cultures among 
chimpanzees (Wrangham et al. 1996; de Waal 2001).
If Darwin’s emphasis on natural selection is to serve as a criterion even in 
anthropology, however, it may seem that human morality, reason, meaning mak-
ing, religion, and the arts are but strange guises of a ‘Darwinian’ opportunism. 
This critique is voiced by many who are at home in the humanities, notably 
social and cultural anthropologists. In this section, this tradition is represented 
also by historical anthropology, a discipline working less with ethnographic 
rather than diachronic, historical methods. Devoted to the phenomena of con-
tingency and change, cultural anthropology approaches the human person from 
a different angle than the supposedly universal truths of science. Certainly the 
importance of the evolutionary time scale does not render the cultural time scale 
insignificant.
The current section takes up this discussion with the question of the evolu-
tion of morality. Eve-Marie Engels, professor of ethics in the life sciences at the 
University of Tübingen, presents a nuanced image of how Darwin’s first anthro-
pological book, The Descent of Man (1871), laid out a concept for the evolution 
of morality. Darwin proposes a naturalism that is not reductionist (Engels in this 
volume). With the evolution of morality, Darwinism does not simply present 
us with “nature, red in tooth and claw” (Tennyson [1849] 2008, 153). Certainly 
the basic Darwinian principle remains intact: a current trait can be accounted for 
by a variation of similar traits in previous generations. At that stage, the partic-
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ular quality of the trait in one lineage proved to be more adaptive, contributing 
to more numerous offspring. The trait in question can be sensory perception, 
speed, timidity, or camouflage, but in this case we are concerned with a more 
pronounced social instinct and a feeling of sympathy.
It is notably David Hume’s and Adam Smith’s moral sense theory that con-
strues morality in terms of feeling. Any human being in trouble, not just a close 
relative, evokes a feeling of sympathy. But according to Darwin ([1871] 1999), in 
our early human ancestors, the feeling of sympathy must have been more lim-
ited in scope. Nonetheless – may I add, perhaps as if by the working of natural 
moral law? – a helpful intervention fueled by sympathy, a unilateral expense to 
begin with, must have been rewarded by natural selection in the long run. Now 
a “‘coevolution’ of nature and culture” (Engels in this volume) sets in that hones 
the beginnings of morality. This concerns not only the acuteness and the radius 
of sympathy, but also the uniquely human moral sense of right and wrong, 
human conscience. Darwin even affirms Kant’s notion of duty, also if it implies 
a costly sacrifice that reduces one’s Darwinian fitness.
He also suggests that self-sacrificial morality is unlikely to have arisen with-
out the religious exhortation to “do good in return for evil, to love your enemy” 
(Darwin; Engels in this volume). Indeed, while “unashamedly naturalistic,” Dar-
win’s central concept of natural selection “did not have to be atheistic, but could 
also be associated with theism, deism, or agnosticism” (Brooke 2013, 38).
Biologists have worked on the evolution of morality beyond Darwin’s 
groundwork discussed by Engels. A crucial point is that even a morality inspired 
by religion may die a Darwinian death, with highly religious populations being 
outreproduced and replaced by less religious ones, or ‘altruistic’ ones by more 
‘selfish’ ones. Darwin’s own answer is that natural selection acts on a group level 
(Wilson 2003). As soon as morality is in place – whether established in religious 
or other ways – another dynamic is required for its preservation, i. e., fitness:
A tribe including many members who, from possessing in a high degree the spirit of 
patriotism, fidelity, obedience, courage, and sympathy, were always ready to aid one 
another and to sacrifice themselves for the common good, would be victorious over 
most other tribes; and this would be natural selection. (Darwin [1871] 2004, 157 f.)
We might also envisage the ‘victory’ of the ‘altruists’ over ‘egoists’ as a non-con-
scious process, as an unnoticed spread of a culture of helpfulness. In addition, 
David S. Wilson has shown that ‘altruistic’ populations are more likely to popu-
late new locations than ‘selfish’ ones (Wilson 2015, 25 f.).
In contrast with between-group competition, ‘selfish’ organisms have an 
advantage in within-group competition, however. An arsenal of three to five 
other theories addresses this problem in Darwinian terms (Nowak 2013, Clut-
ton-Brock 2009, Zahavi and Zahavi 1999). Kin selection can account for behav-
ior that is costly in direct proportion to genetic relatedness. Direct reciprocity 
(“tit for tat”) widens the circle of beneficiaries. This tendency is even more pro-
nounced in indirect reciprocity, in which my reputation of helpfulness is instru-
mental to my recompense by a third party. Only group selection can account for 
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the evolutionary stability of a behavior incurring a net fitness loss for the indi-
vidual, but in one way or another, all of these models rely on an ultimate fitness 
gain through cooperation.
So does Darwin’s concept of the evolution of morality account for all crucial 
elements of human morality? Darwin assumes that in moral conflict, the feeling 
of sympathy will take over after considering the facts. Here as in moral sense 
theory, however, there is little point in reasoning critically if a moral obligation 
exists, if my conscience is too dull, or if I may or should disregard a misguided 
conscience. Can Darwin, then, truly account for the critical sense of Kant’s 
‘ought,’ as he claims? According to Kant, ethics may have an emotional compo-
nent, but this is the feeling of respect for law engendered by reason (Kant [1797] 
2012, 64). Fundamentally, it is not feeling that compels a Kantian to act, but rea-
son working independently of the heteronomous promptings of feeling. From 
a religious rather than a philosophical point of view, can we explain the Good 
Samaritan, or a culture that argues for costly commitment regardless of returns 
(Rolston 2004)? To ask these questions may be to engage reductionism further 
than Darwin intended. But does this leave Darwin’s thesis untouched that “the 
difference in mind between man and the higher animals, great as it is, certainly is 
one of degree and not of kind” (Darwin [1871] 2004, 151)?
Does human culture have to be accounted for, at least in one crucial respect, 
in non-Darwinian terms, or is a reconciliation between evolutionary and cul-
tural anthropology possible? Gregor Etzelmüller, professor of systematic the-
ology and religious studies in Osnabrück (Germany), suggests that the concept 
of the (lived) body (Leib-Körper) provides a bridge between nature and cul-
ture, between evolutionary and historical anthropology. The classic distinction 
between body (Körper) and lived body (Leib) goes back to Edmund Husserl 
(1859 – 1938). While I can turn my body into an object, my lived body evades 
objectification. In both its subjective and objective aspect, the (lived) body is 
both nature and a being that transcends nature in culture. Etzelmüller (this vol-
ume) expresses this ambiguity with the concept of the (lived) body as the “tip-
ping point” between nature and culture, which he adopts from the philosopher 
Bernhard Waldenfels (*1934).
Hence there is no such thing as the mere biology of human life. Nonetheless, 
the human person as a protagonist is always also a particular biological constella-
tion, in an essential rather than an ancillary sense. Moreover, even the behavior of 
comparatively simple organisms does not follow the mere dictates of natural law. 
Niche-construction, rather than an adaptation in which the organism assimilates 
to a given, static environment, is a typical case. Further, even a flagellate displays 
a certain kind of autonomy in predictably swimming away from a particular sub-
stance, as the philosopher Evan Thompson (*1962, Thompson 2010, 163) argues. 
Thus if we continue to speak about “nature” in biology rather than “culture” as 
well, this involves a significant abstraction or extrapolation.
This is especially true, however, concerning human life with its characteristic 
reflexive behavior. With the unique practices of morality and meaning-making, 
humanity constitutes a category of its own in the history of life. In turn, life 
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forms lacking these characteristics, even if displaying a certain kind of autonomy, 
appear “natural” by comparison. Etzelmüller (in this volume) notes that accord-
ing to Darwin, wide-spread social instincts in animals only require an increase in 
intellectual power to attain a fully-fledged moral sense. Yet once this moral sense 
is attained, we are speaking no longer about an animal, but the human person. A 
change by degree that can be traced in the body amounts to a qualitative shift, 
constituting a “tipping point.” Nature takes on a cultural dynamic. While differ-
ent kinds of animals stretch the boundaries of nature in different ways, nature is 
nonetheless the category to assign them.
But does this not render the relation between humanity and biology all too 
tenuous, bordering on the metaphysical? Etzelmüller draws upon the concept of 
the plasticity of human development as described by the Swiss zoologist Adolf 
Portmann (1897 – 1982, Portmann 1990) in answering no. Portmann calls humans 
secondarily altricial. Born with sense organs no longer blocked by a protective 
membrane and with mobile limbs, humans might be called precocial. But the 
retarded development of the brain, the sensory systems, and the wider anatomy 
constitutes an overlay of altriciality, which humans have ‘reinvented’ on a new 
level. Due to their slow and drawn-out development, humans depend strongly 
on environmental factors. Biological facts are crucially involved in that the “‘low 
speed’ of human somatic development allows for social and psychic shaping, 
thus bringing forth the human being as an entity characterized by an irreducible 
mutual interdependence of nature and culture, body and psyche” (Etzelmüller 
in this volume). Due to the plasticity of human development, there is a feedback 
of the cultural dynamic into human biology. “Humans are cultural beings by 
nature” (Etzelmüller in this volume).
While chimpanzees, our closest zoological relatives, display a remarkable 
sense of social connection, for humans sociality is the very fabric of the uni-
verse, and humans take cooperation to another level. Cooperation among apes, 
although remarkable, is limited due to their effective physical adaptedness, which 
is more pronounced than in humans. By contrast, the extreme degree of human 
social and cooperative adaptedness comes to the fore in the phenomenon of 
“over-imitation.” Human children make a “leap of faith” (Etzelmüller in this 
volume) in hypothesizing about meaning in imitation, as in taking a moment 
of silence before a worship service. Conspicuously, they even imitate random 
minutiae. An extreme degree of “shared intentionality” (Michael Tomasello, 
* 1950, Tomasello 2010, 154, Searle 1997) is the fertile ground that allows human 
symbolic communication to thrive. It is this new cultural dynamic that shapes 
the body structure in the slow human physical development. Moreover, in dia-
logue with the philosopher Judith Butler (* 1956), the notion of plasticity allows 
Etzelmüller to explore critically the question whether biology is fate.
The antithesis between the lived body as a “tipping point” and a Cartesian 
ontology then opens up new perspectives for a dialogue between biology and 
historical anthropology. Etzelmüller illustrates this with anthropological tradi-
tions from ancient Egypt, Mesopotamia, ancient Greece, and notably the Old 
Testament and the Apostle Paul. For example, the Hebrew word commonly mis-
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translated as soul denotes the entire person in all her needfulness. Paul, far from a 
somatophobic spiritualizer, saw the organismic constellation of the congregation 
as the matrix in which the relationship with the divine is embodied.
In sum, due to the plasticity of human development, the possibility of a 
non-linear genesis of genuinely novel phenomena in life due to culture can be 
captured by the metaphor of the tipping point. But does the metaphor suggest 
a realm of culture that is homogeneous in having emancipated itself, as it were, 
from nature? Or are there natural factors that modulate expressions of human 
culture in a non-trivial sense? And if the lived body is the tipping point between 
nature and culture, what species do we need to talk about? Ethological studies 
indicate that among apes, there is shared attention, even to the point of vocal 
symbolic communication (Boesch 2002, Seyfarth and Cheney 2012, Crockford et 
al. 2012, Crockford, Wittig, and Zuberbühler 2014). Should we speak of several 
tipping points and distinguish different kinds of culture – although this would 
threaten to relativize the remarkable characteristics of human culture? Con-
cerning humanity, it is perhaps helpful also to draw on another metaphor by 
Waldenfels, which conceives of humanity as living on the “threshold,” or in the 
no-man’s-land between nature and culture, which is crossed again and again but 
cannot be left behind (Waldenfels 2001; 2016, 104 f., 114 f.)
The imitation of seemingly pointless details, so-called “over-imitation,” may 
point to a key ingredient in the unique constellation of human culture. Imitation 
is involved in shared attention, which betrays a fundamentally social mode of 
being in the world and lays the foundation for symbolic communication. At the 
same time, over-imitation may just be the tip of the iceberg. Christoph Wulf – 
who is professor of anthropology and philosophy of education at Freie Univer-
sität Berlin as well as director of Berlin’s Interdisciplinary Center for Historical 
Anthropology – points to the dramatic cultural importance of mimesis. With 
Walter Benjamin’s depiction of his butterfly chase, Wulf (in this volume) points 
out how Benjamin’s grasping the phenomenon of the butterfly is fundamentally 
embodied, mimetic, and enactive. Among other things, mimesis also subverts our 
anthropological distinction of inner and outer, since children even learn feelings 
in mimesis, something we often take for granted as one’s own private domain. 
Moving on to more encompassing social forms, Wulf highlights especially that 
in mimesis, humans create a dense texture of social customs and expectations. 
In creating similarities rather than exact replicas, mimesis differs from mimicry. 
Social customs evolve and diversify. At some point, a birthday came to be asso-
ciated with gift giving, which reinforces an existing personal bond. “This ritual 
knowledge, which enables us to act competently in rituals, evolves from . . . par-
ticipation in ritual activities” (Wulf in this volume). Mimesis inscribes institu-
tions into the body. Rituals then serve as templates in meaning making.
Wulf’s presentation of mimesis confronts us again with the abiding riddle why 
humans can even trade in meaning in the first place. “Receptivity and activity 
overlap,” according to Wulf (in this volume). In imitation, children perform a 
“leap of faith” (Etzelmüller in this volume) in assuming that there is a point 
to the current activity. Bernhard Waldenfels analyzes this phenomenon as an 
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ineluctable interlacing of “pathos” and “response” (Waldenfels 2016, 43, 45). In 
his terminology, pathos denotes both a sensitivity for what we encounter and 
its interpretation, but the interpretation is neither a simple causal process nor a 
free-wheeling creation without ‘friction’ with reality. The response is an articu-
lation, vocal or physical in other ways, that does not, although one’s own, take 
its orientation from oneself but from without, a factor that eludes us. Thus, in 
participating in rituals, we both discover and create forms that allow for shared 
meaning (30, 43 – 45).
Such receptive spontaneity may perhaps be seen as a cultural analogy to 
niche-construction in Darwinian evolution. Indeed “ritual knowledge . . . 
evolves” (Wulf, in this volume), and we might see a resemblance to Darwinian 
‘descent with modification’ in mimesis. Darwinian natural selection constrains 
variation. In culture, however, the constraints in the evolution of rituals are 
rather loose. The supposition of meaning in participating in a ritual can be called 
a “leap of faith” also because it creates with little constraint, allowing for wide 
variation. Humans cooperating in a hunt may understand the process in widely 
differing terms, as ‘bread winning,’ as a check to chaos in nature, or as camara-
derie, as long as the endeavor is sufficiently plausible and successful. According 
to Wulf, the “practical knowledge and social activity,” which is constituted in 
the participation in rituals, “are shaped largely by historical and cultural factors” 
(Wulf in this volume). Yet there is no clean separation between history and cul-
ture on the one hand and practical knowledge and social activity on the other, 
and mimesis plays a significant part in the genesis of the entire complex. Is there 
perhaps a “natural” factor involved in the beginnings of this complex?
In differentiating between culture and nature, a comparison between humans 
and primates can often be instructive. Primatologists have argued for chimpan-
zee cultures based on differing practices of tool and symbol use (Boesch and 
Tomasello 1998). Is this diversity a cultural outgrowth of an overall natural pri-
mate life? Regarding the rituals with which a primate population maintains fun-
damental social cohesion, local distinctions have not been found so far. However, 
when primatologists kept rhesus macaques and stump tail macaques together, 
they found that the species with the more “despotic” temperament adopted the 
manners – one might almost want to say instincts – of the more “egalitarian” one, 
although the behavioral repertoire is not entirely plastic, with only some parts 
having changed (de Waal and Johanowicz 1993; see also Sapolsky 2006).
We may also boil down the mimetic constellation to even simpler constella-
tions. For example, when a polecat is confronted with a rat, hunting behavior 
kicks in practically without learning, but still young polecat must learn from its 
mother how to kill the catch by imitating her bite in the neck (Wuketits 2002). 
How does this mammal “learn” and “know” that biting is the thing to do? How 
does an animal discern the affordances involved in “open instincts”? It seems to 
be a case of pathos and response as well that accounts for the intentional salience 
of the biting. The philosopher Hans Jonas (1903 – 93) speculates that intention-
ality arises when animal emotion provides coordination, the missing connection 
that allows for foraging and hunting to result from sense perception and motility 
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(Jonas 1966). Is this kind of animal emotion the first rudimentary intertwining of 
pathos and response in evolution?
The irreducibility of pathos and response may seem to create a Cartesian or 
a vitalist temptation to attribute it to a factor impinging from outside. But while 
Cartesianism conceives of spirit in ontological opposition to matter, it is instruc-
tive to look at alternative ontologies from a historical point of view. Ancient 
stoicism, for example, understands spirit as an exceedingly fine substance, pre-
supposing a spectrum from coarser to finer materiality (Sedley 1999). Annette 
Weissenrieder’s contribution to this volume illustrates yet another way ancient 
thinkers conceived of the human mind in relation to the human body. She is pro-
fessor of New Testament at San Francisco Theological Seminary, and her article 
on the explanation of epileptic seizures in medical texts from the ancient Medi-
terranean world takes us into material issues in historical anthropology.
Two texts from the so-called Hippocratic Corpus, “De morbo sacro” and “De 
flatibus” (“On the sacred disease,” “On winds”), describe epilepsy in a way that 
has struck interpreters as remarkably rational and naturalist. The Hippocratic 
Corpus is a large, heterogeneous assemblage of about 60 ancient Greek writings 
of unknown origin on medical issues. It is attributed to the elusive 5th century 
figure Hippocrates and was discussed by prominent thinkers such as Galen and 
Celsus (Craik 2014).
Weissenrieder (in this volume) describes how in the antique world, epilepsy, 
or “the sacred disease,” was often understood in religious terms as an effect of 
demons or a lunar deity. But in interpreting the symptoms of the disease, “De 
morbo sacro” credits pneuma, which can be translated as air or breath, but also 
as spirit, with ‘bearing’ human consciousness, while in “De flatibus,” this is a 
property of blood. Once the circulation of air in the body stands still, blocked 
by phlegm – or, depending on the text, if the flow of blood is blocked by air – 
regular consciousness breaks down, seizures occur. In part, such diagnoses are 
informed by animal dissection. While other treatises of the Hippocratic Corpus 
see the heart crucially involved in human cognition and even “De morbo sacro” 
attributes a certain role to other organs than the brain as well, these treatises 
see the human intellect depending on the brain in particular. But “these medical 
texts refuse to envisage a separation of body and mind . . . none of these texts 
proposes a concept of ‘soul’ or ‘mental activity,’” highlighting the role of “sen-
sory and motor skills” (Weissenrieder in this volume) for the constitution of the 
mind.
Prominent depictions of epilepsy in the New Testament gospels employ a 
terminology very similar to the ‘Hippocratic’ medical tradition. In keeping with 
the ‘natural’ bent of the medical explanations, the Gospel of Luke does not see 
demons involved in epilepsy. The Gospel of Mark, by contrast, does see evil spir-
its at work. Their malice seems to speak against the disease as divine punishment, 
which relieves the patient of a significant ‘spiritual’ burden. At the same time, 
given the concepts the Gospels share with the hippocratic traditions, a more 
overtly ‘religious’ view is no less medical, according to Weissenrieder (in this 
volume). On the other hand, certain translations adopt the agential dimension of 
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the demonological interpretation in portraying the disease as an active force, but 
stop short of attributing the disease to a demon.
On the whole, neither the Hippocratic Corpus nor the New Testament texts 
in question, apart from the demonological traditions, see consciousness as an 
entity of a second kind in addition to the fundamental physical dimension. This 
is also why the importance of material traditions in historical anthropology cer-
tainly goes beyond chronicling and book keeping – even though we can no lon-
ger affirm the idea that, for example, epilepsy is due to phlegm blocking the flow 
of air. Rather, historical anthropology confronts our contemporary discourses 
with an alternative choice of categories and issues. Today’s decisions might oth-
erwise remain hidden in plain sight.
The philosopher John McDowell (cf. McDowell 1996) analyzes the epistemo-
logical issues involved. This reminds us of the close interrelationship between 
the scientific, historical, and philosophical dimensions involved in this section. 
Using Kant as an important touchstone, he argues that human understanding is 
both receptive and spontaneous. Sense data do not simply impinge causally on 
our minds, but we are ourselves responsibly involved in human thought achiev-
ing “friction” with reality. McDowell appreciates Kant’s notion of concepts as 
an interface between my intuition and the world. Concepts are created transcen-
dentally by human reason rather than constituted empirically, but they allow for 
a consistent account of nature.
As part of his critique of Cartesianism, however, McDowell fears that the 
transcendental nature of concepts gives rise to “rampant platonism” (McDowell 
1996, 83). By contrast, he wishes to “reinstate friction between thought and the 
world” by taking “capacities of spontaneity to be in play all the way out to the 
ultimate grounds of empirical judgments” (ibid., 66 f.). He compares the genesis 
of a cogent use of spontaneity with the formation of ethical character according 
to Aristotle, which he calls “second nature” (ibid., 84). McDowell assumes that in 
“practical wisdom,” “our eyes are opened” to the objective “requirements of rea-
son” (ibid., 79). Yet even this argument does not fully overcome a conspicuous 
platonism if it assumes a discovery of reality without ambiguities and discrepan-
cies. What is required is a plausible account of how the requirements of reason 
come to correspond to the realities of the world.
I have suggested that this connection is made in an embodied intertwining of 
pathos and response, with an imitator making a “leap of faith,” or when a young 
polecat grasps the anatomical affordances of the prey animal in its paws. Not that 
this explains much, if for such an explanation a reduction to more basic princi-
ples is required. But it does show that there is no inherent reason why we should 
expect such a “leap of faith” to pick out unerringly the one true objective reality. 
Affordances can indeed be multivalent. This is not to argue for relativism. On 
the contrary, the exploration of alternative conceptual schemes can be enriching 
and eye-opening. By contrast, it would be ironic if we dismissed the Hippocratic 
corpus as unscientific in the name of modern empirical science, while in fact fall-
ing into “rampant platonism” in failing to account for the historical genesis of 
the guiding concepts of our own science.
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* Translation by Alexander Massmann.
The Lived Body as the Tipping Point  
Between an Evolutionary and a Historical Anthropology*
Gregor Etzelmüller
Abstract: The article raises the question how evolution brings forth a (lived) body that is 
able to transcend itself in shaping itself culturally. Taking up an idea of Charles Darwin, 
it will be argued that it is human vulnerability, a specific dimension of the human bodily 
condition, that makes the human person a social, cooperative creature. In a second step the 
article focuses on the shift from natural evolution to cultural development. An embodied 
leap of faith seems to be at the beginnings of typically human communication. Evolution 
has brought forth a body that tends to imitate others by nature – and which is thus shaped 
culturally from the outset. Insofar as evolutionary anthropology explores the human as a 
being that is, by nature, open to the cultural shaping of its nature, it opens up bridges for 
a sustained and robust dialogue with historical anthropology. In pointing out alternatives 
to practices and understandings that seem a matter of course, historical anthropology, too, 
relativizes the modern understanding of humanity that is characterized by the dualism of 
spirit and body. 
Introduction
In spite of all interdisciplinary efforts in the two fields, it seems that evolutionary 
anthropology and historical anthropology continue to drift apart. What appears 
to be the result of natural processes to thinkers in evolutionary anthropology 
is understood as a cultural construct by representatives of historical anthropol-
ogy. An approach in anthropology that assigns fundamental importance to the 
human body, however, might counteract the centrifugal trend in anthropological 
studies. For the body is the place where “nature and culture” reach a “tipping 
point.”1 Both the process of evolution (Darwin 2004; Pinker 2011) and social 
expectations and practices (Bourdieu 1984; 2001, Schroer 2005; Karle 2014) are 
inscribed into one’s own (lived) body (Leib-Körper). At this point, the para-
digm of embodiment thus raises the crucial question how evolution brings forth 
a (lived) body that is able to transcend itself in shaping itself culturally (see also 
Jung’s contribution in this volume).
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1 “Umschlagstelle von Natur und Kultur”: I am here adopting a concept from Bernhard 
Waldenfels who gave the keynote address at the Heidelberg symposium, entitled “The Lived 
Body as the Tipping Point of Nature and Culture” (Dec. 4, 2014, in German). As the lecture was 
delivered freely without a fixed manuscript, it is not documented in this volume.
2 Darwin’s position is diametrically opposed to that of the British philosopher Herbert 
Spencer, who wrote with regard to the poor, “the whole effort of nature is to get rid of such, 
to clear the world of them, and make room for better” (cited according to de Waal 2009, 28).
1. The Human Person as the Tipping point  
of Natural Selection and a Culture of Mercy
Charles Darwin already pointed out that with the human person, various evolu-
tionary processes – in his view primarily the reduction of instincts and the devel-
opment of cognitive capabilities – brought forth a living being who can follow 
the guidance of reasons, or more precisely, of “preferences . . . that are constitu-
tive for a person” (Pauen 2007, 270).
[A]s the power of reasoning becomes clearer so that man can value justly the judgments 
of his fellows, he will feel himself impelled, apart from any transitory pleasure or pain, 
to certain lines of conduct. He may then declare . . . I am the supreme judge of my own 
conduct, and in the words of Kant, I will not in my own person violate the dignity of 
humanity. (Darwin 2004, 133)
The synthesis of Darwin and Kant that Jürgen Habermas pursues (Habermas 
2005, 156 f., 175, 188) is thus already visible in Darwin’s own work (see Engels 
this volume).
The meaning of the “tipping point” can be illustrated with the phenomenon 
of natural selection. Natural selection brings forth a living being that can disre-
gard the principle of selection to which it owes its own existence (Engels 2010). 
The human person can act in ways contrary to selection. In The Descent of Man, 
Darwin writes: “we build asylums for the imbecile, the maimed, and the sick; we 
institute poor-laws; and our medical men exert their utmost skill to save the life 
of every one to the last moment.” While Darwin admits that no animal breeder 
would act in this way, he notes that we cannot “check our sympathy, even at the 
urging of hard reason, without deterioration in the noblest part of our nature” 
(Darwin 2004, 159).2
Since communities characterized by mutual support and self-restraint for 
the benefit of others have better chances of survival, natural selection rewards 
such caring communities. Steven Pinker puts it in more general terms: “today no 
biolo gist doubts that evolutionary dynamics like mutualism, kinship, and var-
ious forms of reciprocity can select for psychological faculties that, under the 
right circumstances, can lead people to coexist peacefully” (Pinker 2011, 573). 
There can in fact be selection pressure that positively supports greater cooper-
ation (Tomasello 2014, 31; de Waal 2009; Wilson 2012).
According to Darwin, there is a notable correlation between the specifically 
human bodily condition, especially in its vulnerability, and the particular human 
cooperation. Darwin concedes “that man is one of the most helpless and defence-
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3 See also the emphatic warning issued already by Adolf Portmann not to understand “the 
procedures of human history [merely as] the natural continuation of the evolution of organic 
forms” (Portmann 1944, 21; translator’s note: all text with a German bibliography translated 
by A. M.).
4 Spahn draws attention to this dual perspective in his contribution to this volume.
less creatures in the world.” But it seems precisely this fact that contributed to 
human success in evolution. It stands to reason, according to Darwin,
that an animal possessing great size, strength, and ferocity, and which, like the gorilla, 
could defend itself from all enemies, would not perhaps have become social: and this 
would most effectually have checked the acquirement of the higher mental qualities, 
such as sympathy and the love of his fellows. Hence it might have been an immense 
advantage to man to have sprung from some comparatively weak creature.” (Darwin 
2004, 83 f., see also Engels’s contribution to this volume)
What makes the human person a social, cooperative creature is thus a dimension 
of the human bodily condition, that is, human vulnerability.
2. The Shift from Natural Evolution to Cultural Development
In the history of humanity, natural evolution reaches a tipping point at which 
it shifts to the mode of a cultural process. As a consequence, the dynamics of 
change accelerate dramatically (Jung 2009). Not long ago – in the Mesolithic 
age – humans had to defend themselves against wild animals (De Waal 2009), but 
soon they began to dominate their environment, in such a way that late moder-
nity often does not even know nature anymore except through the media.
A simple consideration illustrates that the rise of modern humanity cannot be 
described in biological terms only3:
The fact is, there simply has not been enough time for processes of biological evolu-
tion involving genetic variation and natural selection to have created, one by one, each 
of the cognitive skills necessary for modern humans to invent and maintain complex 
tool-use industries and technologies, complex forms of symbolic communication and 
representation, and complex social organizations and institutions. (Tomasello 2001, 2)
As a result, we need to ask when and how natural evolution shifts to cultural 
development in such a way that the dynamics of change rapidly accelerate. In 
this endeavor, we will need to keep in mind that, on the one hand, the origins of 
human culture are already prefigured in the evolution of living organisms. This is 
a point made, quite rightly, in enactivism: Every living organism not only adapts 
to the environment, but also contributes to the shape of the environment – thus, 
in a sense, creating it. On the other hand, however, the extraordinary character of 
human culture and its genesis must not be ignored either.4 Human culture must 
be described in continuity with and in discontinuity to the behavior of living 
organisms in general.
Enactivism presents human culture within the framework of the behav-
ior of living organisms. “Organisms shape the physicochemical environment 
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into a milieu (an Umwelt)” (Thompson 2007, 74). In recognizing organisms as 
“‘niche-constructing’ beings” (Thompson 2007, 95), we see our ability to give 
rise to a world structured by meaning prepared in the history of life. Other 
organisms contribute actively to the shape of their environment, thus influenc-
ing the course of evolution.
In observing other creatures struggling to continue their existence – starting with bac-
teria that actively swim away from a chemical repellent – we can, through the evi-
dence of our own experience and the Darwinian evidence of the continuity of life, view 
inwardness and purposiveness as proper to living being. (Thompson 2007, 163)
That even lower organisms are endowed with subjectivity is not a mere postu-
late of thought, but seems likely in the face of the experiments of the biologist 
Martin Heisenberg from Würzburg. He was able to demonstrate that in a flight 
simulator even the behavior of fruit flies engages in a certain degree of freedom 
(Heisenberg 1983; 1985; 1997; 2002). We can already observe in nature that ani-
mal behavior weighs options off against each other:
For example, consider a squirrel on a tree branch gearing up to jump to another. One can 
see the muscles preparing, but in some cases the squirrel decides the leap is too far and 
so, after feigning some jumps, climbs down the trunk and then back up the other branch. 
The most straightforward description of this event is that the squirrel is observing and 
evaluating a simulation of what it would experience if it leaped. (Tomasello 2014, 14)
Based on that evaluation, the squirrel decides against jumping.
The embodied character of mental life refers not only to the fact “that mind 
even on its highest reaches remains part of the organic,” but also challenges us to 
see that “the organic even in its lowest forms prefigures mind” (Jonas 2001, 1).
At the same time we need to be aware of the difference that distinguishes 
human culture from the niche-construction of a bacterium. Certainly, poten-
tial differences are always prepared in evolution. From the perspective of evo-
lutionary anthropology, a specifically human sociality cannot be conceived of 
without the rise of social instincts among animals (Tomasello 2009). The evolu-
tionary benefit of social instincts can help explain why “helping others with sim-
ple physical problems . . . is a naturally emerging behavior” (Tomasello 2009, 7; 
Tomasello 2014, 51 f.). Children as young as two years old, regardless of their 
culture, show such behavior, which can also be observed in elephants and chim-
panzees (Tomasello 2009, 8 – 12; see also the impressive account in de Waal). This 
raises the question of when exactly social instincts arise that allow for a kind of 
behavior that is of a different quality than that of a bacterium actively swimming 
away from a chemical repellent.
According to Frans de Waal, the evolution of social instincts
probably started with the birth of parental care. During 200 million years of mamma-
lian evolution, females sensitive to their offspring outreproduced those who were cold 
and distant. When pups, cubs, calves, or babies are cold, hungry, or in danger, their 
mother needs to react instantaneously. There must have been incredible selection pres-
sure on this sensitivity: Females who failed to respond never propagated their genes. 
(De Waal 2009, 67)
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5 In technical terms, developmental psychologists speak of “over-imitation,” which can be 
confusing as children imitate with high precision, while from a logical and analytical point of 
view over-imitation seems doubtful. The term is intended to clarify that children imitate even 
those elements in an action that are obviously irrelevant for reaching the goal. I am grateful to 
Stefanie Höhl (Heidelberg) for the literature referenced in the following.
6 See Froese and Leavens 2014, 2: “Over-Imitation has been consistently documented 
for children, but not for young and older chimpanzees . . . and it has been demonstrated in a 
cross-cultural context.”
Once the social instincts are in place, however, they can also refer to other 
objects, no longer being directed necessarily towards one’s own offspring alone 
(de Waal 2009, 181 f.).
In this context, another one of Darwin’s observation is apposite. It seemed 
to him highly “probable – namely, that any animal whatever, endowed with 
well marked social instincts . . . would inevitably acquire a moral sense or con-
science, as soon as its intellectual powers has become as well, or nearly as well 
developed, as in man” (Darwin 2004, 102). Accordingly, the decisive, if only 
gradual, difference is located on the level of the cognitive. To be sure, human 
cognitive capabilities are the result of a long evolutionary process, but what dis-
tinguishes humanity from other living organisms, primates especially, seems to 
be the capability of cultural learning. Humans “can learn not just from the other 
but through the other” (Tomasello 2001, 6). For this reason, it is not necessary 
for every individual to invent the wheel anew, but humans can build on what 
was learned in previous generations. This unique procedure of “cultural trans-
mission” creates a “ratchet effect” (Tomasello 2001, 4) that speeds up cultural 
developments immensely. In this way, cultural development is decoupled from 
natural processes (see Jung 2009). To learn “through the other” means, in an 
elementary sense, to learn by imitating the other’s physical behavior. “Imitation 
requires identification with a body of flesh and blood. We’re beginning to realize 
how much human and animal cognition runs via the body” (de Waal 2009, 59). In 
imitating the other, synchronizing with her, we are experiencing the world from 
her perspective – through her body, as it were.
In humans, this form of imitation appears especially pervasive, as the phe-
nomenon of so-called over-imitation demonstrates.5 It has only been observed 
in human children, but occurs in all cultures.6 Starting at about age three, tod-
dlers tend to imitate another’s action “overly precisely” (Hoehl et al. 2014). In 
contrast to chimpanzees, for example, toddlers imitate even those aspects that 
are obviously causally irrelevant for reaching the goal. An experiment by Horner 
and Whiten often referred to in this context demonstrates this with great force.
Young wild-born chimpanzees from an African sanctuary and 3- to 4-year-old children 
observed a human demonstrator use a tool to retrieve a reward from a puzzle-box. The 
demonstration involved both causally relevant and irrelevant actions, and the box was 
presented in each of two conditions: opaque and clear. In the opaque condition, causal 
information about the effect of the tool inside the box was not available, and hence it 
was impossible to differentiate between the relevant and irrelevant parts of the demon-
stration. However, in the clear condition causal information was available, and subjects 
could potentially determine which actions were necessary. When chimpanzees were pre-
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7 Tomasello has revised his previous thesis according to which only humans can understand 
conspecifics as intentional agents. Recent research has shown that “nonhuman great apes not 
only are intentional agents themselves but also understand others as intentional agents” (2014, 
20, see also ix – x).
sented with the opaque box, they reproduced both the relevant and irrelevant actions, 
thus imitating the overall structure of the task. When the box was presented in the clear 
condition they instead ignored the irrelevant actions in favour of a more efficient, emu-
lative technique. These results suggest that emulation is the favoured strategy of chim-
panzees when sufficient causal information is available. However, if such information 
is not available, chimpanzees are prone to employ a more comprehensive copy of an 
observed action. In contrast to the chimpanzees, children employed imitation to solve 
the task in both conditions, at the expense of efficiency. (Horner and Whiten 2005, 164)
Interestingly, children imitate the action that is obviously causally irrelevant 
even if they assume they are not observed or if they are encouraged to reach the 
goal in such a way as makes sense to them. Lyons and colleagues demonstrated 
that in many cases, children imitate an action with high precision even if this 
constitutes a disadvantage in a competitive situation: “children will continue to 
overimitate even when doing so imposes motivationally salient costs” (Lyons et 
al. 2011, 1163).
In addition, toddlers imitate actions even if they were not demonstrated inten-
tionally, i. e., in a pedagogic context or by trusted care givers:
Interestingly, and in contrast to our prediction, children initially reenacted the irrele-
vant actions no matter whether these actions were demonstrated by a pedagogical 
experimenter or by an unfamiliar and non-communicative experimenter. This was true 
even though the no-contact experimenter never interacted with children and avoided 
any contact before or during the experiment. The no-contact experimenter never 
expressed the intention to teach or show anyone how to operate the container and 
instead made it clear that he or she removed tokens from the container in order to 
exchange them for stickers. . . . Our results suggest that preschoolers imitate irrelevant 
actions even when performed by a complete stranger in the absence of communication 
and instruction. The incidental observation of actions whose purpose is opaque in rela-
tion to the goal of the action, thus, seems to be sufficient to trigger overimitation in 
5-year-olds. (Hoehl et al. 2014, 131)
Human children seem to assume that an action performed by a parent or a care 
giver, even by any person in general, is meaningful, even if they do not see or 
understand its point. The child imitates these actions as exactly as possible pre-
cisely because it does not see the point.
On this view, and in direct contrast to the traditional view of imitation, understand-
ing the other’s goals and intentions does not facilitate imitation, but actually hinders 
it because such direct insight obscures the precise means. Imitation requires individ-
uals to change attention from what the other’s goals are to how the other’s actions are 
precisely realized, while emulation is possible without this extra effort.” (Froese and 
Leavens 2014, 5)
Accordingly, it is not the recognition of the other as an intentional actor7 that 
is foundational for the specifically human mode of learning by imitation, but 
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the assumption of there being a point to imitation, in the sense of a leap of faith. 
Humans assume that the other’s actions are meaningful even if her action does 
not seem so at first blush. This supposition of meaning allows for a cultural 
dynamic that will turn out to be of particular importance even for the human 
biology.
That this assumption of meaning amounts to a leap of faith is demonstrated 
by experiments that confront toddlers with a conflict. They are presented with 
two different courses of action, and then they need to decide themselves what 
strategy to pursue.
After being shown two strategies, they chose to maintain the strategy or switch to the 
strategy employed by the pedagogical experimenter (pedagogical-then-no-contact 
and no-contact-then-pedagogical conditions), with whom they presumably shared a 
strong er bond (i. e., social affiliation) and whose normative behavior they may have been 
more motivated to copy. In the pedagogical-then-pedagogical condition, both experi-
menters were equally familiar and pedagogical. Here, it seems that children’s behavior 
was flexible and they performed the strategy they had seen last. (Hoehl et al. 2014, 131)
The capability of toddlers to imitate the actions of others precisely shapes even 
their neuronal system. The difference between human children and apes is even 
reflected in their mirror system. While in apes mirror neurons seem to react only 
to goal-directed action, “the human mirror system . . . codes both transitive and 
intransitive motor acts, it is able to code both the goal of the motor act and the 
movement of which the act is composed” (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2008, 124).
The significance of so-called over-imitation in a typically human mode of life 
is revealed only once the difference between the contexts of one’s lifeworld and 
the experimental setup in developmental psychology is taken into account. The 
experiments just mentioned induce children into imitating a pointless action – 
and the reason they are set up this way is that researchers know about the sig-
nificance of over-imitation for children. Thus, in the lab, over-imitation seems 
pointless, requiring a time commitment and incurring a competitive disadvan-
tage. But what seems odd in the lab does indeed serve a purpose in one’s life 
world. In this latter context, children imitate the actions of their adult care givers 
as well, yet these actions are typically goal directed. On the one hand, evolution 
and history have optimized a multitude of types of action. On the other hand, 
non-instrumental actions such as greeting rituals often fulfill a precise purpose 
in the lifeworld.
In learning by imitation, human children not only explore the world that is 
already opened up for them with respect to cognition, but an entire world of 
pragmatic options, even if their meaning is not plain to them. We can observe 
this every day: For example, toddlers learn to close the fridge long before their 
parents have explained, linguistically, the causality of an open fridge, melting 
ice, spoiling groceries, and a higher electricity bill. The fridge must be closed, 
and if an adult leaves it open too long, a child may well close it spontaneously. 
In mimetic learning, children grasp the difference between the necessity of clos-
ing the fridge and the possibility of leaving other doors, or windows, open. The 
same holds for non-instrumental actions. When attending a church service, chil-
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dren imitate their parents in taking a moment standing for meditation or a silent 
prayer before taking a seat in the pew. This way they learn to enact, in an em- 
bodied way, the difference that distinguishes liturgical communication from 
communication in the everyday world – long before they are able to grasp this 
difference intellectually, and this will then enable them to adopt an autonomous 
stance toward these different modes of communication.
The specific way humans learn culturally, their ability not only to learn from, 
but also through others, is manifest on an elementary level in the child’s imita-
tion of another. Thus, there is no point at which this kind of learning has taken 
place in a non-embodied form. Humans begin to learn culturally with one per-
son imitating the other, even over-imitating that person, in the terminology of 
developmental psychology. Embodied imitation is the tipping point at which 
natural evolution shifts to cultural development. Evolution has brought forth a 
life form that tends to imitate others by nature – and which is thus shaped cul-
turally from the outset.
That the specific mode of human cultural learning is fundamentally embod-
ied, rather than dependent on language, can be seen both in human phylogenesis 
and ontogenesis. Joint attention is the original social context of the supposition 
that there is in fact a point to what the other person is doing (Tomasello 2001, 
84 – 94): by use of a bodily action, such as pointing gestures or the adoption of a 
particular direction of view, persons draw the other’s attention to a third entity, 
at the same time ascertaining that the other grasps the communicated intention 
and acts accordingly.
With respect to phylogenesis, there is ample evidence that the early homi-
nin environment required cooperation. Early humans were a far cry from dom-
inating the savannah (de Waal 2009, 18 – 19). Instead, their survival depended 
fundamentally on cooperation. Unable to survive individually, humans have 
always depended on communication. To be successful, however, communication 
requires the assumption that a movement or an utterance does indeed transport 
meaning, and to respond appropriately to such a gesture is to make a leap of 
faith. Since both communicating parties are interested in communicating suc-
cessfully, however, they are both interested in trust not being exploited for illicit 
purposes. Any pointing gesture thus carries the message, you should – and you 
can – trust me! The pointing gesture not only carries informational content, but 
also communicates the intention to inform, as Tomasello shows. What is more, 
any pointing gesture at once even communicates the call to accept it, in trust, at 
face value. Since successful communication is selected for, however, over time the 
pointing gesture takes on the meaning “you can trust me!” In phylogenesis, the 
assumption of another’s action carrying meaning, to which one responds with 
a leap of faith, is at first embodied in “pointing and pantomiming” (Tomasello 
2014, 49).
In ontogenesis, children are introduced into human communication by way 
of “pointing and pantomiming” (Tomasello 2014, 49; see also Fuchs’s contribu-
tion to this volume) as well. Starting at the age of nine to 12 months, children 
trust “that the adult is pointing out to them something relevant to their current 
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search” (Tomasello 2014, 52). We might say that in trust they adapt to a physical 
gesture. If this trust turns out to be justified again and again, toddlers aged 14 to 
18 months themselves start to “use the pointing gesture to coordinate their joint 
activity” (Tomasello 2014, 51; see the literature used there).
Iconic gestures go beyond the simple pointing gesture “by actually symbol-
izing an entity, action, or situation in an external icon” (Tomasello 2014, 60). 
A necessary prerequisite of iconic gestures consists in the physical ability to 
perform an action resembling the real action itself (Tomasello 2014, 61). Based 
simp ly on their physical abilities, primates would be capable of “pantomiming,” 
but the function of their hands is much more strongly constrained: from the 
get-go the use of an ape’s hand is to hold on tight to its mother. By contrast, the 
human toddler is able to make free use of her hands in various ways (Portmann 
1944, 30). She thus discovers the possibilities her hands are given. But even if 
the motor requirements for gestures are fulfilled, pantomiming may not actually 
occur. Gestures make sense only once I assume that my partner in communica-
tion knows that I want to communicate something (Tomasello 2014, 61).
Both in phylogenesis and ontogenesis, the first forms that practice perspec-
tive taking are embodied in elementary forms of behavior. Perspective taking 
does not require the capacity to speak (Tomasello 2014, 127; see also Fuchs’s 
contribution to this volume). It is embodied articulation, not language, that is at 
the beginnings of communication (Jung 2009; Breyer 2015, 35 – 39). Embodied 
articulation is the tipping point at which natural evolution shifts into cultural 
development.
3. Evolutionary Anthropology Advocating  
for a Plurality of Culture
Humans are cultural beings by nature. To a large extent they shape their own 
behavior by learning and imitating other humans physically, rather than follow-
ing natural instincts. That the development of the human person is shaped by 
her cultural environment is clear from this, and at different times and in different 
contexts, the human person develops differently. Based on this mutual interde-
pendence of natural and cultural processes, we can conclude that humans do 
not live in a particular culture by nature. This has also been pointed out by the 
Jewish philosopher Michael Landmann (1913 – 84): “what is prefigured already in 
nature is the mere fact of culture, but not its particular shape” (Landmann 1961, 
60). There is no type of culture that derives from human nature, from the human 
essence, by necessity.
For that reason it is not correct either to conceive of culture in the singular as a human 
creation. Humans do not create culture in the singular, but particular people create 
their own culture. Humanity creates cultures. That humans may create culture in the 
first place already implies that they create them again and again in different ways, that 
they may create the most diverse cultures. (Landmann 1961, 26)
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Yet, since humans not only create diverse cultures but are themselves shaped by 
their respective cultures, there is no definite human essence. As both creators and 
creatures of culture, we encounter the human essence always in the plural.
The human person is just as diverse . . . as the cultures that shape the person. It is not 
that the human person brings forth different cultures while remaining the same, pass-
ing through them untouched as a constant entity. In creating cultures, humans finish 
creating themselves, and in each culture they provide themselves with a different form 
and direction (Landmann 1961, 61).
Due to the shape of a culture created by humans, human nature itself changes in 
history. “Historical variability is the radical human fate” (Landmann 1961, 26). 
The notion of an unchanging human core thus turns out to be a fiction. “If we 
wish to speak of a core, this would be nothing but open plasticity” (Landmann 
1961, 62, see 27).
This philosophical realization is correlated with the biological fact of the 
enormous human plasticity in ontogenesis. The elementary formation of the 
human baby during the first year is characterized by the exchange with others, 
which amounts to cultural formation.
Thus already during the first year, the life of the human child takes place in the realm of 
the ‘historic,’ in a time during which the human neonate would – if it were a mammal 
in all respects – still have to gain shape under the most pure conditions of natural law, 
i. e., in the darkness of the womb. (Portmann 1944, 70, see 81)
But even processes seemingly purely somatic “such as gaining an upright gait, the 
formation of the spine and the pelvis” (Portmann 1944, 125) take place in touch 
with the social environment, in one’s “own activity of striving, learning, and 
imitation” (Portmann 1944, 70). This is even clearer for the “development of the 
truly human possibilities in practicing and maturing” (Portmann 1944, 101), as in 
the varied uses of the hand, which can learn to write in an ‘elegant hand,’ to play 
the piano brilliantly, to touch gently. The ‘low speed’ of human somatic develop-
ment allows for social and psychic shaping, thus bringing forth the human being 
as an entity characterized by an irreducible mutual interdependence of nature 
and culture, body and psyche (Portmann 1944).
What Portmann described in developmental and behavioral respect corres-
ponds to current thinking about the plasticity of the human brain. “The human 
brain is not only the most complex, but also the most adaptable organ that we 
know of. As the neurosciences show, all our experiences, perceptions, and inter-
actions with the environment modify the neuronal structures throughout our 
lives” (Fuchs 2013, 156). Notably, the long maturation period of the human brain 
is of great significance, since at birth it amounts “only to a little more than 25 % 
of an adult’s brain volume,” appearing not to be fully matured even at age ten 
(Grupe et. al., 67). Evolution has thus brought forth an organ that for its devel-
opment depends on an environment conducive to life, only reaching its detailed 
structure in interaction with the environment. The influence of the envir onment 
extends even into the precise neuronal structures.
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8 See Süssmuth 1984, 8: “There are several tasks of historical anthropology: to detect forms 
of human culture covered by other historical layers, to uncover manifold expressions of life, to 
contribute to a critique of ideologies in making clear distinctions between stereotypical con-
ceptions of imposed and constant characteristics of human motivations, attitudes, and forms 
of behavior.”
9 I am grateful for Michael Bergunder’s challenge to reflect more deeply about the relation 
between embodiment and discourse theories. The phrasing used here follows Bergunder’s un-
derstanding of discourses as “social practices having material effects” (Bergunder 2014, 263), 
which he develops in discussing Foucault, Butler, and Laclau.
Thus, brain research confirms an insight that Portmann, as a biologist, reached 
in the 1940s: “We see the biological characteristics of the human precisely in how 
inherited factors irreducibly grow together with the various social effects – in 
ways that are final and unique from the point of view of the individual” (Port-
mann 1944, 127).
The extent to which the human person is open to social influences can also be 
seen in human sexuality: “even that part of human behavior that is most instinc-
tual, sexuality, is open for a far-reaching freedom of personal decision” (Port-
mann 1944, 59) – and thus for cultural shaping.
Insofar as evolutionary anthropology explores the human as a being that is, 
by nature, open to the cultural shaping of its nature, it opens up bridges for 
a sustained and robust dialogue with historical anthropology, which draws on 
methods from cultural studies. Evolutionary anthropology explores the human 
as a living being that is shaped culturally even in its very nature. It also raises 
awareness of the fact that by nature the human person is destined for culture, 
although not for any specific culture. For that reason, human nature varies his-
torically. The human being is historical and cultural by nature, calling for histor-
ical description. Taking the tipping point of nature and culture seriously, we see 
that the (lived) body is a bridge from evolutionary to historical anthropology.
4. Evolutionary and Cultural Anthropologies
Historical anthropology sees its task in pointing out historical alternatives to 
what seems a matter of course8 and in working against “unwitting retrojections 
of contemporary conceptions onto the past” (Tanner 2009, 147, see 154). The 
human body represents the “starting point of historical anthropology” as well, 
but here the body is seen less in its evolutionary genesis, but “rather in its histor-
ical and cultural character” (Wulf 2004, 134). The cultural and historical forma-
tion of the body is in the foreground – and not only the lived body (Leib), but 
even the seemingly natural body as it is described in medicine and physiology. 
“Even the scientific anthropologies thus appear with a temporal index, becoming 
accessible for analysis in their historically contingent shape” (Tanner 2009, 151).
To put it succinctly in terms of discourse analysis: discourses as societal prac-
tices that must be explored historically are inscribed into the body, thus bringing 
forth bodies as their material effects.9 This thesis contradicts modern dualism, 
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as does evolutionary anthropology – only from the other shore, to continue the 
image of the bridge. Michael Bergunder points out that the notion of the material 
effects of discourse overcomes the “usual, but unsatisfactory, dichotomising into 
discursive and non-discursive, into thought and reality” (Bergunder 2014, 263). 
The notion of discursive practices having material effects is thus directed against 
a dualism that distinguishes thought as mere representation of reality and reality 
itself to begin with. In a second step, the question would be how the two aspects 
can be brought together. According to Bergunder, by contrast, there is no reality 
that is not always already shaped by discourse. We should take the intertwining 
of culture and nature as a starting point, rather than the supposed dichotomy. 
The idea that at first there was nature without culture, which would then be 
reshaped by culture, is ill-suited to how things are. In this respect, the cultural 
approach of discourse analysis runs parallel to a central insight of the philosophy 
of embodiment.
In another respect, both discourse theory and the embodiment paradigm 
choose intersubjectivity as their starting point in describing human reality. The 
individual subject exists only in intersubjective relationships. The subjective 
Spirit – even if taken in the sense of a material reality of the brain – gains shape 
through interaction with the objective Spirit, in being formed by discourses in 
society. The Spirit of a time objectifies itself in law, religion, education, the arts, 
and the sciences. There is no point at which an individual may become aware of 
himself in which he has not already been shaped historically.
Neither the cultural studies approach nor the embodiment paradigm takes 
the individual Spirit as its point of departure, after which one might go on to ask 
how this individual Spirit relates to others and to material reality. Instead, both 
approaches begin by looking at the interrelationship of sociality, individuality, 
and material reality. Human persons “create and modify their being in engaging 
the things that they move and by which they are moved” (Tanner 2009, 155). Yet 
precisely in this respect, human persons resemble all other organisms, as empha-
sized both by Foucault and enactivist thinkers (Foucault 1978; Thompson 2007, 
74, see Malafouris this volume). Thus, we can identify two points of agreement 
between the cultural studies approach and the embodiment paradigm. To begin 
with, they share the concern to overcome the modern dichotomy of thought and 
reality, but they also agree in their fundamental focus on intersubjectivity. These 
two points of agreement, however, raise two important questions.
1. What conditions do bodies have to fulfill in order to be shaped by discur-
sive practices?
2. What properties must a reality have so that individuals do not only con-
stitute the discourse, but are always already shaped by it? To put it differently: 
What is required for top-down effects that is a feedback between the objective 
spirit and the subjectively lived bodies?
According to Judith Butler, the task of cultural anthropology is to discover 
the body as a “site of a number of possibilities that are expanding in cultural 
ways” (Butler 1997a, 11). As the body is not determined by nature, it can become 
a site of unexplored possibilities. This view is not far from Portmann’s notion of 
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the human as born “premature” physiologically. The human being is that which 
is non-determined by nature – see already Nietzsche’s argument to this effect 
(Nietzsche 2003, 56: section 62). Thus, there is a biological basis, as it were, for 
the cultural studies approach (see Foucault 1978, xix). This also implies at the 
same time, however, that the biological description does not necessarily lead to 
essentialism. For biology itself indicates that, based on nature, we cannot say 
what a lived body is and what possibilities it holds. “Even to the biologist the 
human person must appear as that very particular being with a history, as the liv-
ing being with its particular second nature, i. e., culture” (Portmann 1944, 20). It 
is precisely the embodiment approach that discovers the human body as less than 
completely determined, as a “site of a number of possibilities that are expanding 
due to culture” (Portmann 1944, 20).
If the human person, or humanity, materializes realities in discourse, as the cul-
tural studies approach maintains, this implies not only that the human person 
is open to the world, but also that the world is open for the human person. If 
the world were completely determined physically, discursive practices would be 
unable to change the world. By contrast, the cultural studies approach asserts 
that discursive practices gain shape in the world and thereby shape the world 
themselves. The environment of the human person does not simply determine 
human behavior, but in exchange with the environment, the human person 
shapes herself and her world. That is exactly the thesis which the approach called 
enactivism proposes within the framework of the embodiment paradigm: in act-
ing, the human person participates in bringing forth her world.
That the cultural studies approach is partly in agreement with the embodi-
ment approach can also be observed in Judith Butler’s texts, notably in her 
ambivalent relation to Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. According to 
Merleau-Ponty, the lived body is the tipping point of nature and culture, that 
is – in Butler’s words – “the site where the materiality of language and that of the 
world . . . are perpetually negotiated” (Butler 1993, 69). For precisely this reason 
Butler is fascinated with Merleau-Ponty’s approach: “It seemed to me that he 
offered a promising denaturalization of the gendered body” (Butler 1997b, 185). 
He appears to understand the lived body as a “‘historical idea’ rather than ‘a nat-
ural species’” (Butler 1989, 85). The body is conceived of “as a modality of exist-
ence, the ‘place’ in which possibilities are realized” (Butler 1989, 86). Butler con-
cedes that in principle, Merleau-Ponty does not think of the body in essentialist 
terms (Butler 1989, 94), but she sees his argument in The Phenomenology of 
Perception amounting implicitly to a “universalization of the male subject” (But-
ler 1989, 98), which misses the point that gender is always already constituted 
in discourse. Merleau-Ponty describes the individual sexual situation without 
taking into consideration that individuals always face “a sedimented sexuality” 
(Butler 1989, 90). It is only for this reason, Butler argues, that Merleau-Ponty can 
understand the universal dialectics of slave and master as an implication of lived 
experience (Butler 1989, 96). He cites current practice, thus again reinforcing it. 
Doing so, he normatively asserts and strengthens a supposed essence of women: 
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10 According to Butler, in his “incomplete and posthumously published The Visible and the 
Invisible,” Merleau-Ponty “achieved a philosophical distance from the sexual Cartesianism of 
his phenomenological colleagues,” suggesting instead an “ontology of the tactile, a description 
of sensual life” (Butler 1989, 97 f.).
“The slave must be the Other, the exact opposite of the Subject, but nevertheless 
remain his possession” (Butler 1989, 96). By contrast, Butler points out, what 
seems natural to Merleau-Ponty must be deconstructed as the result of a histor-
ical genesis.10
If we take seriously that by nature the human person requires description in 
historical terms, then there is no longer any living being ‘behind’ history that 
is merely natural. Instead, in history there is nothing but the (lived) body as 
the tipping point of nature and culture. This (lived) body, however, can also be 
described precisely with respect to biology. Without the plasticity of the human 
person and her brain, which can be described from a biological point of view, 
without the human ability to interact socially, which can be described by an 
evolutionary anthropology (Tomasello 2014, ch. 1), and without the elementary 
intercorporeity, in which human persons are always already oriented towards 
each other, which can be highlighted in developmental psychology (Fuchs 2013, 
188 – 208, Hoehl et al. 2014), we would not be able to conceive of a natural being 
that can be specified historically. At the same time, biology and psychology 
describe processes that illustrate how comprehensive the influence of social prac-
tices on the human person is. Developmental psychology shows “that learning 
begins already long before birth” (Pauen 2012, 10). Further insights into how 
toddlers learn a particular language demonstrate the far-reaching consequences of 
discursive practices as well. According to studies with infants, “new-born babies 
are sensitive to all sounds of all languages at first, but they lose this sensitivity 
already around the end of their first year, from then on being able only to distin-
guish the sounds of those languages they hear particularly often” (Pauen 2012, 
12). Our social environment not only opens up possibilities for us, it also stunts 
certain possibilities of early infancy. Since our regular social communication 
involves the significant capacity to distinguish between different human faces, 
but not between the faces of apes, infants lose their initial capability of identify-
ing chimpanzee faces individually (Pauen 2012, 13). Neurology shows “that such 
influences are correlated with changes in brain structure” (Pauen 2012, 13) – that 
indeed the social aspect shapes the natural dimension. Notably the development 
of the prefrontal cortex is “open to influences by the social environment in an 
especially high degree. The predisposition toward neuronal and synaptic circuit 
patterns of the prefrontal cortex is actualized not via genetic guidance, but via 
one’s own experience” (Hüther 2012, 16). Exactly which neuronal circuits will 
develop depends on “the stimuli for particular kinds of use which [children and 
youths] experience during their education and socialization. In consequence, at 
least this area of the human brain must be considered a social product” (Hüther 
2012, 17; see Tanner 2009, 152).
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Moreover, the study of epigenetics shows that an organism’s experiences and 
its behavior can have an influence on its sex cells. In 2014, a research group in 
Zurich headed by Isabelle M. Mansuy, a researcher in neuroepigenetics, suc-
ceeded in demonstrating the inheritance of early childhood traumata by off-
spring in mice (Gapp et al. 2014). Presumably microRNA – short copies of 
genetic material influencing gene expression – is involved in transmitting in- 
herited information in this case. The research group discovered
that traumatic stress in early life altered mouse microRNA (miRNA) expression, and 
behavioral and metabolic responses in the progeny. Injection of sperm RNAs from 
traumatized males into fertilized wild-type oocytes reproduced the behavioral and 
metabolic alterations in the resulting offspring. (Gapp et al. 2014, 667)
If these results can be replicated and shown to apply to humans as well, we will 
be dealing with a scientific account of how social experience shapes embodied 
beings across generations. Neuroepigenetics demonstrates that even the reality 
of each of us is historically sedimented.
The fact that discursive practices have real effects and that social relation-
ships shape what is supposedly natural hearkens back to the challenges that 
psychosomatics has always presented for our understanding. The difficulty is 
how psychic realities as well as social ones generate physical realities – that is, 
diseases, as in psychosomatic medicine, or potentially gender, as Judith But-
ler argues. A sophisticated psychosomatics presupposes an interdependence 
between psychic and physical factors that is non-linear, however. In this respect, 
the physical dimension, the body, also plays a role in the genesis of a reality 
that is always shaped by this interdependence. Since social interaction typically 
involves vision, for example, the ability to interact communally is also due to the 
particularities in the morphology of the human eye, the extraordinary human 
sociality to our particular vulnerability, as Darwin noted (see Darwin 2004, 
83 f.).
The (lived) body is indeed the “site of a number of possibilities that are 
expanding in cultural ways” (Butler 1997a, 11), but it has a say in fulfilling these 
possibilities – and thus there are limits to the ways it might be shaped.
5. Historical Anthropology  
and the Anthropology of Embodiment
The bridge between evolutionary anthropology and historical anthropology not 
only opens a passage from the former to the latter, however. In pointing out 
alternatives to practices and understandings that seem a matter of course, his-
torical anthropology relativizes the modern understanding of humanity that is 
characterized by the dualism of spirit and body. It is just one perception among 
several options that have been instantiated historically. The typically modern 
anthropological distinction between inside and outside is culturally conditioned 
as well.
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In our languages of self-understanding, the opposition ‘inside-outside’ plays an 
important role. We think of our thoughts, ideas, or feelings as being ‘within’ us, while 
the objects in the world which these mental states bear on are ‘without’. Or else we 
think of our capacities or potentialities as ‘inner’, awaiting the development which will 
manifest them or realize them in the public world. The unconscious is for us within, 
and we think of the depths of the unsaid, the unsayable, the powerful inchoate feelings 
and affinities and fears which dispute with us the control of our lives, as inner. (Taylor 
2001, 111)
Yet, this feeling of interiority is not atemporal, but is part of a “historically lim-
ited mode of self-interpretation, one which has become dominant in the modern 
West” (Taylor 2001, 111).
The anthology Der ganze Mensch: Zur Anthropologie der Antike und ihrer 
europäischen Nachgeschichte (“The Entire Human Person: Anthropology in 
the Antique World and its European Post-History”), edited by Bernd Janowski 
(Janowski 2012), shows in an exemplary manner that the antique world, in all 
its variety, thought in quite different ways. The introduction states explicitly 
that when modern scholars, “with an integrative intention, critical of academic 
theory,” asked for the whole person in the sense of an “alternative idea,” there 
have “again and again been surprising points of contact with the anthropological 
discourses of the antique world” (Janowski 2012, 9 f.). In ancient Egypt, “the 
body is conceived of as an entirety composed of individual parts,” and human 
life is thought of as “integration into social relationships” (Janowski 2012, 10). 
Mesopotamian traditions are not aware of the “modern separation between the 
physical, psychic-mental, and the social aspects” of one’s life (Janowski 2012, 10; 
see Steinert 2012). Even ancient Greece cannot be simply considered a precursor 
of modern dualism. Even for Homer there is “quite obviously . . . no center of 
our consciousness” (Bremmer 2012, 176). Neither does the medical-philosophi-
cal tradition of the antique world understand the inner human dimension as the 
true person, but rather as that which is internal to the body (Weissenrieder 2016).
Pursuing a consistently historical interpretation, the exegesis of the Old and 
the New Testament has also contributed to the relativization of modern dualism. 
The Old Testament scholar Hans Walter Wolff from Heidelberg pointed out in 
his groundbreaking Anthropology of the Old Testament (1973; see Wolff 1975; 
see Janowski 2013) that from the Old Testament perspective, the human person 
appears as embodied throughout. The Hebrew term that is commonly translated 
as soul, næpæš, denotes “needy man, who aspires to life and is therefore living.” 
The term grasps the human person “primarily in his need and desire,” but also in 
his “emotional excitability and vulnerability,” as a pathic being, as a psychoso-
matic unity. The concept is characterized by the dimension of “‘vitality’, which 
also applies to the animal” (Wolff 1975, 25). The human person is flesh, and so 
the Hebrew term for flesh bāśār can stand in for the personal pronoun in rhe- 
t orical parallelism (Ps 119:120; see Wolff 1975, 28).
For the most part, a dualist anthropology is foreign to the New Testament as 
well. Paul’s letters do not portray, for example, the soul as the site at which the 
relationship with the divine takes place. Instead, they call the body the temple of 
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11 Presumably, Paul suffered from “a physical deficiency that adversely affected his rhe-
torical performance” (Martin 1995, 54). This may have been the physical result of the abuse he 
suffered as a missionary. In that case, his body would have manifested, in the eyes of his antique 
environment, the lowly, dishonorable state of the apostle. For in Roman culture, “a beaten body 
was a dishonoured body” (see Glancy 2010, 41). Yet, Paul’s wish for this weakness to be cured 
was not granted. Instead, he came to embody the word of the risen Christ, “My grace is suffi-
cient for you” (2 Cor. 12:9). The supposed deficit of the apostle’s body thus comes to embody 
the word of the cross and contributes to the transvaluation of all values which it brings about.
the Holy Spirit (1 Cor. 6:19). Paul understands the present body as a soma psy-
chikon, as a psychosomatic unity (1 Cor. 15:44; see Theißen 2016; Weissenrieder 
2016; Etzelmüller 2016). He is impressed by the (lived) body
as an organismic interaction of a limited plurality of organs. Paul thus chooses the body 
as an ideal image for the congregation and the church: a polyphonic interplay of organs 
resulting in mutual strengthening and edification, not by way of mono-hierarchical 
forms of power, but structured only through changing constellations of functional pri-
oritization and subordination. (Welker 2013, 72; see Wilckens 1980, 67)
Moreover, Paul is sensitive to the fact that conflicts in the congregation can result 
in physical disease (1 Cor. 11:30; see Weissenrieder, Etzelmüller 2010, 25 f.), but 
he also sees how the supposed deficiency of his own body contributes to the 
creation of the kind of community11 that says “those members of the body that 
we think less honorable we clothe with greater honor, and our less respectable 
members are treated with greater respect” (1 Cor. 12:23; see Martin 1995, 102).
Over against an anthropology that is construed in dualistic or mentalis-
tic ways, to biblical scholars it seems only appropriate – and only possible – 
to highlight the alien character of the Biblical perception of the human person. 
But surprisingly, the historical reconstruction of the anthropologies of the Old 
and the New Testament shows an understanding of the human person that is 
much closer to current research and discourse about embodiment in the neuro-
sciences, in biology, medicine, and philosophy than those understandings of the 
human that we usually consider modern. Anthropologies of the Old and the 
New Testament thus do not merely open up perspectives on texts that are histor-
ically distanced, but do uncover alternatives to classical modern anthropology. 
In this sense, historical anthropology turns out to hold great potential for future 
research on anthropology.
In conclusion, the human person turns out to be the tipping point between 
an evolutionary and a historical anthropology. On the one hand, evolutionary 
anthropology reveals that by nature, the human person is destined for culture, 
hence being “mere plasticity.” On the other hand, historical anthropology shows 
that foreign, historical perceptions of humans knew about this plasticity, i. e., the 
ineluctable, non-linear interdependence between physical and psychic, individual 
and social, as well as between natural and cultural processes.
It was in view of the Old Testament, which sees the human person as funda-
mentally characterized by the dialogue with God, that Wolff asserted: “In his 
dialogue with God above all, man sees himself as called into question, searched 
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out and thus much less established for what he is than called to new things” 
(Wolff 1975, 3, translation revised; see also Weissenrieder’s contribution to this 
volume). In accordance with this, the New Testament also sees the human being 
as characterized by an open future. The First Epistle of John puts it paradig-
matically: “what we will be has not yet been revealed” (1 John 3:2). This biblical 
insight goes well together with an evolutionary anthropology, which does not 
aim at a description of the human essence, but rather at a better understanding 
of those natural processes that allow the human person to create and establish 
something new again and again. The results of a historical genesis should not be 
misunderstood as the description of the human essence, but as enabling the very 
process of transcending.
As the searchlights of evolutionary and historical anthropology converge 
on the lived body, the human person appears as a living being that cannot be 
described appropriately in naturalistic terms, but as a complex unity resulting 
from the interdependence of natural and cultural processes. This complex con-
stellation is condensed precisely in human embodiment. For this reason, “every 
substantial presentation of the human being must renounce the artificial sep-
aration between approaches in the sciences and in the humanities, which makes 
sense only for more narrow purposes” (Portmann 1944, 125). An embodied 
being that is mere plasticity and that is consequently open in its future demands 
an interdisciplinary anthropology that includes the diverse disciplines and pro-
vides new perspectives on the human (lived) body as the site of possibilities not 
yet realized.
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The Roots of Human Morals and Culture  
in Pre-Human Sympathy
Charles Darwin’s Natural and Cultural History of Morals
Eve-Marie Engels
Abstract: The human being was a topic for Darwin’s revolutionary theory of descent from 
the very beginning (1838). Darwin’s evolutionary anthropology sought to explain not only 
our bodily structure but also the origin of our emotions, of conscience and of the moral 
sense. For Darwin “sympathy” is a fundamental element of the social instincts in ani-
mals as well as a basic element of our moral sense, one which links us to our nonhuman 
predecessors. At the same time Darwin adheres to the idea that morality is a uniquely 
human trait, not reducible to animal instincts; without traces of such sympathetic instincts 
a human being would be an “unnatural monster”. In accordance with his general theory 
of descent Darwin emphasizes the continuity between humans and other animals as well 
as new traits unique to humans: self-consciousness, verbal language and morality. This 
distinguishes him from some of his current adherents.
Introduction
The aim of my contribution is to introduce Charles Darwin as the founder of 
an evolutionary anthropology, who has a particular interest in emphasizing man 
as a being capable of morals. In his natural history of the human being, as out-
lined in his work Descent of Man and further supported in The Expression of the 
Emotions in Man and Animals, Darwin links human evolution to that of other 
animals. In doing so he draws on the old principle of continuity, which has a 
long tradition. In the context of Darwin’s theory, however, the static principle of 
continuity is turned into a dynamic one. Different species are linked together by 
their evolutionary history, and humans are an animal species that has descended 
from prehuman animals and embodies their phylogenetic experience by inheri-
tance. Humans share certain traits with other extinct and living animals through 
descent. On the other hand each new species has particular features which allow 
it to be distinguished from other species. Darwin characterizes the human being 
as the only one which possesses moral faculties, a moral sense. This moral sense 
is a complex human trait with different elements, some of which have their roots 
in our animal history. However Darwin is not a reductionist; he does not claim 
that humans’ moral sense can be reduced to animals’ social instincts.
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1 In my book Charles Darwin (Engels 2007), published in the philosophical series “Den-
ker,” I have explored in more detail the philosophical aspects of Darwin’s theory of descent, his 
evolutionary anthropology and his moral philosophy. For Darwin’s philosophical revolution 
see Engels 2008.
2 The first edition of Descent of Man was published in 1871, a second augmented and cor-
rected edition in 1874. A revised and augmented edition of 1874 was published in 1877. I am 
using the edition of 1877 (Darwin 1989), published in two volumes. When I refer to the second 
one, I will quote as “Darwin 1989, II.”
3 This is the complete term of Darwin’s theory which he uses in the 6th edition of Origin 
of Species (1876).
1. Darwin’s Scientific and Philosophical Revolution
With his theory of descent Darwin created a paradigmatic framework for under-
standing the evolution of organisms.1 He offered an explanation of the origin 
of new species and of the functional character of organisms’ traits, their adapta-
tions, by invoking a unitary scientific principle or mechanism. The revolutionary 
character of his solution consists in having achieved this without drawing on 
religious or other metaphysical assumptions, such as a Creator God, an intel-
ligent designer, or Aristotelian final causes and goal-directed forces immanent 
in nature. Darwin’s goal was to “overthrow the dogma of separate creations” 
(Darwin [1877] 1989, 65)2, the idea that each single species has been created by 
God and the idea of the constancy of species. Species have neither been created 
separately nor are they immutable. Darwin wanted to provide evidence for the 
view that species come into being via the transformation of other species, and 
that this can be explained by natural laws. From the first edition of his Origin 
of Species in 1859 onwards Darwin declined to explain the origin of life as such 
and that of mental faculties: “I must premise, that I have nothing to do with the 
origin of the primary mental powers, any more than I have with that of life itself” 
(Darwin [1859] 1964, 207; see similarly Darwin’s last edition [1876] 1988, 214). 
In his letter of April 18, 1863 to the Athenæum on some reviewers’ reactions to 
the Origin’s use of “Pentateuchal” terminology (he had written of “some one 
primordial form, into which life was first breathed”, Darwin [1859] 1964, 484) 
Darwin admits that “in a purely scientific work I ought perhaps not to have used 
such terms; but they well serve to confess that our ignorance is as profound on 
the origin of life as on the origin of force or matter” (Darwin 1999, 324).
Darwin was not the first to conceive of the mutability of species. From the 
4th American printing (1860) and more extensively from the 3rd English edi-
tion (1861) onwards he mentions in his introduction authors who anticipated the 
idea, among them Buffon, Darwin’s grandfather Erasmus Darwin, and Lamarck. 
Although Darwin particularly emphasizes Lamarck, he also mentions some 
Lamarckian assumptions which he does not find convincing, such as his concept 
of progressive development and his idea of an ongoing spontaneous generation. 
However, with respect to inheritance he draws on Lamarck’s theory of the inher-
itance of acquired characters, which was widespread at that time.
The starting point of Darwin’s “theory of descent with modification, through 
variation and Natural Selection”3 is the assumption that there is an analogy 
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between the origin of new breeds of plants and animals by domestication 
(“methodical selection,” “artificial selection”) and that of new species in free 
nature. Methodical or artificial selection is a main topic in Darwin’s The Varia-
tion of Animals and Plants under Domestication ([1875] 1988), first published in 
1868. Breeders select those individuals of a race which have certain traits or char-
acters useful for the breeders’ purpose, and let them propagate. In the course of 
many generations these traits (insofar as they can be inherited) gradually prevail 
or take the form intended by the breeder. “The key is man’s power of accumu-
lative selection: nature gives successive variations; man adds them up in certain 
directions useful to him. In this sense he may be said to make for himself useful 
breeds” (Darwin [1859] 1964, 30).
In free nature there is an analogous mechanism of selection. Here, however, 
the selected traits are useful for an organism itself in its environment. Darwin 
proceeds from the observation that two organisms of the same species are never 
completely identical. There are always differences between them, variations, 
however small they may be, and thus also differences in the organisms’ adap-
tation to an environment. Those organisms of a species whose traits are bet-
ter adapted to their environment have a higher chance of survival and thus on 
average bear more offspring than the others. This means that a natural selec-
tion of the better adapted takes place. Due to inheritance, those traits which are 
advantageous for survival can accumulate over generations and so increasingly 
change compared to the traits of the aboriginal stock. Over long periods of time, 
from individual variants hereditary varieties, subspecies and finally new species 
thereby evolve. Darwin advocates a gradualism and repeatedly draws on the 
principle of continuity of natural philosophy: “Natura non facit saltum” (Darwin 
[1859] 1964, 194, 206, 210, 243, 460, 471). However, this principle is no longer 
static; it becomes dynamic and it stands for a real relationship between species. 
Natural selection thus leads not only to the dying out of species but also the 
generation of new species. Species descend from other species, and from one 
species several others can evolve by adapting to different places in the “economy 
of nature” (Darwin [1859] 1964, 331, 470). The finches of the Galápagos Islands 
are a striking example of this “principle of divergence” (Darwin [1859] 1964, 112, 
118). Today we call these places in the economy of nature ecologic niches.
In contrast to artificial selection there is no breeder in nature who purposively 
chooses organisms for propagation. How can selection be applied to organisms 
living in a state of nature? Since Darwin no longer drew on the Creator as the 
intelligent designer of species he had to discover some kind of a non-personal nat-
ural mechanism fulfilling the function of selection. Here Darwin leaves the anal-
ogy between artificial and natural selection. He names this natural mechanism the 
“struggle for life” or “struggle for existence” and draws upon Malthus’ law of pop-
ulation. The political economist and clergyman Thomas Robert Malthus points to 
a disproportion between the arithmetical progression of the means of subsistence 
(1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) and the geometrical progression (when unchecked) of the human 
species (1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32) (Malthus 1989, 1:15). Since human populations by and 
large exhibit stability, there must be a mechanism which limits this increase.
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4 I thank the editors of the Darwin Correspondence Project, University of Cambridge, for 
access to unpublished material from the correspondence between Charles Bradlaugh and Dar-
win. The quoted material is at a pre-publication stage, and the Project cannot be held respon-
sible for any errors of transcription remaining. I also thank the copyright holder of this letter, 
Mr. William Huxley Darwin (London), for his permission to quote the letter. Finally I thank 
Dr. Paul White from the Darwin Correspondence Project for our helpful correspondence on 
the interpretation of this letter.
Malthus assumes the constant effect of preventive checks (late marriage or 
restraint from marriage due to sexual abstinence or celibacy) and positive checks 
(common diseases and epidemics, wars, pestilence, plague, convulsions of 
nature, famine) (Malthus 1989, 1:16 – 18). He terms the preventive checks “moral 
restraint,” meaning “a restraint from marriage from prudential motives, with a 
conduct strictly moral during the period of this restraint” (Malthus 1989, 1:18n4).
Reading Malthus’ Essay on 28 September 1838, the idea struck Darwin of how 
to apply the concept of natural selection to free nature.
Hence, as more individuals are produced than can possibly survive, there must in every 
case be a struggle for existence, either one individual with another of the same species, 
or with the individuals of distinct species, or with the physical conditions of life. It is 
the doctrine of Malthus applied with manifold force to the whole animal and vegetable 
kingdoms; for in this case there can be no artificial increase of food, and no prudential 
restraint from marriage. (Darwin [1859] 1964, 63)
But a scarcity in resources is for Darwin only one of many causes of this often 
misunderstood “struggle for life.” Even in situations of abundance of food there 
can be a struggle for life with differential outcomes for reproduction. Life may 
depend on skills such as better hiding, faster climbing and smarter behaviour. 
Cognitive, social, and moral faculties can be as important as bodily vigour in this 
struggle for life in which only the fittest survive. From the 5th edition of Origin 
of Species onwards Darwin adds to “natural selection” the term “survival of the 
fittest,” coined by Herbert Spencer (1864), “fit” meaning adapted to fulfil the 
demands of a given situation (Spencer 1864, 1:444 f.).
For Darwin there is no exception to Malthus’ law and he already includes 
the human being in his calculation: “Even slow-breeding man has doubled in 
twenty-five years, and at this rate, in a few thousand years, there would literally 
not be standing room for his progeny” (Darwin [1859] 1964, 64). Particularly 
the moral or preventive checks described by Malthus play an important role in 
Darwin’s later arguments in his Descent of Man in the context of his concerns for 
the future of mankind. Darwin rejected artificial birth control, a growing topic 
in the 19th century, fearing it would threaten chastity and thereby the basis of 
the family bond. The weakening of the family bond would be the “greatest of all 
possible evils to mankind,” as he wrote in a letter to Charles Bradlaugh (Darwin 
1877).4 He was concerned about the loss of morality and of the social and insti-
tutional security the family provided (see Engels 2012).
From the outset, the metaphors of “natural selection” and “struggle for exis-
tence” were subject to much misunderstanding. They can have quite different 
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5 For an overview of the reception of Charles Darwin in European countries, see Engels 
and Glick (2008).
6 There are further notebooks on geological, ornithological and more subjects, but I will 
concentrate on the above mentioned two. The different notebooks have been transcribed and 
edited by Barrett et al. (1987), and I use their edition here. There are other, earlier transcriptions 
and editions of Darwin’s notebooks by Gruber and Barrett (1974) and by Sir Gavin de Beer, 
M. J. Rowlands, and B. M. Skramowsky on the transmutation of species in Bulletin of the Brit-
ish Museum (Natural History) Historical Series Vol. 2, London 1969 und Historical Series Vol. 3 
London 1971.
meanings: intraspecific as well as interspecific competition, and the struggle of 
individuals or groups against environmental dangers (drought, coldness, wet-
ness, etc.). Darwin moreover uses “the term Struggle for Existence in a large and 
metaphorical sense, including dependence of one being on another, and includ-
ing (which is more important) not only the life of the individual, but success in 
leaving progeny” (Darwin [1859] 1964, 62). The phrase “struggle for life” has 
often been interpreted as a bloody or deadly fight between individuals, races or 
species. In a letter to William Preyer Darwin expresses apprehensions about the 
equivocality of the phrase “struggle for existence,” suspecting “that the German 
term Kampf &c. does not give quite the same idea.” (Darwin 2009, 161).
Depending on the situation, the struggle for existence can be coped with by 
competition or cooperation. The necessity of cooperation for survival and for the 
spread of social virtues is outlined extensively in Darwin’s Descent of Man. The 
emphasis on mutual aid is a line of Darwin-reception which was pursued partic-
ularly in Russia (see Todes 1989). A prominent example is Petr Kropotkin’s book 
Mutual Aid. A Factor of Evolution (1902).5
Already at the end of the first edition of Origin of Species Darwin alludes 
to the importance of his theory of descent for our understanding of the human 
being (Darwin [1859] 1964, 488): “In the distant future I see open fields for far 
more important researches. Psychology will be based on a new foundation, that 
of the necessary acquirement of each mental power and capacity by gradation. 
Light will be thrown on the origin of man and his history” (Darwin [1859] 1964, 
488).
2. Darwin’s Descent of Man
2.1 Darwin’s Early Notebooks
Darwin’s conviction, that humans and other animals are relatives can be traced 
back to his early Notebooks of 1837 (Barrett et al. 1987). Already in July 1837, 
twenty-two years before the publication of his Origin of Species, Darwin began 
writing a series of notebooks in which he treated the revolutionary subject of the 
“transmutation of species.” A second series, which he started in the middle of 
1838, was focused on philosophical subjects: “metaphysical enquiries.”6 These 
notebooks show that Darwin was already convinced of the idea of evolution as 
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opposed to the doctrine of separate creation and constancy of species. In 1842 
he wrote a 35-page sketch of his theory and enlarged it into a 230-page essay in 
1844. These manuscripts were published posthumously by Darwin’s son Francis 
(F. Darwin [1909] 1986).
The scientific and metaphysical notebooks, which were not intended for pub-
lication, manifest in an impressive way the encyclopedic interests Darwin already 
had as a young man. When he set out on the voyage of the Beagle (1831 – 1836) 
he was only twenty-two years old, and when he began to write his notebooks, 
which reveal the germ of his revolutionary theory, he was twenty-eight. The 
Notebooks as well as Darwin’s Marginalia (Di Gregorio 1990) present his com-
ments on a wide range of literature. He reads, extracts, and comments on authors 
of geology, botany, zoology, other natural sciences, medicine, psychology, phi-
losophy, theology, political economics, history and other fields. Darwin’s Note-
books can be characterized as a workshop for his out-of-the-ordinary ideas, his 
thought experiments in exploring radical theoretical possibilities. In his Note-
books “we can, if we look carefully, almost catch his thought on the wing” (Gru-
ber and Barrett 1974, xv).
In the following I will present a very short selection of Darwin’s notes which 
concern his awareness of the radical nature of his ideas (e.g., C 76), his criticism 
of traditional philosophy (e.g., M 84e, M 128), his early views on the origin of 
species (e.g., B 101), his conception of the descent of humans from other animals 
(e.g., C 196 f.), his view of the difference between animal instincts and human 
reasoning powers (C 77 – 78), and other subjects:7
It is absurd to talk of one animal being higher than another.– We consider those, where 
  cerebral structurethe {  } most developed, as highest.–  intellectual faculties
A bee doubtless would when the instincts were.–
(Barrett et al. 1987, B 74, 189)
Astronomers might formerly have said that God ordered, each planet to move in its 
particular destiny.– In same manner God orders each animal created with certain form 
in certain country, but how much more simple, & sublime power let attraction act 
according to certain laws such are inevitable consequen let animal be created, then by 
the fixed laws of generation, such will be their successors.–
(Barrett et al. 1987, B 101, 195)
If all men were dead then monkeys make men.– Men makes angels–
(Barrett et al. 1987, B 169, 213)
Animals– whom we have made our slaves we do not like to consider our equals.– « Do 
not slave holders wish to make the black man other kind? . . . » Animals with affections, 
imitation, fear . . . . pain. sorrow for the dead.– respect
(Barrett et al. 1987, B 231, 228)
Once grant that « species » one genus may pass into each other.– grant that one instinct 
to be acquired (if the medullary point in ovum. has such organization as to . . . force 
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in one man the developement of a brain capable of producing more glowing imagin-
ing or more profound reasoning than other– if this be granted!!) & whole fabric tot-
ters & falls.– look abroad, study gradation. study unity of type– Study geographical 
distribution [C 76] study relation of fossil with recent. the fabric falls! But Man . . . is 
Mammalian.– his . . . origin has not been indefinite– he is not a deity, his end « under 
present form » will come, (or how dredfully we are deceived) then he is no exception.– 
he possesses some of the same general instincts, . . . & ‹ moral › feelings as animals.– they 
on other hand can reason– but Man has reasoning powers in excess. instead of [C 77] 
definite instincts.– this is a replacements in mental machinery– so analogous to what 
we see in bodily. that . . . it does not stagger me.– What circumstances may have been 
necessary to have made man! [C 78]
(Barrett et al. 1987, C 76 – 78, 263)
Reflect much over my view of particular instinct being memory transmitted without 
consciousness « a most possible thing. see men walking in sleep ».– an action becomes 
habitual is probably first stage, & an habitual action implies want of consciousness & 
will & therefore may be called instinctive.– But why do some actions become herede-
tary & instinctive & not others.–
(Barrett et al. 1987, C 171, 292)
Man in his arrogance thinks himself a great work. worthy the interposition of a deity, 
more humble & I believe true to consider him created from animals.–
(Barrett et al. 1987, C 196 f., 300)
If I be asked by what power the creator has added thought to . . . so many animals 
of different types. I will confess my profound ignorance.– but seeing such passions 
acquired & heredetary & such definite thoughts, I will never allow that because there is 
a chasm between Man . . . and animals that man has different origin.
(Barrett et al. 1987, C 222e – 223, 310)
Origin of man now proved.– Metaphysic must flourish.– He who understands baboon 
. . . would do more towards metaphysics than Locke.
(Barrett et al. 1987, M 84e, 539)
Plato . . . says in Phaedo that our “necessary ideas” arise from the preexistence of the 
soul, are not derivable from experience.– . . . read monkeys for preexistence.
(Barrett et al. 1987, M 128, 551)
The distinction « as often said » of language in man is very great from all animals– but 
do not overrate– animals communicate to each other. . . . they likewise must under-
stand each other expressions, sounds, & signal movements.– some say dogs under-
stand expression of man’s face.– . . . How far they communicate not easy to know,– but 
this capability of understanding language is considerable, thus carthorse & dog.– birds 
many cries. monkeys communicate to each other.
(Barrett et al. 1987, M 96 f., 542 f.)
I am tempted to say that those actions which have been found necessary for long gen-
eration, (as friendship to fellow animals in social animals) are those which are good & 
consequently give pleasure . . . Descent of Man Moral Sense (bold type in the original).
(Barrett et al. 1987, M 132e, 552)8
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2.2 Darwin’s Moral Science and Ethics
Darwin waited twelve years, however, before publishing his Descent of Man 
(1871), as he thought that his book would only add to the prejudices against 
his views. But now “the case wears a wholly different aspect” (Darwin 1981, 3). 
What made the difference? Years before Darwin published his Descent of Man, 
other scientists and philosophers had applied his ideas to explain the origin of 
man. He mentions Huxley ([1863] 2009), C. Vogt (1863), Wallace (1864), Rolle 
(1866),9 Büchner (1868), Haeckel (1868) and others. So the public was prepared 
for the idea that the human beings had descended from animals. Nevertheless the 
idea contained much explosive force. Frances Power Cobbe wrote in her review 
of Darwin’s Descent of Man: “Let me say it at once. These doctrines appear to 
me simply the most dangerous which have ever been set forth since the days of 
Mandeville” (Cobbe 1871, 175). I will come back to these doctrines later.
In his Descent of Man Darwin treats four issues. He considers “firstly, 
whether man, like every other species, is descended from some pre-existing form; 
secondly, the manner of his development; and thirdly, the value of the differ-
ences between the so-called races of man” (Darwin [1877] 1989, 4).
The fourth question is the most important for our context. It is the question 
of the origin of the “moral sense or conscience,” because “as far as I know, no 
one has approached it exclusively from the side of Natural History. The inves-
tigation possesses, also, some independent interest, as an attempt to see how far 
the study of the lower animals throws light on one of the highest psychical fac-
ulties of man” (Darwin [1877] 1989, 102).
Darwin wants to investigate the scope of his theory of descent for understand-
ing humans’ moral sense. Is it possible to clarify man’s capacity for morality, 
which we consider as specifically human, by drawing on the theory of descent? 
Can man’s special position as a moral being be clarified within an evolutionary 
naturalism? As we shall see, Darwin does not reject traditional concepts of ethics 
and religion, but combines them with his naturalistic framework and thus brings 
evolutionary naturalism and ethical traditions together. As living beings humans 
are part of organic nature, but as self-conscious, reflecting beings they can also 
go beyond it.
Talking about ethics in the context of Darwin’s work we thus have to consider 
two frameworks of reference. One framework is the evolutionary and cultural 
context of the description and explanation of humans as a species. How did our 
moral ability and attitudes evolve, and what were the conditions for their evolu-
tion? The other context is that of a normative ethics, of evaluation. What makes 
up human morals? Which moral values and norms should we follow? Which 
actions are virtuous? In the light of the implicit or explicit answers to these ques-
tions human action is judged.
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2.2.1 The Evolution of the Human Being, “The Most Dominant Animal”
Before treating the evolutionary origin of the moral sense Darwin first has to 
provide evidence for his assumption that man has descended from animals. In the 
first chapter he makes use of three traditional criteria for showing the similarities 
between animals of different species of the same class or of different classes of the 
same phylum. These criteria had already been established by experts of various 
disciplines (embryology, morphology, brain anatomy, etc.) independently of a 
theory of descent. The three criteria are homologies, which is the resemblance 
of the “Bauplan” of different species of the same class or of different classes of 
the same phylum, the resemblance of embryos of different species founded in 
embryology, and rudiments, organs which have lost the function they previously 
had in phylogenetically earlier organisms. Darwin argues that the best explana-
tion for these phenomena is a common descent of the organisms and their adap-
tation to different conditions of life. He then reconstructs the evolution of man.
An important step in the evolution of the human being is the evolution of 
upright posture (bipedy), with its consequences for other bodily changes, par-
ticularly the evolution of the brain with its specific human functions. The front 
limbs were released from their function of locomotion and could evolve into free 
usable human arms and hands with their specific relation between thumb and 
forefinger. The sense of touch was refined and allowed a more targeted use of 
objects. Darwin mentions the important function of the opposable thumb, typ-
ical of the great apes. It allows objects to be seized and worked on. Darwin also 
assumes a mutual influence between the evolution of articulate language, which 
for him has its origin in imitation, and the evolution of the brain. Here he partic-
ularly relies on Chauncey Wright (Wright 1870). But he is careful to avoid defi-
nite statements about the role of natural selection and other motors of change: 
“It is very difficult to decide how far these correlated modifications are the result 
of Natural Selection, and how far of the inherited effects of the increased use of 
certain parts, or of the action of one part on another” (Darwin [1877] 1989, 57).
Like all other animals, the early progenitors of humans must have tended to 
increase beyond their means of subsistence and thus must have been exposed to 
the struggle for life and to natural selection. “Beneficial variations of all kinds 
will thus, either occasionally or habitually, have been preserved, and injurious 
ones eliminated” (Darwin [1877] 1989, 52). Darwin refers to Alfred Russel Wal-
lace and his “admirable Paper” of 1864, in which Wallace writes of a certain stage 
of human evolution when, along with changes of the brain (the “organ of the 
mind”) and other organs, the “truly human faculties” such as human speech, 
social, moral and intellectual faculties had evolved and become permanent. At 
this point man “would be kept in harmony with the slowly changing universe 
around him, by an advance in mind, rather than by a change in body” (Wallace 
1864, clxvi). Man could develop technologies to construct objects the way he 
needed them for getting along with the world, instead of having to adapt himself 
to the world. “Man in the rudest state in which he now exists is the most dom-
inant animal that has ever appeared on this earth. He has spread more widely 
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than any other highly organized form: and all others have yielded before him” 
(Darwin [1877] 1989, 52). Mankind owes this dominant position, his “immense 
superiority,” to his corporeal and intellectual qualities, his self-consciousness, a 
verbal language as well as his social qualities and habits. The invention and use of 
various technologies such as weapons, tools, traps, the discovery of fire, the con-
struction of rafts and boats gave him an enormous advantage over other animals.
Darwin then responds to the Duke of Argyll’s objection, that humans’ diver-
gence “from the structure of brutes, in the direction of greater physical helpless-
ness and weakness” cannot be explained by natural selection. How could these 
human deficiencies have a selective advantage (Darwin [1877] 1989, 67)? How 
could a “Mängelwesen,” as humans are later described in Arnold Gehlen’s (2004) 
philosophical anthropology, evolve at all by natural selection? Darwin replies 
that we do not know from which species, strong or weak, man is descended, 
but  – and he turns the table  – “it might have been an immense advantage to 
man to have sprung from some comparatively weak creature.” Precisely because 
of our vulnerability we might have become social and might have acquired our 
higher mental and social qualities (Darwin [1877] 1989, 67 f.).
Above all, humans had a selective advantage due to their cognitive flexibility 
in connection with language. In contrast to other animals, humans do not have 
to change their body in order to be able to adapt to their environment, but they 
can change their environment and submit it to their needs. Whereas animals may 
slowly adapt, bodily and behaviorally, to the challenges of a changing world, 
human culture (including technology) allows us to make far more rapid adapta-
tions of nature to our wants and needs.
The lower animals, on the other hand, must have their bodily structure modified in 
order to survive under greatly changed conditions. They must be rendered stronger, or 
acquire more effective teeth or claws, for defence against new enemies; or they must be 
reduced in size, so as to escape detection and danger. When they migrate into a colder 
climate, they must become clothed with thicker fur, or have their constitutions altered. 
If they fail to be thus modified, they will cease to exist. (Darwin [1877] 1989, 132)
There is a dark side to human advantage and our ability to adapt nature, however. 
Today’s climate change and environmental catastrophes manifest in a dramatic 
way our species’ limits. Humans may become victims of their own exploitation 
of nature.
2.2.2 Mental Faculties in Animals and Their Instinct of Sympathy
Darwin’s work was provocative for several reasons. Most controversially, man’s 
appearance on earth can be explained by blind mechanisms of evolution with-
out having to assume God’s creative power, wisdom and goodness.10 Man’s exis-
tence is contingent, “for he owes his birth to a long line of progenitors. If any 
single link in this chain had never existed, man would not have been exactly 
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what he now is” (Darwin [1877] 1989, 171). A second source of provocation 
which seemed no less threatening to many of Darwin’s contemporaries was the 
assumption that mankind had apelike progenitors. For Darwin, there was even 
no “fundamental difference” between man and the other animals with respect 
to their “mental faculties” or “mental powers” (Darwin [1877] 1989, 69 f.). “We 
must also admit that there is a much wider interval in mental power between one 
of the lowest fishes, as a lamprey or lancelet, and one of the higher apes, than 
between an ape and man; yet this interval is filled up with numberless grada-
tions” (Darwin [1877] 1989, 70).
But no matter how large the difference between humans and other animals 
may be, it is certainly “one of degree and not of kind” (Darwin [1877] 1989, 130). 
Darwin firmly assigns mankind a place in the animal kingdom (Darwin [1877] 
1989, 152). At the end of Descent of Man he repeats the observations of the first 
chapters, that – irrespective of all noble qualities – “Man still bears in his bodily 
frame the indelible stamp of his lowly origin” (Darwin [1877] 1989, II, 644).
Humans and other animals share not only bodily features but also certain 
instincts as well as mental faculties, i. e., emotional and intellectual faculties. 
Darwin mentions the instincts of “self-preservation, sexual love, the love of the 
mother for her new-born offspring, the desire possessed by the latter to suck, 
and so forth. But man, perhaps, has somewhat fewer instincts than those pos-
sessed by the animals which come next to him in the series” (Darwin [1877] 
1989, 70).
His representation of the mental faculties of animals provides an excellent 
up-to-date overview of contemporary comparative ethology in the 19th century. 
His knowledge is based on his observations and experience with his own animals 
and children, to a greater extent on the international literature of renowned sci-
entists and experts of a wide range of different fields as well as on the personal 
experience of his correspondents. He makes full reference to Alfred Brehm’s well 
known Thierleben (Brehm 1864) as well as to Johann Rudolph Rengger’s Natur-
geschichte der Säugethiere von Paraguay (Rengger 1830). Even today, Darwin’s 
descriptions of the mental powers of animals and humans have not lost their rel-
evance. He gives a long list of feelings: pleasure and pain, happiness and misery, 
fear, suspicion, revenge, jealousy, shame, love of approbation or praise, mag-
nanimity, rage, sense of humor, love of a dog for his master, maternal affection 
(Darwin [1877] 1989, 73). In animals there are also “more intellectual emotions 
and faculties, which are very important, as forming the basis for the development 
of the higher mental powers.” These are wonder, curiosity, imitation, attention, 
memory, imagination, deliberation, choice, association of ideas, “reason, though 
in very different degrees,” sagacity, caution, cunning, tool use (Darwin [1877] 
1989, 75 – 84).
“That animals sometimes are far from feeling any sympathy is too certain; for 
they will expel a wounded animal from the herd, or gore or worry it to death” 
(Darwin [1877] 1989, 106). Yet Darwin’s picture of animals is basically positive 
in comparison with that of Wallace and Huxley (see Engels 2015). Many animals 
feel sympathy for animals of the same species as well as for those of other spe-
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cies. Examples are adoption and helpful behavior among animals, which occur 
even across species: dogs are defended by Rhesus monkeys, for instance, when 
attacked by other dogs; each warns and helps the other.
Many animals, however, certainly sympathize with each other’s distress or danger. This 
is the case even with birds. Captain Stansbury . . . found on a salt lake in Utah an old 
and completely blind pelican, which was very fat, and must have been well fed for a 
long time by his companions. Mr. Blyth, as he informs me, saw Indian crows feeding 
two or three of their companions which were blind; and I have heard of an analogous 
case with the domestic cock. We may, if we choose, call these actions instinctive; but 
such cases are much too rare for the development of any special instinct. . . . I have 
myself seen a dog, who never passed a cat who lay sick in a basket, and was a great 
friend of his, without giving her a few licks with his tongue, the surest sign of kind 
feeling in a dog. (Darwin [1877] 1989, 106 f.)
Because man has descended from non-human beings who were already equipped 
with social instincts, we do not come into this world as tabula rasa, but rather 
with an evolutionary heritage of social dispositions. We know today that even 
infants aged only 14 to 18 months try in surprisingly manifold ways to help an 
adult who needs support in solving a problem, even if he or she is not their rel-
ative. It seems that such behavior is a natural disposition (see Tomasello 2009). 
The great importance attached by Darwin to emotions in humans and animals 
manifests itself in the fact that he dedicated a whole book to the subject, The 
Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (Darwin [1872] 1998). With this 
book Darwin pursues two goals. Firstly, he wants to provide evidence for the 
unity of mankind by showing human universals across different cultures and 
races. Secondly, he wants to support his view that humans have descended from 
other animals. The primatologist Frans de Waal has endorsed Darwin’s ideas 
about the roots of human empathy in prehuman animals by showing that also 
some species of our primate relatives, like capuchin monkeys and the great apes, 
have a sense of fairness. Some can have an emotional and even a cognitive empa-
thy for others beyond their own species (de Waal 2006).
We humans have mental faculties because we have inherited them from our 
predecessors, from other animals. We have inherited not only instinctive impulses 
from animals but also intellectual faculties. In the quotation Darwin attributes 
intelligence to birds, which are flexible enough to perform actions which are 
appropriate for specific situations, so that this cannot merely be fixed, inherited 
instinctive behavior (see Notebook C 77 f., above). Nevertheless humans are the 
only living being capable of morals. This peculiarity expresses itself in another, 
specifically human trait, in blushing. No animal has this capacity, a human uni-
versal that occurs in the “various races of man.” Darwin dedicates a whole chap-
ter, chapter 13 of his Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals to this 
human peculiarity. The cause of blushing in the context of morals is the thought 
that others think that we are guilty or know that we are guilty (Darwin [1872] 
1998, 331). So the ability to blush presupposes the capacity for reflection. Other 
reasons for blushing are violations of etiquette and modesty. Today’s ethology 
and studies of animal intelligence show more and more the broad range of cogni-
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tive, emotional and social competence in nonhuman animals, from which serious 
questions of animal ethics arise, calling our attitude towards animals into ques-
tion (Benz-Schwarzburg and Knight 2011; Benz-Schwarzburg 2012).
2.2.3 Sympathy as “Foundation-Stone” of Social Instincts
The point of departure for Darwin’s reflections on human morals is his assump-
tion that primitive man, the early, human progenitors of civilized man, possessed 
well-developed social instincts like those already to be found in many animals, 
including the “ape-like progenitors” of primitive and modern man (Darwin 
[1877] 1989, 113 f.). Because our progenitors descended from non-human beings 
who were already invested with social instincts, they did not come into this 
world as tabula rasa, but rather with an evolutionary heritage of social instincts. 
An important element of such social instincts is sympathy for members of the 
same community or tribe. Darwin explains the emergence of these instincts in 
terms of his theory of natural selection, ascribing to them a function necessary 
for preserving the community. Social instincts include parental and filial affec-
tions, sociability, pleasure in one’s fellows, faithfulness, willingness to help, etc. 
(Darwin [1877] 1989, 102 f.).
For Darwin, sympathy “forms an essential part of the social instinct, and is 
indeed its foundation-stone” (Darwin [1877] 1989, 103). The “instinct of sympa-
thy” is the root of our “moral sense or conscience” because our moral sense, like 
the instinct of sympathy, is directed towards the good of the community, not 
egoistically towards our own happiness (Darwin [1877] 1989, 137). The radius of 
social instincts originally only extended to the members of the same community 
or tribe, not to all members of the species. Initially, man was not interested 
in preserving the species but in preserving his own community and tribe. Co- 
operation among members of the same community and tribe ensured survival in 
confrontation with nature and foreign groups, thus becoming a strategy in the 
struggle for existence.
However, compared to our early apelike and human progenitors, our instincts 
are reduced in several ways, in their number, their specialization and their 
strength. The condition for the development of genuine morals is this reduction 
of instincts along with the evolution of reason, judgment and language, with 
“free intelligence” and “free will” (Darwin [1877] 1989, 71 f.). Nevertheless the 
social instincts still give the impulse to our social and moral actions. However, 
they have to be oriented by reason.
Thus although the “first foundation or origin of the moral sense lies in the 
social instincts, including sympathy” (Darwin [1877] 1989, II, 637) and these 
constitute the roots of our “moral sense,” they do not alone suffice to explain the 
phenomenon of morality. According to Darwin, genuine morality consists in the 
“moral sense or conscience,” in a “sense of right and wrong,” this being some-
thing only man possesses. Sometimes Darwin uses “conscience” as equivalent to 
“moral sense”; sometimes he makes a finer distinction between them. The moral 
sense “tells us what we ought to do” while the conscience “reproves us if we 
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disobey it” (Darwin [1877] 1989, 121). The moral sense is our interior lawgiver, 
conscience our interior sanctioning authority.
2.2.4 Man, the Animal Capable of Morals
The evolution of the human intellectual capacities for self-consciousness and ver-
bal language is for Darwin not only important for humans’ spreading over the 
earth, but is also a necessary condition for the possibility of a moral sense. Thus 
only the conduct of humans can be called “moral.”
A moral being is one who is capable of comparing his past and future actions or 
motives, and of approving or disapproving of them. We have no reason to suppose 
that any of the lower animals have this capacity; therefore, when a Newfoundland dog 
drags a child out of water, or a monkey faces danger to rescue its comrade, or takes 
charge of an orphan monkey, we do not call its conduct moral. But in the case of man, 
who alone can with certainty be ranked as a moral being, actions of a certain class are 
called moral, whether performed deliberately, after a struggle with opposing motives, 
or impulsively through instinct, or from the effects of slowly-gained habit. (Darwin 
[1877] 1989, 115 f.).
Even if animals manifest behavior which in us we would call moral, it cannot 
count as moral according to this criterion. On the other hand, humans’ actions 
do not cease to be moral when done without deliberation or hesitation. The 
power of moral judgment makes the all – important difference (Darwin [1877] 
1989, 115 f.). It presupposes the power of reasoning, self-consciousness, a ver-
bal language and the understanding and formulation of moral imperatives, like 
Kant’s (Darwin [1877] 1989, 113 f.).
At the same time, according to Darwin we do not value moral conduct only 
because of the actor’s self-consciousness, but also for the sympathy involved in 
such action. “A man who possessed no trace of such instincts would be an unnat-
ural monster” (Darwin [1877] 1989, 116). Thus Darwin describes human moral-
ity as a complex phenomenon, involving quite different capabilities, reason as 
well as emotions, particularly sympathy, and virtues.
Darwin follows up on the English-Scottish tradition of the moral sense (see 
Hume [1777] 1992; Smith 2000; Bain 1868) but goes beyond it in his biological 
understanding of the human being as well as in his understanding of the moral 
sense and morals. Hume wrote in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals:
It is needless to push our researches so far as to ask, why we have humanity or a fel-
low-feeling with others. It is sufficient, that this is experienced to be a principle in 
human nature. We must stop somewhere in our examination of causes; and there are, 
in every science, some general principles, beyond which we cannot hope to find any 
principle more general. No man is absolutely indifferent to the happiness and misery 
of others. The first has a natural tendency to give pleasure; the second pain. This every 
one may find in himself. It is not probable, that these principles can be resolved into 
principles more simple and universal, whatever attempts may have been made to that 
purpose. But if it were possible, it belongs not to the present subject; and we may 
here safely consider these principles as original: . . . (Hume [1777] 1992, 219 f.n1; italics 
added)
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Hume’s remark reflects the scientific knowledge of his time, before Darwin’s 
theory of descent was formulated, but it also shows that Hume avoids a theolog-
ical-metaphysical explanation. As was revealed in Hume’s posthumously pub-
lished Dialogues concerning Natural Religion ([1779] 1993), one of the repu-
diations of Natural Theology’s argument from design is found in the notion of 
self-organizational powers in nature. In entertaining such an idea, Hume was 
ahead of his time. Darwin’s grandfather Erasmus Darwin, who already held 
evolutionary ideas, quotes Hume in his Zoonomia; or the Laws of Organic Life 
(E. Darwin 1794, 1:509).
Charles Darwin extends their view with an evolutionary perspective which 
includes the experience of the evolving human species from prehuman animals 
and semi-human progenitors. Humans embody the experience of these pro-
genitors through inheritance over evolutionary timescales. Darwin claims that 
his own approach has greater explanatory power than that of Smith and Bain, 
because he can account for phenomena which otherwise would remain puzzling. 
Smith writes in the first chapter of his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), enti-
tled “Of Sympathy,” that “it is by changing places in fancy with the sufferer, that 
we come either to conceive or to be affected by what he feels” (Smith 2000, 4). 
Similarly, for Alexander Bain “Sympathy is to enter into the feelings of another, 
and to act them out, as if they were our own” (Bain 1868, 276). Bain believes that 
the basis of our sympathy for the suffering of others lies in our strong proclivity 
to retain our own former states of pain and pleasure. “The sight of another per-
son enduring hunger, cold, fatigue, revives in us some recollection of these states, 
which are painful even in idea” (Bain 1868, 279). The same holds for pleasurable 
experiences. Thus, “Sympathy is, indirectly, a source of pleasure to the sympa-
thizer” (Bain 1868, 281). Darwin, however,
cannot see how this view explains the fact that sympathy is excited, in an immeasur-
ably stronger degree, by a beloved, than by an indifferent person. The mere sight of 
suffering, independently of love, would suffice to call up in us vivid recollections and 
associations. The explanation may lie in the fact that, with all animals, sympathy is 
directed solely towards the members of the same community, and therefore towards 
known, and more or less beloved members, but not to all the individuals of the same 
species. (Darwin [1877] 1989, 110)
This is not meant as a plea for graduated sympathy and helpfulness but as a 
description of animals’ and humans’ natural disposition. Darwin’s idea of moral 
progress in the individual as well as in human history is that of an expanding cir-
cle. He thinks that sympathy has been increased through natural selection, “for 
those communities, which included the greatest number of the most sympathetic 
members, would flourish best, and rear the greatest number of offspring” (Dar-
win [1877] 1989, 111).
The close link between humans and animals does not only manifest itself in 
Darwin’s idea that humans have inherited the faculty of sympathy from their 
non-human animal ancestors, but also in Darwin’s taking the line of argumen-
tation in the other direction by imagining what would happen to animals’ fac-
ulties if their intellectual powers progressed. It seems to him “in a high degree 
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11 In these three footnotes he refers to Quatrefages, Mackintosh, and Kant.
probable – namely, that any animal whatever, endowed with well-marked social 
instincts . . . the parental and filial affections being here included, would inevi-
tably acquire a moral sense or conscience, as soon as its intellectual powers had 
become as well, or nearly as well developed, as in man” (Darwin [1877] 1989, 
102; italics added).
Already now “besides love and sympathy, animals, exhibit other qualities 
connected with the social instincts, which in us would be called moral” (Darwin 
[1877] 1989, 107; italics added). Darwin refers to the power of self-command in 
dogs, faithfulness among animals, obedience, etc.
For Darwin the “moral sense,” in the strict sense of humans’ power of moral 
judgments, presupposes self-consciousness, a verbal language, by which not only 
public opinion but also general moral and ethical rules can be articulated, and the 
capacity to base one’s judgment on moral imperatives like Kant’s:
I fully subscribe to the judgement of those writers1 who maintain that of all the differ-
ences between man and the lower animals, the moral sense or conscience is by far the 
most important. This sense, as Mackintosh2 remarks, “has a rightful supremacy over 
every other principle of human action”; it is summed up in that short but imperious 
word ought, so full of high significance. It is the most noble of all the attributes of man, 
leading him without a moment’s hesitation to risk his life for that of a fellow-creature; 
or after due deliberation, impelled simply by the deep feeling of right or duty, to sac-
rifice it in some great cause. Immanuel Kant exclaims, “Duty! Wondrous thought, that 
workest neither by fond insinuation, flattery, nor by any threat, but merely by hold-
ing up thy naked law in the soul, and so extorting for thyself always reverence, if not 
always obedience; before whom all appetites are dumb, however secretly they rebel; 
whence thy original?”3 (Darwin [1877] 1989, 101 f.)11
Darwin tries to mediate different ethical traditions which emphasize specific 
aspects of the human being and of morality. These are elements of the theory of 
the moral sense (Hume, Smith), of virtue ethics and of an ethics of duty (Kant). 
Our social virtues are an expression of our moral sense and, following Darwin’s 
line of thought, I propose to describe them as the refined and enlarged “off-
spring” of animals’ and early humans’ social instincts. Humans are not made 
from one piece. Our complex brain with its different parts has evolved over mil-
lions of years and embodies the phylogenetic past of other animals. Since humans 
are “created from animals,” or less metaphorically, since we are descendants of 
other animals, but are special animals, we embody instinctive, emotional, and 
rational elements. This has to be mirrored in ethics. And we have to look at other 
animals in order to learn something about ourselves, because children resemble 
their parents. Darwin doubts that the moral sense is a faculty which develops 
only during individual ontogeny and rejects John Stuart Mill’s and Bain’s posi-
tion:
Mr. J. S. Mill . . . remarks, “if, as is my own belief, the moral feelings are not innate, but 
acquired, they are not for that reason less natural.” It is with hesitation that I venture 
to differ at all from so profound a thinker, but it can hardly be disputed that the social 
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feelings are instinctive or innate in the lower animals; and why should they not be so 
in man? Mr. Bain (see, for instance, The Emotions and the Will, 1865, p. 481) and others 
believe that the moral sense is acquired by each individual during his lifetime. On the 
general theory of evolution this is at least extremely improbable. The ignoring of all 
transmitted mental qualities will, as it seems to me, be hereafter judged as a most seri-
ous blemish in the works of Mr. Mill. (Darwin [1877] 1989, 102n3)
Darwin’s statements about the moral sense give rise to questions and misun-
derstanding. In the quotation he talks about “moral feelings,” “social feelings” 
and the “moral sense.” On the one hand he uses the term “moral sense” in the 
strict meaning of humans’ competence in moral judgments, which presuppose 
self-consciousness, verbal language and the capacity to base one’s judgment on 
moral imperatives like Kant’s. The moral sense is a specific capacity of humans 
that other animals do not have. On the other hand, his footnote on Mill and Bain 
indicates that he also uses the term in the sense of “social feelings” which are 
“instinctive or innate in the lower animals.” And Darwin wonders why these 
feelings should not be so in man. Although he assumes that human instincts are 
reduced with respect to their number, degree of specialization and strength (Dar-
win [1877] 1989, 113, [1877] 1989, II, 636), he sometimes talks of instincts where 
he can only mean instinctive impulses. This is linguistic carelessness, even stron-
ger in the first edition, which is only partially corrected in the second edition 
and by which Darwin has invited the objection that he has no uniform notion of 
sympathy but uses it sometimes in the tradition of Hume and Smith, sometimes 
in the sense of “instinct.” With this double notion of sympathy, so the objection 
further runs, Darwin is presupposing measures of ethical value which are not 
deducible from evolution as such (M. Vogt 1997, 130 f.).
However, Darwin judges certain natural phenomena such as sympathy in the 
light of ethical measures of value, which he can neither deduce from evolution 
nor claims to do so. Thus we can defend Darwin’s project as coherent: he does 
not operate with two notions of sympathy but traces one element of our moral 
sense – sympathy – back to its evolutionary past, to trace its roots in the social 
instincts of animals. This is in fact compatible with his concept of moral sense 
as a human capacity, which is more differentiated than animal instincts but con-
nected with them through natural history. Moreover, when reading Darwin we 
have to keep in mind the stage of human evolution to which Darwin refers. In 
our early human predecessors sympathy was more strongly instinctive than 
later and today. And finally it would be worthwhile investigating more closely 
Hume’s and Smith’s meaning of sympathy. Hume himself uses the notion of 
instinct in connection with “sympathy”: “The social virtues of humanity and 
benevolence exert their influence immediately by a direct tendency or instinct 
. . . A parent flies to the relief of his child; transported by that natural sympathy 
which actuates him, and which affords no leisure to reflect on the sentiments or 
conduct of the rest of mankind in like circumstances” (Hume [1777] 1992, 303).
Eve-Marie Engels244
3. Morals, a Phenomenon of Cultural History  
with Roots in Natural History
Darwin’s fourth question is the question of the origin of the “moral sense or con-
science,” because “no one has approached it exclusively from the side of natural 
history.” Darwin’s “investigation possesses, also, some independent interest, as 
an attempt to see how far the study of the lower animals throws light on one of 
the highest psychical faculties of man” (Darwin [1877] 1989, 102).
This is no rhetorical question, but a truly scientific and philosophical pro-
gram. Darwin’s answer is as complex as the way leading to it (Engels 2011).
Humans’ moral faculties are rooted in the natural history of man, in the 
social instincts as well as in the mental abilities of prehuman animals. But these 
roots are not sufficient to explain and describe our moral sense or conscience. 
In the course of human evolution, starting from animal predecessors through 
semi-human progenitors to modern humans, we have inherited instincts and, 
later, instinctive impulses, directed towards the wellbeing of others, which are 
the necessary condition for the formation of our moral sense. “A man who 
possessed no trace of such instincts would be an unnatural monster” (Darwin 
[1877] 1989, 116). Instincts, mental abilities and verbal language as conditions for 
human morals evolved via the general mechanisms of evolution but were already 
from the early evolution of mankind onwards intertwined with habits and cul-
tural factors, a process which today is called the “coevolution” of nature and 
culture. Since Darwin, like many of his contemporaries, advocated the Lamarck-
ian theory of the inheritance of acquired characters, habits, practiced over a 
long period of time, could become traits of organisms. In the course of time, 
morals became increasingly a cultural phenomenon, albeit with roots in natu-
ral history. Our “sympathies” became “more tender and more widely diffused” 
(Darwin [1877] 1989, 127). Darwin describes moral progress as an expanding cir-
cle of sympathy, of humanity. A tribe, whose members supported each other, 
“would succeed better and conquer the other . . . Selfish and contentious peo-
ple will not cohere, and without coherence nothing can be affected. A tribe rich 
in the above qualities would spread and be victorious over other tribes” (Dar-
win [1877] 1989, 135). This kind of group selection, happening repeatedly in the 
course of history, goes hand in hand with moral progress: “thus the social and 
moral qualities would tend slowly to advance and be diffused throughout the 
world” (Darwin [1877] 1989, 135). Not only the number of virtuous individu-
als thereby increased, but also the quality of sympathy, the standard of morality 
and the circle of beings who become beneficiaries of our moral and social vir-
tues. Moral progress manifests itself in caring for the “imbecile,” “maimed,” and 
finally for animals (Darwin [1877] 1989, 129). For Darwin, “disinterested love 
for all living creatures” is “the most noble attitude of man” (Darwin [1877] 1989, 
130).
Although Darwin revolutionized our view of life by offering a scientific 
explanation of the origin of species, and although he was an agnostic, religion 
played an important role in the cultural progress of humanity.
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To do good in return for evil, to love your enemy, is a height of morality to which it 
may be doubted whether the social instincts would, by themselves, have ever led us. It 
is necessary that these instincts, together with sympathy, should have been highly culti-
vated and extended by the aid of reason, instruction, and the love or fear of God, before 
any such golden rule would ever be thought of and obeyed. (Darwin [1877] 1989, 117)
Darwin’s outlook on “future generations” is optimistic, because “we may expect 
that virtuous habits will grow stronger, becoming perhaps fixed by inheritance. 
In this case the struggle between our higher and lower impulses will be less 
severe, and virtue will be triumphant.” (Darwin [1877] 1989, 129 f.)
Important as the struggle for existence has been and even still is, yet as far as the highest 
part of man’s nature is concerned there are other agencies more important. For the moral 
qualities are advanced, either directly or indirectly, much more through the effects of 
habit, the reasoning powers, instruction, religion, etc., than through Natural Selection; 
though to this latter agency may be safely attributed the social instincts, which afforded 
the basis for the development of the moral sense. (Darwin [1877] 1989, II, 643)
So the answer to Darwin’s question, whether our moral sense can be adequately 
approached exclusively from the side of natural history, is negative. Morals are a 
phenomenon of cultural history with roots in natural history.
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The Creation of Body Knowledge in Mimetic Processes
Christoph Wulf
Abstract: To a great extent, cultural learning is mimetic learning, which is at the center 
of many processes of education, self-education, and human development. It is directed 
towards other people, social communities and cultural heritages and ensures that they are 
kept alive. Mimetic learning is a sensory, body-based form of learning in which images, 
schemas and movements needed to perform actions are learned. This embodiment is 
responsible for lasting effects that play an important role in all social and cultural fields. 
Mimetic processes create both similarities to, and differences from, the situations or per-
sons to which or whom they relate. By participating in the living practices of other people, 
humans expand their own life-worlds and create for themselves new ways of experienc-
ing and acting. Receptivity and activity overlap. In all areas of human existence rituals 
and gestures are important for the mimetic development of body knowledge. Embodied 
knowledge is indispensable to religion, politics, economy, science, families, and education. 
It helps us deal with difference and alterity and create a sense of community and social 
relationships. It also enables us to assign meaning and structure to human relations. Ritual 
knowledge facilitates both continuity and change, as well as experiences of transition and 
transcendence.
Introduction:  
Mimetic Processes: Cultural Learning, Aesthetic Experience  
and the Emergence of Violence
Infants and small children relate to the people with whom they live: parents, 
elder siblings, other relatives and acquaintances. They try to be like them by, for 
example, answering a smile with a smile. However, they also initiate responses 
in adults by using skills they have already acquired (Dornes 1993; Stern 2003). 
These exchanges also enable small children to learn feelings. They learn to evoke 
their own feelings towards other people and to elicit them in others. The brain 
develops in the course of its exchanges with the environment, i. e., certain cap-
acities are trained, others fade (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2008; Fuchs 2008). The 
cultural conditions of early life are imprinted in the brains and bodies of small 
children. Anyone who has not learned to see, hear or speak at an early age has 
tremendous difficulties acquiring these skills at a later age. Initially, the mimetic 
actions of infants and children do not allow for a separation of subject and object; 
this occurs only at a later stage of development. At first, the world is perceived as 
magical, i. e., not only humans but also objects are experienced as being alive. As 
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rationality becomes more developed the capacity to experience the world in this 
way gradually becomes less central. However it is this capacity upon which chil-
dren draw to transform the external world into images in mimetic processes and 
to incorporate them into their internal image worlds (Gebauer and Wulf 1995).
In his autobiography Berlin Childhood around 1900, Walter Benjamin (2006) 
illustrated how children incorporate their cultural environments in processes of 
assimilation. In the course of these processes, children assimilate aspects of the 
parental home such as the rooms, particular corners, objects and atmospheres. 
They are incorporated as “imprints” of the images and stored in the child’s imag-
inary world, where they are subsequently transformed into new images and 
memories which help the child gain access to other cultural worlds. Benjamin 
reports experiences from his childhood in which real space and imaginary space 
so interpenetrate each other to such an extent that they become one space. The 
child becomes similar to a thing, so that the thing becomes a part of them. Things 
look back and seem to be making themselves similar to the child. Thus, for exam-
ple the passage describing a butterfly hunt: “The old rules of hunting took over 
between us: the more my being, down to its very fibers, adapted to my prey (the 
more I got butterflies in my stomach), the more the butterfly took on in all that it 
did (and didn’t do) the color of human resolution, until finally it was as if captur-
ing it was the price, was the only way I would regain my humanity” (Benjamin 
1980c, 244). The mimetic character of the child’s experience, the way incidents 
are expanded by the mimetic faculty, is clear. The child gets butterflies in his 
stomach, and at the same time the butterfly takes on human traits. The capture of 
the butterfly makes it possible to erect boundaries again and to secure the child’s 
form of human being. On the level of appearances, only in overcoming the object 
can the child preserve the constitution of its self-consciousness. Berliner Kindheit 
relates many similar experiences. Some are charged with anxiety and fear, such 
as the encounter with the “Little Hunchback,” who can be regarded as a symbol 
of preservative forgetting, because he takes from the child his unconscious expe-
riences and preserves them, thus preparing the way for memory. Things shrivel 
up; they enter memory in distorted form. The fright that the encounter occasions 
is a moment of self-awareness and at the same time an obstacle to and repression 
of more far reaching self-experience. The child, on the other hand, approximates 
himself completely to the environment, which is comparable to mimicry, and on 
the other, experiences his power over spaces and objects through the dedication 
of his magical interaction with them. Spaces and objects “look back.” Culture 
is handed on by means of these processes of incorporating and making sense of 
cultural products. The mimetic ability to transform the external material world 
into images, transferring them into our internal worlds of images and making 
them accessible to others enables individuals to actively shape cultural realities 
(Gebauer and Wulf 1995, 1998).
These processes encompass not only our modes of dealing with the material 
products of culture but also social relationships and forms of activity and the 
way social life is staged and performed. In particular, it involves forms of practi-
cal knowledge that are learned mimetically in body-oriented, sensory processes 
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and which enable us to act competently in institutions and organizations (Wulf 
2006b). Ritual knowledge is an important aspect of this practical social know-
ledge, and this is the means by which institutions become rooted in the human 
body, enabling us to orient ourselves in social situations. Images, schemas and 
movements are learned in mimetic processes, and these render the individual 
capable of action. Since mimetic processes involve products of history and cul-
ture, scenes, arrangements and performances, these processes are among the most 
important ways of handing down culture from one generation to the next (Wulf 
2014). Without our mimetic abilities, cultural learning and “double inheritance,” 
i. e., the handing down of cultural products along with biological inheritance, 
which enables culture to change and develop, would not be possible (Tomasello 
1999).
Writing – an assemblage of non-sensory similarities – elicits mimetic processes 
that help to bring to life what is read (Benjamin 1980a, 1980b). It is the same with 
other products of culture that also require a mimetic relationship for them to 
come alive. Without such a relationship, they represent simply a cultural possi-
bility that can only realize its full potential through processes of education and 
self-education. Such processes are particularly important in the transfer of cul-
ture from one generation to the next, since these processes require a metamor-
phosis to keep forms of living, knowledge, art or technology alive. As mimetic 
processes are not simply methods of copying worlds that have already been 
symbolically interpreted but also consist in our taking and then incorporating 
“impressions” of such worlds, these mimetic relationships always contain cre-
ative aspects which alter the original. This creates a cultural dynamism between 
generations and cultures which constantly gives rise to new things.
To a great extent, cultural learning is mimetic learning, which is at the cen-
ter of many processes of education and self-education. It is directed towards 
other people, social communities and cultural heritages and ensures that they are 
kept alive. Mimetic learning is a sensory, body-based form of learning in which 
images, schemas and movements needed to perform actions are learned. This 
embodiment is responsible for the lasting effects that play an important role in 
all areas of cultural development. “Becoming similar” to the world in mimetic 
actions becomes an opportunity to leave egocentrism, logocentrism and ethno-
centrism behind and to open oneself to experiences of otherness (Wulf 2006a, 
2016). However, mimetic processes are also linked to aspirations to forms and 
experiences of higher levels of life, in which vital experiences can be sought and 
found. In the experience of love, mimetic movements invokes “the power to see 
similarity in the dissimilar” (Adorno 1978, 191). No knowledge is possible with-
out the production of similarities, without mimesis. It is certainly taken as true 
for scientific knowledge that mimesis is indispensable to the process of know-
ing. “Cognition itself cannot be conceived without the supplement of mimesis, 
however that may be sublimated. Without mimesis the break between subject 
and object would be absolute and cognition impossible” (Adorno 1982, 143). If 
a mimetic element is indispensable to scientific knowledge, it is at the heart of 
aesthetic experience. Mimesis makes it possible to comprehend the self-equiv-
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alency of the artwork and occasions a knowledge from within, which exists 
independently of theories and concepts. Aesthetic experience arouses “a sense 
of being overwhelmed in the presence of a phenomenon that is nonconceptual 
while at the same time being determinate” (Adorno 1984, 236), and this sense 
is largely beyond the reach of planning and resists precise localization. In the 
sudden density of a moment there occurs an aesthetic shock, which can rock 
the foundation of the I. The mimetic impulse leads to momentary contact with 
what is nondeterminate in the similar-to-itself artwork. The works’ similarity 
is not referred to something outside itself, which is why mimesis in this con-
text cannot denote the imitation of something that preexisted the work; rather, 
mimesis is similar to the self-referential creative force of the natura naturans, the 
nonobjective aspect of nature. Aesthetic experience arises in the “fine distance” 
between recipient and artwork and represents a nonscientific form of knowledge. 
“The continued existence of mimesis, understood as the non-conceptual affin-
ity of subjective creation with its objective and unposited other, defines art as a 
form of cognition and to that extent as’rational.’ . . . Art expands cognition into 
an area where it was said to be non-existent” (Adorno 1984, 80). Art is a refuge 
for “mimetic behavior” (ibid. 79), “the organ of mimesis” (ibid. 162). Aesthetic 
experience refers mimetic movement beyond works of art and beyond the sub-
ject to possibilities of historical development. It can thereby become the carrier 
of hopes, expectations, and promises. Its central concern is a non-functionalized, 
improved relation between rationality and sensuousness.
In contrast to their role in aesthetic experience mimetic processes can also be 
connected with the processes whereby we are infected by experiences in which 
our subjectivity dissolves into chaos and uncontrolled violence. These processes 
also involve confrontations with power, domination, violence and oppression, 
which are part of every culture and into which mimetic processes are repeat-
edly immersed. The vicious circle of violence is an example of the mimetic struc-
ture of many forms of violence (Girard 1977, 1987). The starting point of this 
theory of violence is the insight that in mimesis there lies a necessity inextrica-
bly connected with being human, a reason for the emergence of violence among 
humans. Mimetic appropriation of attitudes and behaviors creates competition 
and rivalry, which then become the start of acts of violence. Violent behavior 
is especially imitated. In most societies every act of violence is followed by a 
retaliatory act of violence, an occurrence which threatens the cohesion of the 
society. Two strategies present themselves as methods of mastering the poten-
tial for violence emerging from mimesis: prohibition and ritual. By means of 
prohibitions everything which threatens the sense of community is supposed 
to be excluded. This includes conflicts of competition, rivalry and violence, to 
all of which mimesis gives rise. Mimetic behavior which aims at eliminating dif-
ferences which are essential to the structural maintenance of the internal order 
of a society, such as those behaviors necessitated by hierarchies and the division 
of functions, is forbidden. These essential types of behavior must be preserved 
because they fulfill an integrative function and the society would be threatened 
if unlimited mimesis were allowed. It is necessary to restrain mimesis with pro-
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hibitions in order to strike a balance between its powers of social cohesion and 
social dissolution. While prohibitions strive to suppress violence that threatens 
the cohesion of a society by excluding the mimetic rivalry which contains the 
potential for such violence, rituals represent the attempt to channel manifest 
mimetic crises in such a manner that integration within the society is not endan-
gered. When prohibitions are violated, a mimetic crisis arises that jeopardizes 
the social consensus with a vicious circle of reciprocal violence. It is the task of 
rituals to master the threat to the cohesion of a society in mimetic conflict by 
involving its members in a cooperative act. While prohibitions aim to prevent 
mimetic crises from arising in the first place, rituals pursue the goal of overcom-
ing such crises by the repetition of certain acts intended to foster integration and 
the maintenance of the society (Dieckmann, Wulf, and Wimmer 1996; Paragrana 
2011; Capeloa Gil and Wulf 2015).
1. Social Action and Mimetically-Acquired Practical Knowledge
The capacity for social action is acquired mimetically in cultural learning pro-
cesses. This has been shown in numerous studies in recent years. In mimetic 
processes, for example games, gift exchange and ritual behavior, people develop 
skills that differ from one culture to another. For people to be able to act “cor-
rectly” in each situation, practical knowledge is necessary. This is acquired in 
sensory, body-orientated mimetic learning processes in each different field of 
activity. However, the corresponding cultural characteristics of social behavior 
can only be learned using mimetic approximations. Practical knowledge and 
social activity are shaped largely by historical and cultural factors.
In a first approximation social acts can be regarded as mimetic,
– if as movements they relate to other movements;
– if they can be understood as performances or enactments of the body;
– if they are independent actions that can be understood in their own terms and 
which relate to other actions or worlds (cf. Gebauer and Wulf 1998).
Thus non-mimetic actions would be, for instance, mental calculation, decisions, 
reflex actions or routine behavior as well as one-off acts or rule-breaking.
In contrast to attempts to differentiate forms of mimesis and to place these 
in hierarchical order, my research begins from the assumption that, while 
mimetic elements play a key role in numerous socio-cultural, cognitive and lan-
guage-based phenomena, the attempt to build a hierarchy of different types of 
mimesis is misguided, due to the multimodal bodily- and imagination-based 
character of mimesis itself (cf. Zlatev, this volume).
The relationship between social action, practical knowledge and mimetic 
acquisition of knowledge is demonstrated by the following example taken from 
everyday contemporary culture:
On the morning of her birthday he prepares a glass dish decorated with ivy 
leaves and fills it with water, he makes little boats from walnut shells and places 
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a candle in each one. Next to the dish there is a birthday cake, a large bunch of 
roses, a bottle of champagne and the ring, which is packed in a large box, to make 
it more of a surprise. Breakfast is waiting on the table that has been elaborately 
set; his wife waits outside the room until he has lit all of the candles and opened 
the champagne. He takes her in his arms, they exchange a few words of affection. 
A woman is about to celebrate her birthday and her partner wants to give her a 
present. He wonders what she might like. Initially he does not have many ideas. 
It should not be something useful that she would buy herself. He rejects the 
idea of the fondue set she has shown him in a catalogue. This would be more a 
present for them both than a birthday present and he finds this a little too imper-
sonal for his partner. His thoughts focus on what she would like and what would 
really give her pleasure. He looks through the art books in a bookshop and then 
through the latest novels that have just come out, when he remembers that last 
year she gave him an album of photographs from the early days of photography, 
so he decides that a book would not be the correct choice. In an antique shop he 
looks for a candlestick or an old lamp. He likes what he finds but is still not sat-
isfied. Then he sees a garnet ring. He remembers that she once told him that her 
grandmother had such a ring which she had loved to try on when she was a little 
girl. Now he is certain that he has found the right present; and she is delighted 
with the preparations and the present he selected so lovingly. They both sit down; 
they eat and have breakfast – taking slightly longer than usual. The day begins.
This scene shows us how a man looks for a birthday present and, after going 
through a good deal of trouble, finds it, and how he stages and performs the 
giving of the present and the small, early morning birthday party. His efforts 
are successful and bring great joy. Even when searching for the present, the man 
avoids decisions that would make the present less meaningful for his wife. He 
selects neither a useful nor a “joint” present; he also avoids giving her a similar 
present to the one she had given him recently. After a long search he finds some-
thing that is particularly suitable for his partner and which will appeal to her 
individually. His sensitive selection of a present is complemented by the loving 
preparations of the breakfast table with the candles floating amidst the leaves, the 
roses, the champagne, a birthday cake, the wrapped present, the elaborately set 
table, the tender words and the embrace.
How does the man celebrating his wife’s birthday know what he has to do 
to show her his affection and to turn his efforts into a confirmation of the emo-
tional quality of their shared life? Nobody has given him a set of rules to fol-
low when celebrating birthdays or giving presents. Nevertheless, the man has 
acquired from action- and language-games a knowledge of how to behave appro-
priately, what criteria are important when selecting the gift and setting the stage 
to give it. How does the recipient know what the chosen present and the early 
morning celebration arranged in such a manner mean and how she is supposed 
to react for the breakfast to become a celebration of their togetherness? No one 
has ever told her what the rules are either. However, they both know their roles, 
what they need to do and how they should respond to each other so that the 
morning becomes a celebration of their life together.
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Such situations are only successful because all the participants have a practi-
cal knowledge of what they need to do, how they should respond to each other 
and how they should present themselves. Their actions are derived from prac-
tical knowledge of how, when and which situations are to be performed and 
how their performance and staging can meet or contradict the expectations of 
others. They have learned this in the many opportunities provided by everyday 
life, where they perceived through their own senses the way their parents pre-
pared birthday celebrations for them, their siblings or for each other. In these 
earlier situations there may well not have been candles floating amidst ivy leaves 
or thoughts that resulted in the purchase of a garnet ring. However, there will 
have been other scenes involving the search for presents to delight the recipients, 
the loving thoughtful attitude towards the birthday celebrant and the joy of a 
shared life. There will have been other birthday scenes where, for example, sib-
lings expressed their affection in a teasingly aggressive manner, where “Happy 
Birthday” was sung and presents were given that had been expressly asked for. 
In spite of such differences, birthday parties resemble each other in a number of 
aspects. In mimetic processes inner pictures, feelings and performative sequences 
arise in the participants, which serve as material for them to fashion the scene of 
the giving or receiving of a present or of celebrating or being celebrated in similar 
situations.
Anywhere where someone acts in reference to an existing social practice and 
thereby creates a social practice, there is a mimetic relationship between the two. 
This occurs, for instance, in the example of the birthday present, or when one 
acts according to a social model or uses the body to express a social concept. As 
we have seen, this does not simply involve actions of imitation. Mimetic actions 
are no mere reproductions that follow a pre-existing image precisely. Social prac-
tices performed in a mimetic manner lead to the creation of something individual.
Unlike the process of mimicry, which merely requires an adaptation to given 
conditions, a mimetic process – as can be seen in the example of the birthday 
present – creates both similarities to and differences from the situations or per-
sons to which or whom they relate. In adapting and becoming similar to situa-
tions experienced earlier and to worlds that bear the mark of the culture of which 
they are part, subjects acquire the skills required to behave appropriately in a cer-
tain social situation. By participating in the living practices of other people, they 
expand their own life-worlds and create for themselves new ways of experienc-
ing and acting. Receptivity and activity overlap. In this process, the given world 
becomes interwoven with the individual experience of those who form a mimetic 
relationship with it. We recreate the situations and external worlds experienced 
earlier, and by duplicating them, turn them into our own. It is only by confront-
ing earlier situations or external worlds that these gain their individuality. It is 
not until this happens that our excess drive loses its indeterminate nature and is 
directed into individual wishes and needs. The confronting of the external world 
and the creation of the self occur as part of one and the same system. The external 
and internal worlds become increasingly similar and can only be experienced in 
their mutual dependency. Thus the internal and the external take on similarities 
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and begin to correspond to each other. People make themselves similar to the 
outside world and change as they do so; this transformation involves the chang-
ing of their perception of the external world and of themselves.
Mimetic processes lead us to perceive similarities and create links to our social 
environment and it is through experiencing this that people make sense of the 
world. One of the earliest human skills was to create similarities, and these can 
be seen clearly in phenomena that correspond in a sensory way. Similarities can 
occur between two faces or in processes where one person imitates the actions 
of another. Forms of similarity can also be found between the living and the 
inanimate. One of the purposes of the human body is to create and express sim-
ilarities. Dance and language illustrate this clearly (Brandstetter and Wulf 2007), 
as here there is no difference between representation and expression on the one 
hand, and performance and behavior on the other. They form two aspects that 
are not separate in the act of mimesis, but inextricably linked.
The acquisition of practical knowledge in mimetic processes does not neces-
sarily involve similarities. If mimetic knowledge is acquired by relating to social 
actions or performative behavior from the world of the past, then it is only pos-
sible to identify the perspective of the mimetic relationship by comparing the 
two worlds. Similarity is nevertheless the most frequent trigger for the mimetic 
impulse. However, creating a magical contact can also become the initial point 
of mimetic action. Previous social actions are carried out for a second time in 
mimetic learning processes. The relationship is created not by theoretical think-
ing but aisthetically, through the senses (Michaels and Wulf 2014). The second 
action differs from the first not by challenging it or altering it but by re-perform-
ing it; thus the mimetic action has both a revelatory and a performative character 
and its performance creates its own aesthetic qualities. Mimetic processes relate 
to social worlds already created by humankind that are either real or imaginary.
The dynamic character of social activities is connected with the practical 
nature of the knowledge required for the enacting of such situations. As prac-
tical knowledge it is less subject to rational controls than is analytical knowl-
edge. This is also because practical, ritual knowledge is not a reflexive, self-aware 
knowledge. It only becomes this in the context of conflicts and crises where 
the actions that result from it require justification. If social practice is not ques-
tioned, practical knowledge remains “semi-conscious.” Like habitus knowledge 
it embraces images, schemas and forms of activity which are used for the staging 
and bodily performance of social acts without requiring any reflection on their 
appropriateness. They are simply known and called upon for the staging of social 
practices.
Human beings’ residual instinct, the hiatus between stimulus and response 
and also their “eccentricity” (Plessner 1982) are prerequisites for the extraordi-
nary plasticity of humankind and the opportunities this provides for acquiring 
practical knowledge in mimetic processes, thereby allowing social action to be 
conceptualized, staged and performed. This practical knowledge also includes 
the body movements that are used to stage scenes of social action. Discipline 
and control of body movements result in a disciplined and controlled practi-
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cal knowledge which is stored in the body memory and enables human beings 
to enact the corresponding forms of symbolic and scenic actions. This practical 
knowledge is based on the social forms of action and performance established in 
a particular culture, and is therefore a pronounced but specific knowledge, lim-
ited in terms of its historical and cultural horizons.
Imitative change and adaptation of previous worlds take place in mimetic 
processes (Hüppauf, and Wulf 2009). This is the innovative factor of mimetic 
actions. Social practices are mimetic if they relate to other actions and can them-
selves be seen as social arrangements that constitute independent social practices 
and also relate to other practices. Social actions are made possible by the acqui-
sition of practical knowledge in the course of mimetic processes. The practical 
knowledge necessary for social actions is not only historical and cultural but 
also bodily and ludic knowledge; it is formed in face-to-face situations and is not 
semantically unequivocal; it has aesthetic components and elements of the imag-
inary and therefore cannot be reduced to intentionality; it incorporates an excess 
of meaning and can be seen in the social staging and performance of religion, 
politics and everyday life (Kraus et al. 2016).
2. Mimetic Embodiment in Rituals
In all areas of human existence rituals and gestures are important for the mimetic 
development of body knowledge. Embodied ritual knowledge is indispensable 
in religion, politics, economy, science, families, and education. It helps us to deal 
with difference and alterity and to create a sense of community and social rela-
tionships. It also enables us to assign meaning and structure to human relations. 
Ritual knowledge facilitates both continuity and change, as well as experiences of 
transition and transcendence. Given the significance of rituals in so many areas 
of social life, it is no surprise that there is no generally accepted theory of ritu-
als, since the positions of the individual academic disciplines differ too widely. 
Scholars now generally agree that it makes little sense to reduce the wealth and 
diversity of studies on rituals to individual theories and lines of research. What is 
needed is rather to be aware of a wide variety of aspects and to render the com-
plexity of the field explicit (Wulf et al. 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2011).
All approaches to classifying rituals are faced with the fact that rituals are 
always the product of multidimensional processes of symbolization and con-
struction. The phenomena studied are also more complex than the concepts and 
theories used to describe them. This also applies to the attempt to organize the 
field of ritual studies by types of occasion and to distinguish, for instance, the 
following kinds of rituals:
– Rituals of transition (birth and childhood, initiation and adolescence, mar-
riage, death)
– Rituals of institution or taking up office (taking on new tasks and positions)
– Seasonal rituals (birthdays, days of remembrance, national holidays)
– Rituals of intensification (eating, celebrating, love, sexuality)
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– Rituals of rebellion (peace and ecological movements, rituals of youth)
– Rituals of interaction (greetings, taking leave, conflicts) (Gebauer and Wulf 
1998, 130).
Other attempts at classification are also conceivable and can provide orientation 
in the complex field of ritual research. It is possible to differentiate between the 
following types of ritual activity: ritualization, convention, ceremony, liturgy, 
celebration (Grimes 1985).
In all rituals mimetic processes contribute to the development of practical 
knowledge. When we look at the staging and performance of rituals, the  bodies 
of the participants are implicitly involved. How do these appear in a ritual? How 
are they enacted? What does their arrangement in the ritual tell us about the 
community, the individuals, and their culture? The movements and practices of 
bodies need to be considered. How are they used to exploit the ritual space, 
and what rhythm do they follow? The distance between bodies and the manner 
in which they approach each other or distance themselves are significant. What 
positions do they take up? Do they stand or sit? What movements do they make 
when they dance? The configurations of the body are symbolically encoded 
and convey messages. In terms of gestures, which we can consider to be lan-
guage without words, it is possible to distinguish between iconic and symbolic 
gestures. Iconic gestures are simple “pictorial” gestures with meanings that are 
largely independent of the knowledge of a historical time or a particular culture. 
Examples of such gestures are giving indications of dimensions with simple hand 
movements or expressing tiredness and the need for sleep by inclining the head 
and placing the hands together beside it. Symbolic gestures, on the other hand, 
have different meanings depending on the historical era or culture, and more 
precise historical and cultural knowledge is required to understand them (Wulf 
and Fischer-Lichte 2010). In each case, the “logic” of the body, that is, its presen-
tation and expression, plays an important role in the performance of gestures and 
rituals. This is especially true of the preconscious perception of bodily expres-
sions, which forms the basis upon which the atmosphere of ritual arrangements 
is felt. The bodies of other people look at us before we become consciously 
aware of them, and in this way they determine our perception of them. In order 
for the performance of rituals to result in embodiment-processes, people need to 
experience the flow of energies and forces between them as a physical and psy-
chological process that takes place at the outer reaches of consciousness.
During the staging and performance of rituals, a new social reality is created 
and incorporated by the past (Wulf and Zirfas 2007). This reality is not com-
pletely new, since previous versions of it have existed before; however, it has not 
existed in this particular form at this particular location before this particular 
time. Drawing on earlier rituals, every staging and performance creates a new 
ritual reality and a new ritual community. This ritual community can develop for 
the first time among the people who carry out the ritual actions, but it can also 
be experienced as a repetition through which the community confirms its status 
as such. The performance of rituals is decisive for the forming of the members of 
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communities. The community presents itself in the staging and style of the per-
formance. In the ritual presentation it expresses something that cannot be por-
trayed in any other way. The ritual staging can therefore be seen as a “window” 
that provides a glimpse into the deep structure of the community and the culture 
that creates it. The staging and performing of rituals render something visible 
that was previously invisible and embody it in the participants of the ritual. The 
staging of rituals always includes a reference to previous ritual performances. 
However, this can vary greatly. In some cases the connection between old and 
new ritual performances is very close; in others it is very loose. However, in 
both cases the performance and incorporation of the ritual establishes a form of 
continuity that is important for the effectiveness of the ritual. Often, the histor-
ical continuity is incorporated by the participants of the ritual and stabilizes the 
social order of the community, legitimizing it. This frequently serves to uphold 
the current distribution of power and maintain bodily-based social hierarchies. 
It requires a critical analysis of power relations.
Rituals are tied to time and space, and their cultural and historical conditions 
are embodied in these terms. Different spaces have differing effects on the struc-
ture, quality, and style of the rituals that take place within them. Ritual spaces 
differ from physical spaces. On the one hand, they create ritual stagings and per-
formances; on the other hand, rituals create ritual spaces using body movements, 
settings, and symbolic and indexical frames. Rituals and space are not related in 
terms of subject / object or cause and effect, but interactively. Both rituals and 
spaces are performative (Wulf, Göhlich, and Zirfas 2001). On the one hand, a 
decorated gymnasium provides the space for a school dance, just as a church 
provides the space for a confirmation ceremony. On the other hand, the school 
dance transforms the gymnasium into a ballroom, and the confirmation cere-
mony transforms the church into a living, sacred space. The intermeshing of real, 
virtual, symbolic, and imaginary spaces with the bodily movements of those tak-
ing part plays an important role in the development of ritual activities.
This intermeshing of real, virtual, symbolic, and imaginary spaces with bodily 
movements takes place in an environment shaped by historical and cultural fac-
tors (Wulf 2013a, 2013b). This results in an atmosphere that affects the mood of 
all the participants in the ritual. Actions that have already been carried out here 
before and for which the space is suitable are repeated as part of an attempt to 
adjust to the atmosphere, structure, and function of the space in which the ritual 
is being carried out. The participants change by mimetically recreating the con-
ditions of the space around them. The performative effects and embodiment of 
ritual spaces such as the church, the family living room, and the virtual space of 
electronic media are very different from one another and have different social-
izing effects.
The other constituent condition of ritual activity apart from space is time. 
Two complementary views are important for the manner in which humans deal 
with time. First, rituals play a major role in introducing children to the time 
structure of society. Parents attempt to adjust their children’s rhythms to the 
time rhythms of society and thus to accustom even infants to the manner of 
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structuring time that is the social norm. Childhood rituals are used to ensure 
that time becomes the main structuring influence in children’s lives. Second, in 
our ritualized handling of time, we acquire practical knowledge that is indis-
pensable for the staging and performance of rituals. Insofar as the management 
of time results from cultural learning processes, rituals play a very important 
part in this. Their repetitive character helps to inscribe the order of time into 
our bodies, which then become structured by time. Many rituals are repeated 
cyclically. Their purpose is to assure us of the presence of the community and to 
reaffirm its order and potential for transformation. The aim of rituals is to stage 
continuity, timelessness, and constancy. They are oriented toward processuality 
and the projectivity of communities and individuals. As we structure our time 
in a ritualized manner, we learn to manage it as a social skill. In today’s societies 
the ritual organization of time lends a structure to every aspect of individual and 
communal life.
Between the beginning and the end of a ritual, different sequences of ritual 
activity occur in which different kinds of actions are expected and carried out. 
The rule-bound nature of ritual activity is closely linked to its sequentiality. The 
ritual actions follow an order that is also chronological and embodied. Periods of 
time are created in and by means of rituals which differ from the uniformity of 
everyday life and become moments of heightened intensity. This kind of inten-
sification is due to the exceptional character of the events and is also achieved by 
highly condensing them and speeding them up. In many rituals, time becomes 
sacred time. Memory and reconnection with the past are therefore constitutive 
elements of religions, which, with the aid of rituals, transfer sacred content from 
communicative memory to cultural memory. They thereby render it accessible, 
so that it can be used to shape the future. In the experience of sacred time, it is 
not so much the length of time that counts as its intensity. On the one hand, rites 
of passage make it possible to experience different stages of life as phases with 
their own temporal dynamics; on the other, they create continuity and meaning 
in the process of life. In the time structures of rituals, different times often over-
lap, resulting in highly complex temporal experiences.
Rituals are essential for worship and the embodiment of religion, regardless of 
whether one sees their importance in the creation and practicing of religious feel-
ings in cult ceremonies or focuses on their capacity to create sacrality, in which 
society makes an image of itself. The magical character of ceremonies of promo-
tion to a higher office also has many aspects in common with sacred ceremonies. 
Even a candlelit dinner for two, where the candles on the table emphasize the 
special atmosphere of sharing a meal, raises the question as to whether the scene 
has elements borrowed from the sphere of the sacred and transferred to everyday 
life. The upgrading of such customs by adding sacred symbols may be connected 
to the far-reaching changes in attitudes toward religion and sacred matters that 
we are currently experiencing.
During the performance of rituals, the participants refer simultaneously and 
directly to the actions of other participants. They do so largely by means of 
mimesis, using the senses, the movements of the body, and a joint orientation 
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toward words, sounds, language, and music. A ritual can only take place as a 
structured whole if all actions are successfully coordinated, precisely orches-
trated and adequately embodied. Here the staging is indispensable; however, the 
performance itself is the decisive factor, as the ritual actions need to be exactly 
coordinated. Otherwise the results are farcical, and the ritual breaks down. If the 
interaction is to be harmonious, the ritual activities must be mimetically coordi-
nated with each other. If this is achieved, energies can “flow” between the ritual 
participants, and this is experienced as intense, pleasant, and bonding (Csikszent-
mihalyi 1990). As in dance or courtship behavior, the rational control of actions 
also has limits in rituals. We only have the feeling that a ritual is successful if a 
mimetically created harmony that is beyond rational control develops between 
one body and another, one movement and another, and one gesture and another. 
These mimetic processes form the basis of the feeling of belonging to a commu-
nity as well as the experience of the sacred.
Whereas the synchronous dimension of mimetic processes relates to the 
importance of mimetic processes in the actual conduct of rituals, the diachro-
nous dimension relates to the historical aspects of rituals. Rituals always relate 
to others that have taken place before – either ones in which one has participated 
or ones of which one has heard. Thus the historical dimension is essential for the 
creation and the incorporation of rituals. Ritual actions include mimetic refer-
ences to earlier rituals. As these references are made by mimesis, they create an 
“impression” of earlier performances of the ritual, which is then adapted to suit 
the current context. Depending on the requirements, some aspects of the ritual 
may be transformed in this process. Creating a mimetic link between the current 
world and a previous world ensures historical continuity, which legitimizes the 
current ritual activity, even if it differs from its predecessor. This use of mimesis 
to refer to or reconnect with previous performances of a ritual does not mean 
that it is recreated in exactly the same way every time. To make a reference by 
mimesis is to “adjust oneself to become similar,” that is, to repeat a similar action 
that would not be possible if the previous ritual activity had not taken place. In 
some cases the result of this mimetic referencing also leads to a critical distancing 
from the reference point of the ritual, although this point of reference does not 
become superfluous. In mimetic referencing processes, the configurations and 
arrangements of the ritual action are updated and modified to match the context 
of our own activities. Mimetic constellations, staging styles, and types of move-
ment are acquired and modified according to necessity or what the person thinks 
fit. The “repetition” of earlier rituals does not result in a copy in a photographic 
sense. Rather, through the inclusion of mimetically transferred and assimilated 
elements, something new is created in the repetition for everyone involved. The 
older version is merged into the new in a dialectical fashion. The ritual that has 
been updated by a mimetic process contains the old ritual, which has been given 
a new face and new clothing (Wulf 2005; Michaels and Wulf 2013).
Mimetic processes play an important role in the staging, performing and 
incorporation of ritual events: they produce the practical knowledge necessary 
for the ritual actions in question. This ritual knowledge, which enables us to 
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act competently in rituals, evolves from real or imaginary participation in ritual 
activities. In mimetic processes people take part in ritual actions that are corpo-
real and are both independent and related to other ritual acts or arrangements. In 
so doing, they undergo an expansion in order to accommodate the ritual practice. 
Thus, through mimetic referencing, they undergo a process of adjusting to the 
ritual activities in which corporeality and performativity play an important role. 
These processes incorporate ritual configurations, scenes, sequences of events, 
images, and behavior patterns, all of which, in other contexts, contribute to the 
competent execution of a ritual practice.
Outlook
Mimetic processes are principally but not exclusively orientated towards other 
people. In mimetic processes people also incorporate their cultural environ-
ments. In the course of these processes, children assimilate aspects of their home, 
such as rooms, particular corners, objects and atmospheres. People and objects 
of the environment are incorporated as “imprints” and stored in the body and in 
the imaginary world, where they are subsequently transformed into new images 
and memories that help gain access to people and culture. Culture is handed 
on by means of these processes of incorporating and making sense of people 
and cultural products. The mimetic ability to transform people and the external 
material world into images, transferring them into the internal worlds of images 
and making them accessible to others enables individuals to actively handle 
the relationship with other people and shape cultural realities. These processes 
encompass our modes of dealing with the material products of culture and with 
the social relationships and forms of activity and the way social life is staged 
and performed. In particular this involves forms of practical knowledge that are 
learned mimetically in body-oriented, sensory processes and enable us to act 
competently in institutions and organizations. Ritual knowledge, for example, 
is an important area of this practical social knowledge, and this is the means 
by which “imprints” of people and institutions become rooted in the human 
body, enabling us to orient ourselves and act in social situations. Images, sche-
mas and movements are learned and embodied in mimetic processes, and these 
render the individual capable of action. Since mimetic processes involve other 
human beings and products of history and culture, scenes, arrangements and 
performances, these processes are among the most important ways of handing 
down culture from one generation to the next. In mimetic processes, physical 
and historical-cultural elements are inextricably interwoven, so that it is of equal 
significance what humans have in common and what distinguishes them in his-
torical and cultural respects. In anthropology today several paradigms can be 
distinguished in which these two perspectives play a role (Wulf 2013a). While 
research in the fields of hominization, evolutionary anthropology and philo-
sophical anthropology investigate primarily what we as Homo sapiens have in 
common, research on historical anthropology and cultural anthropology investi-
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gates, respectively, the diachronic and synchronic differences between us. Given 
this situation, new perspectives might arise where the research on hominization, 
evolutionary anthropology and philosophical anthropology to turn to the partic-
ular or individual and research in historical or cultural anthropology turns to the 
general or universal. How difficult these turns are in epistemological respects has 
become clear in many of the large-scale joint-research projects of recent years.
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“It Proceeded from the Entrance  
of a Demon into the Man”1
Epileptic Seizures in Ancient Medical Texts  
and the New Testament
Annette Weissenrieder
And as he is who falls and knows not how,
By force of demons who to earth down drag him,
Or other oppilation that binds man,
When he arises and around him looks,
Wholly bewildered by the mighty anguish
(Dante Alighieri)
Abstract: This paper aims to show how epilepsy was investigated in “rational” medical 
and theological discourses in antiquity: cognitive and somatic manifestations of epilepsy 
are intertwined and an epileptic attack is interpreted as a complete loss of consciousness 
in these sources. In Mark 9:14 – 29 and Luke 9:37 – 43, the Synoptic Gospels narrate Jesus’ 
healing of an epileptic boy which describe the attack using the standard term from ancient 
medicine. This view is further reinforced by Matthew’s version of the story where the sick-
ness of the boy is described with the verb seleniazomai, “to be moonstruck” (17:15). It is 
in fact remarkable that the Gospels, but especially Luke, interpret “epilepsy” linguistically 
in the context of ancient medicine, still mention a demon. The texts distinguish between 
the sick person and the disease that invades the patient as an independent force from the 
outside. If a religious community assumes that it can explain the patient’s etiology and thus 
any deviations from the healthy state through religion, and if it therefore ascribes illnesses 
to unclean spirits or demons and describes overcoming as a process of conquering these 
forces, that does not make the system any less medical. This insight is particularly apt 
when the physical symptoms are expressly understood in a medical sense, but the etiology 
is described demonologically.
Introduction
In the Inferno, Dante Alighieri makes a connection between “the falling evil,” 
that is, the “force of demons” in a human being, and a medical interpretation, 
namely “congesting” or blocking the ventricles of the brain, which is signified 
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2 Aretaeus SC 1.4. Temkin (1994, 40) defines demonic possession as “the intrusion of a god, 
demon or ghost of a hitherto normal individual who now behaves like a willing or reluctant 
instrument of the intrudent.”
3 See Aretaeus SC 1.4.
4 Cf. Galen De diebus decretoriis 3.2 (9.902 f. Kühn); De locis affectis 3.9 (8.175 – 177; 233 
Kühn).
by the Latin term oppilatio, a well-known term in medieval medicine. This term 
oppilatio is often used by medieval physicians describing epileptic phenomena 
(“falls and knows not how,” “oppilation”). At the same time, Dante is referring 
to a demonological explanation of a human being suffering from the falling sick-
ness (“force of demons”) as well as to a medical phenomenon in a person’s brain. 
The oldest source referring both to the demonological (-magical) explanation 
and to medical knowledge comes from first-century C. E. physician Aretaeus of 
Cappadocia, who refers to epilepsy as the result of demonic possession, or the 
punishment of the goddess of the moon.2 The context in which this explanation 
is found, however, also reflects medical knowledge: the brain as the cause of epi-
leptic seizures. Aretaeus’ interpretation may have influenced Greek and Latin 
Church fathers.3 Origen of Alexandria († 254) writes:
Physicians may offer natural theories since according to their view it is not an unclean 
spirit but a bodily affection and physiology which presents itself in bodily humors 
in the head which move according to the movement of the moon which has a humid 
structure as well. We, however, also believe the euaggelion in the point that this disease 
[the lunacy] in those affected with it, is obviously brought about by an unclean and 
dumb spirit. (Origen, In Matth. Comment. 13.3 – 6)
Origen refers to the illness construct of “epilepsy,” which he assumes physi-
cians (iatroi) refer to as a “bodily affection” (sōmatikon sumptōma) caused by 
“humors in the head” (ta hugra . . . ta en tē kefalē) and that he – reminiscent of 
Galen – associates with the course of the moon.4 Both the “humors in the head” 
and “the course of the moon” are grammatically paralleled with Origen’s own 
theological perspective, “the unclean and dumb spirit.” Therefore it is clear that 
Origen largely knows about the physicians’ medical understanding. However, is 
also indisputable that he rejects these. Similar ideas are also expressed in a satir-
ical dialogue by Lucian, who writes, “[e]veryone knows about the Syrian from 
Palestine, the adept in it, how many he takes in hand who fall down in the light 
of the moon and roll their eyes and fill their mouths with foam; nevertheless, he 
restores them to health and sends them away normal in mind, delivering them 
from their straits for a large fee” (Lucian Philopseudes 16, LCL 1921, 344 – 345). 
All four of these sources have one thing in common: They seem to be aware of 
the etiological cause of an epileptic phenomenon in the head and brain, while 
they connect its consequences to a form of demonic obsession that is expressed 
physically. Therefore, the sources allow the supposition that the brain is inter-
preted as “a relational organ” (Fuchs 2011, 347 – 358), which is embodied by dif-
ferent interpretations.
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5 See e. g. CH Coac. 157, 339, 445, 450, 511, 587; Epid. 7.1; Aphor. 2.45; 3.16, 20; Prorr. 1.131; 
Mul. 2.151.
6 Temkin writes: “The distinction between systematic epilepsy, i. e., a syndrome which 
might be associated with various diseases, and the possible existence of an ‘essential’ or ‘genu-
ine’ disease, epilepsy, is of relatively modern origin and was of little importance in antiquity” 
(Temkin 1994, 28; cf. Weissenrieder 2003, chap. 7; Wohlers 1997).
7 If not mentioned otherwise, the translations are mine.
In this paper, I aim to show how epilepsy was investigated in “rational” med-
ical and theological discourses in antiquity. In the following, I will describe the 
terms, some grammatical issues, theoretical foundations, and explanatory strate-
gies of the medical and theological discourses of epileptic phenomena more pre-
cisely. In addition to the Greek text of the New Testament, I will also make use 
of the Old Latin version of the New Testament, the Vetus Latina, though briefly, 
in order to evaluate the reception of medicine in theological discourse. For one 
thing is worth noting: cognitive and somatic manifestations of epilepsy are inter-
twined in these sources.
1. Phlegm, pneuma, Blood and Bile and the Question  
of the Cause of Epilepsy
“Rational medicine” is widespread, above all, in the Corpus Hippocraticum 
(abbreviated thereafter CH) and in later works by medical theorists such as 
Herophilus and Galen (cf. Tieleman 1996), who brought physical and scientific 
legality to the fore (cf. Weissenrieder 2003; Weissenrieder and Etzelmüller 2007). 
“Rational” is understood here as logikos in the sense of theoretically substanti-
ated, indicating a closeness to the natural philosophy of antiquity. The beginning 
of rational medicine refers therefore most clearly “in the discovery of disease as 
a natural process: a particular type of cause produces as a rule a particular type 
of effect” (see Tieleman 2010, 83 – 95, here 90; 2013, 101 – 115). Many texts of the 
Hippocratic Corpus the treatise refer to epileptic phenomena (cf. Weissenrieder 
2003, chap. 7):5 The adjective epileptos means that a person suffers from an attack 
of a disease and the adjective epileptikos refers to any kind of attack.6 Within the 
Hippocratic Corpus De morbo sacro and De flatibus take similar positions, in 
so far as both texts offer an etiological interpretation of the illness of epilepsy; 
however, they take different paths in their theoretical foundation, especially with 
regard to the question of the seat of cognition. Both texts agree in the fact that 
they accept a “consciousness-bearing” substance which spreads in the body. And 
both texts see a connection between the cognitive abilities and physical reac-
tions and a blockage of these “consciousness-bearing” substances in the body. 
Whereas De morbo sacro regards pneuma as the reason of epilepsy, De flatibus 
refers to the blood. We come first to De morbo sacro:
The setting of the fourth chapter is the portrayal of the “epileptic phenom-
ena.”7
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 8 One finds examples of other systems in CH De carnibus 5, according to which all veins 
come from the heart.
 9 Galen refers several times to this aphorism; see De sanitate tuenda I 10.22 f. (CMG V 4.2) 
and III 4.7 (179.10); De opt.const. 4 (IV 746 Kühn); see also Gal De sanitate tuenda CMG V 10 
2.2 126 ff.
10 This view would then be similar to that of Philistion and Diocles of Carystus and the 
single purpose of breathing attributed to Hippocrates by Galen (De Usu Respirationis 1.2 – 3; 
VII 769 K). For air in De morbo sacro see Hippocrate 2003, 255 – 258; see also Debru 1996, 180 ff.
We also take in the majority of spirit (pneuma) along these vessels, for they are vents 
for our body. By drawing in air (aēr), they conduct it into the rest of the body along 
the smaller vessels and they refresh the spirit (pneuma) in the rest of the body and once 
again they discharge the air. For the spirit is not able to stand still but moves up and 
down. Should it stand still somewhere and be cut off, that part where the spirit stands 
still becomes powerless. [CH De morbo sacro 4.1 – 9 (VI 368.1 – 9 Littré)]
The fourth chapter is thus to be classified in an etiological sense. Here the author 
describes the function of the veins in breathing. The chapter provides the basis 
for his further discussion of air and its role in the formation of consciousness. 
The theory developed here forms the basis for numerous Hippocratic treatises 
(cf. De aere aquis locis 10).8 The ancient medical texts do not provide informa-
tion as to how deeply the pneuma infiltrates the body. We read in the Hippo-
cratic treatise De victu 2.38: “As there is breath in living things, it is also present 
in all the remainders.”9 It is the whole body that inhales and exhales. After the 
spirit (pneuma) finds its way to the brain, it takes effect in the stomach, the lungs 
and the “veins”. It is significant that the text shifts between outside air, aēr, and 
inside air, breath / spirit (pneuma). The movement of the pneuma in the body is 
also further specified in chapter 7 by the verb xūmballetai, which has a funda-
mental meaning of “bringing together” or “uniting” (LSJ 1996). It is the interior 
pneuma that, according to the treatise, links the various body parts. Notable is 
the verb reviving / refreshing, anapsūchousi, which lacks a clearly stated object. 
Hence, it is preferable to understand the object of the verb as pneuma, which is 
as breath / spirit the air inside the body.10 The consciousness-bearing substance is 
thus the breath, pneuma, in contrast to De flatibus, where blood is considered the 
central substance. This pneuma must always remain in motion. Otherwise the 
body part in which the pneuma pauses will become powerless.
The seventh chapter provides the heart of the work De morbo sacro. In 
essence, the author explains in chapter 7 that the majority of pneuma is inhaled 
by the respiratory system and the veins “by dragging the air into the body and 
carrying it to the bodily members” (van der Eijk 2005, 131). An “epileptic” sei-
zure is portrayed as the result of phlegm flowing into the air passages, rendering 
the blood vessels unable to distribute the vital pneuma. This accumulation is 
based on the prenatal or postnatal katharsis of phlegm in the brain. The illness 
is caused by a blockage of passages that, spreading out from the brain to the 
rest of the body, is responsible for transporting pneuma. The pneuma can be 
understood here as a “consciousness-bearing” material (van der Eijk 2005, 131 ff.; 
see Temkin 1936, 141 – 44, Temkin 1994). This accumulation results in different 
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symptoms, depending on the part of the body in question: close to heart it leads 
to palpitation and asthma, in the abdomen it leads to diarrhea, and in the vessels 
it leads to a spasm of the hands, crossed eyes, foaming at the mouth, symptoms 
of choking or suffocation. With this enumeration, the author takes up the symp-
toms already mentioned in chapter one, but explains them here scientifically, 
adding aphonia to the list. In contrast to the magician’s understanding of this 
illness, mentioned in chapter 1 of this treatise, the mental affection is of primary 
importance for the physician. The mental phenomena of illness are here associ-
ated with the brain. It is noteworthy that the author grants the heart a reaction 
to the bodily processes.
If the phlegm should be shut off from these passages but make its descent into the 
channels that I have mentioned, the patient becomes speechless and chokes and froth 
flows out of the patient’s mouth. His teeth are clenched and his hands are drawn up. 
His eyes are distorted and perceive nothing. . . . A patient becomes speechless when-
ever the phlegm shuts off the air because it has come down into the channels, and the 
patient receives air neither in his brain nor in his hollow channels nor in his ventricles 
but he stops breathing. Whenever a human receives breath through the mouth or nos-
trils, it goes first to the brain. The greatest part of it, however, goes into the internal 
cavity, some of it to the lung but some of it to the channels. From these body parts, it 
is dispersed to the remaining parts along the channels. As much breath as enters into 
the internal cavity cools the internal cavity and nothing flows to another part. The air 
in the lung and the channels, however, flows together into the ventricles as it enters 
also into the brain. Thus, the air furnishes intelligence and movement to the bodily 
members. Whenever therefore the channels of the air are clogged by the phlegm and 
do not receive the air, the result is that they render the human speechless and senseless. 
The hands become powerless and drawn after the blood becomes calm and not dis-
persed as usual. The eyes are distorted as the small channels are shut off from the air 
and they throb. The foam from the mouth is furnished from the lung, for whenever 
the breath does not enter it, it foams and sputters as though dying. . . . This symptom 
occurs whenever the breath does not enter the mouth as usual. The patient kicks with 
his feet whenever the air is shut up in the members since it cannot pass through to the 
outside because of the phlegm. As the air rushes upward and downward through the 
blood, it engenders spasm and pain. Therefore, the patient kicks. The patient suffers all 
these symptoms whenever the cold phlegm flows in the blood while it is warm, for it 
chills the blood and makes it stand still. If the flow of phlegm should be copious and 
thick, it kills the patient straightaway, for it masters the blood by its cold and congeals 
it. [CH De morbo sacro 7.1 – 39 (VI 372.4 – 374.13 Littré)]
The author is specifically interested in demonstrating that the brain is the cause 
of attacks of the “sacred disease” (cf. Jouanna 2003, 93 ff.; Grensemann 1968, 
200 ff.). In chapter 16, this author addresses a wide-ranging discussion in the 
ancient world about the bodily organ responsible for thinking and intelligence. 
The earliest position seems to be that the diaphragm is the seat of intelligence. 
Authors such as Diogenes of Apollonia (VS 64 A 20) and the Hippocratic author 
of De carnibus argue very forcefully that the heart is the central organ of reason, 
decision-making, and intelligence, and this view was widespread in the ancient 
world. Against this popular position, the author of De morbo sacro weighs in on 
the side of those who assert the brain to be the intellectual center of the human 
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body. Notable in chapter 7 is the verb “perceiving, have understanding” – phro-
neousin (see line 13 underlined), which does not have a clear subject: the subject 
could be either patients or eyes (accusativus limitationes). In order to decide one 
way or the other, it is significant to note that the other references to the patient in 
the treatise all use singular verbs. The plural verb form thus indicates the changes 
in the eyes during a serious attack. In consequence, the eyes and not the patient 
are the subject of perceiving and understanding.
Finally, chapter 16 represents the theoretical explanation of the attacks of the 
“sacred disease” described in chapters 13 – 15. Chapter 14 describes attacks of 
this disease that occur most often at night, while chapter 15 is devoted to those 
attacks that occur during the day. The nocturnal attacks are caused by bile and 
lead to shrieking and destructive behaviors directed both inward and outward, 
and the body is “like a corpse” (see also Mark 9:26). The attacks during the day 
are caused by phlegm and cause an altered consciousness and convulsions. These 
various diurnal and nocturnal symptoms arise from a single source, namely the 
brain. The brain is the chief organ of the body in general. Nevertheless, it is air 
that enables intelligence, comprehension, and discernment. Sense organs, speech, 
and motor skills are mediated through the commands of the brain. The com-
mands are communicated through the air to the individual organs. These organs 
also have the ability of discernment. The air arrives first in the brain, making 
the brain the comprehensive center of intelligence and discernment. Now the 
brain perceives not only the consciousness or intelligence (phronēsis) from the 
air but also climatic changes that alter the air, and the “sacred disease” is there-
fore affected by these environmental factors. The brain is described as interpret-
ing (hermeneus) what came from the air outside. With this thought, the author 
returns to ideas expressed at the beginning of his treatise.
The author differentiates the diaphragm and the heart from the brain. Both 
the heart and the diaphragm certainly have aisthēsis in the sense of reflex and 
sensation, but not phronēsis (consciousness; intelligence) in the sense of mental 
abilities. The brain already plays an important role in the explanation of epilepsy, 
which he describes in chapter 11 [see CH De morbo sacro 11.3 – 5 (VI 382 Littré)] 
as an illness caused by an accumulation of phlegm in and around the brain. He 
employs an empirical argument: If one opened the skull of a goat that died of an 
epileptic fit, one would find a large amount of phlegm around the brain.
For this reason I believe that the brain possesses the greatest power in the human being, 
for it is the interpreter (hermeneus) for us of the phenomena of what comes to the body 
through the air if it is healthy. Further, the air supplies the intelligence (phronēsis) and 
the eyes, the ears, the tongue, the hands, and the feet carry out such things as much as 
the brain knows, for the phenomenon of intelligence is produced in the entire body so 
long as the body partakes of air. But the brain is the interpreter for comprehension. For 
when a human draws in breath (pneuma), it arrives first in the brain, and thus the air 
is distributed into the remaining body after it has deposited its greatest strength in the 
brain, namely, the thing that has both consciousness and understanding (phronēsis and 
gnomē). For if the air were to arrive in the body first and afterwards in the brain, the 
power of discernment (diagnōsis) would be left in the fleshly parts and in the vessels, 
it would come into the brain while it is warm and not pure but mixed with the moist 
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11 The treatise De flatibus has an epideictic character, and we can suppose that it was con-
ceived as a lecture for an audience. I refer primarily to (Krug 1993, 43 ff.; Langholf 1989). This 
treatise shows that the Hippocratics not only had to distinguish themselves from magicians and 
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secretions both from the fleshly parts and the blood so as to be no longer accurate. 
Therefore, I say that the brain is the interpreter of comprehension (sūnesis). . . . Some 
say that we owe our consciousness to the heart and that this is the member which 
grieves and feels anxiety. This is not so; rather it is torn just like the diaphragm and even 
more than that, for the same causes, for blood vessels stretch into it [the heart] from all 
over the body, and the heart has been connected so as to perceive if any pain or strain 
occurs in the human being. Now, it is necessary for the body to shudder and strain for 
the extent of time that a human experiences distress and to contract when it feels pain, 
and when it is overwhelmed by joy it experiences the same. Therefore, in the heart as 
well as the diaphragm, feeling is the most acute. Certainly, in neither of the two share 
in consciousness at all, but of all these things, the brain perceives the intelligence of the 
air before the other members that are in the body. Thus, also the brain first perceives 
if any more violent change occurs in the air by the seasons of the year and if the air 
itself becomes at variance with itself. Therefore also, I say that the most acute and most 
severe and deadliest illnesses as well as the illnesses hardest to discern by the inexpe-
rienced fall within the province of the brain. [Corpus Hippocraticum De morbo sacro 
16.1 – 17.26 (VI 390.10 – 394.8 Littré)]
The author attempts to describe the abilities of the brain by using various terms 
such as phronēsis (consciousness, intelligence), phronimos (consciousness), sūne-
sis (comprehension, understanding), diagnōsis (discerning, thinking), and gnomē 
(understanding). It is clear that phronēsis is presented as the most comprehensive 
of these mental abilities. In English, phronēsis is rendered as intelligence of think-
ing. According to Hüffmeier and Miller, it should be understood more as “having 
one’s senses together” (Hüffmeier 1961, 58; cf. Miller 1948). The term implies 
perception and movement, but it also refers to a force by which a living being 
can deal with its surroundings. It is also remarkable that phronēsis can be found 
throughout the body (through pneuma). Or to say it differently: Pneuma oper-
ates in the body, but sūnesis (understanding) is restricted to the brain (see van der 
Eijk 2005, 127). The brain is not only a source of understanding, but also of feel-
ing, although the heart and the diaphragm take part in that as well. All the other 
terms are dependent on and derivative of phronēsis. Sūnesis is rendered as compre-
hension which is mediated to all other organs through the brain. Comprehension 
is linked to sense and understanding, which according De morbo sacro is trans-
mitted to all organs. Sense, discernment, and understanding are all distinguished 
as brain activities and are also broadly provided to the other organs by the air, 
though not to the degree that the air enables the brain to perform these functions.
In antiquity, the work De flatibus, part of the Corpus Hippocraticum, was 
already recognized as one of the writings11 that represent the doctrine of the 
“Hypothetics,” whose basic premise is that sicknesses have a single cause (see 
CH Flat., ed. Heiberg; CMG I, 1, 91 – 101; Ducatillon 1983, Jouanna 2003, Segal 
1970). The author of De flatibus does not himself use the term hypothesis, but 
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individual phenomena under the catchword nourishment, trophē . In the text, he characterizes 
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their topos: breath is pneuma in the body and air is pneuma outside of bodies phūsē (Ionic for 
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“blasts of air” in bodies that produce movement, as the rest of the text demonstrates.
13 Van der Eijk (2005, 132) analyzes the text as a “haematocentric approach to epilepsy.”
in essence he treats a principle source, pneuma, as a hypothesis. He understands 
pneuma as the ruler (dūnastēs) that fills the universe and displays its power in the 
human body.12
I propose that none of the contributory causes in the body is more for intelligence than 
blood. Whenever blood remains in its usual state, intelligence also remains. When the 
blood is altered, intelligence also undergoes a change. There are many examples testify-
ing that this is so. First sleep, which is common to all animals, testifies to what was just 
said. When sleep comes upon the body, the blood is cooled, for sleep produces a chill-
ing by its nature. The passages become more sluggish by the blood’s being chilled. Now 
this chilling is clear because bodies fall and become heavy, for all heavy things produce 
a falling downward. The eyes close, and intelligence is altered, and some other visions 
that are called dreams spend time there. Second, when the blood suddenly increases 
by drunkenness, souls and the thoughts in souls undergo a change. Souls become for-
getful of present evils and hopeful of future goods. I could state many such instances 
in which changes of blood change the intelligence. If therefore all the blood should be 
completely disordered, the intelligence must be utterly destroyed, for the things learnt 
and recognized are habits. [CH De flatibus 14.1 – 15.8 (VI 110.14 – 114.20 Littré)]
Thus it is clear that this author is not merely talking about the possible effects of 
an epileptic attack, but also says that all physiological and sensory / motor skills 
are lost. In other words, an epileptic attack is interpreted as a complete loss of 
consciousness. The medical authors do not tend to hold theoretical discussions 
about the seat of reason, as we would expect from Plato or Aristotle. However, 
ancient writers are continually confronted with the theoretical issue when they 
are faced with illnesses involving epileptic phenomena, mania, melancholy and 
strokes. The Hippocratic author grants breath / air a central role in the life of 
an organism, and air also plays an important role in causing illness. In addi-
tion to causes outside the body, nourishment and digestion are also important 
since food always contains air. Thus, air itself is now seen as a potential block-
age or hindrance, while in the text De morbo sacro it was more likely to be hin-
dered in its flow throughout the body: the blood13 is cooled by the air, making it 
flow more slowly and providing the body with a reduced supply of conscious-
ness. However, the author of the text also understands this to mean that any 
change in the blood changes the intelligence, phronēsis; in other words, as long 
as the blood is moving normally though the body, intelligence remains constant. 
This movement is said to stop during sleep, when the blood cools and slows 
down.
In his treatise De somno et vigilia, Aristotle thus builds on De flatibus in a 
certain sense, since both suspect that there is a connection between sleep and epi-
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lepsy, though with one difference: blood, which was still central to the argument 
in De flatibus, now fades into the background as a cause.
Sleep arises from evaporation due to food [. . .] Young children sleep deeply because all 
the food is borne upwards. An indication of this is that in early youth the upper parts 
of the body are larger in comparison with the lower parts which is due to the fact that 
growth takes place in the upward direction. Hence too they are liable to epilepsy; for 
sleep is like epilepsy; indeed sleep is a type of epileptic fit. This is why in many people 
epilepsy begins in sleep [. . .]. (Aristotle, De somno et vigilia 3.457a4 ff.)14
Aristotle thus interprets epilepsy as a form of sleep without ascribing a patholog-
ical significance to it. Sleep, he says, results from the process of digesting food, 
which is heated by the warmth of sleep and not only reaches the brain in the 
form of pneuma-breath, a warm steam, but also makes the head heavier, which 
makes the person sleepy. As in De morbo sacro, he says that children are more 
susceptible to this phenomenon.
One final text is ascribed to Diocles and his pupil Praxagoras, which is handed 
down to us through Anonymous Parisinus. As is his custom, Anonymous deals 
with the positions of Praxagoras, Diocles of Carystus, and Hippocrates. The 
reference to Praxagoras in this fragment is uncertain. In his well-known 1895 
study, “Anecdota medica Graeca,” R. Fuchs already pointed out that the descrip-
tion is more like Erasistratos’ etiology of illness preserved in Codex Paris. 636, 
folio 132r.15
The text begins by naming epilēpsias,16 which initially means simply an occa-
sional seizure that, however, does not need to coincide with the symptoms of an 
illness. Here the name can simply refer to any seizure.17
Praxagoras says that it [epilepsy] originates around the thick artery when phlegmatic 
humours come to exist in it. He says that by forming bubbles, these humors shut off 
the passageway of the psychic pneuma from the heart. Thus, this spirit agitates and 
wrenches the body. He says that the affliction ceases when the bubbles settle down 
again. Diocles himself also thinks that there is a stoppage around the same place. He 
also agrees that the other things happen according to the same causes, but it is Praxago-
ras who says these things happen. Diocles has neglected to state the nature of the cause 
of the stoppage but says that patients recover with more difficulty at the termination 
of the affliction if there are impediments to the spirit. Hippocrates states the cause of 
the blockage to be moist phlegm. He said that all the brain is filled with moistures, and 
the psychic spirit is shut off, but not everywhere, since the sinews through which the 
bodily members were set in motion are filled by it. He said that the onset of an epileptic 
seizure and the convulsion and the spasm occur by the charging of the spirit through 
these sinews. He said that the affliction becomes acute either because of the degree of 
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the problematic matter is so great as to suffocate the heat or because of the degree of 
the body’s lack of tone so that the patient is not able to resist the spasms but gives in 
to them beforehand. [Anonymus Parisinus, De morbis acutis et chroniis 3 (18,10 – 20,6 
Garofalo)]
The basic view is that a psychic phenomenon comes from the heart and causes 
convulsions in the body. The opposing view is offered by the author of the work 
De morbo sacro (chap. 9 – 11), part of the Corpus Hippocraticum. The external 
causes of the flow of phlegm are basically named here. The treatise interprets the 
modalities of the course of an illness under changing bodily conditions on the 
basis of which prognoses are formed, since children and the aged are in particular 
danger because of their veins.
To summarize this point: Ancient medical texts use the same terms – nosos, 
nosēma and pathos – to describe illnesses located both in the body and in the 
brain. So ancient definitions of epileptic phenomena are described as a “disor-
der of the body” (CH Epid. VI 8.31.), an “interruption of the leading function” 
of the body (Gal. De sympt.diff. 3, VII 58 – 59 Kühn), and in his Definitiones 
medicae, Pseudo-Galen interprets the illness as a seizure of the thinking faculty 
“when the evil is abating and past its height” (Ps.-Gal. DM 240, XIX 414 Kühn). 
Therefore, these medical texts refuse to envisage a separation of body and mind, 
as remarked by Putnam and Cellucci (see Putnam 1995, 3; Cellucci 2005, 390 ff.); 
instead, the texts identify this illness as responsible for influencing a person’s 
thinking, sensory and motor faculties, and behavior. It should also be noted that 
none of these texts proposes a concept of “soul” or “mental activity.” At this 
point, it should be clear that theories of embodiment and this article presented 
here share an important insight (see Thompson 2010, Gallagher 2013, Fuchs 
2013): “Mind, therefore, is not incidentally but intimately embodied and inti-
mately embedded in its world” (Haugeland 1998, 237). Ancient interpretations 
of epilepsy show that the brain (the heart and the blood) is not a neural network 
that remain hidden in a supposed interior space, largely separate from the world; 
instead, it is to be seen as a dynamic form of physical being-in-the-world. The 
texts also show that sensory and motor skills should not be interpreted sepa-
rately from “consciousness,” but as a way of defining what the mind is.
2. The Synoptic Gospels
In Matt 17:14 – 21, Mark 9:14 – 29 and Luke 9:37 – 43, the Synoptic Gospels narrate 
Jesus’ healing of an epileptic boy. The narratives portray the illness as an embodi-
ment or “disembodiment”18 – as Loren Stuckenbruck calls it – of unclean spirits, 
demons, and spirit / breath into or out of a human body. The terms used in Greek 
are “to cast” (ekballein) out and departing (exerchomai). Both terms allude to 
notions of action and movement of a demon which often leads to an evaluation 
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of the terminology as “exorcistic rather than therapeutic” (Kelley 2011, 210). Do 
the Synoptic Gospels therefore show an emphasis of terms referring to an exor-
cism instead of a illness and healing?
Of course, the previous observations raise doubts about this analysis. First of 
all, it is noteworthy that Mark 9:14 – 29 as well as Luke 9:37 describe the attack 
using the standard term from ancient medicine. Not only do medical texts as 
well as Mark and Luke refer to a young child (paida in the Greek text; infans 
and pueris in Latin) who suffered from epilepsy from “childhood” (ek paidio-
then Mark 9:21),19 the medical texts also refer to the boy’s grinding his teeth 
(Mark 9:18 NTG29; strindet dentibus Vetus Latina),20 foaming (Mark 9:18, 20 
and Luke 9:39),21 and convulsing (Mark 9:20; Luke 9:39).22 Linguistically, these 
descriptions are completely consistent with the manner of speaking found in 
medical texts. The precise naming of the symptoms not only shows that the 
authors must have been familiar with the symptoms of the illness; the list, which 
is mentioned repeatedly by Mark in particular, also indicates that the text’s read-
ers were able to classify the symptoms and assign them to an illness. This view 
is further reinforced by Matthew’s version of the story. The tale of the boy with 
a falling sickness is given its special narrative profile through a dual interpre-
tation of the sickness of the boy, who falls into the fire and into the water; the 
parallelism of the repetition emphasizes its frequency (pollakis, “often”). How-
ever, the story is noteworthy because of the use of the verb selēniazomai, “to be 
moonstruck” (17:15). In medical literature, this term is first used by Aretaeus of 
Cappadocia, who also takes a commonly held view in the context of a medical 
etiology, writing:
But also it is reckoned a disgraceful form of disease; for it is supposed that it is an 
infliction on persons who have sinned against the Moon (Selene): and hence some have 
called it the Sacred Disease, and that for more reasons than one, as from the greatness 
of the evil, for the Greek word hieros also signifies great; or because the cure of it is not 
human, but divine; or from the opinion that it proceeded from the entrance of a demon 
into the man: from one, or all these causes together, it has been called Sacred. [Aretaeus 
SC I 4.2 (38.28 ff. Hude; translation: Adams 1856, 297)].
According to Aretaeus, Selene is said to punish crimes against the moon god-
dess with “epileptic phemonena.” The type of crime can be better understood 
through a brief notice by Callimachus (3rd century BCE), which he took from 
the chronicler Chenomedes; the text mentions that the goddess Artemis had 
afflicted Cydippe, a woman of Naxos, with quartan fever, then a bad cold and 
finally epileptic attacks (see Call. Aet. 75,121 ff.). Artemis sends these attacks 
because Cydippe had promised Artemis, against her will, to marry a man named 
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Acontius and then tried to back out of her oath. In this sense, “epileptic phe-
nomena” are beyond human intervention, but certainly are the result of human 
guilt (Keydell 1969, 390). Aretaeus’ comments could thus indicate that the boy’s 
falling sickness was caused by a divine power as a punishment. However, there 
are several reasons that the text does not necessarily follow this interpretation:23 
Galen is investigating the influence of the environment, the macrocosm, on the 
human body.24 In this sense, the illness is caused by phlegma, which comes from 
environmental influences that cannot be affected by people. This is also made 
clear by a short passage in De morbo sacro:
This disease, which is called sacred, arises from the same causes as the others, from the 
things that come and go away and from cold and sun and winds that change and never 
rest. These things are divine, so that one ought not to separate this disease and regard 
it as being more divine than the others; it is rather that all are divine and all are human 
(alla panta theia kai anthrōpina panta), and each of them has a nature and a power of 
its own. [CH De morbo sacro 18.1 – 2 6.394 Littré (translation: van der Eijk 2005, 51)]
One way of understanding this grammatical construction is that theios, the 
divine, can be included as an attribute or prophasis along with the climatic fac-
tors. Accordingly, it would be the climatic factors that are beyond human influ-
ence. An illness is only divine if it is caused by factors that are beyond human 
influence, such as heat or cold, the sun or the moon. If we follow Galen’s medi-
cal interpretation, it is possible that the term selēniazomai, “to be moonstruck,” 
(Matt 17:15) refers to the supposedly unchanging position of the moon. This 
clearly cannot be influenced by human power, as the triple reference to the disci-
ples’ inability makes clear in the Matthaean version of the Gospel (v. 16, 19, 20). 
This is all the more serious because in Matt 10:1, 8, the disciples are charged with 
healing the sick. Thus, an inability to provide healing indicates a lack of faith 
(v. 19). In Matthew 21:22, the request is syntactically subordinate to the prayer, 
which also creates a dependency at the content level. The past tense form, “which 
you already received,” implies that the prayer has been heard. In the prayer, the 
petitioner subordinates himself to the will of God (Matt 21:22) and asks that 
God’s will be done through his request. Thus, the “correct” request is through 
the mode of prayer, but the prayer itself shows the relationship to God. This 
perspective is further emphasized when we include a redactional change to the 
Matthaean version, interpreting Jesus’ question “When shall I be with you?” as 
a reference to the Emmanuel Christology in the first chapter, God’s being with 
you. Secondly, the Matthaean version emphasizes the boy’s physical suffering 
(paschein) or feeling badly (kakōs echein; see the manuscripts C D W f1 f13 M lat 
syr) in verse 15. In any case, the question of guilt is not mentioned. We can there-
fore see that despite the variations in the terminology employed in the Synoptic 
Gospels, in each case the boy’s condition can be identified as epilepsy; the terms 
refer to the boy’s illness and suffering.
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Ancient medicine is familiar with two models of epilepsy as described above 
(see Weissenrieder 2003, chap. 7). Both of these start from the assumption of 
damage to the brain due to bodily fluids brought on by the congestion of breath 
in the arteries. One form manifests itself in conspicuous seizures; the other results 
in paralysis. Whereas both phenomena are mentioned together in the Gospel of 
Mark (Mark 9) – an impossible scenario in the context of ancient medicine – the 
author of the Gospel of Luke omits the symptoms describing paralysis in the 
boy and limits himself to the depiction of a seizure brought on by phlegm, which 
includes a fit of dramatic physical movement.
It is in fact remarkable that Luke, who interprets epilepsy in the context of 
ancient medicine, still mentions a demon (Luke 9:42). Any interpretation of this 
text always has to take the ambiguity of the term pneuma into consideration: On 
the one hand, the unclean spirit refers to a demonic interpretation of the illness, 
epilepsy (also mentioned in De morbo sacro); on the other hand, pneuma also 
refers to unclean pneuma inside the human body, which is the cause of the epi-
lepsy. If one follows the interpretation of the unclean spirit as a demon, the ques-
tion regarding the function of this demon arises (For further details on epilepsy 
see Wohlers 1999; Temkin 1994; Weissenrieder, 2003).
A hint is found in the story of the healing of Peter’s mother, who was ill 
with a high fever (Luke 4:39). In addressing the fever, Jesus treats the fever as 
a demon and thus as a responsive person. Luke distinguishes between the sick 
person and the disease that invades the patient as an independent force from 
the outside. A comparable situation can also be found in Mark 9:20, where the 
pneuma recognizes Jesus and the boy then loses consciousness and experiences 
an attack; or in Mark 9:25, where Jesus merely addresses the unclean spirit, not 
the boy: “you mute and deaf spirit, I command you . . .” Precisely for this reason, 
the patient is freed of the religious responsibility for his illness. This results in 
the paradoxical situation that the introduction of a demon is to be interpreted 
as antidemonic. Accordingly, the mention of the demon in Luke’s story of the 
healing of the epileptic boy demonstrates that the cause of the disease is not to 
be found in his alleged sins, but is to understand as being beyond human con-
trol. Or, in a medical and sociological sense: if a religious community assumes 
that it can explain the patient’s etiology and thus any deviations from the healthy 
state through religion, if it ascribes illnesses to unclean spirits or demons and 
describes overcoming them not as a physiological process, but as a process of 
conquering these forces, that does not make the system any less medical. This 
insight is particularly apt when the physical symptoms are expressly understood 
in a medical sense, but the etiology is described demonologically. It is also worth 
noting that in Greek manuscripts of Luke 9:42 (א, A, C, D, L) exaiphnēs belongs 
to krazein: The boy cries out suddenly. In the Old Latin manuscript tradition 
(D and e), however, exaiphnēs belongs to pneuma which reflects the medical 
tradition: the pneuma seizes him suddenly. The demonological system of inter-
pretation (the unclean, silent spirit) is thus seen as an expression of the med-
ical understanding that the illness is caused by an unclean pneuma. Potential 
therapeutic and exorcistic meanings can overlap here. This is particularly clear if 
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we look once again at the Latin manuscripts. In the so-called Vetus Latina, the 
Old Latin Bible manuscripts, which consists of manuscripts from the 2nd cen-
tury C. E. on, terms refer to the action of eliminating the demons: “scolding,” 
(see Luke 9:42) “throwing out” or “eliminating by force” increpare, eicere, exig-
ere, excludere, expellere, or depellere. Some texts seem to take on the perspec-
tive of the evil spirit when they speak of “quitting” and “decamping” – exire, 
recedere, abscedere, absistere. In Roman medicine, one faces a medical phenom-
enon: symptoms and diseases that may not have a corporeal existence are pre-
sented as if they were physical objects, and they are indeed often associated with 
predicates that imply they are animate, even human agents of the action of the 
verb. Actions and states are also ascribed to body parts and remedies, which 
include a notion of movement, aggressive attack, force, capacity, and occupa-
tion. The medical historian D. R. Langslow calls this an “element of corpore-
ality, animacy, and even anthropomorphism used for physiological processes” 
(Langslow 2000, 194). The Gospel narratives do not reflect on the different 
causes of epileptic seizures described above, nor do they raise the question of 
convulsion coming from the heart or the brain. However, the symptoms seem 
to reflect the ancient medical discussion in different ways. There are first of all 
metaphors for an action of the human body, ranging from involuntary to vol-
untary: Almost all manuscripts of the Vetus Latina of Mark and Matthew trans-
late the polysemous Greek verbs ballō and ekballō with eicere in the European 
text. Celsus has eicere for “vomiting” of bodily substances, Scribonius has rei-
ectio and reicientes for “vomiting, bringing up” of poison, of blood and other 
substances,25 and Cassius Felix uses reiactatio “vomiting, bringing up” of blood 
or phlegm, from the verb used figuratively from its basic sense “to throw back 
violently.”
Luke often refers to mittere and dimittere. In the narrative on Peter’s moth-
er-in-law, the fevers do bestow supernatural abilities and may be ascribed to the 
evil powers that cause pain as mentioned in 4:36. These evil powers would then 
be opposed by Jesus. This conclusion is contradicted, however, by examples in 
ancient Roman medicine relating to the actions of diseases and remedies. The 
medical historian Langslow thus refers to a disease “approaching or more aggres-
sively attacking the patient, seizing the patient, letting him go, and departing.”26 
Celsus uses decedere for the “abatement of an illness” and remittere (remissio) for 
the “remission or abatement of an illness,” and he speaks mainly of fever as a dis-
ease leaving the patient. In addition, he speaks of the even more aggressive notion 
of occupare and occupatio, as we can also see in Luke’s version of the epileptic 
boy (114.9). Finally, Cassius Felix uses dimittere as well as remittere and appre-
hesio, or “seizure” of the senses, (see André 1963, 60 – 62, 65) and he also speaks 
of an illness being born, nativitas, which refers to an illness’s initial growth.27 The 
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results suggest, carefully expressed, that the terms eicere, dimittere and remittere 
used in the Vetus Latina translation do not refer to exorcism, but are much more 
like a medical description of an illness that was experienced by ancient medical 
scientists as “approaching” or even “aggressively attacking” people (Langslow 
1992, 196 ff.). The fact that fever was evaluated as one of these illnesses that seize 
or occupy a person is obvious from these sources (Vietmeier 1937, 53 – 54). The 
results suggest, carefully expressed, that the terms “to cast out” and “departing 
of a demon” used in the Synoptic Gospels and its translations into Latin transla-
tion do not refer to exorcism, but much more resemble a medical description of 
an illness, which was experienced by ancient medical scientists as “approaching” 
or even “aggressively attacking” people. The terminology is rather therapeutic 
than exorcistic.
3. Conclusion
Mental life is not just embedded in the world, but also evokes this world. Cogni-
tion can be understood as the shaping of a meaningfully structured environment. 
This creates access to a “deep continuity of life and mind” (Thompson 2010, 
128). If we follow the ancient texts, this mental life is disrupted by the illness of 
epilepsy – in the sense of a systematic disruption whose phenomenology is based 
on a physiological disruption of human consciousness. All of the ancient texts 
(including those of the New Testament) associate epilepsy with the loss of the 
patient’s cognitive activity, the brain and the (unclean) air (pneuma), the blood, 
the heart, or a demon. And all of the texts refer to the loss of sensory stimu- 
li – blindness, deafness, or the ability to feel pain. Thus, all of these texts also 
describe a loss of communication with the outside world. If we read the ancient 
sources from the perspective of embodying the mind, the non-linear causality of 
the interactions between mental and physical processes thus becomes clear.
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4. The Mutual Intertwinement  




Numerous characteristics have been identified that distinguish contemporary 
humans from other living animals. Among the physical differences are upright 
locomotion, hands with opposable thumbs, a vastly larger relative brain size, a 
markedly higher gene expression rate in the brain, and a course of life-history 
with extended childhood and post-reproductive phase. Contemporary humans 
possess complex tools, language, art, music, religion, and explicit normative 
rules. Their social life is marked by joint attention, cumulative culture, a the-
ory of mind, extended co-operation (even a division of labor), and the teaching 
of naïve individuals by experts. Humans reflect upon experiences in their deep 
past, plan for years ahead, think about what happens after death, examine cau-
salities in structured ways, debate ethical issues, and create new problems and 
solutions. They settle around the whole world, reach out into space, exploit a 
wide range of natural resources, transform a multitude of environmental factors, 
create new materials and build highly artificial settings. Contemporary humans 
differ in many aspects of body, mind, and behavior (i. e., tackling problems they 
encounter) from other living animals. The differences lie in the nature and in the 
culture of Homo sapiens.
But how are human nature and culture entangled? How far do physical, cog-
nitive, and behavioral features distinguish us from other species? Are the distinc-
tions absolute or a matter of degree? How independent are they and in what ways 
do they interrelate? What were the prime movers and developmental factors that 
created Homo sapiens? Which of these prime movers and developmental factors 
have been necessary, which ones sufficient to develop humans as they are and as 
they perform today? Since Darwin published his ground-breaking volumes On 
the origin of species by means of natural selection (1859) and The descent of man, 
and selection in relation to sex (1871), supernatural explanations of human origins 
have been excluded from scientific discussion. Yet, while evolutionary-biological 
processes such as genetic mutation and selection are widely seen as necessary in 
explaining human cultural behavior to some extent, it is questionable whether 
they provide a sufficient explanation, particularly of the diversity of that behav-
ior. The articles in this section follow context-based approaches to get closer to 
the central question of how the specific combination of natural and cultural char-
acteristics exhibited by contemporary humans could have developed in physi-
cal and cognitive interaction with the material world. The contributions present 
different lines of arguments while sharing a common emphasis on evolutionary 
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processes shaping human capacities rather than singular developmental leaps that 
miraculously altered the human being. The focus here is on the mutual devel-
opment of body, mind, behavior and environment, and the reciprocal effects 
each has on the other. Only in this way, the contributors agree, can one explain 
aspects and processes of continuity and change in human nature / culture.
Basing itself on Material Engagement Theory (Malafouris 2013), Lambros 
Malafouris’ paper “On human becoming and incompleteness: a material engage-
ment approach to the study of embodiment in evolution and culture” explores 
openness to creative evolution as a special feature of human evolvability. Fol-
lowing a radical embodied and enactive approach, thinking can be understood 
as “thinging.” Things become vital agents in human thinking through acts of 
engagement and enactive signification: though lacking intentionality, things 
 nevertheless offer possibilities, set limits, open paths, merge with other things 
to create new contexts, providing humans with changing spheres for interaction. 
The mind is always thinking about, with, and through the material world. And 
it is embodied not only in having a neural and neurological basis or in being 
expressed by bodily actions or perceiving information through physical organs, 
but also by being formed through the body while engaging with the world. 
Cognition, perception, mediated bodily action, and material culture form a 
 continuum that not only appears in a situated setting, but also shapes human 
ontogeny and evolution. The human mind is intertwined with a plastic culture 
which brings about metaplasticity, a form of human biosocial becoming. The 
minds of Homo sapiens are not complete or fixed, but open and incomplete. 
Malafouris does not deny genetically evolved structures, but presents material 
engagement as the main constituent of cognitive evolution. He identifies “cre-
ative thinging” as part of our human nature.
In his contribution “Metaplasticit-ies. Material engagement meets mutational 
enhancement,” Duilio Garofoli seeks to combine Material Engagement Theory 
with certain features of human cognition acquired through evolutionary-biologic- 
al processes. He addresses the question of the deeper history of the genus Homo: 
according to Malafouris (2013), humans have been materially engaged since they 
started to produce and use their own tools around 3.3 million years ago. Thus, 
metaplasticity, the integration of cultural and neural levels of plasticity, began 
quite early in the course of human evolution. At the same time, Garofoli recog-
nizes the problem that “not every human biological system, provided with the 
appropriate conditions of cultural engagement with artefacts, can bring forth any 
potential cognitive function.” To overcome this problem, Garofoli introduces 
a neuroconstructivist approach, bringing together genetic enhancement of the 
neurological system and the more context-based MET. Material engagement is 
seen as a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the emergence of cognitive 
functions in contemporary humans. Neural plasticity cannot be extended with-
out limit; there are constraints on the brain / body system. Garofoli rejects models 
of innate psychological entities, representations of how to cope with the world, 
such as those proposed by evolutionary psychology. Instead, he points to an 
acquired modularity of the neurological system: there, the innate component lies 
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in physical properties of the bodily system that allow the acquisition of partial 
representations. For Garofoli there is no strict relationship between selection of 
biological enhancements and specific behavioral innovations; there is no gene 
for art or religion or football. Instead, mutational enhancement over the course 
of evolution allowed different ranges of metaplasticity. The capacity for a meta-
plastic development of cognition in humans did not evolve in a single biological 
step after which only material engagement created new forms of cognitive and 
cultural expressions. Rather, the basic neural system itself underwent mutational 
enhancement. And with these different neural systems different Homo species 
engaged with the material, natural and cultural world in different ways, devel-
oping not just metaplasticity, but possibly several different metaplasticit-ies. 
Cultural products such as body ornaments are thus not the result of a specific 
mutation for personal adornment, nor are they brought forth only by material 
engagement. They rest on distinct neural structures in combination with multiple 
forms of material engagement; these might involve different “cognitions”, even if 
their material products, for example shell ornaments, might look the same.
In “Artefacting minds: material engagement theory and joint action,” Shaun 
Gallagher and Tailer G. Ransom expand Material Engagement Theory from the 
individual level to the development of joint actions and their cognitive back-
ground. Usually, joint actions are associated with cognitively strong precondi-
tions such as shared beliefs, normative commitments, or interlocking intentions. 
Recent studies, however, have shown that joint actions are possible at a lower 
level of cognitive sophistication, on the basis of simple embodied dyadic inter-
actions with joint attention directed to relevant factors. Gallagher and Ransom 
point here to the role played by intersections between agents, material things, 
and social structures in the emergence, construction and constitution of mental 
processes in joint actions. Taking examples of spontaneous joint actions (danc-
ing), distributed joint actions (terrorist cells), and joint actions guided by joint 
attention (moving a bookcase) the authors define these as dynamical embod-
ied intersubjective interactions and distinguish them from joint intention and 
joint attention which may (but don’t have to be) associated with joint action. 
In joint actions there is generally no simulation, imitation, or motoric match-
ing. The movements are coordinated but distinct, and there is often no theoret-
ical inference. Rather, things and environments shape the movements’ dynam-
ics. The intentions-in-action are dynamical processes; in joint actions the actors 
share the overall goal, but use different movements and means. On the basis of 
MET and Bruno Latour’s (2005) Actor-Network Theory, Gallagher and Ransom 
argue that intentions are formed via material engagement. Action and agency 
are embodied and situated in a particular physical and artefactual environment 
connected to values, skills and know-how that constrain the affordances of that 
environment. The affordance of a certain artefact can shape human intention, but 
changes in the use of an artefact may introduce alterations in affordance: joint 
actions may expand or shrink the affordance space – the range of possibilities for 
action depending on the body and the environment – relative to what individuals 
may accomplish on their own.
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In his contribution, Wolfgang Welsch takes a broader perspective on the evo-
lution of human cultural capabilities and draws the attention to “bodily changes 
during the proto-cultural period and their ongoing impact.” His central con-
cern is to resolve the nature versus culture dichotomy, and to this end he views 
cultural evolution not in opposition to human nature, but as lying at its foun-
dation. Welsch defines three periods of human evolution: a phase displaying 
merely biological adaptation; a proto-cultural phase which started around two 
million years ago and ended around 40,000 years ago; and finally a cultural phase 
in which biological and genetic changes largely cease. Key physical, behavioral, 
and social changes originating in the proto-cultural phase include the increase 
in body size, changes in sexuality, growth of the brain and changes in its struc-
ture, the development of an apparatus of self-reference, an increase in reflectiv-
ity, and the capacity to learn from others. The perception of objects as tools and 
their deliberate manufacture show feedback processes occurring between brain 
development and behavior. The proto-cultural phase, according to Welsch, dis-
played a remarkable acceleration of cultural innovation processes in comparison 
with biological adaptions; indeed, as Welsch argues, biological evolution essen-
tially stopped around 40,000 years ago with the Upper Paleolithic Revolution. 
Since that time, cultural evolution has held sway and a cumulative culture can 
be observed. Welsch concludes that our whole cultural evolution is based on 
the human constitution achieved in the proto-cultural period. Human universals 
such as the phenomenal experience of color, facial expressions of basic emotions, 
the understanding of elementary gestures, and certain aesthetic preferences orig-
inate in that period: “our biological and proto-cultural preconditions are not 
something dubious that we would better leave behind. On the contrary, they are 
productive potentials that enable everything to come.”
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On Human Becoming and Incompleteness:  
A Material Engagement Approach to the Study  
of Embodiment in Evolution and Culture
Lambros Malafouris
Abstract: What is the meaning of embodiment in evolution and culture? My aim in this 
essay is to explore that question from the perspective of material engagement theory 
(MET) (Malafouris 2013). In particular, I want to describe and explain how the argument 
for the constitutive intertwining of mind with the material world challenges the traditional 
(neo-evolutionary) ways of understanding the importance of embodiment, plasticity, and 
material culture in human evolution. Based on the relational enactive foundation of mate-
rial engagement theory and building on notions of metaplasticity and creative thinging 
this essay will propose a different view of human becoming. This new understanding chal-
lenges neo-Darwinism and its foundation in evolutionary psychology and recognizes the 
impact of material culture on the making and evolution of human intelligence.
Introduction
I begin with an image and a question that can help us to focus and visualize the 
main underlying problem that I will try to tackle in this paper. The image depicts 
a process of making, specifically, the forming of a clay vessel by the hands of the 
potter on the wheel (Figure 1). The question concerns the meaning of embodi-
ment relevant to the human abilities of making and growing: What is the mean-
Figure 1: What is the meaning of embodiment in the context of making? (photo by author).
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1 For a good discussion on the concept of evolvability, the question whether the ability to 
evolve itself evolves, its role within an extended evolutionary synthesis see Pigliucci (2008): Is 
evolvability evolvable?
2 I will use the term cognitivism in this paper to refer broadly to classical computational, 
representational, internalist and nativist modular theories of cognition.
ing of embodiment in the context of making? The short answer I would like to 
propose is that we humans are embodying and self-bounding creatures able to 
influence our developmental paths by changing our means of material engage-
ment and by altering, mediating and regulating the flows of energy and matter. 
Human beings evolve by creating material things and assemblages which scaffold 
the ecology of our minds and shape the boundaries of our thinking. This open-
ness of the human mind to Bergsonian creative evolution – not just Darwin-
ian natural selection – is one of the distinctive features of our species’ ability to 
evolve. I call that special feature of human evolvability1 metaplasticity; it operates 
by means of creative material engagement (Malafouris 2015). This special feature 
also indicates that the nature of human intelligence is to remain amenable to deep 
reorganization and reconstitution, thus, to remain incomplete. In this paper, I 
will try to explore, the major implications of this ongoing dialectic of co-consti-
tution of people and things for the traditional ways we understand the process 
human becoming, in particular, for the ways we understand the importance of 
embodiment and culture in human evolution. In the first part of the paper I make 
some basic points on the use and abuse of the notions of embodiment, evolution, 
and culture. I cannot discuss the complex histories and debates that surround 
those concepts in different disciplines. I just want to clarify my understanding of 
those terms in order to avoid confusion about the claims I am going to make in 
the second part of this paper. I begin with embodiment. Specifically, I am inter-
ested, in what we call embodied cognition.
1. From Embodiment to the Act of Embodying
I admit there is something disconcerting about the term embodied mind. It can be 
argued that from the perspective point of phenomenology, ecological psychol-
ogy, process, or pragmatist philosophy a term like ‘embodiment’ looks, rather, 
unnecessary. Indeed, for those committed to a genuinely dynamical grounding 
of human mind in bodily movement and to the tight connections between per-
ception and action the skin was never a boundary. In order to appreciate the 
value and contribution of the embodied cognition approach it is necessary to 
understand the history of this theoretical paradigm as a critique of cognitivism2. 
Seen in this context the need for embodied cognition becomes clearer: the notion 
of embodied mind is needed because a big part of cognitive science operates still 
on the implicit assumption that the mind is essentially a disembodied represen-
tational engine inside the head of the individual. In recent decades the embodied 
cognition approach has been challenging that assumption trying to illustrate the 
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3 Here I draw on a useful distinction, proposed by Andy Clark (1999), between two variet-
ies of embodiment: ‘simple’ versus ‘radical’ embodiment.
important ways that the body (and by extension the world) matters for thinking. 
Unfortunately, despite the growing contemporary interest in embodied cogni-
tion there is little agreement about just what it means (Gallagher 2005; Kiverstein 
2012). Not surprisingly the label embodied cognition is used to refer to a variety 
of theories, some of which are more ‘radical’ than others (Shapiro 2014; Galla-
gher 2005; Kiverstein 2012).
Viewed from the perspective of material engagement theory those hard or 
‘radical’ meanings and uses of the term embodied mind (e. g., Chemero 2009; 
Fuchs and De Jaegher 2009; Hutto and Myin 2013) according to which cognition 
is grounded in situated action, and is interdependently constituted by the specific 
kind of body we possess, are certainly more helpful than weak or ‘simple’ forms 
of embodiment3.
One important question that can help us understand those differences between 
radical and weak uses of embodied cognition concerns what is meant by ‘body’ 
here. I argue that if notions of embodiment are to have any real explanatory value 
in the study of culture and human evolution the ‘body’ ought to mean something 
different than the brain. This is not because the brain should be kept separate 
from the body, rather it is because if in our discussion of embodiment we allow 
the brain to qualify as part of the body we run the risk to trivialize the claim that 
the body is crucial to mental life ending up with some version of brain identity 
theory (Goldman and de Vignemont 2009, 154). What I call embodied cognitiv-
ism, namely, the limited representational view of embodied mind as something 
contained, localized in, caused by, or identifiable with the brain must be over-
come. The embodied mind must be more than a collection of neural representa-
tions or it is an empty concept. This last point is worth stressing.
Another basic question in this context, of course, concerns the nature of the 
exact contribution of the body to cognition and about whether this contribution 
can be accounted for by way of classical computational models or whether some-
thing more radical is needed. It is necessary when we speak of embodiment as the 
condition of cognitive extension to clarify some important, often implicit, dis-
tinctions, such as those between derived and non-derived content, and between 
causal influence and constituency (Wheeler 2014, 378). More important for my 
purpose in this chapter, is the question of where does material culture fit into this 
emerging picture of the embodied mind? I should clarify then, that the meaning 
of embodied cognition in the context of MET is not signifying a simple shift 
from the disembodied computational image of mind to one that is now grounded 
in neural structures and brain networks. It is also not associated with a view of 
the mind as existing within the body’s interior. Rather, it signifies that the details 
of embodiment and thus of action, situation, and mediation matter. Seen in this 
way embodiment is less of a property and more of a process, specifically, an act 
of embodying. This act of embodying forms the precondition for material engage-
ment and vice versa. Taken together the two processes, embodying and mate-
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rial engagement, explain the dynamical nature and variety of forms that human 
mental processes can take, and how they connect to the world they are about. 
Thus, it no longer makes any sense to separate an ‘inner’ domain of mentality 
from an ‘outer’ domain of materiality. Rather, embodied cognition involves and 
emerges from situated dynamic interactions between different types of materials 
and activities. The fact that a variety of material extra-neural resources (bodily, 
artefactual, or semiotic) contribute to human cognition also implies that given 
the unique properties of each material resource they will make a separate and 
distinct contribution. Embodiment is what brings those diverge resources and 
their properties together to form what we define as the human mind.
On that note I turn now to the concepts of evolution and culture.
2. Evolution and Culture
I will keep it simple. So far as basic biological constitution is concerned I take we 
all agree that human beings, like any other creature, can be described as the prod-
ucts of Darwinian evolution operating through dynamics of variation (mutation 
and recombination), inheritance, competition and selection. Things, however, 
are different, and remain heavily contested, when it comes to the neo-Darwinian 
theory or the so-called Modern Synthesis and the way that this has been applied 
in the study of culture and human cognitive evolution (see for review Mesoudi 
2011; Mesoudi, Whiten, and Laland 2006). Indeed, there are limits to what can 
be explained by way of natural selection acting on genetic variation. Take for 
instance the traditional culture-gene coevolution theory by Boyd and Richerson 
(1985). It is based on the fundamental premise that there are two distinguishable, 
yet, complementary and interacting evolutionary processes, i. e., genetic evolu-
tion and cultural evolution. In summary, the main claim is that cultural evolution 
exhibits the Darwinian properties of variation, inheritance, and the accumulation 
of successive cultural modifications over time. In other words, the major claim 
is that ‘culture’ evolves like an organism does. Beliefs like genes, spread, persist 
or disappear. The question for a theory of cultural evolution is to understand 
why and how? Seeing culture as an evolutionary system in its own right implies 
that cultural change, as a form of non-genetic inheritance, could then be studied 
using similar methods and concepts to those already in use to study of biological 
evolution (e. g., population-dynamic concepts and evolutionary models). Such 
a unified approach to the study of cultural change might look appealing from a 
methodological or empirical perspective. However, it embodies various short-
comings especially from a material engagement perspective. I will just mention 
one important shortcoming that is more relevant to my purpose here: Neo-Dar-
winian theory is inherently ‘cognitivist’, it adopts fully the basic essentialist prem-
ises of evolutionary psychology which views the human mind as a collection of 
functionally specialized (i. e., domain-specific) universal computational modules 
fixed (via natural selection) inside the head (Cosmides and Tooby 1987; Barkow, 
Cosmides, and Tooby 1992; Pinker 2003). An immediate implication of adopting, 
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tural) that occur independently of, or do not involve direct changes in the DNA sequence.
implicitly or explicitly, such an internalist computational view of mind is that for 
the majority of the proponents of the Darwinian models of cultural evolution 
culture is essentially seen as acquired information (knowledge, beliefs, and values) 
that is inherited through social learning, stored in human brains, and expressed 
in behavior and artifacts (e. g., Mesoudi, Whiten, and Laland 2006; Richerson and 
Boyd 2005). For instance, Richerson and Boyd define culture as “information 
capable of affecting individual’s behavior that the acquire from other members of 
their species through teaching, imitation, and other forms of social transmission” 
(2005, 5). As they explain, their use of the term information refers to any kind of 
mental state (idea, knowledge, belief, value, attitude or skill), conscious or not, 
“that is acquired or modified by social learning and affects behavior” (ibid).
I want to argue that this view of culture as a collection of internal representa-
tions inside the head and the epiphenomenal conception of material culture that 
it implies is deeply flawed. For one thing it misrepresents materiality as a passive 
means of adaptation and offers an erroneous view the relationship between cog-
nition and material culture as one based on representation and information pro-
cessing. For another it reiterates the nature / culture dichotomy. I should clarify 
here that my quarrel with the neo-Darwinian (Modern and Extended Synthesis) 
does not lie in the existence of non-genetic inheritance4 systems, rather, it con-
cerns the ways those systems become conceptualized as disembodied informa-
tion processes and the possible role they have been argued to play in human evo-
lution. In principle I agree with the general epistemic contention that the most 
fundamental questions of human becoming “can only be answered by a theory 
in which culture has its proper role and in which it is intimately intertwined 
with other aspects of human biology” (Richerson and Boyd 2005, 4). But I can-
not see how such an objective can be accomplished by reiterating conventional 
ideas of what count as culture, biology, mind or life. I take that very few people 
will seriously deny that culture is rooted in human biology or that we have an 
evolved psychology that shapes what we learn and the ways we think. But the 
important question, I want to suggest, is not one of influence or mere interac-
tion, rather it is a question about constitution. Put it simply it is a question about 
what is the domain that really matters for explaining the phenomenon we are 
seeking to understand. What does it mean to say that “culture is part of biology” 
(Richerson and Boyd 2005, 4)? What is exactly the nature of the relationship or 
connection between biology and culture implied when we argue that “we are 
largely what our genes and our culture make us” (ibid, 7)? I will argue that as 
long the cognitive system and its development remains confined to the organism 
alone, environmental and cultural resources might influence the process of devel-
opment and evolution but they remain fundamentally distinct and secondary if 
compared with genetic influences.
To be fair one could argue that, to some extent, the ‘population thinking’ 
approach to cultural evolution manages to avoid the fallacy of classical socio-bi-
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ology (and memetics) by recognizing that culture change is not a mere extension 
of biological evolution. As Richerson and Boyd write: “[c]ulture is interesting 
and important because its evolutionary behavior is distinctly different from that 
of genes . . . [c]ulture would never have evolved unless it could do things that 
genes can’t!” (2005, 7).
Nonetheless, without denying that for gene-culture coevolution theory ‘cul-
ture’ is indeed recognized as an important influence the kind of ‘interaction’ that 
one can find at the heart of the gene-culture coevolution approach is far too soft 
to provide an adequate description of the relation between cognition and mate-
rial culture.
Evolutionary psychology and neo-Darwinianism misrepresent human be- 
coming because they misconstrue the relational ontology of embodiment, mate-
riality and action. Their notion of culture divorced from the embodied, partici-
patory and situated character of human ways of perceiving, acting, and thinking, 
losses its explanatory power and value.
How can we understand better those processes? I propose that we should 
view the human mind as the emergent dynamical product of this developmen-
tal conflation of embodiment, evolution and culture. What this implies is that 
when we speak about interaction between embodiment, evolution and culture 
we should not be thinking of three independently realized processes that some-
how interact but, instead, of an ongoing ontological conflation, a constitutive 
intertwining of mind and matter. The later means that the nature of interaction 
is dynamic, transactional and participatory. Such a radical relational conception 
of human becoming able to accommodate the plasticity and situated character 
of material engagement can help us overcome the classical distinction between 
proximate (non-genetic) and ultimate (genetic) causes in biology (see Laland et 
al. 2013) offering new analytical bridges between the developmental and the evo-
lutionary aspects of human cognitive becoming (see also Malafouris 2010; Mala-
fouris 2015; Gosden and Malafouris 2015).
3. Thinking as Thinging
I now return to the image of the potter working with the clay (Figure 1). I want 
you to notice that what we see here is a single moment in the life history of this 
material object – if we can call it an object at this stage. If we want we could 
look at a different moment from an earlier stage in the process of making. We 
could look for instance at the very beginning where the act of centering the clay 
takes place, or instead, we can look at the final stages of the process, or maybe at 
the final product itself. However, there is a reason I chose to focus on that spe-
cific moment, rather than at some other stage of the process of making. There is 
something about that specific moment that is tying together the totality of the 
form-making processes brought about in the making of this particular thing (see 
also Gosden and Malafouris 2015). This moment binds together past, present 
and future in a way that is less visible at earlier stages of the process and is prob-
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ably completely invisible at the end (when the object is finished). Mainly this is 
because it is during that moment that the underlying tension between mind and 
matter is best revealed. The phenomenal consciousness of this object spreads 
in-between the states of matter and form. It is stable enough to be identified and 
named as a vase. But still, it remains plastic, open to change and transformation: 
an experiential mixture of materiality, affectivity, and creativity. In a way then 
this image speaks of two kinds of ‘uncertainty’ in the potter’s way of thinking 
and feeling with and through the soft clay: one about origins and the other about 
endings. Uncertainty about origins refers to the processes responsible for the 
potter’s form-making abilities. What kind of cognitive recourses are involved? 
There is also uncertainty about endings because as long as the object remains 
plastic it remains unfinished. I want to emphasize that moment of ongoing plas-
ticity and incompleteness because I want to use it as the grounding metaphor for 
my perspective on human becoming and the evolution of mind. I will return to 
exemplify that in the last section. First I want to dwell a bit further on the trans-
actional and participatory character of form-making. I said that this image helps 
us to visualize the ongoing dynamical tension between matter and form. What 
brings this tension about is, of course, the potter’s body. But what is it exactly 
that moves the hand of the potter enabling the creation of this specific form out 
of clay? Let’s take one step at a time starting with something more basic: Exactly 
how are things related to thinking? Where does the mind of the potter stop and 
the form of the object begin?
According to cognitivism the answer is simple: The potter’s head offers a 
‘natural’ demarcation line for separating pure mind-stuff from the clay. What 
about the cultural transmission and evolution of the embodied skills and ways 
of thinking involved in the art of potting? As we discussed the neo-Darwinian 
approaches to cultural evolution are firmly grounded in evolutionary psychol-
ogy and its computational ‘internalist’ foundation. Whatever the culturally sit-
uated information and skills that enable the potter’s fingers to know or discover 
the precise force, place and time of the appropriate grip they become acquired, 
learned and transmitted, like any other cultural recourse involved in pottery 
making, by means of internal representations. I imagine that this substitution of 
bodily skills with neural representations makes good sense if your approach to 
culture follows Richerson and Boyd’s conviction “that most cultural variation is 
caused by information stored in human brains – information that got into those 
brains by learning from others” (2008, 5). But the neurocentric ontology of this 
representational logic is problematic: First, it precludes any causal role for mate-
rial culture in human thought and its products often resemble a lifeless abstrac-
tion; second, it misleads us to think that all that really matters for the study of 
mind in culture, or of culture in mind, is to understand the nature of the internal 
mental representations and the input / output mechanisms that enable their for-
mation, acquisition, and cultural transmission. In other words, on this construal, 
embodiment does not matter in culture or human evolution.
Here is the problem or paradox then: If you are committed to cognitivism you 
don’t need embodiment or culture; all you need is system able to process ‘inter-
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nal representations,’ that is, disembodied information learned and transmitted 
across generations.
Many people working in the sciences of the mind from a variety of embodied, 
extended, distributed and enactive perspectives think that there are alternative 
ways to conceptualize the relations between brains, bodies and the world avoid-
ing the representationalist treatment of cognition as a computational ‘black box’ 
(Varela, Thompson, and Rosch et al. 1993; Clark 1997, 2008; Hutchins 1995, 
2010; Hutto and Myin 2013; Chemero 2009; Wheeler 2005; Noë 2004; Sutton 
2008; Menary 2010). Similarly, the material engagement approach that I advocate 
(Malafouris 2013) insists on the one hand, that the brain can only be understood 
as one element of a larger intelligent bodily system that incorporates material 
culture, and on the other hand, that the physical location and ontology of human 
intelligence remains an open question. As we discussed earlier embodiment, at 
least in the radical sense that matters for human cognitive evolution and is con-
sistent with theoretical principles of MET, comes with the price of continuity 
between cognition and material culture, or else between cognition, perception 
and mediated bodily action. The implications of this continuity are not well 
understood yet. MET insists that only a thorough reconfiguration of the relation 
between cognition and material culture can provide a feasible alternative frame-
work to battle the cognitivism of classical evolutionary psychology. The organ-
ism’s worldly engagements, and acts of making, become the new analytical unit 
for the study of mind. Obviously, I do not mean to question the neural bases of 
cognition. I want simply to underline that from a material culture-perspective 
one can hardly find any convincing reason – besides convention – why the study 
of the mind should be restricted to neural processes occurring inside an individ-
ual’s brain. Rather, what we see is both equivalence and complementarity of what 
is ‘inside’ with what is ‘outside’. Brains, bodies and things participate equally, 
albeit in different ways, in human cognitive life.
At that point I would like to introduce the notion of thinging, and more spe-
cifically what I call creative thinging (Malafouris 2014; cf. what Gallagher and 
Ransom call artifacting (this volume). I use those notions to articulate and draw 
attention into the varieties or kinds of cognitive life instantiated specifically in 
acts of thinking and feeling with, through, and about material things. The phil-
osopher Martin Heidegger, in his famous essay “Das Ding” (The Thing) (1975, 
166), uses the same term, i. e., “thinging” to express how things “gather” space 
and time tying together their material constituents. My own use of the term 
thinging tries to retain something of this original sense of ‘gathering’ at its heart. 
But I also diverge from the Heideggerian phenomenological path, especially rel-
evant to one aspect of ‘thingness’ that is typically cast in the shadow: the vital-
ity and agency of things in human thinking, or else, the cognitive life of things 
(Malafouris 2008a; Malafouris and Renfrew 2010; Bennett 2010; Sutton 2002). 
More specifically, I use this term to differentiate the active participatory process 
by which things are presented to us through acts of engagement and enactive 
signification, from the passive process by which things are often construed as 
re-presented in us by way of internalization and mental substitution. Thinging 
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5 The ability of using elementary tools it is well demonstrated, in both nature and captivity, 
most famously by chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and New Caledonian crows (Corvus moned-
uloides) (for a good review see Biro, Haslam, and Rutz 2013.
is inherently dynamical and non-representational, although in certain contexts it 
can become the vehicle for external representation.
Thinging incorporates time-varying and culture specific artefacts, material 
assemblages and bodily techniques; it also extends to sensory and cognitive pros-
theses and interfaces of any kind. This description of thinging is probably too 
general to serve taxonomic considerations. But in its lack of analytic closure it 
opens up new possibilities for transgressing some of our common-sense assump-
tions about what minds and things are, and about how they relate and connect to 
each other. The analytical value of the notion thinging, then, lies in helping us to 
disentangle, on the one hand, from a cognitivist view of what mind consists of, 
and on the other from a narrowly modernist definition of what matter consists 
of. In any case, the basic premise that I want to communicate through the notion 
of thinging is quite simple: We humans are thingers. What is more important, we 
have been altering our own developmental paths by making new things and by 
changing our means of material engagement. Not only most of our thinking is 
thinking with, through and about things, it is also, creative thinging (Malafouris 
2014). Humans are creators of new things which constantly change the ecology 
of our minds and re-shape the boundaries of our thinking. This brings us back to 
the question I raised at the beginning: How can we make sense of the embodied 
form-making activities that made us what we are?
No other animal has been or can be defined as a species on the basis of its rela-
tionship with the variety of things and material forms that it makes. We humans 
are precisely a species of this rather strange sort. Let me explain, I say we are 
strange, not because, I deny that other animals are capable of thinging – the rap-
idly expanding literature on animal tool use proves that to a certain extent they 
are5. Nor do I say we are strange because I believe that by making things, and by 
thinking through things we overcome the limits of our ‘nature’ and enter into a 
separate ‘cultural’ realm. No other controversy in the study of human becoming 
has been more unhelpful, misleading and sterile than that between nature and 
culture. There is no moment in the history of human evolution where biology 
gave way to culture. The following quote from Griffiths and Stotz (2000, 44 – 5) 
nicely summarize the crux of the problem:
Human development is, not uniquely but certainly outstandingly, reliant on external 
scaffolding. This scaffolding is commonly referred to as culture. Part of the rationale 
of the traditional idea of human nature was to isolate features that do not depend on 
culture. These ‘biological’ features represent our true nature – the naked ape stripped 
of its cultural clothes. It seems to us that this traditional project is as misguided as seek-
ing to investigate the true nature of an ant by removing the distorting influence of the 
nest! Human beings and their cultures have co-evolved as surely as ants and hives or 
dogs and packs. Human nature must inevitably be a product of a developmental matrix 
which includes a great deal of cultural scaffolding. (Griffiths and Stotz 2000, 44 – 5).
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By the same token, the kind of thinking in anthropology, rooted in A. L. Kroe-
ber’s tradition of ‘superorganicism’ (Kroeber 1917) which dismisses any need to 
incorporate biology in the study of human culture is obviously false and must 
be rejected. None of the empirical phenomena people often describe under the 
headings of human biology and human culture – not even the most basic human 
actions and movements – makes sense, or even exists, in isolation. Human becom-
ing has always been inseparably linked with the developmental contingencies of 
action. No bodily activity – not even our basic capacity for bipedal locomotion – 
is immune to the situated dynamics of real life ontogenetic development.
As the anthropologist Marcel Maus neatly points out in his famous essay on 
bodily techniques, there is no “natural” way to move our bodies (Mauss [1935] 
1973, 74). But I suggest it would be equally wrong to think of bodily move-
ment as an isolated ‘culturally’ induced phenomenon. There is no “natural” or 
“cultural” way to move our bodies. Instead, we should think of the acting body 
as a relational developmental achievement of situated material engagement. For 
instance, the potter’s body, entering into the craft of pottery making, working 
with clay and developing the skills of the practice, it becomes more than a body; 
it becomes situated. That is, it becomes specific and different (it embodies a 
unique developmental life history). It becomes affected by the physical and psy-
choactive properties of clay, by the patterns and rhythms of coordination, and 
by the kinesthetic experiences, muscular memories and skills attached to it. As 
we discussed from a material engagement-perspective the meaning of the term 
body, far from reductive and fixed, refers to the details of bodily implementation 
(neural and extra-neural) and action-taking potentials as those can be determined 
by the nature of local interactions, cultural practices and prostheses. In a way 
then the potter’s body and mind are one.
This last point brings us right at the heart of the phenomenon I am trying to 
capture when I talk about human strangeness: we humans have made thinging 
in general, and creative thinging in particular, part of our nature. Put it simply, 
with thinging biological heredity becomes creative evolution. Instead of simply 
reproducing ourselves, we rather extend ourselves and we construct new cog-
nitive and material ecologies for growing and instituting our minds. We create 
things which in turn create us (for different perspectives on that see Malafouris 
2013; Malafouris and Renfrew 2010; Hodder 2012; Gosden 2008, 2005; Olsen 
2010; Webmoor and Witmore 2008; Knappett and Malafouris 2008b; Bennett 
2010; Knappett 2005, 2011; Renfrew 2004, 2007; Schiffer and Miller 1999; Latour 
2005). This is what I call the priority of material engagement.
4. Metaplasticity and Incompleteness
What does it mean? To answer that I return to the comment about ‘human 
incompleteness’ I’ve made before. We are used to think of our ‘sapient’ minds, 
with all our unique capacities, as the apex of evolution. This vision of humanity 
as ‘complete’ and ‘fixed’, and the concomitant neo-Darwinian ideals of cognitive 
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and behavioral ‘modernity,’ is almost certainly wrong (Nagel 2012; Tallis 2011; 
Ingold 2013; Ingold and Pálsson 2013; Barrett 2011, 2014; Dupré 2008). From 
the perspective of the material engagement approach the human mind emerge as 
an ‘open’ unfinished project, potentially, in a permanent state of on-going evo-
lution. I said before that we humans are different from other animals in that we 
have made thinging our nature. I would also insist that we humans are also a spe-
cies extensive and, thus, ‘incomplete.’ What I am proposing is that we humans, 
unlike any other species, seem to have more than just a plastic mind: we have 
a mind which is also inextricably intertwined with a plastic culture. I am not 
saying that other species are not plastic or intelligent in their own special ways. 
And, obviously, I am not just talking about brain or neural plasticity here. I am 
trying to gesture towards a different kind of plasticity: the plasticity of a mind 
not limited by the skin. I call that metaplasticity (Malafouris 2015; 2013, 2010).
The notion of metaplasticity seen as an expression for human biosocial becom-
ing can be linked with other non-genetic forms of biological organization but 
it should not be confused or conflated with notions of individual phenotypic 
plasticity and variation. It represents an alternative to the Neo-Darwinian forms 
of non-genetic inheritance (like epigenetic inheritance or cultural transmission) 
that is based on the logic of enactivism and operates by means of creative mate-
rial engagement.
The focus here is on understanding the nature of plastic changes, not at the 
level of the individual, but in the broader systemic context (cultural or social) 
where thinging takes place. At this higher level of engagement with the mate-
rial world where neural and cultural plasticity interact and exchange properties, 
material culture competes, equally with any other brain region, for a place in 
the human cognitive system. The active mind has no a priori location. Human 
beings, understood as real living creatures that move and act in this world, are the 
developmental products of this conflation or ‘meshwork’ (Varela, Thompson, 
and Rosch 1993; Knappett 2011) of brains, bodies and things. If you separate 
the three – if you separate brain, body and culture – you end up with a number 
of overly simplified abstractions about lifeless categories. I am not denying the 
analytical value of those abstractions for many disciplines; but I do think they are 
misleading when it comes to understanding human becoming.
Conclusion
Our understanding of how evolution works is rapidly changing (see Laland et al. 
2014). Many important shortcoming of mainstream neo-Darwinian evolutionary 
thought have been exposed. For instance, since the introduction of niche-con-
struction theory to evolutionary biology by Lewontin in the 1980s (Lewontin 
1983, 2000), there has been surmounting evidence on how organisms often “act as 
co-directors of their own and other species’ evolution” by modifying natural selec-
tion in their environment (Laland, Odling-Smee, and Myles 2010, 139; Laland, 
Odling-Smee, and Feldman 2000; Laland et al. 2009; Lewens 2003; Odling-Smee, 
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6 For example, Richerson and Boyd argue “that the human cultural system arose as an ad-
aptation, because it can evolve fancy adaptations to changing environments rather more swiftly 
than is possible by genes alone” (2005, 7).
Laland, and Feldman 2003; Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray 2001; Sterelny 2003; 
Donohue 2005). Moreover, the recent calls for an Extended Evolutionary Synthe-
sis has been very influential in understanding better how non-genetic processes 
by which organisms grow and develop can be drivers of evolution, and thus must 
be seen as part of evolutionary theory (see Laland et al. 2014; Pigliucci and Muller 
2010; Jablonka, Lamb, and Zeligowski 2014; Odling-Smee et al. 2003).
I find the general idea of an Extended Evolutionary Synthesis appealing – for 
the same reasons that I find the broad idea of extended cognition appealing. Still 
many of the conceptual barriers confronting neo-Darwinian theories remain. To 
give one example, a further problem neo-Darwinian models inherit from evolu-
tionary psychology, beyond the mentioned computational character of psycho-
logical adaptations and the related arguments about their modular internal struc-
ture, is the false dichotomy between evolved (innate) domain-specific structures 
and learned behaviors. One reason for the persistence of this false opposition, 
of a universal evolved human nature versus our culture-specific ways of learn-
ing, can be found in the influence that computational thinking still has on the 
way psychology traditionally understands the basic structure of human mental 
architecture. Another reason, as Barrett et al. point out, is probably because the 
main argument about human evolution “is framed in terms of adaptation, when 
the real issue . . . [is] the degree of plasticity or flexibility shown by our learning 
mechanisms” (Barrett, Pollet, and Stulp 2014, 5).
From the perspective of MET, I suggest that we need to resist any ten-
dency at reducing the nature of change in human beings to a series of under-
lying domain-specific adaptations and shift the focus, instead, on processes of 
deep enculturation, dynamical enskilment, and ‘profound embodiment’ (Clark 
2008; Wheeler and Clark 2008; Chiel and Beer 1997). What this means essen-
tially is that there is no pre-determined central driver (genetic or cultural) but 
instead a temporally emergent coalition of situated developmental forces. Moving 
away from the previously described dichotomous account of development and 
evolution toward an account incorporating elements from developmental sys-
tems theory (DST) (Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray 2001; Griffiths and Gray 1994, 
2001; Griffiths and Stotz 2000), ‘niche-construction theory’ (Odling-Smee et al. 
2003; Sterenly 2003; Stotz 2014), and neuroconstructivism (Mareschal et al. 2007; 
Quartz and Sejnowski 1997) and probabilistic epigenesis (Gottlieb 2003, 2007) 
will put us in a better position to recognize the multiplicity and dynamical char-
acter of resources contributing to the developmental process. Although some 
more recent ‘neo-evolutionary’ approaches, adopting a more interactive outlook 
have been successful in pointing out the importance of what Karola Stotz calls 
“the human-being-in-its-developmental-niche” (Stotz 2010, 498 – 99) and dis-
pense with the need of genetically specified abstractions they retain still much 
of the basic neo-Darwinian logic of the adaptationist program6 (Sterelny 2003; 
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Jablonka and Lamb 2005; Richerson and Boyd 2008). What the study of culture 
and human evolution needs is not a more extended version of the neo-Darwinian 
representational logic but instead a more radical, process-based, post-Darwin-
ian enactive conceptualization. Of course, that is more easily said than done. As 
pointed out by Varela, Thompson, and Rosch at their seminal work The Embod-
ied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience:
Part of the difficulty in moving beyond the adaptationist framework is to determine 
what to do after we abandon the idea of natural selection as the main explanation, so 
that every structure, mechanism, trait, or disposition cannot be explained away by its 
contribution to survival value. The temptation is to say, But then are things there for no 
reason at all? The task in evolutionary biology is to change the logical geography of the 
debate by studying the tangled, circular relations of congruence among the items to be 
explained. (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch [1991] 1993, 195; italics added)
The perspective of material engagement, I propose here, brings with it a new 
emphasis on materiality and on the long-term developmental mechanisms by 
which the bidirectional, mutual constitution of brain and culture occurs. From 
the perspective of material engagement theory the recognition of the material 
world as a constitutive and efficacious part of the human cognitive system means 
that interaction elicited by our surroundings (human or nonhuman) not only 
influences our cognitive abilities and affective responses from the very beginning 
but also shapes the form and the constitutive mechanisms of interaction. Differ-
ent forms of material culture demand and dictate different kinds of engagement 
and forms of relatedness. New materialities (objects, materials, or assemblages) 
bring about new modes of acting and thinking. Those changes are not simply 
epiphenomenal added layers of complexity and variation on a stable evolved core 
of natural cognitive capacities. Instead, they penetrate and alter the historical 
constitution of that core.
This recognition, that the relationship between an organism and its rela-
tive niche can be modified and that those alterations (conscious in the case of 
humans) matter to the evolutionary process, also demonstrates the evolutionary 
significance of the huge variability we see archaeologically in material culture and 
the built environment. If there is anything truly distinctive and universal about 
human mind it must be its openness to cultural influence and variation. This is 
not to deny that any evolved genetically guided structures exist, but instead to 
recognize that genetic and neurobiological underpinnings do not determine any-
thing before and outside the specific developmental pathways and situational 
affordances of material engagement.
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Metaplasticit-ies: Material Engagement  
Meets Mutational Enhancement
Duilio Garofoli
Abstract: Material engagement theory (Malafouris 2013) rejects the idea that human cogni-
tive evolution is the result of a passive process of natural selection. Cognitive capabilities 
and behavioral outcomes do not stem from hard-wired neurocognitive modules as the 
most appropriate solutions to adaptive problems. In contrast to these neurocentric tenets, 
cognitive evolution is explained as an enactive process, according to which humans bring 
forth new meanings and cognitive abilities by thinking with artifacts and through artifacts. 
Human minds thus emerge from a bio-cultural transformative process driven by the plas-
ticity of culture in relation to the plasticity of the brain (i. e., metaplasticity). However, 
material engagement theory is threatened by a serious risk of misuse in cognitive evolu-
tion theory. Neuroplasticity, in fact, does not warrant that every human biological system, 
provided with the appropriate conditions of cultural engagement with artifacts, can bring 
forth any potential cognitive function. Drawing upon the principles of neuroconstruc-
tivism, I will argue that the enactive / transformative process of material engagement is 
compatible with a concept of “acquired” modularity, and at the same time also limited by 
innate constraints within human biological systems. Thus, new cognitive properties could 
still require mutational enhancement as a necessary condition of their being acquired. In 
this way, I will explore the possibility that different hominins, situated within different 
environments / cultures and subject to specific biological alterations, could have evolved 
different metaplasticit-ies.
Introduction
Cognitive archaeology is a developing discipline that tackles the problem of 
human cognitive evolution by integrating knowledge from several fields of 
enquiry, including paleoanthropology (Benazzi et al. 2011; Bruner 2010), empir-
ical archaeology (Conard and Bolus 2003; d’Errico 2003; Zilhão 2011a), cog-
nitive neuroscience (Coolidge and Wynn 2005; Stout and Chaminade 2007), 
genetics (Krause et al. 2007), archaeological theory (Hodder 2012; Knappett 
2005), embodied cognition (Malafouris 2013), semiotics (Preucel 2007), lin-
guistics (Botha 2010; Noble and Davidson 1996; Johansson 2015) and philos-
ophy of mind (Sterelny 2011). These different approaches are brought together 
by the logic of reconstructing the properties of ancient minds from the behav-
ioral traces left in the archaeological record of extinct human populations (Ren-
frew 1994; Garofoli and Haidle 2014; Wynn and Coolidge 2009; Dubreuil 
2011).
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Since the first era of this discipline, the most critical problem has focused on 
what Colin Renfrew (1996) has called “the sapient paradox,” namely the appar-
ent mismatch between the rise of a modern anatomy and the emergence of a set 
of behaviors that overlap with those shown by historical / ethnographic human 
populations. Current evidence in paleoanthropology shows indeed that modern 
human anatomical forms could be identified in the African Middle Stone Age 
as early as 200 kya (McDougal, Brown, and Fleagle 2005; White et al. 2003). 
By contrast, behaviors that resemble those found in ethnographic populations, 
which define the controversial concept of “behavioral modernity” (Wadley 2001; 
Henshilwood and Marean 2003; Conard 2010; Garofoli 2016; Shea 2011) took 
much longer to manifest in the record. Great interest was therefore focused on 
defining the mechanisms that explained this disconnection. Three alternative 
models were defined over time as a result of this research. These models differ-
entiate for the role that culture and biology respectively undertake in explaining 
the emergence of behavioral modernity and, in particular, the cognitive capabili-
ties and limits of archaic human populations (e. g., Neanderthals), as opposed to 
those of modern humans (d’Errico and Stringer 2011; Nowell 2010).
The first perspective, commonly referred to as the “human revolution” model 
(Mellars and Stringer 1989; Bar-Yosef 1998; Klein and Edgar 2002), argues that 
the European Upper Paleolithic archaeological record shows discontinuity in 
both the quality and quantity of new artifact categories, compared to the African 
Middle Stone Age (Klein 2008; Mellars 2005). Besides some limited and contro-
versial cases (d’Errico and Nowell 2000), ivory figurines (Wynn, Coolidge, and 
Bright 2009) and cave art (Fritz and Tosello 2007), for example, have no prece-
dents in the Middle Stone Age. At the same time, artifacts such as body orna-
ments or laminar technologies, which are poorly represented in Middle Stone 
Age sites, become abundant during the Upper Paleolithic (Klein 2000). In this 
sense, revolutionary models argue that the Upper Paleolithic marks a discrete 
leap in modern human technological sophistication (cf. Welsch, this volume). 
This approach is usually combined with the idea that mutational enhancement, 
possibly incurring in some human populations in Africa at ca. 60 kya, represents 
the most plausible explanation for the cultural enhancement that characterized 
the florescence of innovations typical of the Upper Paleolithic (Klein 2000; Mel-
lars 2006). At the same time, these models defend the idea that cognitive enhance-
ments exerted a remarkable role in the replacement of Neanderthals by modern 
human populations (Lewis-Williams 2002; Mithen 1996; Stringer and Gamble 
1993; Wynn and Coolidge 2004).
Although the “human revolution” has long received great attention in cog-
nitive archaeology, new archaeological data from several South African Middle 
Stone Age sites has led to a reconsideration of these initial assumptions. Evi-
dence has come to light of artifact kinds, previously associated with the Upper 
Paleolithic only, dating back prior to the 60 kya threshold postulated by the 
partisans of the “Upper Paleolithic Revolution” (Nowell 2010). In particular, 
engraved ochre fragments (see Anderson 2012, for review), perforated shells used 
as body ornaments (d’Errico et al. 2005; Bouzouggar et al. 2007; d’Errico et al. 
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2009), burials (Schwarcz et al. 1988), laminar tools (Barham 2001; Henshilwood 
2009) and bone tools (Yellen et al. 1995; d’Errico and Henshilwood 2007) have 
been reported in several locations within the African continent. In this light, 
McBrearty and Brooks (2000) argued that the apparently discrete explosion of 
innovations characterizing the Upper Paleolithic was in fact produced by an 
underlying gradualist dynamic. A slow incremental process of cultural evolu-
tion deeply rooted in the African Middle Stone Age proceeded for millennia 
until it reached a threshold. After this threshold, social and technological factors 
began to mutually reinforce each other, causing cascade events of population 
growth, technological diffusion, and leaps in innovation, leading modern humans 
to migrate out of Africa and invade Europe. The Upper Paleolithic revolution is 
thus only an illusion provided by a threshold effect, while cultural, demographic 
and environmental factors, rather than mutations within the brain, are sufficient 
to explain the burst of innovation typical of the Upper Paleolithic. However, this 
approach still maintains that the emergence of Upper Paleolithic innovations is a 
prerogative of modern humans alone (d’Errico and Stringer 2011, 1061).
The opposite extreme to the biological position is offered by the “cultural 
school” (d’Errico 2003; Speth 2004; Villa and Roebroeks 2014; Zilhão 2007). Par-
tisans of this model attempted to demonstrate that Upper Paleolithic innovations 
are neither constrained by biology, nor necessarily connected with modern anat-
omy. Instead, variations in the environmental, demographic and social conditions 
(i. e., the context) were to be considered as the unique factors leading different 
human populations in different locations and times to develop more advanced 
behavioral practices as a response to ecological pressures. Recent studies that 
ascribe to Neanderthal populations in Europe the independent production of 
body ornaments (e. g., Finlayson et al. 2012; Zilhão et al. 2010), pigments (d’Err-
ico and Soressi 2002), hafted weapons (Mazza et al. 2006), burials (Grün and 
Stringer 2000), laminar blades (d’Errico et al. 1998), bone tools (Soressi et al. 
2013) were used to give credit to this idea (for review, see d’Errico 2003; Zilhão 
2007, 2011a, 2011b, 2012; Villa and Roebroeks 2014). In consequence, advocates 
of the cultural school argue that the same cognitive / biological bases were present 
in humans since the Middle Pleistocene (ca. 500 kya; see Nowell 2010 and ref-
erences therein; d’Errico and Stringer 2011; Soffer 2009) and hence that modern 
and archaic populations were cognitively equivalent (Burdukiewicz 2014; Zilhão 
2007).
The debate about the emergence of modern behavior is dominated by a series 
of intuitions that have roots in a secular opposition between contrasting philo-
sophical traditions. While the biological models find a parallel with the rationalist 
conceptions of innate abilities, cultural / context-based approaches rest instead on 
empiricist grounds. At the same time, modern-centric intuitions are now viewed 
as distorting any theories which compare Homo sapiens and Neanderthal cogni-
tion. Mutational enhancement approaches are perceived as integral to the Victo-
rian idea that modern humans evolved a complete / perfect brain, which allowed 
them to prevail over the primitives (Zilhão 2011a). On the other hand, the guilt 
for having downplayed Neanderthals for decades (Papagianni and Morse 2013) 
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has fostered new dogmatic positions which reject the existence of any biological 
differences between human species (Klein 2008, 272).
These intuitions have exerted dramatic influence on cognitive archaeo logical 
debates, generating opposition between theoretical agendas which often lack 
solid justification. Many of the current approaches have neglected to explain the 
very mechanisms of interaction between cultural changes in the archaeological 
record and the brain. The context-based models introduced above lack a detailed 
analysis of how context-related factors interact with the brain. Biological mod-
els, in turn, do not clearly explain how neural mutations can affect culture. The 
absence of such explanations has led scholars from different traditions to create 
some emblematic “proxies” (in the sense both of substitutes and approximations) 
for the various existing models, where summary connections between brains, 
minds and culture have been postulated and then criticized.
Only recently, some proposals (d’Errico and Banks 2013) have focused on 
elucidating how technological and cultural evolution could be related to vari-
ations in the ecological niche (Banks, d’Errico, and Zilhão 2013), addressing in 
particular the relationship between artifacts and adaptive environments (e. g., 
Lahr and Foley 1998). An additional focus has regarded the relationship between 
the transmission of cultural innovations and demographic dynamics, attempting 
to show that the appearance of new technologies in the record is constrained by 
minimum population size (Shennan 2001; Powell, Shennan, and Thomas 2009; 
but see Read 2012 and French 2016 for limitations). However, models of cultural 
and cognitive evolution which integrate historical-social aspects with biological 
factors are still rare (Haidle et al. 2015).
1. Aims
In this chapter I will provide a more coherent analysis of the mechanisms under-
lying the proxy models adopted in cognitive archaeology. My aim will be, first, 
to illuminate the potential relationship between genes, cognitive functions and 
behavior in both biology and context-based models. I will show that the proxy 
for biological models corresponds to a hard-core version of evolutionary psy-
chology, where genes exert strong influence on hard-wired cognitive modules, 
which in turn generate inflexible adaptive behaviors. On the other hand, I will 
argue that the context-based models best fit with a mechanism of cognitive 
transformation that combines elements of cognitive / cultural niche construction, 
embodied cognition and neuroplasticity. I will refer in particular to Lambros 
Malafouris’ (2013) material engagement theory as a thorough instance of these 
family of mechanisms in cognitive evolution.
After making evident the main differences between these approaches, I will 
show that material engagement theory and, more generally, plasticity-based 
mechanisms are compatible with mutational enhancement models. The tension 
between these approaches is resolved when we abandon the idea, intrinsic to 
biological proxies, that neural mutations acting on hard-wired modules are suffi-
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cient conditions for the emergence of new technologies in the record. In line with 
Wheeler and Clark’s (2008) neuroconstructivist lean, I will argue that modules 
are not innately specified, but can be acquired along an embodied and culturally 
situated developmental trajectory. Furthermore, modules do not run genetically 
determined programs that lead to the production of adaptive behaviors and tools. 
On the contrary, modules can integrate aspects of the material world within their 
functional outcome (Wilson 2008). Thus, plasticity of the brain, in relation to 
the plasticity offered by material culture (what Malafouris [2010] calls “meta-
plasticity”) can lead to the production of a massive series of different extended 
mental architectures. However, although the gamut of possible architectures is 
great, metaplasticity is limited by constraints distributed within the whole brain-
body-world system. Therefore, mutational enhancement could still represent a 
necessary condition for the acquisition of extended cognitive modules. I will 
conclude that the co-evolution of cognitive niches, bodies and brains can lead 
different human species to evolve along alternative metaplastic trajectories, since 
their plasticity could be subject to different constraints and degrees of freedom.
2. The “Magic Mutation”: Explaining the Trick
In cognitive archaeology, biological models are often criticized by their detrac-
tors for being based on “magic mutations” (e. g., Malafouris 2007, 295). This 
expression is often used to argue that the mechanisms connecting neural 
enhancement with the emergence of innovations in the Upper Paleolithic record 
are poorly defined by partisans of the biological approach.
This blurry picture about the actual nature of biological models can be clari-
fied by drawing upon Steven Mithen’s (1994, 1996, 2014) work. In accord with 
the multidisciplinary goal and methods of a conditional cognitive archaeology 
(Abramiuk 2012, 30 – 33; Garofoli and Haidle 2014; Haidle 2014; Wynn and 
Coolidge 2009), this author has integrated the archaeological record with the-
ories of mental architecture, embracing the idea that the human mind is modu-
lar (Mithen 1996). In cognitive science, several authors have elaborated different 
definitions of the concept of module. According to Jerry Fodor (1983, 1985), a 
module is a specialized, encapsulated mental organ that has evolved to handle 
specific information types of particular relevance to the species. Encapsulation 
means that it is impossible to interfere with the inner workings of a module. 
Modules also act unconsciously and fast; they provide determined output in rela-
tion to specific input, regardless of the content of the input itself, while they do 
not provide information about the intermediate steps of this process. Modules 
develop along a universal ontogenetic trajectory, are localized within the brain 
and break as a result of pathological conditions leaving the rest of modular archi-
tecture unaltered (see Elman et al. 1996, for review).
While moderate proposals argue that not all cognition is modular (Fodor 
1983), more extreme approaches claim that the human mind is constituted by a 
massive set of modules (Carruthers 2006; Sperber 1996). Other radical versions 
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defend the existence of Darwinian algorithms within the mind, namely functions 
that are selected to cope with specific adaptive problems such as kin recogni-
tion, foraging, or even the identification of potential dangerous animals (Cos-
mides and Tooby 1987, 2013; New, Cosmides, and Tooby 2007). These stances 
are united by the idea that modules or Darwinian algorithms are hard-wired by 
natural selection in order to provide certain adaptive behaviors.
Such a view resonates with a conception of culture close to that advocated 
by supporters of the New Archaeology (see Abramiuk 2012, sec. 1.2 and 2.1.1). 
According to this school of thought, culture represents an extra-somatic means 
of adaptation to environmental problems (White 1959), which is subject to evo-
lutionary mechanisms similar to those related to the selection of adaptive ana-
tomical structures (Binford 2001). Cultural practices are thus selected in relation 
to their ability to maximize human reproductive fitness (see Wylie 2002, 67 – 70, 
for review). The idea that artifacts are the mere byproduct of intrinsic neuro-cog-
nitive modules suggested that culture is thoroughly the product of Darwinian 
selection acting on genes. Most importantly, modules are domain-specific pro-
cessors, namely computational entities that deal with a specific kind of informa-
tional content. In other words, modules are hard-wired with innate bodies of 
knowledge that they exploit to solve adaptive problems, a conception known as 
representational nativism (Elman et al. 1996, 367 – 371; Spelke 1994; cf. Zahidi and 
Myin, this volume).
Drawing upon Howard Gardner’s (1983) approach, Mithen (1994, 1996) 
argued that the evolution of the human mind was characterized by the selection 
of specific intelligences, each related to a particular domain of human life (e. g., 
technical, social, linguistic). These intelligences evolved as encapsulated domains, 
each hard-wired with specific algorithms and causally related to specific behav-
ioral outcomes. The evolution of archaic human lineages was characterized by an 
increasing specialization (and separation) of these different intelligences (Mithen 
2014). The archaeological record of Neanderthals, for example, shows that great 
achievements were reached in technological intelligence, such as the production 
of highly sophisticated hafted spears (e. g., Mazza et al. 2006), and social intelli-
gence, as supported by the ambush strategies likely involved in big game hunt-
ing (Villa et al. 2005). However, the absence of manifestations of art comparable 
to those of the modern human Upper Paleolithic (Wynn and Coolidge 2004) 
proves that Neanderthals lacked integration between such modules (Mithen 
2014). This integration requires the evolution of a metacognitive module in 
modern humans, mostly scaffolded by language, which is capable of establishing 
connections between the various intelligences. The appearance of such a new 
mental architecture could be explained by both cladogenetic mechanisms similar 
to those described by Klein (2000), where bottlenecks lead to a dramatic radia-
tion of neurally modern Homo sapiens, as opposed to the nearly modern Homo 
helmei. Alternatively, anagenesis could be also considered for a gradual transfor-
mation of an archaic Neanderthal-like architecture into a fully modern one. Both 
mechanisms are compatible with strong instructionism (Wheeler 2006; Wheeler 
and Clark 1999), namely the idea that genes fully specify their outcome. In this 
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1 Nevertheless, one must acknowledge that not all the existing models in evolutionary psy-
chology actually subscribe to this whole set of requirements at one and the same time. Some 
moderate versions, for example, concede that the content processed by algorithms which 
evolved in a “Stone Age world” can be partly attuned to the challenges of contemporary set-
tings (e. g., an “avoid a stampeding elephant” algorithm is modulated to “detect an approaching 
truck”; see Sperber 2005). In addition, evolutionary psychologists have attempted many times to 
reject the charge of “genetic determinism,” by emphasizing the importance of the environment 
in the emergence of domain-specific functions (e. g., Kurzban 2010). However, the psychologist 
Alison Nash (2014) has recently countered that the environment, within this line of defense, 
pays only “lip service” to the developmental process, by passively “triggering” a genetically de-
termined program which nevertheless rests inscribed in the brain by natural selection.
way, genetic mutations can produce neurobiological changes, which can directly 
modify innate representations, change Darwinian algorithms, alter domains of 
intelligence and ultimately lead to the production of adaptive behaviors. The 
combination of strong instructionism, hard-wired modularity and culture as 
extra-somatic adaptation represents well the “Neo-Darwinian synthesis” of cog-
nitive evolution (cf. Malafouris, this volume; Iliopoulos and Garofoli 2016). This 
represents the extended version of the proxy model commonly associated with 
revolutionary and biologically oriented approaches in cognitive archaeology.1
3. Context-Based Approaches
In the current cognitive archaeological debate, two growing bodies of theory, 
namely the incremental (McBrearty and Brooks 2000) and the cognitive equiv-
alence model (d’Errico 2003; Zilhão 2007), favor cultural mechanisms over bio-
logical enhancements as drivers of cognitive evolution. However, the detailed 
mechanisms concerning how context can profoundly alter cognition have barely 
been explored and currently remain underspecified in archaeological theory. A 
more thorough explanation for such mechanisms requires multidisciplinary inte-
gration with knowledge drawn from different domains (see Laland and O’Brien 
2010, for an example).
It is broadly recognized in evolutionary biology that many organisms can 
act upon their living environments, creating selective environments to which 
they (and their offspring) adapt (Laland, Odling-Smee, and Feldman 2000, 2001; 
Odling-Smee, Laland, and Feldman 2003). Humans have adopted culture to cre-
ate and maintain such selective environments, a process currently known as cul-
tural niche construction (Kendal et al. 2011; Laland and O’Brien 2011; see Wat-
kins 2016, for review).
Cultural niches are not simply an outstanding example of active ecological 
engineering, they also show the uniquely human ability to modify the informa-
tional structures and opportunities within the environment. Rather than simply 
selecting among alternative sources of information, humans can alter the very 
way information can be drawn from the environment, acting in this way as “epis-
temic engineers” (Sterelny 2003, 148; Clark 2008, 66 – 68). Consider, for example, 
the creation of learning environments for the transmission of lithic technologies, 
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2 However, Iliopoulos and Garofoli (2016) have recently argued that even cultural models, 
like biological ones, are compatible with a hard-core evolutionary psychology argument (and 
such as the Acheulean bifacial hand-axes (Wynn 2002). Being situated within 
dedicated “tool working” areas of activity, youngsters at first become famil-
iar with lithic technologies by coming into contact with the byproducts of the 
experts’ flaking activity (i. e., the debris). Then, they can directly interact with 
experts and rely on the technical solutions already figured out in the past. In this 
way, the embedment within an epistemically altered environment eliminates the 
need for reinventing the same technology many times (Sterelny 2011, chap. 2). 
Furthermore, apprenticeship systems facilitate the production of artifacts by 
superseding costly individual cognitive strategies with more economic distrib-
uted ones. The cognitive load that is required to support the invention of an 
artifact, such as the construction of mental plans and networks of inferences, is 
reduced by simply becoming attuned to the actions of a teacher. In sum, cultural 
niches are represented by collections of practices, values, norms and relation-
ships, built on through the engagement with social agents and artifacts, which 
emerge within an epistemically engineered environment.
Cultural niches act also as cognitive niches, since they represent new develop-
mental contexts for children. Embedded in such engineered environments, chil-
dren are exposed to new meanings and relationships since their early age, which 
deeply alter their cognitive development (Kendall 2011). This allows transfor-
mation of the human mind throughout ontogenesis. At the same time, the emer-
gence of new socially relevant situations also influences the adult mind. Inter-
action with young learners can indeed lead expert adults to acquire new values, 
like the importance for group survival of transmitting a technique to the new 
generations. This long-term goal can lead experts to develop a higher degree of 
tolerance toward younger individuals, which in turn can alter social relationships 
(and cognition) within a group.
Most crucially, the cultural / cognitive niche is also vertically transmitted, since 
the epistemically modified environments are bequeathed from one generation to 
the next, allowing the accumulation and transfer of a huge cultural and cognitive 
“capital” along a Lamarckian dimension (Jablonka and Lamb 2005). In addition, 
the process of downstream epistemic engineering could be incremental, for the 
inherited environment could be further modified by the following generations 
(Sterelny 2011). Importantly, the vertical transmission of a cultural / cognitive 
niche relies on the idea that the human mind is massively plastic, rather than 
being represented by a set of fixed modular adaptations to a Paleolithic world 
(Sterelny 2003, chap. 10). Thus, the mind is specifically adapted to keep pace 
with continuously changing cultural / cognitive niches. Adaptations of this kind 
involve enhancements in neuroplasticity mechanisms combined with an exten-
sion of childhood / adolescence periods (Bock and Sellen 2002), which are critical 
for learning. The downstream transmission of developmental contexts, coupled 
with the plasticity of the human mind, represent a plausible account of the mech-
anisms sought by cultural models in cognitive archaeology.2
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they often adopt evolutionary psychology rhetoric). Indeed, provided that both these models 
accept the existence of innate domain-specific modules, the difference between the two could 
simply boil down to whether genes are the main cause of development (i. e., genetic determin-
ism) or whether the environment “triggers” innately specified functions (see note 1).
4. Embodied / Extended Variants
An additional issue is how the plastic human mind gets dynamically attuned 
to an inherited cultural niche. Various explanations have been proposed to 
address this problem. According to Sterelny (2003), the human mind evolved as 
a domain-general device, provided with basic abilities, such as processing statis-
tical regularities, focusing the attention on some targets, or inhibiting irrelevant 
stimuli. Such domain-general abilities are connected to critical stimuli that are 
made salient by the cultural niche itself. In this way, there is no need to develop 
hard-wired modules able to identify and process specific contents, if these con-
tents are already evident within the world. A domain-general cognitive archi-
tecture requires simply attunement to such situated information. The process of 
cognitive transformation introduced earlier is the result of different adaptations 
to different cultural niches.
Another body of theories, known as the extended cognition hypothesis 
(Clark 2008; Rowlands 2010; Menary 2007), argues that the engagement with 
the cultural niche is not simply the product of an interaction between internal 
cognitive properties and salient external aspects. Artifacts and social agents could 
in fact be constitutive of human cognition, resulting in a massive series of hybrid 
mental architectures (Clark 2008). The plasticity of the brain allows humans to 
dynamically assemble such hybrid systems in relation to the situation in which 
they are enculturated, rather than having a fixed internal architecture inflexibly 
operating on the world.
The most radical approach to such an active externalist view is likely repre-
sented by Lambros Malafouris’ (2013) material engagement theory. Malafouris 
(2013, chap. 4) argues that a proper theory of extended mind requires embracing 
the idea that humans not only use artifacts to assist their cognitive processes, but 
that they think through artifacts themselves (see also Knappett 2005). At the base 
of this theory is the idea that the enactive engagement with artifacts leads to the 
emergence of new cognitive and behavioral possibilities for human agents. For 
example, the action of tracing a curved line on a cave wall with pigments allows 
an Upper Paleolithic human to perceive the back of an animal (Malafouris 2007). 
The affordances for action provided by the material properties of pigments, cou-
pled with explorative actions on a cave wall, bring forth a new series of meanings, 
represented by pictorial images. The pictorial action gradually leads humans to 
reflexively think about the creative process itself, scaffolding the emergence 
of a concept of image. Once images are socially shared, they can ground new 
meanings and social relationships that can enact the construction of appropriate 
socio-cognitive abilities.
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Thus material culture is plastic in that it affords many possibilities for cog-
nitive transformation, which in turn is made possible by the plasticity of the 
human brain. Integration between the cultural and the neural levels of plasticity 
defines the concept of metaplasticity (Malafouris 2010), which stands at the crux 
of material engagement theory.
5. Acquired Modularity
The concept of metaplasticity is introduced as a diametric alternative to the 
modular approach defended by evolutionary psychologists (Malafouris 2013, 
46). Where the latter seeks the existence of a universal human nature grounded 
into innate psychological entities (Buss 1994; Pinker 1994), the former argues 
that human minds are incomplete by nature (Malafouris, this volume), since they 
emerge as the product of material and social engagement. Such a rejection of 
modularity is based on two main reasons. The idea that the mind and the cul-
tural / cognitive niche co-construct each other seems to better explain the exist-
ing empirical evidence than does the modular approach (Dekker and Karmil-
off-Smith 2011). Williams syndrome, in particular, has been used as a paradigm 
to show that developmental disorders are not caused by “broken” modules 
(Karmiloff-Smith 2012b; Karmiloff-Smith and Farran 2012), which leave the rest 
of the architecture intact (for this approach, see Baron-Cohen 1998; Carruthers 
2002; Pinker 1999, 262; van der Lely 2005). On the contrary, small innate biases 
caused by genetic mutations can influence a child’s activity, leading to dysfunc-
tional outcomes within a developmental trajectory. As a result, the whole mental 
architecture is affected by this initial variation, even if the long-term effects of 
such an early impairment are more evident in some specific cognitive functions 
than in others (Karmiloff-Smith 2009).
On the other hand, metaplasticity and material engagement theory also 
emerged as a rejection of some deep metaphysical problems that afflict the innate 
modularity approach. Without going into details, it is worth mentioning the 
notorious problem of homuncularism that is inextricably associated with repre-
sentational nativism (Gibson 1979; cf. Zahidi and Myin, this volume). There are 
issues with the assumption that modules are agents that interpret the content of 
some stimuli by means of innate knowledge. In fact, modules are clusters of neu-
rons, which can either respond to stimuli or not, and thus it is unclear how they 
can “know,” “simulate” or “talk about” aspects of the world (Gallagher 2008). 
Another problem with innate modularity lies in the idea that human behavior 
and cognitive life are a priori shaped by algorithms which evolved during the 
Paleolithic (Pinker 1994), thereby reducing the richness and variability of human 
life and culture to a mere by-product of natural selection (Tallis 2011).
However, these problematic aspects with modularity have led proponents of 
metaplasticity (and similar massive plasticity approaches) to assume overdefen-
sive positions. In fact, the opposition between modularity and metaplasticity 
exists only insofar as we consider the innate aspect of modularity, namely that 
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3 For neuroconstructivists, a representation is “an information state within the brain of an 
organism that contributes to adaptive behavior within a given environment” (Mareschal et al. 
2007, 4). Although these authors accept the notion of computation over mental representations, 
their approach appears open to an anti-representational amendment (see Zahidi and Myin, this 
volume).
modules are hard-wired in the neural system and that they harbor native repre-
sentations (see above). Wheeler and Clark (2008) have applied a neuroconstruc-
tivist approach (Mareschal et al. 2007; Farran and Karmiloff-Smith 2012; Wes-
termann et al. 2007) to show that the existence of encapsulated, domain-specific 
modules is not necessarily innate. Drawing in particular upon Karmiloff-Smith 
(1992), they have argued that given the early plasticity of the human brain, mod-
ules can be progressively acquired during development. The modularization pro-
cess combines native biases in, for example, the ability to plan saccades (Brown 
et al. 2003), with the proactivity of the subject to engage with the world. Par-
tial representations, namely neural activations that correlate with aspects of the 
world, are built in throughout development and used as bricks to construct more 
complex representations (Mareschal et al. 2007, 101 – 102).3 The acquisition of 
partial representations restricts the plasticity of the system, reducing the gamut 
of possible outcomes, so that development itself becomes a critical constraint in 
influencing the developmental outcome (Karmiloff-Smith 1998). Regions of the 
brain acquire partial representations through processes of competition for infor-
mation and bring about new functional outcomes and more complex represen-
tations by cooperative processes with other regions (Mareschal et al. 2007, 97). 
This view constitutes what in general is defined as the interactive specialization 
model of development as opposed to the maturational one, according to which 
modules develop along deterministic trajectories and abilities present at birth are 
unlocked according to a pre-specified time program (Johnson 2001; Johnson and 
de Haan 2011, 13 – 14).
6. Body Ornaments as Transformative Technologies
In this section I will adopt early body ornaments as a case study to argue that 
cognitive modules can be acquired through a process of material engagement. 
Body ornaments present some concrete advantages in comparison to the Old-
owan tool-making example sketchily introduced by Malafouris (2013, 175) as a 
paradigm for cognitive transformation. Like the production of Oldowan hand-
axes (Wynn 2002), early beads can act as material scaffolds for the emergence 
of new meaningful relationships and cognitive processes at the individual level. 
At the same time, ornaments specifically bring forth social relationships and 
socio-cognitive abilities, altering the human cultural / cognitive niche. This case 
study also makes evident the bridging between niche construction and material 
engagement theory.
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As previously suggested, perforated shells have been found at several African 
Middle Stone Age sites (e. g., d’Errico et al. 2005) and supposedly in some late 
Neanderthal sites in Europe (Zilhão 2012). Pierced shells are considered to be 
body ornaments by an abductive argument that focuses on the following factors: 
the shells show signs of active manipulation, which consist in the intentional per-
foration of the item, although the exploitation of natural openings is also possible 
(Bouzouggar et al. 2007). Furthermore, evidence of use-wear recorded on the 
perforation edge is consistent with the use of a string to form pendants (d’Errico 
et al. 2005; Henshilwood et al. 2004). In addition, evidence for the transpor-
tation of shell beads from coastal shores to distant regions, alongside the lim-
ited nourishment value of these mollusks, strengthens the idea that these objects 
could be socially relevant (Bouzouggar et al. 2007; d’Errico et al. 2009). The 
presence of such body ornaments within the archaeological record of ancient 
human populations has been associated with symbolism and said to prove behav-
ioral and cognitive modernity (e. g., Henshilwood and Marean 2003; Kuhn and 
Stiner 2007). Furthermore, at a deeper level of cognitive realization, Henshil-
wood and Dubreuil (2009, 2011) have argued that such ornaments prove the 
acquisition by their users of shared conceptual abstractions and meta-representa-
tional capabilities necessary to implement full-blown mindreading. Against this 
paradigm, a growing number of authors have contended that shell beads cannot 
be considered as symbols at a semiotic level (Coolidge and Wynn 2011; Rossano 
2010; Iliopoulos 2016). In addition, an enactive approach to social perception 
(Hutto 2011; Gallagher and Hutto 2008; De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007; Fuchs 
and De Jaegher 2009) suffices to explain the emergence of these ornaments in the 
record without the need for the costly cognitive abilities that are considered nec-
essary to produce full symbolism. The enactive argument implies that the mean-
ing of a shell bead is directly perceived as an embodied emotion toward the shell 
itself (Gallagher 2008). Indeed, the properties of the nacre are special in them-
selves and foster an aesthetic reaction from the observer. The person displaying 
the shell can directly perceive the embodied emotional reaction of the observer. 
In this way, the embodied reaction grounds the meaning of the shell, without 
the need to infer it through mindreading. This meaning motivates individuals to 
wear shells as ornaments and to maintain this practice in the long term. This in 
turn alters the cognitive niche in which children develop, shaping the perception 
of adorned individuals for subsequent generations (see Garofoli 2015, for the full 
version of this argument).
Placed in the context of Malafouris’ (2013) approach, the engagement with 
non-symbolic body ornaments represents a necessary condition for the acqui-
sition of more advanced cognitive abilities. The meaning of an ornament is first 
maintained as a concept grounded in the perception of embodied emotions 
(see Barsalou 1999; Prinz 2002, for a similar approach). Once body adornment 
becomes embedded within the culture of a group, embodied concepts are gradu-
ally targeted by vocalizations and turned into words (Barsalou et al. 2008; see the 
contributions to this volume by Fuchs, and Zahidi and Myin, for an embodied 
approach to language acquisition). Concrete word concepts scaffold the emer-
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gence of abstractions and lead to the production of a language composed of 
propositional chunks. In turn, propositional language could be used to build a 
contextual / behavioral narrative, namely a set of stories that describes the actions 
and reasons of some agents within a concrete social context, often involving 
social norms (Fiebich 2016). Let us consider the following example:
“Everybody cheers the man with many beads,” said the mother to the child, “for he has 
hunted many animals and he is the strongest man of the tribe.”
A narrative of this kind leads children to understand the ornament’s meaning 
without necessarily reinventing it from an initial phase of embodied perception. 
This phase becomes part of the cognitive niche by being embedded in narra-
tive practice, so that children can rely on such narratives to directly understand 
what being the chieftain means (Gallagher and Hutto 2008). Thus, narratives can 
augment the direct perception of embodied aspects of the world. Furthermore, 
the concepts brought forth by body ornaments can be recycled and plastically 
adapted to other situations, thus further transforming the mind and the cognitive 
niche. An increase in the use of language as a cognitive tool in social contexts in 
turn scaffolds the production of linguistic meta-representations of the kind “I 
know that you know.” This leads to the formation of narratives that do not sim-
ply contain a description of concrete actions and reasons of the protagonists, but 
which also focus onto mental contents (Fiebich 2016; Milligan, Astington, and 
Dack 2007). For example:
“The augur looked at the twirling birds and waited in silence. The warriors believed he 
wished to say not to start the fight.”
The education of children in such mentalistic narratives allows the acquisition 
of full-blown mindreading, namely the ability to understand others in terms of 
mental states (Apperly 2011).
The crucial point in relation to material engagement theory is that body orna-
ments and narratives, by altering the cognitive niche and the plastic human brain, 
can mediate the construction of specific functional modules. Indeed, these arti-
facts can lead to the emergence of modules which process embodied concepts, 
linguistic abstractions, propositional meanings and meta-representations (see 
Barnard 2010, for a cognitive architecture compatible with this argument).
7. Innateness Rethought
Neuroconstructivism does not only solve the apparent tension between material 
engagement theory and the modularity of mind. It also shows that context-based 
approaches are compatible with mutational enhancement models. Acquired 
modularity implies that modules are constructed along a trajectory of multilevel 
interactions, which range from the cellular to the cultural level.
At the crux of acquired modularity lies the concept of “domain-relevance” 
of brain regions as opposed to that of domain-specificity typical of hard-wired 
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modularity (Karmiloff-Smith 2009, 2012a; Dekker and Karmiloff-Smith 2011). 
Domain relevance rejects the main idea at the heart of representational nativism, 
namely that neural systems harbor innate knowledge. On the contrary, the innate 
component lies here in the physical properties of neural cells, layers, regions and 
bodily systems which constrain “the kinds of information that can be received, 
and hence the kinds of problems that can be solved and hence the kinds of rep-
resentations that can subsequently be stored” (Elman et al. 1996, 30). Thus, this 
form of nativism focuses on the structural limits to the acquisition of cognitive 
functions. In particular, the functional potential of a set of elements within a neu-
ral network is constrained by the relationship of this element with the rest of the 
network. While at the local level cortical regions could show larger degrees of 
freedom, at the level of regional connectivity (embrainment) the neural architec-
ture is partly determined by its mutual relationship with other regions (Elman et 
al. 1996, 27 – 30; Johnson and de Haan 2011, 14). Furthermore, functional acqui-
sition is constrained by the structure of the body, as well as by how the neural 
system is physically connected to the body itself (Mareschal et al. 2007, chap. 4; 
Gallagher 2005). A five finger hand or a standing posture influence the type of 
affordances for action that can be brought forth by engaging with the world and 
thus shape the kind of information reaching the brain. Development itself then 
provides new constraints by reducing the functional flexibility of brain regions 
as a result of progressive specialization (Elman et al. 1996, 33; see above). In sum, 
the physical constraints of some domain-relevant regions alter the probabilities 
that interaction with the environment will lead to the emergence of a specific 
cognitive function (Gottlieb 2007).
This way of rethinking innateness, however, does not eliminate the fact that 
innate components are critical for development and evolution. Giving up neu-
rocentric / deterministic ideas of hard-wired modularity does not leave room to 
an extreme form of classic empiricism. The emergence of a cognitive function 
merely becomes distributed among many levels and is subject to a similarly dis-
tributed set of constraints. Although a concept of strong neurocentric causality 
disappears when abandoning representational nativism, this does not imply that 
all hominid brains are unstructured monads that can give rise to every potential 
outcome in relation to their specific engagement with the world. Modularization 
still implies the existence of a structural flexibility that allows the acquisition of 
a particular function. Roughly put, whatever the origins of a cognitive function 
are, either brought forth by material engagement or innately specified, its very 
existence implies that such a function has some minimal neurobiological require-
ments to be implemented.
8. Impossible Modularization
Let us consider the emergence of body ornaments in late Neanderthal cultures 
(e. g., Zilhão 2012). In relation to the discussion above, these artifacts could have 
been used by Neanderthals to transform their mind, as well as their cognitive 
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niche. Such a transformation could require the emergence of new modules to 
process linguistic propositions that are built upon an initial stage of enactive per-
ception of embodied emotions. However, this shift is only a logical possibility 
and does not represent a necessary outcome. Likewise, even if Neanderthals had 
basic linguistic forms that allowed them to create propositional meaning, the 
shift from this level to that of linguistic meta-representations is not a priori war-
ranted.
Focusing on this second case, constraints upon the emergence of meta-rep-
resentations could lie in two different places. First, the physical properties of 
the Neanderthal neural architecture could have insufficient flexibility to allow 
the production of meta-representations. In this way, Neanderthals would not 
be provided with domain-relevant regions that allow them to acquire a specific 
module for a theory of mind. For example, the degree of connectivity of the 
Neanderthal temporal lobe could be different from that of modern humans, 
preventing them from acquiring some language-based cognitive functions. The 
architecture of the brain is constrained in a way that no neuronal recycling or 
plastic rearrangements (e. g., Dehaene and Cohen 2007) allow such meta-repre-
sentations to be acquired. Second, constraints could exist in the embodiment of a 
cognitive function, so that even if Neanderthals did possess brain regions flexible 
enough to acquire meta-representations, the relationship between these relevant 
regions and other aspects of the brain-body system nevertheless impedes the 
acquisition of this function. For example, higher levels of expression of hormone 
receptors for the control of stress could have disrupted the acquisition of a “lan-
guage of diplomacy” in Neanderthals, even if their brains per se were sufficiently 
plastic to acquire this function (Ambrose 2010). Higher levels of stress could 
have exerted repercussions at the social level, impeding the consolidation of some 
necessary conditions for the emergence of full-blown mindreading. A potential 
inflexibility of these receptors to culturally-mediated modulations could have 
made the acquisition of such cognitive abilities impossible in the long term.
In this way, material engagement represents only a necessary condition for 
the emergence of cognitive functions. On the other hand, it is logically possible 
that biological constraints need to be released in order to allow a function to 
modularize.
9. Limitless extension
In the previous section I have argued that the brain-body system of archaic 
humans such as Neanderthals could have had an inferior level of intrinsic plas-
ticity. However, it could be objected that since development is a situated process, 
the acquisition of a cognitive function cannot simply be evaluated by looking 
at the internal constraints of the brain-body system. In fact, acquired modules 
can be extended (Clark 2008) and based on the manipulation of material vehicles 
(Menary 2007). Such an extended approach raises important new considerations 
about the neurobiological limits to cognitive transformation in human evolu-
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tion. Indeed, limited neuroplasticity does not preclude a cognitive function being 
acquired by off-loading the burden onto the material world.
It is worth considering, for instance, the notorious case of bartenders dis-
cussed in extended cognition literature (Beach 1988; Clark 2001). Bartenders 
have to face the problem of preparing specific cocktails at certain hours of the 
evening. One strategy to realize this task would be to create an internal model of 
the detailed relationships between cocktail types and time-frames. This strategy, 
although possible, appears to be very costly in cognitive terms, since many rela-
tionships need be memorized and retrieved at the right time. Bartenders, how-
ever, can structure their environment in order to facilitate such a problem-solv-
ing activity. They usually adopt the material features of glasses (such as shape 
and size) to define associations with particular kind of cocktails. In addition, 
they organize their working environments, so that different glasses are spatially 
arranged in a way that corresponds to the chronological order in which cock-
tails will be prepared. Bartenders thus use variation in the glass shapes (which is 
allowed by the plastic properties of glass) to solve a mnemonic problem of asso-
ciation. At the same time, they use spatial disposition to visualize time relation-
ships. We could now return to the problem of cognitive evolution, considering 
this example as a paradigmatic case of mentalistic vs. situated strategies. We could 
then take the case of a primitive agent who has insufficient neural flexibility to 
implement the mentalistic cognitive approaches to spatial problem solving, and 
who could realize only situated strategies. Would this mean that the primitive 
agent has inferior visuospatial abilities compared to the modern bartender who 
can do both? Recently, Bruner and Lozano (2014) seem to have reached a similar 
conclusion in relation to the Neanderthal use of teeth as a third-hand interface to 
assist praxis, which has limited counterpart in ancient Homo sapiens populations. 
These authors have argued that the use of an additional interface in Neander-
thals, instead of stone tools, is due to the absence of efficient visuospatial inte-
gration in this species compared to Homo sapiens. It could be argued, however, 
that mentalistic operations are not intrinsically more efficient than the embodied 
version Bruner and Lozano (2014) ascribe to Neanderthals, if judged in terms of 
results. Therefore, one can conclude that cognitive extensions can in principle 
be as efficient as mentalistic processes, at least in the short term, and thus that 
intrinsic limits to plasticity can be fully compensated by cognitive extensions 
without great adaptive loss.
However, an extreme application of this argument raises a series of import-
ant problems. Even though cognitive extensions can reduce the cognitive load 
and allow a less plastic system to acquire a function, this process is not limitless. 
Extensions cannot create an infinite range of cognitive capabilities potentially 
realizable by a brain-body system. If we take this idea as valid, it could be argued 
that any brain-body system, independently of its intrinsic limits, could acquire 
whatever final hybrid configuration. In other words, this would mean that while 
brains and bodies are constrained, their engagement with the world it is not. The 
problem of limitless neural plasticity discussed above is thus transferred to the 
material dimension. Such an assumption implies that the material engagement 
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with the world can result in any possible cognitive outcome, since the world is 
infinitely plastic. These conditions force us to face the situation depicted in the 
1992 movie The Lawnmower Man, where the engagement with a set of myste-
rious virtual reality machines, coupled with the administration of neurotrophic 
drugs, leads a simple mind to acquire super-human powers such as telepathy or 
psychokinesis.
10. Relational and Situated Constraints
In contrast with limitless plasticity, when artifacts are integrated within the devel-
opmental process, they become part of a wholly constrained system. Constraints 
emerge in the very relationship between the brain-body system and material 
culture, so that the kind of possible hybridizations are also limited. Given the 
intrinsic plasticity of a system, it is therefore possible that some hybrid archi-
tectures cannot be assembled. For example, monkeys are generally considered 
to have limited capacity to solve analogies, specifically the ability to understand 
relationships between relationships (e. g., AA analogous to BB and different 
from CD, see Holyoak and Thagard 1994). Evidence in comparative psychology 
shows that apes can use tokens for “same” or “different” relationships between 
pairs of elements, thus facilitating analogical reasoning. Conversely, monkeys 
seem to fail to use such material anchors to solve analogies (see Thompson and 
Oden 2000, for review). In this sense, their limited neural plasticity does not sim-
ply impede them from performing analogies in their minds; it also hampers the 
application of extended strategies.
On the other hand, constraints upon cognitive extension could also be fully 
located within the world. That is, there could be intrinsic properties of the world 
which impose mandatory solutions upon cognitive agents. Let us consider the 
case of mentalistic mindreading discussed in the previous sections and in partic-
ular the construction of a linguistic meta-representation “I know that you wish 
X.” This linguistic representation allows an individual to represent the proposi-
tional attitude of another subject towards a mental state X “as such” (you wish 
X) and to represent his own propositional attitudes toward this proposition (I 
know that). Such a form of mentalistic mindreading has been argued to be depen-
dent on language acquisition in developing children (Milligan, Astington, and 
Dack 2007; Ruffman et al. 2003). Although there is no space to support the fol-
lowing assumption in this chapter, let us suppose that there is simply no way to 
represent the content of someone else’s mind which is not language-based. In this 
way, the adoption of writing or Braille code alters the physical vehicle through 
which language is constructed, but it does not provide a substantially different 
cognitive strategy than orally produced language. Considering Malafouris’ (2010) 
concept of metaplasticity, in this case the material side, rather than the neural one, 
is tightly constrained. Thus, only agents who have an embrained and embodied 
system that allows the acquisition of meta-representational language can acquire 
full-blown mindreading, since alternative cultural strategies are impeded.
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11. Metaplasticit-ies
According to Wheeler and Clark (2008), the universal character of human nature 
is actually a meta-nature, represented by the possibility of dynamically assem-
bling a vast gamut of extended cognitive architectures. The structure of these 
architectures depends on the trajectory of embodied and situated modularization 
that takes place during development. The element of constancy lies here in the 
possibility for radical variation in the cognitive outcome, rather than in a series of 
innate, fixed and universally shared cognitive modules, a conception that is close 
to Malafouris’ (2010) metaplasticity.
In this chapter, I hope to have sufficiently argued that such a meta-nature has 
limits, represented by the constraints that are distributed within the whole brain-
body-world system which characterizes extended cognitive architectures. In par-
ticular, I have identified constraints: (a) intrinsic to neuroplasticity, (b) located 
within the brain-body-artifact relationship, and (c) fully situated in the structure 
of the world. Crucially to the current argument, such limits could be altered 
by mutational enhancement, allowing the modularization of cognitive functions 
which could not be constructed with different levels of plasticity (Garofoli 2013; 
Roberts 2016).
The critical point is that the context / culture-based mechanisms currently 
adopted to explain the rise of innovations in the archaeological record are com-
plementary with and not opposed to mutational enhancement. Cognitive niche 
shaping (Watkins 2016), downward transmission of epistemically engineered 
environments (Sterelny 2011), cultural transmission augmented by demographic 
effects (French 2016), coupled with neuroplasticity can transform the mind only 
within certain limits. Mutational enhancement could thus still represent a neces-
sary condition for the emergence of some specific cognitive abilities (cf. Coolidge 
and Wynn 2005; Russell 1996), although no longer a sufficient condition, as in 
the innate modularity approach.
The view of cognitive evolution emerging from these arguments is close to 
that embraced by Cochran and Harpending (2009). The shaping of a cogni-
tive / cultural niche creates conditions of selection for neural substrates that allow 
the acquisition of adaptive cognitive functions (Lewontin 2000; Laland, Odling-
Smee, and Feldman 2000; Iriki and Taoka 2012). The Lamarckian transmission 
of the cognitive / cultural niche to further generations makes possible the durable 
selection of these substrates over time (Jablonka and Lamb 2005).
This position has remarkable implications within the current debate about 
the mechanisms of cognitive evolution. The human meta-nature could have 
been triggered by small alterations on an ancestral brain architecture (Wheeler 
and Clark 2008, 3572), which correlated with drastic changes in the innovations 
characterizing the Middle to Upper Paleolithic transition (Bar-Yosef 2002). In 
this way, metaplasticity appears, in principle, to even be compatible with those 
revolutionary models in cognitive archaeology which ascribe the Upper Paleo-
lithic revolution to discrete mutations in brain architecture (e. g., Klein 2000). 
However, models like the incremental approach (McBrearty and Brooks 2000), 
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according to which innovations slowly emerged until a threshold was reached 
that generated the illusion of a technological revolution, could also be compatible 
with the idea that some forms of mutational enhancement were running beneath 
these incremental dynamics.
However, we do not necessarily have to imagine metaplasticity, or meta-na-
ture, as a modern human feature, that abruptly or gradually emerged during 
Homo sapiens’ evolutionary history. An analysis of material culture in human 
evolution shows that humans were social beings interacting with tools much ear-
lier than the appearance of Upper Paleolithic cultures. The flaked cobbles of the 
Oldowan and early Acheulean cultures (Wynn 2002), the emergence of simple 
spears (Thieme 2005) and shelters (Gamble 1999) in some Homo heidelbergensis 
camps, the hafted weapons of Neanderthals (Mazza et al. 2006) and early mod-
erns (Wadley, Hodgskiss, and Grant 2009) and the emergence of figurative art 
in the Homo sapiens Upper Paleolithic record (Fritz and Tosello 2007) suggest 
that these different hominins were materially engaged. This does not mean that 
these species shared the same meta-nature, since they could have developed along 
alternative trajectories, constituted by different domain-relevant neural archi-
tectures, body structures and cognitive / cultural niches. Hence, these hominins 
could have realized their own metaplasticit-ies, characterized by a series of intrin-
sic constraints and idiosyncratic neural augmentations.
Conclusions: Epistemological Implications  
for Cognitive Archaeology
In the light of the considerations advanced above, the traditional approach to 
a conditional cognitive archaeology (e. g., Abramiuk 2012, 30 – 33) needs to be 
rethought. Viewing cultural innovations as the product of new innate mod-
ules allowed scholars to infer the timing for such biological changes by directly 
looking at variations within the archaeological record (e. g., Mithen 1996). The 
dynamic and emergent aspects of metaplasticity tell against this approach. Muta-
tions affecting domain-relevant properties of the brain could show effects on 
domain-specific cognitive functions only after millennia of material engagement 
and plastic rearrangements. Thus, no strict relationship exists between innova-
tion and selection of biological enhancements.
Furthermore, conditional cognitive archaeology has to shift focus from abil-
ities that are de-contextualized and static to metaplastic trajectories, highlight-
ing differences and similarities between the trajectories undertaken by differ-
ent human populations. This approach implies identifying the artifacts which 
scaffolded processes of cognitive transformation in the record, as well as the 
cognitive abilities that are minimally constrained by this transformation. The 
approach becomes much more complex when we consider the possibility that 
metaplastic trajectories could have been augmented by mutational enhancement 
(see Hutchins 2008, 2018). Conditions for the incurrence of such mutations need 
to be identified as integrated within a trajectory of change.
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In this sense, it is worth asking whether the metaplastic trajectories taken by 
Neanderthal populations prove the existence of an equivalent level of cognitive 
flexibility in this species compared with modern humans, or whether the modern 
human Upper Paleolithic trajectory strongly departs from those of the Neander-
thals (Garofoli 2013). Considering the case study discussed earlier in this chapter, 
it is possible that Neanderthals were provided only with embodied strategies of 
social cognition, or at most with a level of flexibility that allowed the construc-
tion of behavioral-contextual narratives. In this way, Neanderthals could have 
invented their body ornaments and used them to transform their social cognition 
along a trajectory that is different from that of modern humans. Perhaps, their 
metaplasticity was limited in its construction of meta-representations and full 
blown theory of mind. The minimal conditions for the presence of such abilities 
ought to be identified in Neanderthal material culture in a process of transforma-
tion similar to the one introduced here (see Mithen 2014, on similar grounds). At 
the same time, Neanderthal metaplasticity could have been equally (if not even 
more) efficient in the realm of embodied cognition, imagistic reasoning or basic 
language constructions. Thus, the potential absence of meta-representations in 
Neanderthals could have led this species to develop cognitive abilities that have 
no counterpart in modern humans. Langbroek’s (2014) idea that humans could 
have evolved different “cognitions,” is illustrated well by the existence of differ-
ent metaplasticit-ies.
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Artifacting Minds: Material Engagement Theory  
and Joint Action
Shaun Gallagher / Tailer G. Ransom
Abstract: In this chapter we argue that an account of joint or collective action should make 
explicit the dynamical relations, not just among intersubjective forces, including normative 
and institutional practices, but also among the material conditions imposed by artifacts, 
tools, media, etc. Not only do joint actions emerge at these intersections, but also vari-
ous aspects of the relevant cognitive processes (intentions, beliefs, commitments, common 
knowledge, etc.), rather than pre-existing in any complete form, emerge in the dynamical 
mix of agents, material things, and social structures. We employ Material Engagement 
Theory (MET) to explicate an account of these factors, and we show how this approach to 
joint action is consistent with an enactivist theory of cognition.
Introduction
There has been a lot of ink spilled on the topic of joint and collective action. 
Established accounts tend to ground joint actions in terms of individual agents 
with separate intentions, plus shared beliefs about the activity that is jointly 
accomplished (Tuomela 2005); or individuals with separate intentions, who form 
plural subjects together through their normative commitments to act jointly 
(Gilbert 2009); or individuals with interlocking intentions, meshing sub-plans 
and common knowledge of each other’s intention to act together (Bratman 
2009). These are just a sample of contemporary accounts of joint or collective 
action. Recently, however, efforts have been made to show how joint actions 
are possible without these strong, cognitively sophisticated preconditions which 
complicate or rule out some forms of activity such as team reasoning (Pacherie 
2012), interacting with children or other less “cognitively complicated” critters 
(Tollefsen 2005) or some simple embodied interactions with others, which do not 
need to involve anything more complicated or conceptually / representationally 
loaded than a basic dyadic interaction with joint attention directed at the relevant 
state-of-affairs (Fiebich and Gallagher 2013). In this chapter we argue that any 
account of joint or collective action should make explicit the dynamical relations, 
not just among intersubjective forces, including normative and institutional prac-
tices, but also among the material conditions imposed by artifacts, tools, media, 
etc. The idea is that not only do joint actions emerge at these intersections, but 
also various aspects of the relevant cognitive processes (intentions, beliefs, com-
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mitments, common knowledge, etc.), rather than pre-existing in any complete 
form, are constituted in the dynamical mix of agents, material things, and social 
structures.
The approach we take in this chapter fits well with a project that Lambros 
Malafouris (2013) develops under the title Material Engagement Theory (MET). 
Although Malafouris applies MET to questions about agency and intentionality, 
he does not discuss joint agency or shared intentions. We think his analysis can 
be extended to include considerations about joint actions. Our aim is to provide 
a MET analysis of joint action, and to show how this approach is consistent with 
enactivist accounts of cognition. At the very least this type of analysis will high-
light some traditionally ignored features of joint action, and we think it provides 
some innovative insights.
1. MET and the Concept of Agency
From the perspective of the philosophy of mind, MET is a non-representational-
ist version of distributed cognition, or the extended mind hypothesis (Clark and 
Chalmers 1998), and has close kinship with enactivist approaches to cognition. 
MET does not rule out representations altogether; it leaves room for external 
representations that may be the products of our practices and engagements with 
the material world, but it does not endorse an account of the mind constituted 
by internal representations of the external world. Malafouris, working within 
the perspective of archeology and anthropology, characterizes MET in terms 
of post-processual thinking, niche-construction theory, developmental systems 
theory, and Actor-Network Theory (2013, 33, 40, 123). MET is situated pri-
marily as an approach to material culture. Its purview involves, accordingly, an 
evolutionary framework with the aim of providing a deep historical account of 
how the contemporary human mind emerged out of a dynamic interplay of ana-
tomical, neurological, cultural and material forces. It also has clear application 
to philosophy of mind and cognitive science, especially in relation to  embodied 
cognition approaches. It focuses on what Edwin Hutchins (2010, 705) has 
called “cognitive ecology,” “the web of mutual dependence among the elements 
of a cognitive ecosystem” (see Malafouris 2013, 36). The elements are not just 
neural, but extend to include elements of the body and the environment. In this 
regard, however, the aim of MET isn’t just a mapping of how brains, bodies, and 
environments have co-evolved in terms of causal correlations. It also seeks “to 
discern the possible ways in which the actual nature of the relationship between 
them might have changed in the course of human evolution” (2013, 39). This 
involves what Malafouris calls “metaplasticity,” where evolutionary change is 
not explained simply in biological terms of brain plasticity, but includes the 
effects of our engagement with culture and the material environment (45 ff.). 
“MET is particularly concerned with the mechanisms that mediate those plastic 
changes, not at the level of the individual, but at the systemic level of encultura-
tion and social practice” (50).
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According to MET, the embodied mind stretches into the surrounding mate-
rial reality and consists in the interaction between brain, body, and things or 
artifacts. Malafouris provides a good example of this in his discussion of the 
Mycenaean Linear B tablets. Linear B is a script, predating the Greek alphabet, 
used to write the earliest form of Greek on clay tablets. For users of the Lin-
ear B tablets, cognitive processes incorporated certain practices made possible 
by the tablets, employing not simply the representational mnemonic function 
they served, but also the physical manipulation of the medium allowed by the 
material tablets. Such physical manipulation not only facilitated problem solving 
by a spatial (re)organizing of complex cognitive tasks but also transformed the 
physical boundaries of the problem space and thereby restructured the prob-
lem-solving process (Malafouris 2013, 72). The spatial arrangement of informa-
tion afforded by the use of clay tablets made a certain kind of cognition, which 
previously did not happen, possible. Furthermore, the detailed cultural practices 
that grew up around the production and use of such tablets contributed to a 
reorganization of knowledge. They introduced a different set of skills and affor-
dances that “radically reconfigure the cognitive ecology and the dynamics of the 
Mycenaean memory field” (81), shifting cognition into a new operation: reading. 
“The Linear B tablets, by ‘being there’ in the ‘outside’ world, enable the Myce-
naean scribe to substitute visual recognition for recall, thereby transforming the 
difficult ‘internal’ memory problem into an easier ‘external’ perceptual one” (82). 
The tablet format did this, moreover, in a way that allowed others to see the pro-
cess and to comment and improve on it. In this respect it introduced more than 
a form of epistemic environmental scaffolding, in support of intelligent action 
(Sterelny 2010); it rather introduced a kind of entanglement, which describes the 
dynamical network of co-dependent cognitive and practical relations between 
humans and material things (Hodder 2011).
We might think of these tablets as external to the cognitive system. But ‘inter-
nal’ and ‘external’ are relative terms; a material artifact, may be physically exter-
nal to the human organism, but at the same time, to the extent that it involves 
a practice, and therefore a coupling to the organism, it can be internal to the 
cognitive system (Malafouris 2013, 84; also see Aydin 2013). Importantly, in 
contrast to the emphasis on parity, isomorphism or cognitive equivalents found 
in the extended mind paradigm (Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2008), MET 
emphasizes the differences introduced into cognition, generated by differences 
among artifacts, brains and bodies, much like the productive effects one gets 
when one combines the different media of spatial hand gestures with sequen-
tial vocal speech (see McNeill 1992). The engagement with artifacts, such as the 
Linear B tablets, contributes something to the cognitive process that changes it. 
In this sense, what happens in this engagement is not a mere offloading of some 
cognitive capacity, which finds its origin first in the brain, and is then exterior-
ized onto a stable, material scaffolding. Instead we find the generation of new 
cognitive capabilities and practical affordances that emerge out of the interaction 
between the scribe and the tablet, where the dynamically intertwined features of, 
and contributions to, the system are not reducible to its individual parts.
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Moreover, things, with which we engage, from the Linear B tablets to the 
contemporary iPhone, don’t simply sit there in their materiality, but also act 
as “emotional anchors” that elicit affective and aesthetic responses. Material 
things are not simply seen; they are manipulated, exchanged, desired, “fetishized, 
revered, ridiculed, and so on” (Malafouris 2013, 87), and can have transformative, 
metaplastic effects on cognition. Accordingly, they take on additional cultural 
significance and become part of a broader “web of cultural meaning” that enables 
a range of nuanced and normative action-perception cycles.
To bring us closer to the issue of joint action, let’s consider the application 
of MET to the question of agency. On the analysis given by Malafouris, agency 
should not be considered a property of humans, or of things, but a property 
of the material engagement that involves both humans and things. He employs 
Bruno Latour’s Actor-Network Theory (ANT) to clarify this idea. On this the-
ory, actions occur in networks that include people and things without giving 
any sort of a priori privilege to the role played by one type of element as the 
supposed “prime mover” of the process (128). People don’t act outside of some 
context or simply from some de novo intention formed abstractly inside their 
mind. It is certainly true that people sometimes engage in acts of deliberations 
that one cannot simply deduce or explain from the contextual priors alone. They 
may consider different options for actions (reasons or means to realize an action) 
and search for new problem-solving strategies for specific challenges that they 
encounter in their surroundings. But this intention formation is itself shaped by 
the affordances offered by the environment – it’s a mentality shaped by the envi-
rons, which may also be guided or informed by others, and may in fact take place 
through intersubjective discussions. Accordingly, prior intentions have contex-
tual priors that explain why someone may have formed them the way they did. 
That means intention formation is embedded, not only in an individual’s life 
history, but in that individual’s relations with others, in her cultural milieu, and, 
in effect, in the world, as a phenomenologist might say. Intentions emerge in a 
world populated with artifacts, or things that do things: a speed bump that mod-
ifies any intention you may have to speed down a neighborhood street; or a cum-
bersome weight attached to a hotel room key that forces you to organize your 
intentions and actions so that you leave the key at the desk rather than carry it 
away (Malafouris 2013, 124; Latour 1991, 104). Intention formation is not some-
thing that simply happens in your head; intentions are being formed via engage-
ment with the materiality of things in the surrounding environment. Malafouris 
quotes Gell in this regard: agency is “a global characteristic of the world of peo-
ple and things in which we live, rather than an attribute of the human psyche, 
exclusively” (1998, 20; quoted in Malafouris 2013, 136).
To flesh out this idea Malafouris turns to Searle’s concept of ‘intention-in-ac-
tion’. Here we’ll adopt Pacherie’s (2006; 2007) terminology that distinguishes 
between a prior or distal (D-) intention, an intention-in-action or present (P-) 
intention, and a motor (M-) intention. At least in some cases a P-intention is 
unconnected to any D-intention. And in every case it is in the action, which is 
occurring in the world, constrained or enabled by particular artefacts that make 
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way or get in the way of the action. The agent is constantly adjusting her action 
to the physical contours and demands of the environment. The notion of the 
M-intention highlights the fact that an intention is also fully embodied insofar 
as every P-intention has to be cashed out in detailed, dynamic, mostly non-con-
scious motoric terms. Action and agency are material in the very real sense that 
they are ineliminably embodied and situated in a particular physical and artifact-
ual environment. The context of action is even wider than the immediate phys-
icality involved, however, since it is always situated in a “Background” (to use 
Searle’s term) or habitus (to use Bourdieu’s). The background / habitus should be 
considered part of the extended mind – a part that includes cultural values, skills, 
know-how, and so forth – all of which constrain the affordances presented in 
any environment.
Here we want to link up Malafouris’s account of action to the notion of affor-
dance space. This concept derives from Gibson’s notion of affordance: it defines 
a range of possibilities for action that depend on both body and environment. 
Such affordance spaces can be physical, but also social and cultural (see Brincker 
2014; Gallagher 2015).
An affordance space is defined as the (abstract) range of possibilities provided 
by any active movement in body or change in environment. An individual’s 
occurrent affordance space is defined by evolution (the fact that she has hands, 
for instance), development (her life-stage – infant, adult, aged), and by social and 
cultural practices (normative constraints) – all of which enable and constrain the 
individual’s action possibilities. The human affordance space, for example, dif-
fers from a non-human animal’s due to differences in evolution. Humans have 
hands and capacities for certain kinds of movement, and for that reason, a variety 
of cognitive possibilities are afforded and constrained by these anatomical dif-
ferences. A child’s affordance space differs from an adult’s due to differences in 
developmental factors. Humans learn to move or think in specific ways across 
developmental parameters. One individual’s affordance space differs from an- 
other’s due to differences in experience, skill level, education and normative con-
straints, etc. Humans are enabled or constrained to move or to think in particular 
ways due to their prior experiences and plastic changes in both brain and body, 
but also within the constraints of their environment.
The concept of metaplasticity is also relevant here. In this respect, it’s not just, 
as Malafouris suggests, that the affordance offered by a certain artifact can shape 
or reshape a human intention (2013, 143). Beyond that possibility, changes in 
practice, whether intentional or accidental, whether due to an agentive decision, 
or to the material particularities of the environment, may introduce modulations 
into the affordance space that, in the long term, loop back into the background, 
and change the habitus in potentially radical ways. This is still consistent with 
Malafouris’s own aim in his analysis of intention and agency, namely, that inten-
tion formation “should be understood as a distributed, emergent and interactive 
phenomenon rather than as a subjective mental state. The artifact should not be 
construed as the passive content or object of human intentionality, but as the 
concrete substantiating instance that brings forth the intentional state” (144).
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1 It’s curious that the term ‘artifacting’ is in use as a noun, but as yet does not have a dictio-
nary definition (see, e. g., https://www.wordnik.com / words / artifacting). It is used as a techni-
cal term in media-technology to mean something like an accidental trace of the technological 
apparatus or a compression that interferes with or detracts from the quality or aesthetics of the 
product. In this respect, however, it means precisely the same thing as (and may be slang for) 
the term ‘artifact,’ as when one says, for example, that we can see in the photo an artifact due to 
optical refraction or a lens effect. In this paper we are using the term ‘artifacting’ as a verb, along 
with its odd derivative adjective ‘artifacted.’
Bringing together these different concepts of distributed agency, embodied 
and situated intentions, affordance spaces, and metaplasticity, MET is consistent 
with much of the extended and also enactive conceptions of cognition. To put 
this in somewhat dramatic terms, we might say that the mind itself is an artifact – 
something made or formed in the complex mélange of bodies, material things, 
physical, social, and cultural environments, practices, backgrounds, and so forth. 
It’s not the person simpliciter who makes, or makes up, his mind; rather, the mind 
is “artifacted” at the intersection of all of these forces.1 This, however, would be 
too one-sided, since we also want to emphasize the enactive nature of cognition 
by saying that the mind is artifacting as it is engaged in the realization of actions. 
Artifacts or material items do not simply enforce, even if they constrain, specific 
actions. There is a dynamical coupling between the organism (as a self-sustaining 
system) and its environment that may sometimes assume an asymmetric struc-
ture in which one can differentiate varying degrees of active engagement and pas-
sive experiences (e. g., Di Paolo 2005). As such, the organism achieves a degree 
of autonomy that actively modifies the environment for the sake of self-mainte-
nance and adaptation.
2. METing out Joint Action
Despite claiming that agency and cognition are not the accomplishments of an 
individual agent per se, the analyses and examples offered by Malafouris are 
mostly about individuals engaged with things and environments. Intentions are 
distributed across the individual and the surrounding environment; an individual 
is driving his car over a speed bump; an individual guest is returning a key to the 
hotel desk; an individual scribe is engaged in holding a clay tablet (but not inter-
acting with an official standing next to him or the small boy in the foreground 
[this is Chadwick’s description as rehearsed by Malafouris 2013, 78]), an indi-
vidual potter is sitting at the potter’s wheel, and an individual knapper is work-
ing with the stone. To be sure, these examples lead to important and insightful 
analyses; and furthermore there is no question of MET denying the importance 
of social interaction, as Malafouris makes clear numerous times in his book. 
Given all of this we think it may be productive to look at the case of joint action 
through the lens of MET – something that may offer insights into joint action, 
and at the same time, extend MET into more intersubjective interactive settings.
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Joint action has been defined as “any form of social interaction whereby two 
or more individuals coordinate their actions in space and time to bring about a 
change in the environment” (Sebanz, Bekkering, and Knoblich 2006, 70). Con-
sider three examples of joint action.
(1) Spontaneous joint action. I’m standing next to you at a party. Music starts 
and I am so moved by the beat that I grab you and we start dancing. In this 
case there is no formation of a D-intention (for either of us); a shared P-in-
tention only starts to emerge as we continue to dance and perhaps adopt tac-
tics to avoid bumping into others. In thinking about how this joint action is 
initiated we could say that the music elicited the initial step. Maybe both of 
us were motivated by the music. The action that resulted started by shaping 
my bodily movements into a specific dance step, thereby generating an M-in-
tention, assuming that my action was not just automatic or unintentional. In 
this joint action of dancing, we are both hearing the music, but it’s not clear 
that we are jointly attending to the music in any unambiguous way. Indeed, 
it is not clear that joint attention is involved at all.
(2) Distributed joint action. You and I are currently involved in a large com-
plex action that is spatially distributed in such a way that we are not in the 
same location. Indeed, we may not even know each other. For example, we 
may be engaged in a terrorist action to blow up a significant national land-
mark. To accomplish this action we are located in two different places and 
engaged in two different sub-actions. We have the same goal and we know 
that we are acting jointly to accomplish this goal. But it’s possible that we 
belong to two different terrorist cells and are following instructions given to 
us by a third party who explains the project to us in great detail. In this case 
our shared D-intention governs our joint action, but our P- and M- inten-
tions are entirely different and distinct. In this case, there is no joint attention 
involved; indeed, since we are in different places, following different instruc-
tions and are doing different things, joint attention is not involved. Follow-
ing a set of instructions in some sense takes the place of guidance by joint 
attention. In this particular example, the joint action doesn’t even involve 
embodied intersubjective interaction.
(3) Joint action guided by joint attention. I call your attention to the bookcase 
and convince you to help me move it to the next room. Moving the book-
case is a joint action guided by a relatively abstract D-intention (to move the 
bookcase) that begins as my individual D-intention but is then shared by 
you. The most significant contribution comes from our interactive P-inten-
tions (deciding how to turn the bookcase so that it fits through the door, etc.) 
that involve an ongoing shaping of our coordinated M-intentions as we move 
the bookcase through the door, etc. In this case there is clear joint attention, 
shifting, perhaps, from bookcase, to doorway, and back.
These three examples are not meant to be exhaustive; there are many other exam-
ples of joint action that involve different intentional structures and degrees of 
joint attention.
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What can MET tell us about such joint actions? Clearly each of these joint 
actions involves material engagement and rich contexts (that can also be expli-
cated in terms of background or habitus). With respect to the various aspects of 
cognition involved, they are best characterized as extended across brains-bod-
ies-agents-environments, in ways that incorporate relevant background compo-
nents. With respect to intentions, for example, the relevant shared intentions may 
be primarily in our bodies or emerging in our actions (as in 1). Alternatively, a 
shared D-intention may be primarily a matter of communicating or instructing 
(as in 2), and is thus instantiated in other joint actions of communication, or 
even written down (or encoded) in more than one set of instructions. This type 
of arrangement may in fact characterize many of the actions, practices or rituals 
of institutions that document their goals and establish formal statements of their 
strategies. Even in the last example (3), the shared D-intention is not so much 
a similarity or identity of the mental states of two individuals; it gets shared 
through communicative means. Oftentimes a D-intention is actually formed 
through communicative means, coming into my thoughts through something 
I overheard, for example, and taking shape only when I express an incomplete 
or obscure idea that you make more precise in your communicative response. 
It’s not always clear whose idea it was to do X, because the intention was liter-
ally distributed across several individuals and shared with all of the imprecisions 
involved in communicative acts.
Both (1) and (3) involve dynamical embodied intersubjective interactions 
without which the joint action itself would not be accomplished. Dancing 
together obviously involves some degree of intersubjectively coordinated move-
ment (the degree of which will depend on the dance, from something close to 0 % 
in free form dance to something close to 100 % while dancing the tango). Indeed, 
the joint action is nothing other than this movement. Moving the bookcase also 
requires some degree of coordination of our individually embodied movements.
We note three things about these kinds of intersubjectively coordinated move-
ments. First, unless there is some kind of imitation involved, the dynamics of 
the interaction are not based on mirroring. One might imagine a form of dance 
where one partner simply imitates the other partner, but this would be some ide-
alized process (and clearly not the basis for either free form or tango). In most 
cases we cannot appeal to a purely brain-based simulation doctrine of motoric 
matching or imitation to explain how we accomplish the joint action. Our move-
ments are coordinated but also necessarily different. In moving the bookcase, 
imitation would likely defeat the purpose. We mention this because there is obvi-
ously some form of social cognition involved in these examples (that is, one agent 
understands what the other is doing, and vice versa, at least to some degree), but 
at least in (1) and (3) the social cognition is neither a form of simulation nor a 
theoretical inference. Specifically, in these cases, intentions are not hidden away 
inside the heads of the agents; they are communicated and in some sense take 
shape in the bodily movements themselves.
Second, things and environments shape the movement dynamics. This is an 
important insight that comes from MET. Joint action involves material engage-
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ment. This seems obvious in (3). The bookcase is of a certain shape, size, weight 
and material, and these properties constrain our movements. Getting the book-
case through the door may involve standing it upright and twisting it just so – 
but this entirely depends on how the bookcase is shaped, its weight relative to 
our strength, etc. Similar things can be said about the doorway – its height and 
width, where it is positioned in the room, the proximity of other walls and cor-
ners, etc. I move my arm to this grip and then move the bookcase this way pre-
cisely because I need to move it at a certain angle through a certain angle of the 
door – and this is something that has to be coordinated with you, either by some 
short speech act, or gesture, or movement itself. In fact, when moving the book-
case, some of the dynamic joint motor intentions can be coordinated without 
any direct communication between participants, but through joint attention to 
the artifact in the specific context of our project. If, for instance, I feel the book-
case start to tip slightly to the right (your left), this change is something I will 
automatically react to by changing the position of my hands or the amount of 
force I apply to one part of the bookcase or another. In this case, I counter-bal-
ance your movements (and vice versa), not because I directly attend to the motor 
dynamics of your body and the intentions that they are supposed to express, but 
rather because we attend to the bookcase and couple our movements through 
this material artifact. This project of moving and balancing immanently couples 
our movements often without the need for explicit communicative acts, and can 
be achieved simply because we jointly attend and react to the situation from 
unique, but coordinated perspectives on the same thing. In this respect, things 
and environments shape our M- and P-intentions, and the very dynamics of our 
movements. It’s also quite possible that the jointness of our action (with all the 
cognitive aspects of intention and attention) fails or dissipates temporarily and 
then quickly gets reestablished because it is supported by the structure that is 
reflected in just the way that our bodies are dynamically coupled to each other, 
to the things and to the specifics of the environment. Intentions are thus consti-
tutively formed and sustained by the whole network of social and material pos-
sibilities for a particular action in the course of its being enacted.
In this regard, one could give a much more detailed explication for these dif-
ferent kinds of coordination by means of the conceptual tools and the corre-
sponding empirical results in dynamical systems theory. These would include 
the analysis of movement patterns that reflect a combination of stability and 
variability over time, and an understanding of coordinated actions as self-orga-
nizing under constraints, such that in some cases, “individuals spontaneously 
are pulled into the orbit of another’s incidental movements,” and in some cases 
environmental constraints push coordinated joint action into being (Marsh et 
al. 2009, 322). “The dynamical perspective makes the prediction that there are 
some ‘dances we cannot do’ – whether those dances be alone or with another 
individual” (Marsh et al. 2009, 322, citing Schmidt and Richardson 2008). In this 
context there has been a significant amount of research on social synchrony that 
allows for precise predictions about what conditions will suit the coordination 
of movement in tandem with others. Studies using magnetic sensor systems have 
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shown that rhythmic movements as well as aperiodic, highly stochastic move-
ments enter into the dynamics of interpersonal coordination (Fowler et al. 2008; 
Schmidt and Richardson 2008; van Ulzen et al. 2008). Using dynamical equa-
tions, other studies have shown that individuals engaged in interactive contexts 
move in and out of coordination with significantly more time in in-phase or anti-
phase behavior than in non-coordinated states (Richardson, Marsh, and Schmidt 
2005). As Marsh et al. (2009) make clear, these processes are not driven by cen-
tralized neural or cognitive processes like simulation or those typically explained 
in game theoretic approaches; rather neural activation is entrained by the dynam-
ical processes that extend over body and environment. The MET hypothesis in 
this context is that the introduction of a significant artifact or instrument in 
the immediate environment of the joint action would alter the (intersubjective) 
dynamics and redefine that joint action.
Third, as Malafouris indicates, all of this plays out most directly in the P-in-
tentionality involved in the action. For each individual, we should consider the 
P-intention (the intention-in-action) as a dynamical process. And, precisely for 
reasons given in the previous two points, there is no coincidence of P-intentions 
between you and me as we move the bookcase, or as we dance. Accordingly, as 
Searle (1980) indicates, shared intentions-in-action may have the same goal in 
common, but they don’t necessarily have the means in common. We can make 
this an even stronger claim: they necessarily don’t have the means in common. 
For example, to move the bookcase through a certain angle, I will have to place 
my hands differently from yours. Even in dancing, my response to you will dif-
ferentiate my P-intention from yours, since you are likely responding to me in 
a different way than I am responding to you, whether in a formal tango or a lib-
ertarian free form. Even in the case where I try to imitate you, the dynamics of 
my movement (the instantiation of the P-intention in the M-intention) are nec-
essarily different given that my body has a different starting position, size, shape, 
weight, energy level, motor habit, etc. from yours. How I am going to respond, 
in micro-detail, is just as constrained by my body-schematic and affective para-
meters as our joint action is constrained by the specific material properties of the 
bookcase.
One might be tempted to say that the P-intention is constituted by the inte-
gration of bottom-up material constraints that relate to the specifics of body-en-
vironment, and top-down elements that derive from the D-intention. Two things 
may be inaccurate in this characterization, however. First, there may not be a 
D-intention in the mix of things (as in 1). Second, the D-intention has no privi-
lege in regard to material engagement. That is, a D-intention is just as constrained 
by the specifics of body-environment as the P-intention. It’s unlikely, for exam-
ple, that I will form a D-intention to invite you to join me in eating my car (to 
use an example from Malafouris). “That is so because such an intention is not 
afforded. A car might afford a variety of human intentions, some of them quite 
odd indeed, but at the same time it constrains and limits them” (2013, 143). The 
very materiality of a car limits the possibilities; moreover, such limitations and 
impossibilities are reflected in (background) cultural practices (or the absence of 
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2 A good example of this can be found in the house-building practices of the Eipomek in 
Papua New Guinea. The process starts with a general D-intention to build a house, which re-
quires a joint action by a number of participants. The size of the house will be determined by 
the actual number of men that show up to participate in the construction on the day the house is 
built. The available material and specific social practices determine other features of the house. 
With the material at hand, the Eipo men build perfectly round houses using implicit geometrical 
knowledge and concepts for which they do not possess a term, e. g., circle or metrical distance 
(Thiering 2015, 218 ff.). Thiering argues that the building process is shaped by the affordances 
of the construction material, and the processes in joint actions that reflect an embodied (situ-
ated / distributed) shared knowledge.
such practices). In that case, if one is tempted to call a D-intention a top-down 
element, one has to acknowledge that the D-intention is also determined by bot-
tom-up material constraints, and the affordance space offered by the material 
aspects of action and culture.2
The notion of affordance space also helps us to understand some important 
aspects of joint actions. Joint actions may expand or shrink the affordance space 
relative to what individuals may accomplish on their own. On the one hand, 
the expansion of the affordance space should be intuitive. Although I cannot 
move this bookcase on my own, I can move it if I can get you to help me. Our 
joint action makes possible something that was impossible via individual action. 
And although I may be able to dance alone, I can’t do the tango alone. In some 
regard, when I add my skills (strengths) to your different set of skills (strengths), 
we both may gain by expanding the affordance space to offer more possibilities. 
On the other hand, some joint actions may limit my individual affordances. If 
we decide to go for a walk together, your slower gate may prevent me from 
achieving the right level of exercise. Or my commitment to the joint action may 
prevent me from doing something else. In joint actions one often has to compro-
mise for the sake of accomplishing the goal, and such compromises can lead to a 
contraction of either or both of the individuals’ affordance spaces.
The affordance spaces defined by joint-action possibilities are not only depen-
dent on the individuals (their skill levels, strengths, weaknesses, etc.) involved, 
but on the material aspects of things, environments, and cultures. It’s precisely 
the weight and shape of the bookcase that prevents me from moving it on my 
own; and it may even take three people to move (although in most cases we sug-
gest that removing the books can solve this problem). It’s precisely the fact that 
there is a wide doorway that creates an affordance for this move. And it’s pre-
cisely the effects of the cultural background and my background reading skills 
that motivate me to keep the bookcase rather than use it as firewood. Using it as 
firewood is a possibility in our affordance space, but the fact that the bookcase 
is an original Memphis-Milano design makes it a more remote possibility. You 
would likely object to my suggestion that we burn a Memphis-Milano bookcase, 
even if it were not aesthetically pleasing to you.
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Conclusion
Although researchers are quick to admit that, for example, “studies on joint 
action challenge the assumption traditionally held in cognitive psychology that 
perception, action, and higher-level cognitive processes can be understood by 
investigating individual minds in isolation” when it comes to explaining joint 
action the focus remains on identifying the mechanisms within individuals that 
allow for its possibility, for example, the mechanisms that would “allow individ-
uals to share representations” (Sebanz, Harold, and Knoblich 2006, 70). It will 
pay to focus briefly on Sebanz, Harold, and Knoblich’s (2006) excellent review 
article on joint action because it nicely summarizes standard interpretations, but 
also points in a direction indicated by MET.
There are plenty of accounts of joint action that place the majority of emphasis 
on shared beliefs, representations, predictions, etc., that is, accounts that seemingly 
start and finish inside the subject’s head. Shared internal representations, for exam-
ple, are said to enable the initiation of coordinated action or to keep the action on 
track once engaged (e. g., Sebanz, Harold, and Knoblich 2006, 70). On such views, 
establishing joint attention, in the service of joint action, is considered to be the 
establishment of shared mental representations rather than being itself a basic joint 
action that involves movement and related bodily and environmental constraints 
(Fiebich and Gallagher 2013). Thus, standard explanations of joint action suggest 
that to be able to engage in complementary movements that contribute to the 
joint action one requires a “joint goal representation” that would suppress what is 
considered to be the default process of imitating or simulating or mirroring what 
one sees. In turn, both imitation and joint action rely upon the ability to predict or 
“infer” action goals, and to “represent the other’s task in a functionally equivalent 
way to one’s own” (Sebanz, Harold, and Knoblich 2006, 70).
When experimental subjects become participants or agents in joint action, 
however, rather than mere observers or predictors of the other’s action, research-
ers discover that the material aspects of bodies and things have an effect on joint 
action. Thus, in one experiment co-actors modify their actions depending on the 
length of the wooden board they have to grasp (acting as either an individual or as 
co-actor), and on the physical length of the other agent’s arms (Marsh et al. 2006; 
Knoblich and Jordan 2003). Thus, “pairs with large mean arm spans made the 
transition from taking turns to lifting jointly at a longer plank length than pairs 
with small mean arm spans” (Sebanz, Harold, and Knoblich 2006, 73). One might 
think, and MET certainly would propose, that the important elements modulating 
joint action in this case are the material lengths of the arms and boards involved 
in the task. A more standard interpretation, however, retreats from this view and 
takes the important elements to be the individual agent’s “beliefs” – so that actions 
are adjusted “not only by what individuals believe they can do, but also by what 
they believe they can do with others” (Sebanz, Harold, and Knoblich 2006, 73).
This seems a clear example of the different direction of analysis proposed by 
MET. According to MET, the material aspects of things (their shape and weight 
and substance) and environments (their physical and social and cultural affor-
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dances) as well as other people (their postures, movements and expressions) 
matter and enter into the constitution of joint action. Joint action is not sim-
ply action in close proximity accompanied by shared mental representations of 
goals and tasks. It’s materially constrained and materially enabled interaction 
that redefines the affordance space and allows us to do things that we could not 
do on our own.
We conclude by noting again that there are many different kinds of joint and 
collective actions. We suggest that the embodied-enactive-extended approach 
offered by MET can provide critical analyses of the more complex forms of joint 
actions that go beyond things like dancing or moving bookcases. For example, 
material artifacts afford the possibility for coordinating social forces in ways that 
might not otherwise be possible, and in this regard there are cases where specific 
kinds of material engagement can disclose new social affordances. Consider, for 
example, something like the Arab Spring or the Occupy movements, where gov-
ernments were preventing or discouraging people from gathering together in the 
same space to organize and resist. Despite this prohibition, coordinated collec-
tive activity was not only made possible through the use of social media; the form 
that activity could take was in large part enabled and constrained by the detailed 
affordances of material culture – the technology, the buildings, the places directly 
tied to cultural practices – allowing for particular kinds of social-political action 
that would have been impossible in the absence of such materially constituted 
affordances. The same kinds of material and social affordances defined the types 
of actions and sanctions (including bodily threats) utilized by government agen-
cies in response. A larger scale analysis of the overall dynamics that emerge from 
such confrontations is beyond the scope of this chapter, but we mention such 
examples to indicate at least one direction of future research.
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1 The following is largely based on the more detailed account provided in Welsch ([2012] 
2015, 715 – 735).
Bodily Changes During the Proto-Cultural Period  
and Their Ongoing Impact on Culture
Wolfgang Welsch
Abstract: The paper focuses on the importance of the protocultural period of human-
kind. During this period – extending from roughly 2.5 million years ago to 40,000 years 
ago – homo sapiens attained the characteristic constitution it still has today. In our pres-
ent basic bodily, emotional, affective and even cognitive setup we are still much the same 
as our ancestors were at the end of the protocultural period and at the beginning of the 
subsequent take-off of cultural evolution 40,000 years ago. The protocultural period has 
brought about “the innate, generic constitution of modern man” (Clifford Geertz). This 
will be explained with respect to bodily, practical, and social changes during that period. 
Our protocultural setup sustains, on a general level, all our subsequent cultural evolution 
and, in specific cases, directly inspires cultural creations.
Introduction
I want to draw attention to the importance of the proto-cultural period of human-
kind. This period extended from roughly 2.5 million years ago to 40,000 years 
ago. It was during this period that Homo sapiens attained his characteristic con-
stitution as it still persists today. We are, I suggest, in our basic bodily, emotional, 
affective and even cognitive setup still much the same as our ancestors were at the 
end of the proto-cultural period and at the beginning of the subsequent take-off 
of cultural evolution 40,000 years ago (see Welsch [2012] 2015, 715 – 735).1
The text that was most inspirational to me when developing this view was 
Clifford Geertz’ article “The Impact of the Concept of Culture on the Con-
cept of Man,” published almost 50 years ago. In this article Geertz characterized 
the proto-cultural stage as an “overlap period of cultural and biological change” 
(Geertz [1966] 1973, 48) resulting in the human constitution as we know it today. 
During this period, Geertz stated, man “quite literally created himself” (ibid.) 
by producing “the innate, generic constitution of modern man” (Geertz [1962] 
1973, 67).
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2 Genetic changes include, in particular, skin and eye color. Other alterations are a conse-
quence of agriculture. Currently immunological adjustments are taking center stage.
1. Classification of the Proto-Cultural Period
In the development towards the modern human, three stages are to be distin-
guished. It goes without saying that this division is rather schematic; future 
research may move one or the other date a bit but the overall picture that I draw 
is likely to hold water. And don’t let us ignore that in addition to individual data 
one must develop an overall picture – an account of where continuity prevails 
and where big changes take place.
The first stage began about 7 million years ago when the hominid line split 
off from the chimpanzee line, a period which lasted until about 2.5 million years 
ago when the first members of the genus Homo appeared. During this first and 
comparatively longest stage (it lasted four and a half million years, after all) sur-
prisingly little happened. The australopithecines (the various precursor forms of 
Homo) differed little from their closest relatives, the chimpanzees. Their body 
size was similar, their brain volume was barely larger, and many among them still 
spent part of their lives in trees. All this did not change for a long time.
The second stage began about 2.5 million years ago and lasted until about 
40,000 years ago. This stage I call the proto-cultural period. It was of paramount 
importance for the human constitution. At the beginning of this phase our ances-
tors were, as I said, hardly any different from the first australopithecines about 
7 million years ago. But at the end of the proto-cultural period (40,000 years 
ago), humans not only had a brain three times the size of the beginning, but were 
producing highly sophisticated weapons, figurative representations and musical 
instruments. During this period (between 2.5 million years and 40,000 years ago) 
the crucial development must have occurred that transformed the human animal 
into a fully-fledged human being.
Finally, the third stage – that of cultural evolution – began about 40,000 years 
ago and extends to the present day. During the proto-cultural period there was 
an interplay of biological evolution and cultural innovation. While increasing 
their cultural activities, people also underwent biological and genetic modifica-
tions. Crucially, this no longer occurs during cultural evolution. Now the devel-
opment is primarily cultural with barely any biological or genetic alterations.2
How did the proto-cultural changes come about, and what did they consist in?
2. Proto-Cultural Changes
a. Physical changes
Firstly, physical changes occurred. Upright walking was perfected, the hand was 
refined, body size increased considerably (while Homo habilis, about 2.1 million 
years ago, was little taller than 1 meter, Homo erectus, only 300,000 years later, 
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3 Hairlessness is not, as previously supposed, an adaption to climate change (in this case our 
ancestors would, in the first place, have been obliged to reduce their head hair instead of rein-
forcing it) but a result of sexual selection. Hair growth reduction became attractive as a means 
to visibly distinguish ourselves from our closest apish relatives. In mating, those candidates 
were preferred who matched this new human fashion – which entailed a spread of hairlessness 
in the genome of our ancestors. In this way, an aesthetic inclination generated a new distinctive 
human feature. One might add: it is an aesthetic phenomenon insofar as our hairlessness is only 
a visual appearance. In fact, human bodies possess as many or even more hairs than many pri-
mate species, it’s just that our hairs have in most cases become so unremarkable that the optical 
illusion of hairlessness or nakedness arises (see Menninghaus 2003, 88). Gender-specific varia-
tions (stronger hair and especially beard growth in men) are to be seen as strategies of gender 
distinction (dimorphism).
4 In humans the neocortex accounts for about three quarters of the brain weight.
5 A comparison with rats (with whom, after all, we share 90 percent of our genome) makes 
the amount of change evident. In rats, the ratio of external to internal communication is (con-
versely to our case) 90:10 (cf. Storch, Welsch, and Wink 2001, 375). The quantitative reversal of 
measured up to 1.80 meter). And by reducing their body hair (whilst reinforcing 
their head hair), humans have increasingly disassociated themselves from their 
closest relatives, the great apes.3 Changes occurred in the area of sexuality too: 
males lost their penis bones, female breasts became sexualized, a-fronte prac-
tices began to replace the conventional a-tergo practices, and in this context not 
only the sense preferences changed dramatically but, as Freud suspected, human 
sexuality altogether was forever “heavily damaged” (Freud [1930] 1974, 234n4)
Humans’ external appearance and essential practices changed significantly 
during the proto-cultural period. As products of this period we are clearly dis-
tinguished from our animal relatives as well as from our hominid ancestors.
b. A Brain Beyond Comparison
The human brain also changed considerably during the proto-cultural period. 
First, there was a rapid increase in volume: from about 400 cubic centimeters 
in the early australopithecines to more than 600 cm3 in Homo rudolfensis (the 
first species of Homo, about 2.5 million years ago), then notably to Homo erec-
tus (before about 1.8 million years) with almost 1000 cm3, and to Homo sapiens 
(200 – 150,000 years ago) with more than 1200 cm3 – an increase by a factor of 3 
over 2.5 million years.
But the increase in size (caused mainly by the growth of the neocortex4) is 
only one thing; at least as important are the structural changes which occurred 
over that time. It was during the proto-cultural period that the basic configura-
tion of the human brain developed that is still characteristic of our brains. The 
human brain turned increasingly into an apparatus of self-reference. The rela-
tionship between external and internal functions of the brain shifted more and 
more in favor of the latter. At the end of this period, only 10 percent of cortex 
volume served outer reference (perception and motor skills), while 90 percent 
served inner reference (internal coordination processes) (cf. Storch, Welsch, and 
Wink 2001, 375).5
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the ratio in humans amounts to a qualitative leap. In human evolution it was probably above all 
the prefrontal lobe and the rear associative cortex that grew disproportionally compared to the 
primary sensorimotor structures (cf. Preuss 2001, 154 f., 2000, 1223 – 25). It is also noteworthy 
that the overall genetic similarity between humans and chimpanzees (more than 98 percent) 
applies much less to the brain. In the course of human evolution, gene expression patterns con-
cerning the brain have changed significantly more than those in chimpanzees: about 5.5 times 
as much (By contrast, there exist no such changes in other cells e. g., liver or blood cells [Pääbo 
et al. 2002, 341]). This is a further indication of how important brain modifications were in the 
course of hominization.
6 To be sure, this growth of reflectivity already began with the great apes, but in humans it 
has reached an unparalleled extent.
7 “His [man’s] large and efficient brain is a consequence of culture as much as its cause. He 
does not have a culture because he has a large brain; he has a large brain because several million 
years ago his little-brained ancestors tried the cultural way to survival. Of course, the correct 
way to view this is a feedback process . . . The cultural things themselves propelled him into get-
ting a larger brain” (Fox 1991, 283 f.). Already in 1966 Clifford Geertz had stated: “Between the 
cultural pattern, the body, and the brain, a positive feedback system was created in which each 
shaped the progress of the other” (Geertz [1966] 1973, 48).
The extent of this imbalance becomes fully clear when one looks at the 
number of neural connections instead of the ratios of volume. Of the roughly 
1014 connections in our brain only every ten millionth serves purposes of exter-
nal communication, whereas all others serve purposes of internal communication 
(Spitzer 2002, 52). Thus the internal communication paths outweigh those of 
external communications by the enormous ratio of 107 : 1. Each external con-
nection is counterbalanced by 10 million internal connections! Our brain is pre-
dominantly an apparatus for self-reference. We humans are world champions 
of internal communication, of reflection in the broadest sense. Herein lies the 
unique feature of the human brain.6
3. Tool Development and New Social Requirements  
as the Driving Factors
How did this brain configuration come about? Basically through feedback 
processes between brain development on the one hand and the human activi-
ties made possible by it on the other. The brain did not just grow on its own, 
like a tumor. Neither the increase in its size nor the growth in its self-refer-
entiality were results of an autonomous process, so to say a greenhouse of the 
skull. Instead the human brain has evolved via feedback from the activities it 
afforded. The increased performance of the enlarged brain enabled new activities; 
to master these amounted to a selective advantage, which in turn reinforced the 
increase. Thus, brain optimization and activity development have continually 
provoked each other.7
Two types of cultural activity were particularly important for this: the devel-
opment of tools and new requirements of social life.
Clearly indicative of the connection between brain development and tool 
development is their synchrony. The oldest tools date back to around 2.6 million 
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 8 The Oldowan-tools were found in Ethiopia.
 9 Sometimes there is even a directly proportional correlation between the size of the group 
and the size of the cortex (the part of the brain that is responsible for the intelligent processing 
of information). While the typical group size is 50 members in chimpanzees, it is 150 members 
in hunter-gatherer populations – which corresponds perfectly to the fact that the human brain 
has about three times the size of a chimpanzee brain.
10 It is in this context that the emergence of human language or proto-language should be 
considered. It certainly helped increase the associative-reflective abilities to a remarkable ex-
tent. However, we know to date very little about the evolution of language – almost nothing. 
Already the Australopithecines and Homo habilis showed an increase in Broca’s area (which, in 
humans, is responsible for syntactic language), but this does not entail that they used language 
(presumably their vocal apparatus was not yet sufficiently developed for that). Moreover, even 
in chimpanzees and orang-outangs an increase occurred in those parts of the brain where our 
language centers reside: Broca’s area (for syntax) and Wernicke’s area (for semantics). Damage to 
these parts of the brains in apes results in disturbance of their vocal communication. It appears 
that the human ability to speak rests on a prehuman prototype. The most common hypothesis 
concerning the origin of verbal language is that it was first developed (as a proto-language) by 
Homo erectus (about 1.8 million years ago). The formation of syntactic language may have oc-
curred only 50 – 40,000 years ago.
years ago,8 just when a significant enlargement of the brain occurred. The steps 
in brain development which followed were likewise associated with advances in 
tool technology, both in Homo habilis, who was the first to chip sharp-edged 
pieces from stones (thus the suffix “the skillful” – habilis), and in Homo erectus, 
who developed an intensified culture of tools.
It is perfectly understandable that tool techniques require reflective skills. The 
perception of an encountered object as a tool already requires the re-interpreta-
tion of that object from the perspective of an internal purpose. Likewise its trans-
formation into a better tool (such as in the production of bifaces) requires antic-
ipatory imagination and an assessment of one’s operations in comparison with 
one’s goal. And the production of completely novel tools (such as spears, bows 
and arrows) again requires a high degree of internal reflection: first the draft of a 
new possibility, then the equally internal calculation of the means to achieve this 
goal. All these operations are essentially based on internal, reflective processes.
In addition to new tool technologies, new social demands promoted the 
increase in reflectivity. Already in the animal kingdom we notice a correlation 
between brain size and social life: animals living in large groups generally have 
more brain mass than those who interact with only a few conspecifics.9 During 
the proto-cultural period human social life became more and more complex 
and so required an increase in reflection. Conventionally, humans had already 
learned to master the understanding of intentions and states of consciousness of 
conspecifics. Now, however, they developed new social rules (division of labor, 
group privileges, initiation rites, etc.) and new practices (building huts, strategies 
for hunting, tanning of animal skins, etc.) for which they did not possess genetic 
programs, but which needed a brain capable of learning. Thus a pressure of social 
selection emerged in favor of learning and reflectivity. In this way social life, too, 
has contributed to the optimization of the brain.10
In short: the proto-cultural progress of both tool technology and social com-
plexity fostered reflective capacities. Through a continuous feedback between 
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11 Before that date Homo sapiens had already spread beyond Africa, about 100,000 years 
ago to Israel, about 60,000 years ago to East Asia and about 45 to 40,000 years ago to Europe 
(Cro-Magnon) (see Mithen 1996, 172 f.). But in each of these lines, and independently of each 
other, a transition to cultural evolution occurred around 40,000 years ago.
12 It is similar to Uranium: If one accumulates Uranium 233, up to about 12 kg not much 
happens, but once one reaches 15 kg, an unstoppable chain reaction breaks out. One might 
imagine the explosion of cultural evolution in a similar manner. The initially slow increase in 
proto-cultural goods and activities gained momentum, accelerating to the point where it reached 
a critical mass: the take-off of cultural evolution.
activity innovation and brain optimization, the extremely reflective and efficient 
brain that is typical of humans emerged. The specificity of the human brain (the 
overwhelming dominance of internal, reflective functions over external, stimu-
lative functions) is a result of the proto-cultural development. And, as we shall 
soon see, an extremely momentous result at that.
4. The Dynamics of Proto-Cultural Development  
before the Take-Off of Cultural Evolution
Let us take a brief look at the dynamics of proto-cultural development. In the 
beginning (2.5 million years ago) the number and importance of proto-cultural 
inventions and achievements was still low. But slowly these grew and became 
increasingly important for survival in nature and against competitors. Thus a 
selection pressure developed which managed such capacities and encouraged fur-
ther ones.
In this way, over time, the balance between natural and cultural virtues shifted 
towards the latter. Previously, only physical assets had been decisive for the suc-
cess of individuals and groups. When hunting, for example, the faster was the 
more successful. But now the slower could compensate for his physical handicap 
with a more sophisticated strategy. The physical virtues were increasingly con-
fronted by cultural and intellectual advantages. These represented a new kind of 
power and created chances for physical underdogs to gain the upper hand.
In the course of this development, the efforts of early humans shifted more 
and more to proto-cultural achievements. These became the decisive factors of 
success in the competition between different groups and between different indi-
viduals within the same group. Proto-cultural advancement was augmented, 
and investment in proto-cultural achievements (inventions, learning processes) 
became key – both for the group and the individuals. Proto-cultural stocks grew 
faster and faster, shifting into an acceleration phase.
It is foreseeable that eventually a point will be reached, in evolutionary terms, 
from which only cultural innovation can lead any further (Biological optimi-
zation, which takes a long time, would now be simply too slow). This point 
was actually achieved about 40,000 years ago.11 At that time the proto-cultural 
acceleration passed over into the take-off of a new type of evolution, of cultural 
evolution. The arrow of culture was released from the bow of proto-culture.12
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13 By analogy with Kant’s claim that “the critical path alone is still open” (Kant [1781] 1965, 
668 f., A 856).
14 These are bone flutes – the oldest specimen (to date) was found in 1995 in Slovenia.
15 Currently the oldest find is a human figure made from a mammoth tusk (discovered near 
Kostenski, about 400 km south of Moscow).
16 They date back to around 37,000 years ago.
17 The paintings in Chauvet could be 30,000 years old, those at Lascaux may have originated 
17,000 years ago.
18 The Neolithic Revolution occurred (like the earlier turn to cultural evolution) inde-
pendently in the Middle East, in Africa, in China, in America and in Europe (there relatively 
late, in Central Europe only in the 6th century BC).
Humanity entered a new evolutionary mode. Long before, in the time of the 
australopithecines, everything had moved along the paths of natural evolution; 
subsequently, during the proto-cultural period, there was an interplay of bio-
logical and cultural development; now, however, humanity crossed the Rubicon 
towards an exclusively cultural evolution. A new mode of transmission became 
the order of the day: learning and tradition-building instead of genetic transfer; 
and the previously occasional invention of cultural achievements shifted into the 
cumulative mode of cultural evolution (see Tomasello 1999, 37). From now on, 
the cultural path alone was open.13
To briefly indicate its main stages: in Europe, the take-off of cultural evolu-
tion led to the Upper Paleolithic Revolution (45,000 to 30,000 years ago) with 
its gigantic explosion of creativity, where the first musical instruments14 and the 
earliest statues (human and animal figures) emerged,15 but also new tools (narrow 
blade technology) and highly refined weapons (balanced spears and harpoons) 
were developed,16 soon followed by the first cave paintings (Chauvet, Lascaux).17 
The next big step was taken with the Neolithic Revolution in the Middle East 
more than 10,000 years ago, when agriculture began, cities were founded and a 
sedentary life form replaced that of hunter-gathering.18 Finally, about 6000 years 
ago, the stage of advanced civilizations which extends to the present day began.
5. The Emergence of Culture from Nature and Proto-Culture
In short, proto-culture first emerged from nature, and then culture from pro-
to-culture. For this to occur, nothing had to be added from the “outside.” Pro-
to-culture developed from natural beginnings, and culture emerged through the 
increasing dynamics of proto-culture.
This explanation dispenses with the crux of older theories – the recourse to 
an external factor supposedly responsible for the foundation of culture. The 
old dichotomous thinking – nature versus culture – had necessitated such an 
assumption. Today, however, we can understand how culture de facto emerged 
from nature via the mediating pivot of proto-culture. Culture did not origi-
nate through some disruption or through the influence of higher forces; it has 
emerged step by step from nature and proto-culture.
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19 To be sure, proto-culture already exists in the animal kingdom. Some higher animals have 
developed practices that one could hardly not describe as proto-cultural. Examples are the use 
and production of tools, forms of social organization, efficient ways of communication, aes-
thetic practices, and the emergence of cultural diversity. This occurrence of proto-culture in the 
animal kingdom is not surprising at all. It is generally the case that we find nothing completely 
new in the human sphere. Everything exists in weaker form already in other animals – and the 
closer they are to us, the more the traits crucial to us have already undergone an increase in 
their evolution. We make the most of the prehuman talents bequeathed to us. It is just that our 
relatives stopped in their proto-cultural activities at a relatively modest level. As far as one can 
see, nowhere in the animal kingdom did an acceleration get under way that would have lead to a 
take-off of culture in the emphatic sense. This has only happened in human evolution.
20 Certainly the environment – especially the cultural environment – plays an important 
role during epigenetic development. A Stone Age brain was not capable of inventing the theory 
of relativity during the Stone Age, it could do so only in the social cognitope of highly sophis-
ticated modern physics. The brain is not just a biological but also a social entity. But the basic 
configuration of the apparatus which is capable of all the subsequent cultural achievements was 
developed in the Stone Age and is no different today than it was then. Wolf Singer has expressed 
this relationship between ancestral hardware and cultural software as follows: if a Stone Age 
baby were to grow up in our civilization, it would look the same and achieve the same learning 
results as our children; conversely, were a baby from the 21st century to grow up in a Stone Age 
culture, it would be indistinguishable from genuine Stone Age children (cf. Singer 2002, 44).
6. The Great Importance of the Proto-Cultural Development
Let me once again underscore the great importance of the proto-cultural develop-
ment. It has created our – physical as well as intellectual – nature, the nature which 
everyone still bears within himself. It has made us the special beings we are – from 
physical characteristics such as baldness and upright walking via our behavior in 
sexual and social life through to the unique brain configuration that has become 
vital for our existence as learning and cultural beings. And lastly, the proto-cul-
tural development even fired the starting pistol for cultural evolution. One can 
hardly overestimate its importance. The proto-cultural development accom-
plished the transition from the human animal to a fully-fledged human being.19
a. Cultural Evolution Still Rests  
on Proto-Culturally Formed Human Nature
The whole of cultural evolution is based on the human constitution as it was 
achieved at the end of the proto-cultural period. Since then our genetic setup has 
hardly changed. We are still born as stone-age babies.
At the same time, this makes clear how great and eminently powerful our pro-
to-culturally accumulated capital was: it was good enough to carry all future cul-
tural evolution. From the first works of art to Picasso, from the invention of writ-
ing to the internet, from the pyramids to moon landing, people have been able to 
produce their cultural achievements with the help of their proto-cultural set-up. 
Einstein invented the theory of relativity on the basis of a Stone Age brain.20
In particular it was the brain-configuration reached at the end of the pro-
to-cultural development which has made possible not only the leap into cultural 
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21 This once again throws light on the aforementioned congruence between the end of the 
genetic modification of humans and the beginning of cultural evolution. This simultaneity is 
no coincidence but a congruence on both sides. Through proto-cultural development, humans’ 
biological setup had become good enough to support the entire future cultural evolution. And 
conversely, it belongs to the nature of cultural evolution to have only very little genetic retroac-
tion and to rely instead on cultural continuity and progress.
22 In the meantime, similar sequences have been demonstrated for the classification of plants 
and animals (cf. Brown 1991, 14).
23 On aesthetic universals, see especially Welsch (2012, 292 – 330).
24 Darwin already emphasized the “similarity, or rather identity” of humans in their elemen-
tary skills and behavior: One could “hardly fail to be deeply impressed with the close similarity 
between the men of all races in tastes, dispositions and habits” (Darwin [1871] 1981, 232).
evolution but also all the extraordinary achievements during its course. Through 
proto-culture the treasure of our nature blossomed, and culture is acting it out.21
b. Universals: Continuing Witnesses  
to the Proto-Cultural Level of Development
We can easily verify our proto-cultural imprint by looking at details of our emo-
tional life, our aesthetic assessments and our cognitive activities. The keyword 
here is “universals.” These universals are firmly connected with human nature as 
it was attained at the end of the proto-cultural period – and they are still effec-
tive across otherwise existing cultural differences, precisely because that nature 
is common to all humans (see Welsch [2012] 2015, 731 – 734).
During the heyday of cultural relativism, the existence of universals was sys-
tematically denied. Since then, hard scientific evidence has emerged to refute 
such relativism. Brent Berlin’s and Paul Kay’s study on Basic Color Terms from 
1969 was groundbreaking (Berlin and Kay 1969). The authors showed that the 
members of different cultures, even when dividing the color spectrum according 
to the number of color words their language possesses (the number ranges from 
two to eleven), give amazingly matching answers when asked which color sample 
(from about 300) best represents a color type for which they have a word. Thus 
the phenomenal experience of color is not culturally determined, but universal. 
Berlin and Kay found, furthermore, that the sequence of the appearance of color 
words is by no means arbitrary. If a language has only two color words, these are 
always white and black; the third one is always red; the fourth is either green or 
yellow, and the fifth yellow or green; followed by blue and brown; and only at 
the end come purple, pink, orange and gray. There are hard universals for phe-
nomenal judgments and linguistic (incidentally, also phonological) sequences.22
In addition, universals exist in the relation of facial expression to basic emo-
tions, the understanding of elementary gestures, and to some aesthetic pref-
erences.23 All these universal features are anchored in the still persistent pro-
to-cultural nature of all humans.24 To express it in a take home message: what is 
universal, is proto-cultural; what is not, is cultural.
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25 “It is the emotional displays on the generic side of the ledger that the mass arts gravitate 
toward – such as fear, elation, sadness, anger, surprise, lust, and so on. This is the stuff upon 
which mass art thrives, as a quick review of the most popular motion pictures attests. Mov-
ing-image mass art is able to convey, to a significant degree, this emotional information so 
effectively to large and diverse audiences of heterogeneous backgrounds because of its reliance 
on close-ups of faces, something that within a certain range of emotional expressions, ones par-
ticularly germane to the territory mass art cultivates, audiences can comprehend in large part by 
dint of their innate biological equipment” (Carroll 2004, 104).
c. The Ongoing Impact of our Proto-cultural Nature  
on our Cultural Existence
Our basic proto-cultural nature will certainly be refined (sometimes also twisted) 
in epigenetic and cultural processes. But it supports and determines us from the 
ground up. It provides our possibilities – and sets certain limits. To take a prac-
tical example, just try to produce, whenever you feel joy, the expression of sad-
ness, and vice versa. With some effort you may succeed for a short time, but you 
will then begin to feel a deep inner confusion, and the experiment is best stopped 
before you end up in a mental hospital. It is wise to trust these old routines rather 
than delve too deep into them – otherwise our cultural activity breaks down.
Proto-cultural achievements not only tacitly support all our cultural activity, 
but sometimes even explicitly come to the fore. For example, when Renaissance 
art introduced perspective, it did not invent perspectival seeing (this had been 
successfully practiced from time immemorial) but only raised this age-old habit 
to its representational principle; it switched from the hitherto culturally pre-
dominant pattern of the self-being of things to the phylogenetically much older 
perspectival perception of things in space – and was thus able to create wonderful 
paintings which we feel closer to than previous iconic representations. Here an 
age-old proto-cultural invention was culturally brought to bear; the recourse to 
ancient stock gave culture a new direction. And this holds true for other innova-
tions in the arts, such as impressionism or op-art: each draws on old practices of 
everyday perception, making them explicit.
Contemporary mass media is another example: they widely rely on the pro-
to-culturally bred ability to decipher facial expressions. Hence the many close-
ups of faces in film and television, which convey important information, and 
do so independently of specific languages and cultures, by making recourse to 
universally shared age-old patterns of understanding.25
These are just a few examples of the impact of proto-cultural achievements on 
our cultural existence. We often understand the latter better when we take their 
proto-cultural grounding into account.
I am not saying that all cultural phenomena could be sufficiently explained by 
pointing out their proto-cultural contents. That would be an erroneous claim. 
But some traits of cultural phenomena do have proto-cultural explanations.
With respect to our evolutionary heritage, I suggest, a fundamental change of 
thinking, a reorientation in contrast to deep-seated habits is needed. Our biolog-
ical and proto-cultural preconditions are not something dubious that we would 
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better leave behind. On the contrary, they are productive potentials which 
enabled everything which was to come. Their vector points forward as well as 
backwards. As our proto-cultural nature once allowed the emergence of culture, 
so it still provides us with the energy to continue the path of culture. Cultural 
evolution has not occurred against the grain of our biological nature, but grew 
out of it, and its subsequent course unfolds that nature’s potentials rather than 
choking them off. We should cherish this potential in its proto-cultural as well 
as cultural form.
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